文献翻译-博弈论的方法对土地和房地产开发过程分析

原文：A game theory approach to the analysis of land and property development processesLand and property development processes obviously can be seen as a social situation in which the interaction of individuals or groups of individuals is one of the essential elements. To study and understand social situations, it is important to analyse how the decisions of actors are interrelated and how those decisions result in outcomes. In this paper, we propose a game theoreticalmodelling approach to analyse it. Hence, the objective of the paper is to investigate the usefulness as well as the limitations of game theoretical modelling for analysing and predicting the behaviour of actors in decision-making processes with respect to the development of land and property. For that purpose,we have developed gamemodels for the case study of the development of a greeneld residential location in the Netherlands with respect to the implementation of new Dutch legislation on cost recovery. Our study demonstrates that game theory could help us to identify the key strategic decisions of land and property development projects by showing the different payoffs for stakeholders of their chosen strategies and selecting the equilibrium in which all stakeholders involved are best of. We also found many limitations of using game theory in our case study especially regarding the assumptions underlying the model. However, we conclude that game theoretical modelling can be a useful decision support tool in spatial planning, because it provides a way to think about the complexity of strategic interaction and, in particular, about the conicting structure of collective decision-making processes.First, we must dene the possible strategies for the municipalities to develop a greeneld location for residential use within the Dutch context. The municipality usually takes the initiative for greeneld residential developments. To make sure that the plan is implemented, municipalities often decide to take part in the land development process. This approach is called active land policy and is referred to as the public development model, which means that the municipality acquires all the land to be developed, services the land, readjusts the parcels into building plots suitable for the desired development and after that releases them to builders/developers and end users. This public development model is also often used in situations that private developers have already acquired land on the location with the intention to build houses. The private developers usually agree to sell their unserviced land to the municipality without trying to make prots. In return, they hold a building claim to the municipality that guarantees them the rst right to buy the serviced land, against prices that have been agreed upon before they sold the unserviced land. This model is usually referred to as the building claim model. This approach excludes competitors from the development and ensures the private developer a high-quality location for protable housing development.An often used alternative development strategy to the public land development model is a land development model based on a public private partnership between the municipality and some of the private developers that have acquired land on the location. The advantage of this model for both the public and the private actors is that they can share nancial risks and expertise. In this model, the public and private stakeholders involved establish a joint venture land development company which takes over the role of the municipality in the public development model.The main reason for adopting an active land policy with respect to the development of greeneld sites (public or public private partnership model) is that municipalities can exert more inuence on the spatial development process compared to the situation in which they adopt a facilitating land policy. Moreover, municipalities will also have an opportunity to gain some prots from the development even though it is not their main purpose. In some situations, however, it appeared to be impossible for the municipality to acquire all land. Some of the land-owning private developers did not agree with the public or publicprivate model and aimed for private development of the part of the location that is owned by them. Some of them also refused to contribute to the costs of plan related infrastructure and public space development. They are considered as free riders. Municipalities were lacking the legal tools to require a nancial contribution to plan-related costs (cost recovery) from those free riders. This has resulted, for some municipalities, in serious problems with cost recovery of public investments in public land development processes.By making use of game theory, we have analysed stakeholders strategic behaviour in land and property development processes. To investigate the usefulness of game theory for modeling decision-making processes in land and property development processes, we have built a game theoretical model of a typical greeneld residential development in the Netherlands concerning the implementation of newDutch legislation on cost recovery. Our study has demonstrated that game theory helps to identify the key strategic decisions to bemade in this type of development projects, shows the different payoffs, in relative terms, for stakeholders of their chosen strategies and enables to select the equilibrium situations in which all stakeholders are best of. However, we are also aware that the case study, in its present form, still contains many limitations. In this nal section we discuss the problems that must still be solved to increase the attractiveness of game theory for decision support with respect to land and property development. First, as long as the strategies of the stakeholders in the model are not based on empirical data, the usefulness of the outcomes for decision support is only limited. However, it is certainly possible to validate the preferences of the stakeholders, for instance by making use of stated preference techniques.Moreover, the outcomes of the game can also be tested by playing the game with real stakeholders or experts in a laboratory situation.Second, initially game theory assumes that the players possess complete information about the strategies of the other players. This assumption underlies ourmodel aswell. It implies that each player knows the strategies and the payoff functions of the other players. Unfortunately, in practice, stakeholders do usually not hold complete information about the strategies and payoff functions of the other players. Moreover, stakeholders may withhold information for strategic use. This reduces of course the usefulness of the outcomes of the model as presented here. However, games with incomplete information (the strategies or payoff functions of one or more players are unknown or partially known), imperfect information (a player does not know for sure where he stands in the game) or asymmetric information (some players are better informed than others) are more and more studied, especially in microeconomics. An alternative approach which applies to games in strategy form is to repeat a game several times through time. This will give the players the opportunity to learn and to adapt their strategies accordingly. This is also meaningful in the case of incomplete information: starting with incomplete information in the beginning of the game, the players will collect information during repeatedly playing the game. They then will be able to learn rationally and update their conjectures about the other players strategies and payoff functions by observing the other players behaviour. Even in the case of conicting optimal strategies of the stakeholders, repeated games would give the stakeholders the opportunity to adjust their strategies to the strategies of other stakeholders. Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993) revealed that rational learning in repeated games eventually can lead the game to reach the equilibrium.Another limitation regarding game theory is its notion of rationality with respect to the behaviour of the players. This notion also underlies our model. Of course, the assumption that individuals act perfectly rational may never match a real-life situation. However, recent developments and experimentation in game theory pay more attention to behavioural aspects of the player, including bounded rationality, emotions and intuitive decision-making. It can be used in further research to increase the reliability of the model.Finally, the application of game theoretical modelling to complex decision-making processes like in land and property development processes, involves, by denition, the simplication of reality in the model. There are much more coincidental events involved and much more linkages between types of actors (e.g., informal relations between stakeholders) andmixed types of actors in reality. One example of this simplication problem is the path dependency of the tree. In our model, we have assumed that the municipality will start the tree, but it is also possible in a real-life situation that other stakeholderswill start the treewhichwill probably lead to different outcomes. Although we believe that more complexity can be built in, game theoretical models like any other model are always an abstraction of reality. However, these presumed weaknesses can also be seen as strength, as modeling exercises are often used in other research elds as decision support tools. In general, models coerce the accuracy of argument. Models force the modellers to be explicit in expressing the assumptions, and in arriving at conclusions by deduction. They have to showhow a particular conclusion derives from certain assumptions. The game models in this paper are able to capture the logic of the process of land and property development. Furthermore, models help us to discipline and formalize intuition. Intuition, undoubtedly, is central to any understanding, including in modelling. However, intuition alone is not reliable. Although the results of many models agree with our intuition, not all intuitions can be supported by models. Game theoretical modelling can be one of the tools for exploring the strategic logic of situations. It forces us to be specic about the characteristics of conicting situations.The specic advantage of game theory in formal modelling is its focus on strategic interaction and conict in collective decision making processes. It naturally leads us to consider the individual strategic decisions and their interdependency in relation to collective outcomes. In addition, game theory provides a way to think about the complexity of strategic interaction and, in particular, about the conicting structure of collective decision-making processes. When the game is constructed, the choices of the players and their consequences are specied as demonstrated in this study. That specication is a representation of a conicting structure. Different players want different things, opt for different outcomes. A game tree is an expression of rules about how to play a game and structures in this way the conict among the players. Different sets of rules will, ceteris paribus, lead to different games and hence to different structuring of social conict. This structural variation in games may help us understand the consequences of social conict in collective decision-making processes. In sum, we strongly believe that game theory, compared to alternative modelling techniques, offers a promising approach for modelling land and property development processes, because it takes account of the complexity of the process and the assumptions in the model can be validated empirically.Referrence1 Adams, D., May, H.G., 1991. Active and passive behaviour in landownership. UrbanStudies 28, 687705.2 Alexander, C., 1965. A city is not a tree. Architectural Forum 122 (1), 5861.3 Aumann, R.J., 1989. Lectures on Game Theory. Underground Classics in Economics Westview Press, Boulder.4 Berkman, H.G., 1965. The game theory of land use determination. Land Economics 41 (1), 1119.5 Camerer, C.F., 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press, Princeton.6 Colman, A., 1999. Game Theory and its Applications: In the Social and Biological Sciences. Routledge, London.7 Elster, J., 1982. Marxism, functionalism and game theory. Theory and Society 11 (4), 453482.8 Fudenberg,D., Levine,D.K., 1993. Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 61, 547573.译文：博弈论的方法对土地和房地产开发过程分析土地及物业发展进程，显然可以视为一种社会情况。在这种情况中，个人或群体中的个人之间的互动是关键的要素之一。分析行动者的决策是怎样相互联系的，以及这些决定是如何导致最终的结果，对于研究和了解社会情况是非常重要的。在本论文中，我们提出了一个博弈理论的模型来分析它。因此，文件的目的是调查博弈理论的模型在分析和预测行动者在土地及物业发展方面的决策行为的实用性以及局限性。为此，我们建立了一个博弈模型用于荷兰的一个未开发的居住地点于荷兰新发布的收回成本的立法的个例研究。我们的研究表明，博弈论可以通过显示不同的股东在不同的策略下所得的收益以及选择对每个股东利益最大化的均衡，来帮助我们识别土地及物业发展项目的关键战略决策。我们也发现在案例研究使用博弈模型的局限，尤其是这个模型的一些基本假设。不过，我们认为博弈理论模型可以成为空间规划的一个有用的决策支持工具，因为它为思考战略互动的复杂性，特别是集体决策过程中冲突的结构的思考提供了一种思路。首先，我们必须以荷兰被背景，规定市政府为住宅开发新的土地的可能的策略。市政当局通常在开发住宅土地中采取主动。为了确保该计划的实施，市政当局往往决定博弈土地开发过。这种方法称为主动的土地政策，也叫做公共发展模式，这意味着市政当局要求所有土地都得到开发和服务，重新调整建筑用地用于开发的分配，并且在之后分配给建筑商/开发商和最终用户。当个体开发商已经在该区域得到土地并打算建造房屋时也可以用到这个公共发展模式。个体开发商通常会同意把无公用设施的土地出售给市政当局，不收取利润。作为回报，市政当局保证他们有优先购买具有公用设施土地的权力，不管在开发商出售他们土地之前所商定的价格。这种模式通常被称为建筑索要模型。这种方法不包括开发的竞争对，并确保个体开发商拥有用于营利的商品房开发的高品质的位置。一个经常使用的替代发展战略，以公共用地的发展模式是一个土地开发模式为公众之间的直辖市，并认为已经取得土地的位置私人发展商一些私人伙伴关系的基础。此为公营和私营行为者模型的优点是，它们可以共享的金融风险和专业知识。在此模型中，公共和私人利益相关者成立合资公司，土地开发在全市的公共发展模范作用需要。采用有关新居住区开发（公共或公私营合作模式）的积极的土地政策的主要原因是因为与推进式土地政策相比，市政当局可以在空间发展进程中产生更大的影响力。此外，市政当局也将有机会获得从开发中获利，尽管这不是他们的主要目的。在某些情况下，市政当局不可能收购全部土地。一些个体开发商不同意以公众或公私营合作模式来开发他们所拥有的土地。他们中有些人还拒绝投资基础设施和公共空间的建设。他们被认为是搭便车者。市政当局缺乏法律手段要求那些搭便车的个体开发商在资金上对计划有关的费用（成本回收）进行投入。这种现象将导致一些市政当局在收回投资在公共土地发展进程上的公共投资成本的过程中出现严重的问题。我们利用博弈论分析了利益相关者在土地及物业发展进程中的战略行为。为了探讨博弈理论模型在土地及物业发展进程的决策过程中所起的作用，我们已经建立了一个在荷兰成本回收新政下的未被开发的一个典型居民区的博弈论模型。我们的研究表明，博弈论可以帮助识别在这一发展项目中关键的战略决，显示不同的收益，使得利益相关者了呀选择他们利益最大的一种平衡情况。但是，我们也知道，这个个案研究，以目前的形式，仍然有许多限制。在最后一节我们讨论了博弈论所需要提高的方面，以提高其在土地及物业发展方面的决定支持的吸引力。首先，只要在模型中利益相关者的战略不是基于经验数据，结果对于决定支持的的实用性还是有限的。此外，游戏的结果也可以通过与现实利益相关者或在实验室的专家进行博弈进行测定。第二，博弈论最初假定博弈者拥有对其他博弈者的策略的完整信息。这个假设成为模型的基础。这意味着每个博弈者都知道其他博弈者的策略及回报。不幸的是，在实践中，利益