BOT项目中政府违约风险的法律应对

BOT 项目中政府违约风险的法律应对独 创 性 声 明本人郑重声明:所呈交的论文是我个人在导师指导下进行的研究工作及取得的研究成果。尽我所知,除了文中特别加以标注和致谢的地方外,论文中不包含其他人已经发表或撰写的研究成果,也不包含为获得中国人民大学或其他教育机构的学位或证书所使用过的材料。与我一同工作的同志对本研究所做的任何贡献均已在论文中作了明确的说明并表示了谢意。签名: 张杰日期: 2010 年 4 月 30 日关于论文使用授权的说明本人完全了解中国人民大学有关保留、使用学位论文的规定,即:学校有权保留送交论文的复印件,允许论文被查阅和借阅;学校可以公布论文的全部或部分内容,可以采用影印、缩印或其他复制手段保存论文。签名: 张杰 导师签名: 余劲松 日期: 2010 年 4 月 30 日摘要 政府有提供公共服务的职能,这是现代政府的基本职能之一。如何履行政府的公共服务职能,具体来说,政府要负责公共基础设施的建设和维护,如:道路、桥梁、铁路等,负责向公众提供公共产品,如:电力、燃气等。随着国民经济的快速发展和人民生活水平的不断提高,基础设施建设的发展有了更新、更高的要求。在政府财力有限的情况下,单一的筹资渠道不能满足形势发展的需要,基础设施的供给与社会经济发展的客观需求之间出现一定的矛盾,需要吸引新的投资主体,开辟新的融资渠道。BOT 模式的出现很好的解决了这种矛盾,因而在世界范围内迅速得到推广和应用。 BOT 是一种新型投资模式,是指政府(通过契约)授予私营企业(包括外国企业)以一定期限的特许经营权,许可其融资建设和经营特定的公用基础设施,并准许其通过向用户收取费用或出售产品以清偿贷款、回收投资并赚取利润;特许权期限届满时,该基础设施无偿移交给政府。BOT 模式无论对于东道国政府还是外国投资者都有着独特优势:对东道国政府而言,减轻了政府的财政负担;防止政府债务风险的发生;提高了项目的运作效率;使普通民众享受实惠。对于外国投资者而言,使得私人主体有机会涉足到一个国家的基础设施建设领域;可以获取稳定的投资回报率;可以带动其他产品的贸易流动,如大型的工程建设装备;使得私人投资者获得经济、社会等多方面的收益。 我国企业,尤其是大型建筑企业在“走出去”进行海外投资时也大量采用BOT 模式,以去年为例,中国水电集团与老挝电力公司以 BOT 方式共同投资建设的老挝水电站。中国凯迪总公司与越南煤炭矿业集团以 BOT 方式在越南投资建设电厂。BOT 模式的出现给我国大型基础设施建筑企业的海外发展提供了新的选择。但事实上,就现阶段而言,根据商务部的数据统计,我国海外过程承包在建项目 80%以上都位于东南亚、非洲及拉美地区这些欠发达地区,和欧美发达国I 家和地区相比,这些地区普遍存在着法制不健全、政治局势动荡等投资不利因素。这就使得我国投资 BOT 项目面临极大地政治风险,但目前在世界范围内,直接的征收和国有化行为已经罕见,战争和内乱爆发的可能性也相对较小,应注意的是,在东道国政府和外国投资者签订了特许协议的情况下,政府违约行为越来越多,因此,在我国企业海外投资 BOT 项目的同时,应着重防范政府违约风险。 本文的写作目的就是探讨如何防范我国企业在海外投资 BOT 项目时可能遇到的政治风险,尤其是政府违约风险。文章着重从法律角度,尤其是国际投资法的角度来探讨应对之策。 本文总共分三章, 第一章,BOT 政府违约风险中的“约”?BOT 特许协议,本章是本文写作的逻辑起点,探讨 BOT 项目中的违约风险,首先就必须弄清楚违约中的“约”指代的什么?本章首先介绍了 BOT 项目的合同安排,认清 BOT 特许协议在整个项目的基础地位。然后着重介绍了 BOT 特许协议,包括其概念、特征、内容、性质、效力等多方面内容。 第二章,BOT 项目中的政府违约风险,本章是本文的重点,在本章中,通过介绍政府违约风险的概念、特点以及表现形式,并深刻分析出现政府违约行为的原因,了解政府违约的后果。通过这些内容准确把握了这种风险对于 BOT 项目的重大影响,进而去引出本文的中心?法律应对措施。 第三章,BOT 项目政府违约风险的法律应对,在当前的国际局势下,征收及国有化风险、战争及内乱风险等政治风险出现几率较小,对于 BOT 项目而言,影响最大的政治风险是政府违约风险。据此,就需要着重探讨政府违约风险的应对措施。其次,介绍应对该风险的方法,总体上分几个大的类别:首先,运用双边投资条约的保护伞条款;其次,在特许权协议中订立相关条款来应对风险,如:稳定条款、调整条款、重新协商条款以及法律选择条款等。再次,通过保险途径来转移风险,这又可以分成两种情形,即向国际性的多边投资担保机构投保政府违约险;向国内的中国出口信用保险公司投保政府违约险;第四,笔者提出一个大胆建议,即建立政府违约基金,专门针对国际投资活动中越来越严重的政府违约风险就行担保。最后,指出我国法律法规其相关制度对于应对政府违约风险的缺陷并提出改进意见。II 结语。呼吁我国政府转变观念,认清我国的经济发展潜力,改变传统上对于海外投资保护理论的态度,对西方的海外投资保护的理论进行批判的吸收。关键词:BOT;特许协议;政府违约风险;III Abstract Providing public services is one of the basic functions of modern governmentHow to fulfill the governments public service function, specifically, the government is responsible for public infrastructure construction and maintenance, such as: roads, bridges and railways, electricity, gas, etcWith the rapid development and peoples rising living standards, the need for the infrastructure development become newer and higher. In the case of limited government financial resources, single sources of funding can not meet the development needs of the situation, the supply of infrastructure and socio-economic development of the objective needs of a certain contradiction between the need to attract new investors to open up new financing channels. BOT model appears a good solution to this conflict, which spread rapidly around the world and applied BOT is a new investment model is that the Government through contract to grant the private sector including foreign enterprises to a certain period of the franchise, permit the financing of construction and operation of specific public infrastructure, and to allow its customers to pay through costs or sell products to pay off loans, recovery of investment and make a profit; the concession period expires, the infrastructure transferred to the Government without compensation. BOT model both for the host government and foreign investors have a unique advantage: the host government, to reduce the financial burden of government; to prevent the occurrence of the risk of government debt; improve the operational efficiency of the project; to enjoy the benefit of ordinary people. For foreign investors, the main private sector the opportunity to make a country involved in the infrastructure building; can get a stable return on investment; can promote other products, trade flows, such asIV large-scale construction equipment; allows private investors economic, social, and many other benefitsThe purpose of this article is to explore how to prevent overseas investment of Chinese enterprises in BOT projects may face political risks, particularly government default risk. The author focuses on the legal point of view, especially in terms of international investment law of countermeasures There are three chapters in this thesis: Chapter one , BOT concession agreement, this chapter is the logical starting point of this writing, of the risk of default in BOT projects, must first clear breach of contract in the “about“ refers to what? This chapter introduces the contractual arrangements for BOT projects, understand the BOT concession agreement the foundation of the entire project. Then focuses on the BOT concession agreement, including its concept, characteristics, content, nature and content validity and other aspectsChapter two, the risk of the governments breach of contract in BOT projects, this chapter is the focus of this article, in this chapter, the government default risk by introducing the concept, characteristics and expressions, and profound analysis of the reasons for the breach occurs the government to understand the consequences of government defaultThrough an accurate grasp of the content of this risk for the BOT project of significant impact, and thus leads to the center of this paper - the legal responseChapter three, the legal response to the the risk of the governments breach of contract in BOT projects, in the current international situation, the levy and the risk of nationalization, war and civil disturbance risks of political risk appears less likely, for BOT projects, the greatest impact of political risk is that the Government default risk. Accordingly, we need to focus on default risk of the governments response. Second, it introduces the risk approach should, in general in several broad categories: first, the use of umbrella terms of bilateral investment treaties; Second, the concession agreement entered into in the relevant provisions to deal with risks, such as: stability terms, adjusted terms of renegotiating terms, and choice of lawV terms. Third, w