工程管理毕业设计外文翻译--政治制度建设，制度建设.doc

本科毕业设计外文文献及译文文献、资料题目： urban renewal policy in chicago 文献、资料来源：期刊journal of urban affairs 第31期文献、资料发表（出版）日期：2000.8院 （部）： 管理工程学院专 业： 工程管理班 级： 工管081姓 名： 李洪砚学 号： 2008021014指导教师： 亓霞翻译日期：2012.6.3山东建筑大学毕业设计外文文献及译文外文文献：advanced encryption standardregime building, institution building:urban renewal policy in chicago,19461962joel rastuniversity of wisconsin-milwaukee abstract:urban regime analysis emphasizes the role of coalition building in creating a capacityto govern in cities. through a case study of urban renewal policy in postwar chicago, this articleconsiders the role played by political institutions. conceptualizing this historical period as oneof regime building, i show how existing political institutions were out of sync with the citys newgoverning agenda of urban renewal and redevelopment following world war ii. creating a capacityto govern in urban renewal policy required both coalition building and a fundamental reworking offormal governing institutions. it was spring 1964, and chicago was in the midst of its greatest construction boom since therebuilding effort following the great chicago fire of 1871. in the third of a series of articles on chicagos postwar revitalization, the chicago tribune celebrated the accomplishments of the past 10 years: more than six million square feet of new office space constructed downtown; nearly 1,000 acres of “blighted” land cleared for new development; a total of 27 urban renewal projects completed, under way, or approved for construction; a new convention center built on the lakefront; and the emergence of ohare international airport as “the worlds finest jet terminal” (gowran, 1964). under the leadership of richard j. daley, elected mayor in 1955, chicagos massive urban renewal program would eventually rank first among u.s. cities in total federal dollars received (chicago tribune, 1968). the accomplishments of chicagos urban renewal program during mayor daleys first decadein office are all the more remarkable when examined alongside the record of his predecessor as mayor, martin h. kennelly. plans for urban renewal in chicago, orchestrated largely by business leaders, were under way when kennelly was elected mayor in 1947. kennelly enthusiasticallyembraced the business communitys redevelopment agenda and eagerly sought federal funding forslum clearance and public housing. however, urban renewal quickly became mired in controversy,stalling progress on numerous fronts. of a total of eight slum clearance and redevelopment projectsinitiated during the kennelly administration, none had been completed by the time kennelly leftoffice in 1955. downtown redevelopment was still largely at a standstill, with only one new officetower under construction.how was chicagos urban renewal program transformed from its origins as a weak andconflict-ridden initiative into the political and economic steamroller it ultimately became underthe leadership of richard j. daley? scholars of urban political development have identified thepost-world war ii era as a period of regime building (cummings, 1988; deleon, 1992; ferman,1996; levine, 1989; mollenkopf, 1983; spragia, 1989; stone, 1989). in what robert salisbury(1964) called “the new convergence of power,” city officials across the country formed sustained, multiissue alliances with local business leaders around urban renewal and redevelopment. ac-cording to urban regime theorists, the success of postwar redevelopment efforts was determinedmore by the strength and cohesiveness of such coalitionsor “regimes”than by the formalpowers of local government (stone, 1989; stone & sanders, 1987). effective governance in de-velopment policy was achieved when resources controlled by government and nongovernmentalactors (mainly business) were deployed around a shared agenda. what mattered most, in otherwords, was not the formal machinery of local government or local political institutions but theability of public and private actors to unite around a governing agenda commensurate with theresources at their disposal (elkin, 1987; stoker, 1995; stone, 1989, 1993). prospects were partic-ularly good when a resourceful and cohesive business elite was paired with a politically powerfulmayor such as daley of chicago.while a focus on informal governing arrangementsin particular, the mobilization of resourcesthrough regime buildingexplains much about how governing capacity was created in postwarcities, informal arrangements are not the whole story. as skocpol (1992) has argued, policyoutcomes are determined in part by the “fit” between the goals of politically active groups and existing political institutions. governing institutions serve as “staging grounds” or “rules of thegame” for political action, favoring certain political actors and courses of action over others (bridges, 1997, p. 14). according to skocpol (1992, p. 54),the overall structure of political institutions provides access and leverage to some groupsand alliances, thus encouraging and rewarding their efforts to shape government policies,while simultaneously denying access and leverage to other groups and alliances . . . . thismeans that the degree of success that any politically active group or movement achieves isinfluenced not just by the self-consciousness and “resource mobilization” of that social forceitself.in general, the governing institutions of cities immediately following world war ii were ill-suited to the task of large-scale redevelopment. urban renewal and redevelopment required strongexecutive leadership and centralized planning and development authority. in many cases, however,the powers of city government were highly fragmented. political machines, while typically indecline, were still a significant presence in many cities, dispersing power among ward bosses(teaford, 1990). even in nonmachine cities, the predominance of weak-mayor, strong-council citycharters left many mayors with little executive authority (peterson, 1961). in both machine andnonmachine cities alike, planning and development functions were often carried out by numerousagencies with little coordination among them (gottehrer, 1967; mantel, 1970; oconnor, 1993;salisbury, 1961).urban regime theorists examining development politics in postwar cities have paid scant atten-tion to such institutional shortcomings. however, the architects of postwar urban redevelopmentwere clearly aware of them. in cities across the country, regime building was accompanied byefforts to reorganize city government and create new governing institutions more conducive tothe new redevelopment agenda. in philadelphia, new york, st. louis, boston, chicago, and else-where, new city charters, charter revisions, and other administrative reforms were proposed tostrengthen and centralize the administrative powers of city government.1such reforms, frequently initiated or championed by business leaders and other proponents of redevelopment, were op-posed by machine politicians, certain city bureaucrats, and other political actors who stood tobenefit from the status quo.the political contests that surfaced over the institutional structures of postwar cities are con-sistent with skowroneks (1982) observation that new or reformed governing institutions do not materialize simply because new governing demands produce a need for them. in chicago andother cities, redevelopment efforts were mediated through institutional arrangements that becameobjects of struggle in their own right. the success of postwar regime builders was determined inpart by their ability to craft and successfully advance new institutional arrangements that favoredtheir objectives over those of their political rivals.in chicago, the “fit” between the citys governing institutions and politically active groupsin urban renewal policy initially favored neighborhood organizations, civil rights groups, wardpoliticians, and other opponents of urban renewal policy, allowing such groups to successfully playan obstructionist role. during the richard j. daley administration, however, changing political conditions created opportunities for institution building. reworked governing institutions werecombined with daleys informal powers as machine “boss” to produce a new set of governingarrangements that favored proponents of redevelopment. the effectiveness of urban renewalpolicy was greatly enhanced. while the focus of this study is on regime building in postwar chicago, chicagos urban re-newal experience provides lessons for modern-day reformers as well. episodes of regime buildingare conceptualized here as politically contingent periods in which the breakdown of old alliancesand governing agendas has yet to be followed by the consolidation of new governing arrange-ments. the evidence from chicago suggests that proponents of regime change in contemporarycities should consider more carefully the role of governing institutions in regime building, sinceproblems of fit between governing agendas and political institutions may surface with increasedfrequency during such episodes. if the fit between the goals of change-oriented groups and po-litical institutions is a poor one, as was initially the case in chicago, then the mobilization ofresources accomplished through regime building may need to be accompanied by parallel effortsto bring institutions in line with new governing demands.regime building for urban renewalfollowing world war ii, chicago faced challenges similar to those of other cities around thecountry. middle-class residents were moving to the suburbs in growing numbers, leaving behinda population that was increasingly poor and non-white. a semicircle of substandard housing and businesses covering roughly 15,000 acres extended outward several miles from the centralbusiness district (mhpc, 1946a). property values were falling in many areas of the city, includingdowntown chicago. from 1939 to 1947, the assessed valuation of property in the central businessdistrict fell from $552 million to $481 million, a drop of 13% (teaford, 1990, p. 19).downtown business leaders, alarmed about the implications of these trends for their corporateproperty holdings, took the lead in developing an action plan to address the growing crisis. themost influential business organization at the time was the metropolitan housing and planningcouncil (mhpc), an organization founded in 1934 to provide civic leadership in planning anddevelopment policy. although officially governed by a board of 38 directors representing arange of interests, mhpc was dominated by a small group of downtown business executives(meyerson & banfield, 1955). the organizations president, ferd kramer, was also presidentof one of chicagos largest real estate firms. other prominent board members included miltonmumford, an assistant vice-president of marshall field and company, and holman pettibone,president of chicago title and trust company.in 1946, mhpc released a report containing a strategy for urban renewal that would ultimatelybe embraced by both city and state policymakers (mhpc, 1946a).2according to the report,chicagos problems stemmed, above all, from the unchecked growth of blight. to reverse the tide,government would have to take steps to make inner-city locations attractive once again to privatenvestors. mhpc proposed that a public agency with eminent domain powers be charged withassembling parcels of land in inner-city locations and demolishing existing structures (hirsch,1998). the cleared land would be sold to private developers at a reduced cost, while residentsdisplaced through “slum clearance” would be rehoused in new public housing developments.mhpc announced its plans at an october 1946 luncheon whose guests included the publishersof the citys major newspapers, the presidents of the citys largest banks, and top real estateexecutives (neil, 1952).during the following months, milton mumford, holman pettibone, and other members ofmhpcs inner circle worked with republican governor dwight green and democratic mayormartin kennelly to secure bipartisan support for state urban renewal legislation (hirsch, 1998).these efforts culminated in the passage of two bills, the blighted areas redevelopment actand the relocation act, in july 1947. the bills, which extended eminent domain powers toslum clearance projects and provided state funding for slum clearance and public housing,substantially embodied the program for urban renewal unveiled by mhpc less than a yearearlier.mhpcs efforts received a boost with the election of martin kennelly as mayor in 1947.chicago had been governed since the early 1930s by a powerful democratic party machine. bythe end of world war ii, however, a series of scandals implicating current mayor edward kellyproduced growing support for reform (biles, 1984; omalley, 1980). in the national electionsof 1946, half of the chicago areas congressional seats were won by republicans (omalley,1980). to preempt the growing reform wave, leaders of the citys democratic organization chosekennelly as the partys nominee for mayor. a successful business executive with no previous ties to the machine, kennelly was appealing to reformers. however, as the machines candidate formayor with no political base of his own, he had little political leverage to assert his independencefrom the party organization (biles, 1995).kennelly was well known in business circles, serving as vice-president of the chicago asso-ciation of commerce and industry, chairman of the red cross fund drive, a trustee of depauluniversity, and a member of the federal reserve banks industrial advisory committee (biles,1995). after assuming office in april 1947, he quickly made urban renewal a priority, appointing a 15-member committee for housing action to develop proposals for housing and slum clear-ance. the committee, chaired by holman pettibone and including fellow mhpc board membersferd kramer and milton mumford, played a key role in the passage of the states 1947 urban re-newal legislation (hirsch, 1998). in july 1948, governor green announced chicagos first urbanrenewal project to be carried out under the new law (chicago tribune, 1948). groundbreakingfor the construction of new public housing units followed several years later.while progress on urban redevelopment during the early postwar years was heartening tocivic leaders and other proponents of urban renewal, problems soon began to surface. landassembly, slum clearance, and public housing construction were all taking much longer thanoriginally expected, in some cases placing the completion of projects in jeopardy. the crux of theproblem, most civic leaders agreed, was the fragmentation of the citys administrative powers,which posed a barrier to quick, decisive action. urban renewal policy was administered by severaldifferent agencies, with responsibilities for slum clearance, redevelopment, public housing, andother activities divided among them.3by the early 1950s, this structure had becomeunwieldy.coordination was increasingly difficult to achieve, creating “many points at which success couldbe blocked; but none at which it could be assured” (mhpc, 1956a, p. 3).a second and related problem was posed by the weakness of the executive branch of citygovernment. formally speaking, chicago was a council-governed city. city council held thepower of approval over mayoral appointments, it prescribed the duties and powers of most cityofficers, and it could create new city departments and agencies at will. it also exercised variousadministrative powers, including preparation of the city budget, awarding of city contracts, andapproval of zoning variances. for urban renewal projects, council approval was required fordesignation of project areas, site plans, the terms of sale of city-owned land to developers,rezonings, and street closings (chicago city council, 1953). a council majority could blockvirtually any action by the mayor (banfield, 1961; chicago home rule commission, 1954).as a comprehensive program for urban redevelopment, urban renewal policy required a city-wide perspective on the part of local government officials. however, aldermen were frequentlyindifferent to planning and development issues that did not directly concern their wards.4in situ-ations where their wards were affected, the needs of ward constituents typically came first. if anurban renewal or public housing project was opposed by a substantial number of ward residents,the alderman representing that district was likely to oppose it as well (meyerson & banfield,1955). without strong executive leadership, an uncooperative alderman or bloc of aldermencould derail plans for new development.in the past, the office of the mayor was strengthened informally through the fusion of politicaland administrative power (chicago home rule commission, 1972). previous mayors such asedward kelly had dominated city council by forming alliances with party leaders or by servingjointly as mayor and machine boss. mayor kennelly, however, distanced himself from machineleaders and made no effort to bring city council under his control. as he put it early in his term,“chicago is a council-governed city . . . . i dont think its a function of the mayor to boss thealdermen” (quoted in simpson, 2001, p. 107). with control over urban renewal policy lodged, bydefault, in city council, coordinated action was extremely difficult to achieve.under these conditions, questions of “fit” between the citys governing institutions and the goalsof urban renewal stakeholders became paramount, as illustrated by the following two examples.chicagos first urban renewal project, announced by governor green in july 1948, was a proposed100-acre development in a black neighborhood on the citys south side (hirsch, 1998). planscalled for the constructio