agencytheory代理理论粗略翻译.doc

Agency theory has been used by scholars in accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science, organizational behavior, and sociology. Yet, it is still surrounded by controversy. Its proponents argue that a revolution is at hand and that the foundation for a powerful theory of organizations is being put into place. Its detractors call it trivial, dehumanizing, and even dangerous.代理理论已被学者用于在会计，经济，金融，市场营销学，政治学，组织行为学和社会学。然而，它仍然被争议包围。它的支持者争辩说，革命就在眼前，而且“一个强大的组织理论的基础正在落实到位”（詹森，1983年，第324页）。它的批评者称之为琐碎，非人性化，甚至是“危险的”。Which is it: grand theory or great sham? The purposes of this paper are to describe agency theory and to indicate ways in which organizational researchers can use its insights. The paper is organized around four questions that are germane to organizational research. The first asks the deceptively simple question, What is agency theory? Often, the technical style, mathematics, and tautological reasoning of the agency literature can obscure the theory. Moreover, the agency literature is split into two camps (Jensen, 1983), leading to differences in interpretation. For example, Barney and Ouchi (1986) argued that agency theory emphasizes how capital markets can affect the firm, whereas other authors made no reference to capital markets at all (Anderson, 1985; Demski & Feltham, 1978; Eccles, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985).这是它：宏大理论或大假？本文的目的是描述代理理论，并指出如何使组织的研究人员可以使用它的见解。本文是围绕四个问题是有密切关系的组织研究。第一问的看似简单的问题，什么是代理理论？通常情况下，技术风格，数学和文学社的同义反复的推理可以掩盖的理论。此外，该机构的文献被分为两大阵营（詹森，1983），从而导致不同解释。例如，Barney和大内（1986）认为，代理理论强调怎样的资本市场能够影响企业，而其他作者所有（安德森，1985未提及资本市场; Demski费尔塔姆，1978;埃克尔斯，1985;艾森哈特， 1985）。The second question is, What does agency theory contribute to organizational theory? Proponents such as Ross (1973, p. 134) argued that examples of agency are universal. Yet other scholars such as Perrow (1986) claimed that agency theory addresses no clear problems, and Hirsch and Friedman (1986) called it excessively narrow, focusing only on stock price. For economists, long accustomed to treating the organization as a black box in the theory of the firm, agency theory may be revolutionary. Yet, for organizational scholars the worth of agency theory is not so obvious. 第二个问题是，什么是代理理论有助于组织理论？支持者如罗斯（1973年，第134页）认为，“代理的例子是通用的。”然而，其他学者如佩罗（1986）声称，代理理论的地址不明确的问题，赫希和Friedman（1986）称之为过于狭窄，只关注股票价格。对于经济学家，早就习惯了处理组织中的企业理论的“黑盒子”，代理理论可能是革命性的。然而，对于组织学者代理理论的价值就不那么明显了。The third question is, Is agency theory empirically valid? The power of the empirical research on agency theory to explain organizational phenomena is important to assess, particularly in light of the criticism that agency theory is hardly subject to empirical test since it rarely tries to explain actual events (Perrow, 1986, p. 224). Perrow (1986) also criticized the theory for being unrealistically one-sided because of its neglect of potential exploitation of workers. 第三个问题是，是代理理论实证有效的？在代理理论的实证研究来解释组织现象的力量是重要的评估，特别是在光的批评，代理理论是“很难受实证检验，因为它很少试图解释实际事件”（佩罗，1986年，页。 224）。佩罗（1986）也批评理论为是因为工人的潜在剥削其忽视不切实际的片面。The final question is, What topics and contexts are fruitful for organizational researchers who use agency theory? Identifying how useful agency theory can be to organizational scholars requires understanding the situations in which the agency perspective can provide theoretical leverage. 最后一个问题是，什么主题和上下文是富有成效的人谁使用代理理论组织研究人员？如何识别有用的代理理论可以是组织学者需要了解在该机构的角度可以提供理论上的杠杆作用的情况。The principal contributions of the paper are to present testable propositions, identify contributions of the theory to organizational thinking, and evaluate the extant empirical literature. The overall conclusion is that agency theory is a useful addition to organizational theory. The agency theory ideas on risk, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and information systems are novel contributions to organizational thinking, and the empirical evidence is supportive of the theory, particularly when coupled with complementary theoretical perspectives.本文的主要贡献是提出可检验的命题，找准理论来组织思想的贡献，并评估现存的实证研究。总的结论是，代理理论是一个有益的补充组织理论。代理理论观点上的风险，结果的不确定性，激励机制和信息系统对组织思维新颖的贡献，而经验证据支持的理论，加上互补的理论观点时尤为如此。Origins of Agency Theory代理理论的起源During the 1960s and early 1970s, economists explored risk sharing among individuals or groups (e.g., Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968). This literature described the risk-sharing problem as one that arises when cooperating parties have different attitudes toward risk. Agency theory broadened this risk-sharing literature to include the so-called agency problem that occurs when cooperating parties have different goals and division of labor (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Specifically, agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work to an- other (the agent), who performs that work. Agency theory attempts to describe this relationship using the metaphor of a contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 在20世纪60年代和70年代初，经济学家探讨个人或群体之间的风险分担（例如，箭头，1971年威尔逊，1968）。该文献中描述的风险分担问题，因为一个出现时合作方有对风险的不同态度。代理理论扩大了这种风险分担的文献，包括在合作各方有不同的目标和分工发生了所谓的代理问题（詹森和麦克林，1976;罗斯，1973）。具体来说，代理理论是冲着无处不在代理关系，其中一方（委托人）委托工作的，其他（代理），谁执行这项工作。代理理论试图使用合同（詹森和麦克林，1976）的比喻来形容这种关系。Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences. 代理理论关注与解决，可以发生在代理关系的两个问题。首先是机构问题出现时，（一）委托人和代理人的冲突及（b）就很难或昂贵的主体来验证一下代理实际上是这样做的愿望或目标。这里的问题是，委托人不能确认代理已经表现得恰如其分。二是风险分担的出现时，委托人和代理人都对风险的不同态度的问题。这里的问题是，委托人和受托人可能更喜欢，因为不同风险偏好的不同的动作。Because the unit of analysis is the contract governing the relationship between the principal and the agent, the focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship given assumptions about people (e.g., self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), organizations (e.g., goal conflict among members), and information (e.g., information is a commodity which can be purchased). Specifically, the question becomes, Is a behavior-oriented contract (e.g., salaries, hierarchical governance) more efficient than an outcome-oriented contract (e.g., commissions, stock options, transfer of property rights, market governance)? An overview of agency theory is given in Table 1. 因为分析的单位是管理委托人和代理人之间的关系的合同，该理论的重点是确定监管提供了有关人士（如自身利益，有限理性假设的委托 - 代理关系的最有效的合同，风险厌恶），组织（成员之间如目标冲突），信息（例如，信息是一种商品，可以购买）。具体来说，问题就变成，是一个行为导向的合同（例如，工资，分层治理）比以成果为导向的合同更有效率（如佣金，股票期权，产权转让，市场治理）？代理理论的概述示于表1。The agency structure is applicable in a variety of settings, ranging from macrolevel issues such as regulatory policy to microlevel dyad phenomena such as blame, impression management, lying, and other expressions of self-interest. Most frequently, agency theory has been applied to organizational phenomena such as compensation (e.g., Conlon & Parks, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1985), acquisition and diversification strategies (e.g., Amihud & Lev, 1981), board relationships (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Kosnik, 1987), ownership and financing structures (e.g., Argawal & Mandelker, 1987; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), vertical integration (Ander- son, 1985; Eccles, 1985), and innovation (Bolton, 1988; Zenger, 1988). Overall, the domain of agency theory is relationships that mirror the basic agency structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative behavior, but have differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk.该机构结构适用于各种环境，从宏观层面的问题，如监管政策，微观对子现象，如怪，印象管理，卧，和自身利益的其他表情。最常见的，代理理论已被应用到组织现象，如补偿（例如，康伦和公园，1988;艾森哈特，1985），收购和多元化战略（例如，Amihud列弗，1981），董事会的关系（例如，法玛和詹森，1983; Kosnik，1987），所有权和融资结构（例如，ArgawalMandelker，1987;詹森和麦克林，1976），垂直整合（安德儿子，1985;埃克尔斯，1985），创新（博尔顿，1988;曾格，1988）。总体而言，代理理论的域名是反映一个主体和一个代理谁从事合作行为的基本机构的结构，但具有不同的目标和对风险的不同态度的关系Agency Theory From its roots in information economics, agency theory has developed along two lines: positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 1983). The two streams share a common unit of analysis: the contract between the principal and the agent. They also share common assumptions about people, organizations, and information. However, they differ in their mathematical rigor, dependent variable, and style. 从它在信息经济学根源，代理理论是沿着两条线发展。实证主义和委托代理（詹森，1983）两个流共享分析的常用单位：委托人和代理人之间的合同。他们还共享关于个人，组织和信息共同假设。然而，他们在数学的严谨性，因变量和样式不同。Positivist Agency Theory Positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations in which the principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the governance mechanisms that limit the agents self-serving behavior. Positivist re- search is less mathematical than principal-agent research. Also, positivist researchers have focused almost exclusively on the special case of the principal-agent relationship between owners and managers of large, public corporations (Berle & Means, 1932). 实证研究都集中在识别在哪些情况下委托人和代理人可能有相互冲突的目标，然后描述，限制了代理人的利己行为的治理机制。实证重新搜索比委托代理研究较少的数学。此外，实证研究人员已经几乎全部集中在大型，公共机构（伯利和米恩斯，1932）的所有者和经营者之间的委托代理关系的特殊情况。Three articles have been particularly influential. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explored the ownership structure of the corporation, including how equity ownership by managers aligns managers interests with those of owners. Fama (1980) discussed the role of efficient capital and labor markets as information mechanisms that are used to control the self-serving behavior of top executives. Fama and Jensen (1983) described the role of the board of directors as an information system that the stockholders within large corporations could use to monitor the op- portunism of top executives. Jensen and his col- leagues (Jensen, 1984; Jensen & Roeback, 1983) extended these ideas to controversial practices, such as golden parachutes and corporate raiding. 三篇文章都特别有影响力。詹森和麦克林（1976）探讨了公司的所有权结构，包括如何拥有股权由经理对齐管理者与所有者的利益。法玛（1980）讨论了作为用于控制的高层管理人员的利己行为的信息机制，有效的资本和劳动力市场的作用。法玛和詹森（1983）描述为大型企业内部的股东可以用它来监测运算portunism的高管信息系统董事会的作用。 Jensen和他的同事联赛（詹森，1984;詹森和Roeback，1983）扩展了这些想法有争议的做法，如金色降落伞和企业扫荡。From a theoretical perspective, the positivist stream has been most concerned with describing the governance mechanisms that solve the agency problem. Jensen (1983, p. 326) described this interest as why certain contractual relations arise. Two propositions capture the governance mechanisms which are identified in the positivist stream. One proposition is that outcome-based contracts are effective in curbing agent opportunism. The argument is that such contracts coalign the preferences of agents with those of the principal because the rewards for both depend on the same actions, and, there- fore, the conflicts of self-interest between principal and agent are reduced. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) described how increasing the firm ownership of the managers decreases managerial opportunism. In formal terms, 从理论的角度，实证流一直最关心的描述是解决代理问题的治理机制。詹森（1983年，第326页）这说明利益，“为什么某些合同关系产生的。”两个命题捕捉它们在实证数据流中确定的治理机制。一个命题是基于成果的合同是有效遏制代理人的机会主义。的说法是，这种合同coalign与这些主要代理的喜好，因为无论是奖励依赖于相同的动作，并有上脱颖而出，委托人与代理人之间的自我利益的冲突就会减少。例如，詹森和麦克林（1976）介绍了如何提高管理者的企业所有权降低管理机会主义。在正式条款Proposition 1: When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 命题1：当委托人与代理人之间的合同是一个基于成果，代理更可能表现在委托人的利益。The second proposition is that information systems also curb agent opportunism. The argument here is that, since information systems inform the principal about what the agent is actually doing, they are likely to curb agent opportunism because the agent will realize that he or she cannot deceive the principal. For example, Fama (1980) described the information effects of efficient capital and labor markets on managerial opportunism, and Fama and Jensen (1983) described the information role that boards of directors play in controlling managerial behavior. In formal terms, 第二个命题是，信息系统也遏制代理人的机会主义。这里的论点是，由于信息系统的通知校长关于什么的代理实际上是干什么的，他们很可能会遏制代理人机会主义因为代理会意识到他或她不能欺骗主事人。例如，法玛（1980）描述了管理上的机会主义有效的资本市场和劳动力市场信息的影响，法玛和詹森（1983）描述的信息的作用是董事局的控制管理行为发挥。在正式条款，Proposition 2: When the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 命题2：当主要有信息来验证代理行为，代理更可能表现在委托人的利益。At its best, positivist agency theory can be regarded as enriching economics by offering a more complex view of organizations (Jensen, 1983). However, it has been criticized by organizational theorists as minimalist (Hirsch, Michaels, & Friedman, 1987; Perrow, 1986) and by microeconomists as tautological and lacking rigor (Jensen, 1983). Nonetheless, positivist agency theory has ignited considerable research (Barney & Ouchi, 1986) and popular interest (Meet Mike, 1988). 在其最好的，实证代理理论可以看作是通过提供组织（詹森，1983）更复杂的视图富民经济。然而，它已被批评组织理论家简约（赫希，迈克尔，与弗里德曼，1987;佩罗，1986）和微观经济学家的同义反复，缺乏严谨性（詹森，1983）。然而，实证代理理论闹得沸沸扬扬相当重新搜索（巴尼和藕池，1986）和流行的权益（“相约迈克，”1988）Principal-Agent Research委托代理研究Principal-agent researchers are concerned with a general theory of the principal-agent relationship, a theory that can be applied to employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, and other agency relationships (Harris & Raviv, 1978). Characteristic of formal theory, the principal-agent paradigm involves careful specification of assumptions, which are followed by logical deduction and mathematical proof. 委托代理的研究人员所关心的的委托 - 代理关系的一般理论，可以应用于雇主与雇员，律师与委托人，买方与供应商理论，和其他机构的关系（哈里斯和拉维夫，1978）。形式理论的特征，委托代理模式包括仔细规范的假设，这之后是逻辑推理和数学证明In comparison with the positivist stream, principal-agent theory is abstract and mathematical and, therefore, less accessible to organizational scholars. Indeed, the most vocal critics of the theory (Perrow, 1986; Hirsch et al., 1987) have focused their attacks primarily on the more widely known positivist stream. Also, the principal-agent stream has a broader focus and greater interest in general, theoretical implications. In contrast, the positivist writers have focused almost exclusively on the special case of the owner/CEO relationship in the large corporation. Finally, principal-agent research includes many more testable implications. 与实证流相比，委托代理理论是抽象的，数学的，因此，较少接触到组织的学者。事实上，这个理论的最强烈批评（佩罗，1986;。Hirsch等，1987）主要集中于更广为人知的实证流他们的攻击。此外，委托代理流具有更广泛的关注，并在一般情况下，理论意义更大的兴趣。与此相反，实证作家们几乎全部集中在大公司的老板/ CEO关系的特殊情况。最后，委托代理研究包括更多的可测试性的影响。For organizational scholars, these differences provide background for understanding criticism of the theory. However, they are not crucial. Rather, the important point is that the two streams are complementary: Positivist theory identifies various contract alternatives, and principal-agent theory indicates which contract is the most efficient under varying levels of out-come uncertainty, risk aversion, information, and other variables described below.对于组织的学者，这些差异对理解理论的批判提供了背景。然而，它们并不重要。相反，重要的一点是，这两个数据流是互补的：实证理论确定各种合同的替代品，并委托 - 代理理论表明该合同是最有效的在不同的门诊来的不确定性，风险厌恶情绪，信息和描述的其他因素的水平下文。The focus of the principal-agent literature is on determining the optimal contract, behavior versus outcome, between the principal and the agent. The simple model assumes goal conflict between principal and agent, an easily measured outcome, and an agent who is more risk averse than the principal. (Note: The argument behind a more risk averse agent is that agents, who are unable to diversify their employment, should be risk averse and principals, who are capable of diversifying their investments, should be risk neutral.) The approach of the simple model can be described in terms of cases (e.g., Demski & Feltham, 1978). The first case, a simple case of complete information, is when the principal knows what the agent has done. Given that the principal is buying the agents behavior, then a contract that is based on be- havior is most efficient. An outcome-based contract would needlessly transfer risk to the agent, who is assumed to be more risk averse than the principal. 委托代理文学的重点是确定最优契约，行为与结果，委托人和代理人之间。简单的模型假定委托人和代理人，一个容易测量结果，并代理谁更厌恶风险比委托人之间的目标冲突。 （注：后面更多的风险规避者的论点是，代理人，谁不能分散他们的就业，应该是风险规避和校长，谁能够分散他们的投资，应该是风险中性的）的简单模型的方法可以的情况下（例如，Demski费尔塔姆，1978）来描述。第一种情况下，完整的信息，一个简单的例子，就是当校长知道代理人已经完成。鉴于主要是购买代理的行为，则是基于行为的一个合同是最有效的。以结果为基础的合同将不必要的风险转移给代理，谁被认为是更厌恶风险比本金。The second case is when the principal does not know exactly what the agent has done. Given the self-interest of the agent, the agent may or may not have behaved as agreed. The agency problem arises because (a) the principal and the agent have different goals and (b) the principal cannot determine if the agent has behaved appropriately. In the formal literature, two aspects of the agency problem are cited. Moral hazard refers to lack of effort on the part of the agent. The argument here is that the agent may simply not put forth the agreed-upon effort. That is, the agent is shirking. For example, moral hazard occurs when a research scientist works on a personal research project on company time, but the research is so complex that corporate management cannot detect what the scientist is actually doing. Adverse selection refers to the misrepresentation of ability by the agent. The argument here is that the agent may claim to have certain skills or abilities when he or she is hired. Adverse selection arises because the principal cannot completely verify these skills or abilities either at the time of hiring or while the agent is working. For example, adverse selection occurs when a research scientist claims to have experience in a scientific specialty and the employer cannot judge whether this is the case. 第二种情况是当校长不知道到底是什么代理做了。由于代理的自身利益，代理人可能会或可能不会表现为一致。代理问题的产生是因为（一）委托人和代理人具有不同的目标和（二）委托人不能确定是否代理已表现得恰如其分。在正式文献，代理问题的两个方面的引用。道德风险是指缺乏对代理的部分努力。这里的论点是，代理可能根本就没有提出商定的努力。也就是说，代理人是在推卸。例如，发生道德风险，当一个科学家工作在公司的时间是个人研究项目，但研究是如此复杂，企业管理无法检测哪些科学家正在做。逆向选择是指由代理能力的失实陈述。这里的论点是，代理人可以要求有一定的技能或