【精品文档】21中英文双语法学专业外文文献翻译成品：合同：第三方受益人的权利：密歇根州受益合同条款履行效力

此文档是毕业设计外文翻译成品（ 含英文原文+中文翻译），无需调整复杂的格式！下载之后直接可用，方便快捷！本文价格不贵,也就几十块钱！一辈子也就一次的事！外文标题：Contracts： Rights of Third Party Beneficiary： Effect of Michigan Beneficiary Contract Statute 外文作者：GW Hueschen 文献出处:Michigan Law Review , 2001 , 50 (2) :336-339 (如觉得年份太老，可改为近2年，毕竟很多毕业生都这样做)英文2189单词， 10769字符(字符就是印刷符)，中文3179汉字。On agreement to make mutual wills, Stephen and his two sisters entered into an agreement whereby the sisters agreed to will to Stephen, or in event Stephen predeceased them, to his wife, all property which they should receive from their father. Stephen did predecease the sisters, whereupon they executed new wills with no provision for Stephens widow. Upon death of the last sister, the widows bill for specific performance of the agreement was dismissed by the circuit court. In affirming on appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the agreement as to Stephen and all other persons except the sisters being without consideration, the sisters were each bound only at the option of the other while both lived, and each could revoke with the others permission. Execution of the new wills showed a common purpose to do away with all agreements to leave plainti任 anything，the will of each sister amounting to a revocation of the agreement, to which the consent of the other sister is fairly to be inferred in the absence in the contract of any stipulation requiring revocation to be in writing. Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank of Coldwater, 328 Mich. 639, 44 N.W. (2d) 192 (1950). The courts treatment of the present fact situation as giving rise to a binding agreement between the sisters to make mutual wills even though the consideration of Stephen was held nonexistent，1 is in line with Phelps v. Pipher2 as the12 Moore v. Mitchell, supra note 3.13 With regard to whether a claim for premiums for workmens compensation insurance constitutes a claim for taxes for conflict of law purposes, there seems to be little authority. Some analogy may be drawn to a number of decisions holding that unemployment and workmens compensation premium claims are taxes for purposes of bankruptcy. See 135 A.L.R. 1509 (1941); 161 A丄.R. 217 (1946). On the other hand, one New York City municipal court, on facts identical with the principal case, recently rejected the contention that a claim for workmens compensation premiums is a tax or penal claim, on the ground that the state in making such collection is acting in a proprietary rather than a public capacity. State of Ohio v. Wilcox Construction Co., 100 N.Y.S. (2d) 508 (1950).1 It is possible that the entire agreement might have been held void on a basis that, since Stephens consideration failed, the bargained for inducement was not received by either sister, this including some consideration from Stephen. See 1 Williston, Contracts 100， 115 (1936).2 320 Mich. 663, 31 N.W. (2d) 836 (1948).second consecutive case overlooking or ignoring the effect of the Michigan Beneficiary Contract Statute3 on the rights of a beneficiary. Historically, Michigan was one of the last jurisdictions to depart from the English rule prohibiting beneficiaries from suing on the contract, a rule which has “been abandoned or radically modified by exceptions and qualifications in almost every State of the Union.，4 After a period during which third party beneficiaries, with the exception of the mortgagee beneficiary5 and the insurance beneficiary,6 were uniformly held to have no rights under the contract, the case of Smith v. Thompson7 went far toward bringing the Michigan law into accord with the almost unanimous view elsewhere.8 Finally, the question was believed put at rest by the Beneficiary Contract Statute of 1937.9 But questions arose; at least counsel would appear not to have recognized any application of the statute to contracts to make mutual wills. In Phelps v. Pipher,10 the court, after finding an agreement between husband and wife to make mutual and reciprocal wills established by the evidence,11 though resting in parol,12 held the plaintiff son to be a beneficiary under the agreement of his parents13 and as such entitled to sue in equity for specific performance.14 However, since the beneficiarys rights were held to vest only upon death of one of the parties to the contract,15 revocation by the1 Act 296, Public Acts of Michigan (1937), 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) 26.1231 to 26.1235.2 Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Brown, 290 Mich. 433 at 438，287 N.W. 798 (1939). The more significant Michigan decisions are collected in “Mich. Anno, to the Restatement of Contracts,14 Mich. St. B.J. 156 (1935).3 See 14 Mich. St. B.J. 156 at 168 (1935).4 Id. at 165，166.5 250 Mich. 302，230 N.W. 156 (1930). See 73 A.L.R. 1389 (1931); 29 Mich. L. Rev. 365 (1931). This case, in holding that a donee beneficiary had a right, after the death o one party to the contract, to sue in equity to enforce a promise to make mutual wills for his benefit, overruled dicta to the contrary in K.O.M.M. v. Sharp, 163 Mich. 449, 128 N.W. 786 (1910).6 For the various “incursions” previously made into the old Michigan rule, see Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156 (1930), and especially as related to a donee beneficiary, see 14 Mich. St. B.J. 156 at 163 (1935).7 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) 26.1231 to 26.1235.8 Supra note 2.9 The wills were executed at the same time and evidence of previous agreement was undisputed. But in Eicholtz v. Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666，21 N.W. (2d) 914 (1946)， distinguished by the court, mere execution o identical wills at different times was held insufficient to establish an agreement. See cases in Eicholtz v. Grunewald, supra, at 677，678.10 Ample authority for this proposition exists in the Michigan cases. See, e.g., Smith v. T1 son, supra note 8; Eicholtz v. Grunewald, supra note 11.e beneficiary under such agreement is a “donee，or “gift，beneficiary. See 1 Grismore, Contracts 231 (1947)； 2 Williston, Contracts 356 (1936)； 1 Contracts Restatement 133(a) (1932); 14 Mich. St. B.J. 156 at 161 et seq. (1935). This consideration is important since the Michigan beneficiary statute distinguishes between “donee” and “creditor” beneficiaries. 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) 26.1233.19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) 26.1231 to 26.1235 was apparently ignored by counsel, reliance being placed on earlier cases. t is the contract to make the will, not the will itself, which is irrevocable. This is true only because equity will decree specific performance. . It is only the right of action to enforce the contract, if anything, which vests in the beneficiary at the death of one of the testators.” Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178 at 182, 183, 242 N.W. 878 (1932)parents before the death of either left the plaintiff without enforceable rights.16 Thus both in Phelps and in the instant case the plaintiff was denied specific performance, though the statute would appear to indicate a contrary result. Under the statute, the donee beneficiary s rights must vest at the moment the agreement is made, unless the court sees fit to read in some implied conditions or limitations, or to imply “some stipulation, agreement, or understanding . to the contrary.” Nor should the question of constitutionality present any obstacle to retroactive application of the statute, since in several cases decided since the statute became effective its application has been retroactive. While such retroactive application of the statute undoubtedly would be subjected to considerable19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1949 Supp.) 26.1233 provides that a donee beneficiarys rights shall be deemed to have vested “subject always to such express or implied conditions, limitations, or infirmities of the contract to which the rights of the promisee or the promise are subject, without any act or knowledge on his part, the moment the promise becomes legally binding on the promisor, unless there is some stipulation, agreement, or undertaking in the contract to the contrary. . . Sec. 26.1235 provides: “The provisions of this act shall be construed to be applicable to contracts made prior to its enactment unless such construction be held to be unconstitutional. . .Such might even be implied from the very fact that the contract is one to make a will, by its nature ambulatory.Sec. 26.1235. Note 17 supra.Hutchings v. Securities Exchange Corp., 287 Mich. 701, 284 N.W. 614 (1939) and Aiton v. Slater, 298 Mich. 469，299 N.W. 149 (1941) (dictum) in which 26.1231, giving beneficiary same right Hutchings v. Securities Exchange Corp., 287 Mich. 701, 284 N.W. 614 (1939) and Aiton v. Slater, 298 Mich. 469，299 N.W. 149 (1941) (dictum) in which 26.1231, giving beneficiary same right of enforcement as promisee, was applied; Ireland v. Lester, 298 Mich. 154，298 N.W. 488 (1941) in which 26.1233，vesting beneficiarys rights under contract at time it was executed, was applied. Indeed, in Lutz v. Dutmer, 286 Mich. 467 at 486，487，282 N.W. 431 (1938) and Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Brown, 290 Mich. 433, 287 N.W. 798 (1939)，retroactive application of the statute has been expressly upheld as constitutional since affecting only the remedy and not the right. Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 at 430，54 S.Ct. 231 (1934). No reason is apparent why the statute may not be similarly constitutionally applied in relation to time of vesting of a beneficiarys rights under a contract to make mutual wills. Since the beneficiary in such case was entitled to specific performance in equity (after Smith v. Thompson) before the statute upon death of one of the parties to the agreement, retroactive application of the statute to give the beneficiary a vested interest as soon as the contract was executed would appear merely to be giving the beneficiary a more effective remedy.criticism, as would the statutes application to contracts to make mutual wills executed subsequent to its enactment, as in effect depriving a will of its ambulatory nature,21 yet it is the contract and not the will which is specifically enforceable;22 and it does not seem unjust to the contracting parties to require inclusion in the agreement of a condition or stipulation that the beneficial rights thereunder should not vest upon execution of the contract, if such is in fact their intent.23 It is to be hoped that, in the next case of this type appearing before the supreme court, the effect of the beneficiary statute will be given full consideration in the attorneys briefs.Gordon W. Hueschen, S. Ed.See Ireland v. Lester, supra this note. Of course, it is possible to take the approach that this would be varying a substantial right in that the beneficiary previously was held to have no rights until one o the parties to the agreement died, but since a law which gives validity to a void contract, thus creating a legal duty where none existed before, is held to be constitutional, it would seem to follow that a statute can constitutionally expand a right in the beneficiary where a narrower one already existed, so long as that riit, and the correlative duty, is consistent with the undertaking voluntarily assumed by die promisor. See Grismore, “Beneficiary Contracts in Michigan,” 8 Detroit L. Rev. 1 at 18 et seq. (1938) and Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Brown, supra this note, at 443, 444.21 This was the original argument against allowing enforcement o a contract to make a will, which was discarded when it was recognized that it was the contract and not the will which was irrevocable. 6 Corn. L.Q. 127 (1920); 15 Corn. L.Q. 358 (1930); 4 Iowa L. Bul. 1891918). So it would be in the case o a contract to make mutual wills; the contract would be irrevocable without the beneficiarys consent, not the will.22 Note 15 supra.23 Such view as to time o vesting accords with that o text writers and the Restatement. Note 16 supra. But see Page, “The Power o Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering Performance to a Third Person,” 12 Wis. L. Rev. 141 (1937). It is noteworthy that some states have statutes making joint and mutual wills revocable, Bordwell, “Statute Law o Wills,” 14 Iowa L. Rev. 1 at 34 (1928)，but even such statutes would not appear to affect contract rights under an agreement pursuant to which mutual wills might be made.1N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) 14:13-1.1.合同：第三方受益人的权利：密歇根州受益合同条款履行效力在双方达成了一项协议的基础上，斯蒂芬和他的两个姐妹同意签订相互遗嘱，即姐妹们同意将斯蒂芬或斯蒂芬之前提前给他们的遗嘱，并告知妻子他们应该从他们的父亲那里得到的所有财产。斯蒂芬确实预先给了姐妹们，在那里他们执行了新的遗嘱，并没有为斯蒂芬的遗嘱提供任何条款。在最后一个姐姐去世后，巡回法庭驳回了当事人关于具体履行协议的法案。在申诉中可以肯定的是，密歇根苏美法院认为除了姐姐没有考虑之外，关于斯蒂芬和所有其他人的协议，姐妹们每人都只能在另一方的选择下接受约束，而且每一方都可以撤销其他人的许可。新遗嘱的执行表明了一个共同的目的，即废除所有协议，将任何事情都留给原告，每个姐妹的意愿都等于撤销协议，而另一个姐妹的协议是在不存在的情况，相当于是推断就书面协议需改一些规定。罗斯与密西根州南密歇根国家银行328密歇根州639,44 N.W. （2d）192（1950）。 法院对目前事实情况的处理是，即使斯蒂芬的意见不存在，两姐妹之间也达成了相互遗嘱的约束协议，与菲尔普斯诉Pipher案件一样，是连续第二起案件忽视或避开密歇根州贝恩州“合同法”3对受益人权利的影响。 12摩尔 对米切尔，前注3。13关于工人赔偿保险费索赔是否构成法律冲突的税收索赔，似乎没有什么威慑力。一些论可能是因为一些决定认为失业和工人补偿保费索赔是用于破产目的而执行的税收。见135 A.L.R. 1509（1941）; 161 A丄.R。 217（1946）。另一方面，纽约市一家市级法院根据与主要案件相同的事实，最近驳回了关于工人赔偿保险费索赔属于税收或刑事索赔的说法，理由是国家正在进行这种收集是以专有而非公共的身份行事。俄亥俄州诉威尔科克斯建公司，100 N.Y.S. （2d）508（1950）。 可能整个协议可能被认为是无效的，因为斯蒂芬的想法没有得到执行失，所以两个姐姐都没有收到其他相关的条款，这包括斯蒂芬的一些考虑。参见Williston，合同100,115（1936）。320 密歇根州. 663, 31 N.W. (2d) 836 (1948).从历史上看，密歇根州是最后一个违反英国禁止受益人起诉合同的管辖区之一，该条约“几乎在每个国家中都被废除，或者进行理性修改”。在这期间，第三方受益人，除抵押权受益人和保险受益人之外，任何人单方面无权享有合同下的权利，Smith 诉Thompson的案例将密歇根州的法律化为符合其他地方几乎都遵照的法规。最后，这个问题被认为是1937年福利合同法规定的终止。至少律师不会承认任何法律适用于签订相互意愿的合同。在菲尔普斯诉Pipher案中，法院在夫妻双方通过证据确立相互和相互的意愿后达成协议，虽然以假释为依据，但在原告儿子的协议下原告儿子为受益人，他的父母并有权以股权方式为特定目标提起诉讼.但是，由于受益人的权利仅在合同一方当事人死亡的情况下被授予，因此在父母离开原告之前，由其父母撤销没有可执行的权利。 1密歇根州公立法案（1937年），19密歇根州统计局。安。 （1949 Supp。）26.1231至26.1235。2监护人委托人 Corp. v。Brown，290 Mich。433 在 438,287 N.W. 798（1939）。在密歇根州收集更重要的密歇根州决案。 Anno，重申合同，14 Mich。St. B.J.156（1935）。3参见密歇根州圣路易斯市密歇根大街146号（168）（1935）。4ID。在165,166。5250 Mich。302,230 N.W. 156（1930）。见73 A.L.R. 1389（1931）; 29密歇根L. Rev. 365（1931）。这种情况下，认为受赠人有权在合同一方死亡后，起诉公平执行承诺，为他的利益制定相互遗嘱，在K.O.M.M.中驳回了相反的意见。诉Sharp，163 Mich。449,128 N.W. 786（1910）。6对于先前在密歇根州旧规则中所做的各种“入侵”，见Smith v。Thompson，250 Mich。302，230 N.W. 156（1930），特别是与受赠受益人有关的情况，参见密歇根大学圣约翰分校156第163期（1935年）。719 Mich。Stat。安。 （1949 Supp。）26.1231至26.1235。8Supra注2。9遗嘱在同一时间被确定，先前协议的证据无可争议。但在Eicholtz v。Grunewald，313 Mich。666,21 N.W. （2d）914（1946），由法院区分，只是在不同时间执行相同意愿不足以建立协议。见Eicholtz v。Grunewald案，见上文，677,678。在密歇根州的案例中存在这种主张的很多权力。参见例如Smith诉T1儿子，前注8; Eicholtz v。Grunewald，前注11。根据该协议受益人是“受赠人”或“受益人”。参见Grismore，合同231（1947）; 2威利斯顿，合同356（1936）; 1复合重述133（a）（1932）; 14 Mich。St. B.J. 156，161 et seq。 （1935年）。由于密歇根受益人法规区分了“受赠人”和“债权人”，因此要考虑这一重要的点。 19 Mich。Stat。安。 （1949 Supp。）26.1233。19 Mich。Stat。安。 （1949 Supp。）26.1231至26.1235显然被律师忽视，依赖于先前的案件。 制定遗嘱合同，而不是遗嘱本身，这是不可撤销的。这仅仅是因为股权决定的具体表现。 .只有行为权才能执行合同，如果有的话，其中一个遗嘱人因其离世后而归属于受益人。“Keasey v。Engles，259 Mich。178 at 182,183,242 N.W. 878（1932）因此，无论在菲尔普斯还是在本案中，原告都被剥夺了具体的履行条款，尽管该法规似乎表明了具有相反的结果。根据该法规，除非法院认为适合在某些隐含的条件或限制条件下得以适用，或者隐含“某些规定、协议或条款”，否则受赠人的权利必须在达成一致意见的时刻得到归属。 “相反，”合宪