CorporateFinanceandtheLifeCycleoftheFirm公司金融与企业生命周期.pptVIP

Corporate Finance and the Life Cycle of the Firm 公司金融与企业生命周期,Stewart C. Myers China International Conference in Finance July 8, 2004 2004中国金融国际年会 2004年7月8日,Corporate Finance and the Life Cycle of the Firm 公司金融与企业生命周期,Functions of financial markets and institutions 金融市场与金融机构的功能 Corporate governance 公司治理 Coinvestment of human and financial capital 人力资本与金融资本的共同投资 The life cycle 生命周期 Startup and growth 初创与成长期 Going concern 持续经营期 Cash cow in decline 衰退中的现金牛期,Financial Markets and Institutions 金融市场与金融机构,First task: 首要任务 Move capital into companies with positive-NPV investments. 向那些拥有正NPV投资项目的企业投入资金 Move capital out of companies with negative-NPV investments. 从那些拥有负NPV投资项目的企业抽出资金 Corporate governance: protect investors so that capital can move efficiently. 公司治理：保护投资者以便实现资金的有效转移,Protection of investors对投资者的保护,Complete protection of investors is not feasible and not desirable. 完全的投资者保护不可行，也没有必要 Managers know more than investors. 经理层比投资者知道的更多 Incomplete contracting: managers must have discretion. 不完全合同：经理层必须拥有判断力 Discretion means that managers self-interest must be respected. 判断力意味着必须尊重经理层自我利益 Coinvestment of human and financial capital. 人力资本和金融资本的共同投资 Maximize firm value, not shareholder value. 公司价值最大化，而非股东价值最大化,Coinvestment 共同投资,Choose financial architecture to assure efficient coinvestment. 选择金融架构以确保有效共同投资 Incentives激励 Risk sharing风险分担 Optimize (dont maximize) bargaining power of financial capital. 金融资本谈判力的最优化（不是最大化） Danger of short-termism. 短期危机,The Life Cycle 生命周期,Startup and growth 初创期及成长期 Preserve managers bargaining power ex post. 根据过去发展情况，保持经理层的谈判力 Going concern 持续经营期 Stable allocation of bargaining power. 谈判力的稳定分配 Cash cow in decline 衰退中的现金牛期 Shift bargaining power to outside investors. 转移谈判力到外部投资者,Startup and growth financing innovation 初创及成长期融资创新,Entrepreneur contributes sweat equity. 企业家贡献人力资本 Several years commitment, high risk of failure. 多年承诺，并面临高失败风险 Requires fair (high) upside compensation if success. 成功时，要求公平（高）薪酬 Ex post bargaining power may be limited. 事后谈判力可能受到限制 Outside investors cant commit to pay fair upside compensation. 外部投资者不能确保支付公平的高薪酬 Incomplete contracting 不完全合同 Staged investment to shut down failures. 分段投资以及时停止失败项目,Why does venture capital work? 为什么要进行风险投资？,Limited life private equity partnership must cash out. IPO or sale of startup IPO或启动销售 Early IPO preserves entrepreneurs incentives. 及早进行IPO能够保持企业家的积极性 Entrepreneurs are paid with a forward-looking currency, common stock. 支付企业家forward-looking currency,普通股,Cash cow in decline 衰退中的现金牛期,Human capital in declining firms doesnt want to leave. 衰退企业中的人力资本不愿意离开 Cant write contract that would force efficient disinvestment. (NPV not verifiable.) 没有书面合同防止无效投资（NPV不可证实） Therefore shift bargaining power to financial capital. 因此，需要转移谈判力给金融资本 LBOs, mergers in declining industries 衰退行业中的杠杆收购与并购 Stock incentives for top management 高级管理层的股权激励,Going concerns 持续经营期,Successful corporations continue for generations. 成功的企业会持续经营下去 Value is in organization, not physical assets. 企业价值在于组织本身，而非实物资产 Outside investors have little evident bargaining power. 外部投资者几乎没有明显的谈判力 Boards of directors? 董事会？ Stock options for managers? 经理层的股票期权？ Regulation, legal penalties? 监管，法律惩处？,Going concern equilibrium 持续经营均衡,Coalition of insiders “splits the pie” with financial partners (outside investors). 内部投资者与金融伙伴（外部投资者）“分享蛋糕” Insiders take X% of cash flow, contribute X% of new investment. 内部人获得1X%的现金流，贡献X%的新投资 ( 1 X )% to outside investors. 外部人获得1X%的现金流，贡献1X%的新投资 Each partner maximizes NPV. 各自最大化NPV Efficient investment, assuming: 有效投资，假设： X% stable over time. X%比例保持不变 Open, indefinite horizon. 无限期,Dangers of short-termism 短期危险,In stable equilibrium, the coalition of insiders has the same goals as outside investors. 在稳定均衡中，内部人集团与外部投资者目标一致 Equilibrium can break down if: 如果出现以下情况，均衡会被破坏： Sharing rule (X%) is expected to change. 预期分享规则(X%)发生变化 Fixed horizon. 有限期 Coalition of insiders breaks up, e.g., if top management wants to cash out in a bubble. 内部人集团破裂，例如，泡沫现象下高级管理层套现,Going-concern equilibrium 持续经营均衡,Open horizon mitigates agency problems that dominate static models. 开放模型能够在一定程度上克服静态模型中存在的代理问题 Corporate governance doesnt have to force good behavior, just support the equilibrium. 公司治理并不优化行为，只是维持均衡,Concluding comments 结论,Coinvestment of human and financial capital. 人力资本与金融资本的共同投资 No single optimum financial architecture. 不存在统