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法学研究方法作业 TheForgottenDinnerGuest:TheBeyondaReasonableDoubtStandardinaMotionforaJudgmentofAcquittalinaFederalBenchTrialJaredKneiteltAbstractInparisontociviltrials,criminaltrialsaredecidedonmorestringentstandardsofproofHowever,motionsforjudgmentofacquittalincriminalnon-jurytrialsarecurrentlydecidedonamerelegalsufficiencystandardasopposedtothebeyondareasonabledoubtstandard.ThisArticleexaminesthelackofreasoninganduniformityindecidingthesemotionsaswellasthepotentialdangersandinjusticesposedtoadefendantbyapplyingalowerstandard.Throughanexaminationofbothdomesticandforeignlaw,theauthorarguesfortheapplicationofthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardwhendeterminingmotionsforjudgmentofacquittalincriminalnon-jurytrials.WeletotheDinnerParty:IntroductionThestandardforjudgingaciviltrialislowerthanthestandardforjudgingguiltinacriminaltrial,andthereisnojuryinanon-jurytrial.Somehow-despitethesetwoveryobviousconclusions-thenieenthcenturystandardfordeterminingamotionforadirectedverdictinaciviljurytrialisstillappliedtoourmodemmotionforajudgmentofacquittalinacriminalnon-jurytrial.Inacriminaltrial,atthecloseofthegovernmentscase-in-chief,thedefensemaymakeamotionforajudgmentofacquittalononeormoreoffensescharged.Ifthemotionisunsuessfulandthedefensecallsacase,thedefensemaymakeanothermotionforajudgmentofacquittalatthecloseofitscase.ThisArticleconcernsonlythemotionattheendofthegovernmentscase.Atpresent,themotionwillsueedonlyifthegovernmenthasnotpresentedlegallysufficientevidenceofalltheelementsoftheparticularoffenseoroffenses.ThisArticlediscusseswhy,inanon-jurytrial,thebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardshouldbeapplied-insteadofmerelythelegalsufficiencystandard-whenthebenchconsidersamotionforajudgmentofacquittal.Notknowingwhetherthegovernmenthasproven-inthejudgesmind-thedefendantsguiltbeforeinvitingthedefendanttocallacaseactuallymilitatesagainstthepresumptionofinnocence,theassurancethatthegovernmentdischargesitsburden,andthedefendantsrighttoremainsilent.ThisArticleshowsthatthejurisprudenceintheUnitedStatesimproperlycites,forthestandardfordeterminingwhethertograntordenyamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinanon-jurytrial,eitherthestandardinajurytrialorthestandardforappellatereview.ThisArticleexaminesthehistorical(lackof)developmentofthemotionforajudgmentofacquittalandtheperceivedconstitutionalpreclusionagainstthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandard.Namely,thebench-asthearbiteroflaw-cannotusurpadefendantsSixthAmendmentprotectiontobetriedonthefactsbyajuryofhispeers.Ofcourse,inanon-jurytrial,thebenchisboththearbiteroflawandfact-finder;hence,thereisnoSixthAmendmentpreclusion.Atpresent,thereisnoruleintheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedureexplicitlygoverningamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinabenchtrial.IsitRule236(JuryorNonjuryTrial)orRule29(MotionforaJudgmentofAcquittalinaJuryTrial)thatgovernsthemotion?AlthoughdistrictcourtjudgesinalmostallofthereporteddecisionsassumeRule29governs,thereareseveralcasesinwhichdistrictcourtjudgeshaveturnedtoRule23asthegoverningstatute.Further,evenamongtheauthorsoftreatisesontheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedure,thereisdisagreementastowhatRulegoverns.WrightsFederalPracticeandProcedurediscussesamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinabenchtrialunderRule29.oYetMooresFederalPracticestates,Rule29hasnorealapplicationwhenacaseistriedbythecourtsincethepleaofnotguiltyasksthecourtforajudgmentofacquittal.ThisArticleconcludesbyproposinganewRule29(e)toresolvethisambiguityandtomakeclearthatthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardisthestandardthatshouldbeemployedindeterminingamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinabenchtrial.I.ByInvitationOnly:RespondezSilVousPlaitAcriminaldefendantisnotguiltyunlessprovenguilty;thegovernmentbearstheburdenofprovingthecriminaldefendantguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt;andthegovernment(notthedefendant)mustintroduceevidencesufficienttopersuadethefact-finder,beyondareasonabledoubt,ofthedefendantsguilt.14Thus,ifthegovernmentdoesnotintroduceevidencetoprovethedefendantguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt,thenthedefendantisnotguilty.Attheconclusionofthegovernmentscase,thegovernmentscasewillpresumably-andinalmostallcircumstances-beatitshighest.Ifthegovernmenthasnotprovenitscasebeyondareasonabledoubtafterthepresentationofitsevidence,whenwilliteverbeabletoproveitscasebeyondareasonabledoubt?Thisbegstheverysimplequestion:Ifthedefendantisnotguiltyattheconclusionofthegovernmentscase-inchief,whyshouldthedefendantbeinvitedtocalladefense?Althoughthegovernmentmayhavepresentedlegallysufficientevidenceoftheoffensescharged,thejudgestillmaynotfindatthecloseofthegovernmentscasethatthegovernmentproveditscasebeyondareasonabledoubt.Forexample,thejudgemayfindtheaountsofthegovernmentwitnessestobeunworthyofbelief(eitheraloneorinbination)orcircumstantialevidencepresentedtobetoocircumspecttosustainaconviction.Asalways,thegovernmentmustproveitscasebeyondareasonabledoubt.Thisburdeniswithouttheassistanceofanydefenseevidence(includingthedefendantstestimony).Effectively,invitingthedefendanttocalladefensecase-despitetheuncertaintyofwhetherthegovernmenthasproveditscasebeyondareasonabledoubtatthecloseofitscaseandwhetherthejudgewouldhaveacquittedthedefendantofanoffensecharged-reducesthegovemmentsburdenatthatstage.Thisinvitationtothedefendanttocalldefensewitnessesorforthedefendanttotestifyonhisownbehalfmilitatesagainstthegovernmentsobligationtoproveitscase.Suchaninvitationshouldbecorrectlyconsideredasnotonlyareductionofthegovernmentsburden(andthereforeimpermissibleburdenshifting)butalsoaviolationofdueprocess.Elevatingthegovernmentsburdenatthemotionforajudgmentofacquittalstagetobeyondareasonabledoubtactuallystrengthensthepresumptionthatthedefendantisnotguiltyandproperlyholdsthegovernmenttoitsburden.Thisstrengthenstherequirementthatthegovernmentproveitscasebasedsolelyonitsownevidenceandwithouttheassistanceoftheintroductionofadefensecase.1I.TheForgottenDinnerGuest:HistoricalDevelopmentoftheMotionforaJudgmentofAcquittalThemotionforajudgmentofacquittalincriminalsuitsevolvedfromitscounterpartincivilprocedure.Federally,inthelate1700s,civiljudgescouldwithdrawacivilcasefromajuryanddecidethecase;then,themonlawmotionfornon-suitcame;andfinally,inthemidnieenthcentury,thecivilmotionforadirectedverdictemerged.7Themotionforjudgmentofacquittalincriminalcasescamestilllaterandwasprobablyinfluencedbytheseearlierdevelopmentsintheciviltrial.Theearlycasesdirectingacquittaldidsowithoutcitinganyauthoritybutapparentlyassumedsuchpowerwasinherentinthejudgesroleaspresidingofficer.9Indeed,MooresFederalPracticestatesthatRule29(MotionforaJudgmentofAcquittalinajurytrial)oftheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedurewasmodeledonRule50oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure.20Thus,amotionforacquittalinajurytrialisequivalenttoamotionforadirectedverdict(nowcalledjudgmentasamatteroflawunderCivilRule50),orjudgmentnotwithstandingtheverdict(judgmentn.o.v.)underpre-Rulespractice.21However,therestillremainsnolegislationspecificallydirectedtowardsamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinacriminalbenchtrial.Thisisduetolegislativeoversightbased,seemingly,onthemereimportationofthestandardsemployedinaciviljurytrialintoacriminalnon-jurytrialwithoutappropriateconsiderationforthedefendantsexposuretoadeprivationofhisliberty,hisrighttoremainsilent,thegovernmentsburdenofprovingthedefendantguiltybeyondareasonabledoubtratherthanbyapreponderance,andthepresumptionofthedefendantsinnocence.III.TheHeadoftheTable:ThePrevailingLegalSufficiencyStandardThestandardforjudgingamotionforajudgmentofacquittal-inajurytrialatleast-isbasedonBurksv.UnitedStates.Theprevailingrulehaslongbeenthatadistrictjudgeistosubmitacasetothejuryiftheevidenceandinferencestherefrommostfavorabletotheprosecutionwouldwarrantthejurysfindingthedefendantguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt.23Eventhetrialcourt,whichhasheardthetestimonyofwitnessesfirsthand,isnottoweightheevidenceorassessthecredibilityofwitnesseswhenitjudgesthemeritsofamotionforacquittal.24ThisviewisaeptedontheSixthAmendmentrightthatadefendantbetriedbyajuryofhispeers.Injurytrials,thecourtcannotsubstituteitsjudgmentforthatofthejury.25TodosowouldusurpthepowerofthejuryandviolatetheSixthAmendmentguaranteetobetriedbyonespeers26aswellastheFifthandFourteenthAmendmentsdueprocessprotections.Todate,however,theSupremeCourthasnotconsideredthestandardonamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinanon-jurytrial.Thismightbebecauseesteemedanderuditepractitionershaveeffectivelywrittenoffconsideringthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardinbenchtrialsand,assuch,theissuehasnotreachedtheSupremeCourt.Forexample,Section467ofWrightsFederalPracticeandProcedurestates,Amotionforjudgmentofacquittalatthecloseoftheprosecutionsevidenceinacasetriedtothecourtisconsideredbythesamestandardasinajurycase.29However,noneofthecasesWrightreliesonforthispropositioninSection467areonpoint.IV.TheUnweleGuest:WhenWrightIsWrongForsupport,WrightcitesUnitedStatesv.Salman,oUnitedStatesv.Pierce,3UnitedStatesv.Magallon-Jimenez,32UnitedStatesv.Carter,andUnitedStatesv.Stubler34-noneofwhichweredecidedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt.Salmaninvolvedapre-trialdismissalofanindictment.Pierceinvolvedthetesttobeappliedinappellatereviewofthesufficiencyofevidenceafteratrial,juryorbench,andquotedJacksonv.Virginiafortheappellatestandard.Thus,Piercedidnotconcernadeterminationbythetrialcourtonamotionforacquittal.BothMagallon-JimenezandCarterheldthat,inbothjuryandbenchtrials,thereissufficientevidencetosupportaconvictionif,viewingtheevidenceinthelightmostfavorabletothegovernment,anyrationaltrieroffactcouldhavefoundtheessentialelementsofthecrimebeyondareasonabledoubt.AswithPierce,Magallon-JimenezandCarterconcernedtheappellatereviewofthesufficiencyoftheevidenceanddidnotrelatetoadeterminationofamotionforacquittalattriallevel.40Outofthosefivecases,Stublerwastheonlyonethathappenedtobeabenchtrial.4InStubler,thedefendantmovedforajudgmentofacquittalafterhewasconvicted.42ThedistrictcourtheldthatRule29oftheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedureallowsforamotionforjudgmentofacquittal,andthestandardthecourtmustapplyiswhethertheevidenceisinsufficienttosustainaconviction.Further,thedistrictcourtheldthisstandardremainsthesameeveninanon-jurytrial.Inasurprisedemonstrationofalackofunderstandingofthestandard-StublercitedcivilcaselawregardingtheAgeDiscriminationinEmploymentActtosupportthatholding.45WrightsFederalPracticeandProceduredemonstrates-byitscitationtotheseinappositecases-thatithasnotappropriatelyanalyzedthejurisprudenceinmakingitsassertionthatthestandardinabenchtrialisthesameasinajurytrial.Noneofthesecasesconcernatrial-leveldeterminationofamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinabenchtrialattheconclusionofthegovernmentsevidence.Thus,Wrighthaspropoundedabaselesspropositiononamerecursoryexamination,preventingaproperanalysisofthestandard.Amorethoroughexaminationiswarranted.V.ANostalgicAffair:LetUsGoBacktoCampIntheUnitedStates,thereareonlythreecasesfoundtodateinwhichthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardwasdiscussedinabenchtrial:UnitedStatesv.Camp,46UnitedStatesv.Laikin,4andUnitedStatesv.CascadeLinenSupplyCorp.ofNewJersey.8InCamp,atwo-defendantcasetriedbeforeadistrictjudge,amotionforajudgmentofacquittalwasmadeafterthecloseofthegovernmentsevidenceandbeforeeitherdefendantputonacase.49Thecourtexpresslyconsideredwhetherthestandardonthemotionshouldbewhethertheevidencewasinsufficienttosustainaconvictionandheld,logically,thatstandardmeantwhetherthegovernmentsevidenceprovedthedefendantguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt.oAordingtothecourt,ifthegovernmentdidnotprovethedefendantguiltyandthecaseweretoproceed,continuingwiththecasewouldputuponthedefendanttheriskthatbyhisownevidence,asbytestimonyproducedoncross-examination,hemightsupplytheevidencewhichconvincesthetrieroffactofhisguilt,whereabsentsuchevidencethetrieroffactwouldnotbesoconvinced.TosubjectthedefendantinacriminalcasetosuchariskwouldbecontrarytotheprinciplesbywhichthecriminallawhasdevelopedintheUnitedStates.Itwouldineffectrequirethedefendanttoassistinprovidingavitalelementoftheevidencewhichconvictshim.Thus,Campallowedforacoordinatedeffortof(1)thepresumptionofinnocence,(2)thegovernmentsevidentiaryburdenofprovingthedefendantguilty(ifitcan),and(3)thedefendantsrighttoremainsilenttoprotectthedefendantfromconviction.WhileCampsreasoningappearssensible,somecourtshaveexpresslyrejectedtheCamplogic.InLaikin,thedefendantinabenchtrialrequestedthecourttoconsiderwhether,onhismotionforajudgmentofacquittal,thegovernmentsevidenceprovedhimguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt.TheLaikincourt,citingtheSeventhCircuitcaseofUnitedStatesv.Feinberg5,4heldthatthecorrectstandardistakingthegovernmentsevidenceinthelightoraspectmostfavorabletothegovernment.TheFeinbergcourt,inmakingitsholding,citedGlasserv.UnitedStates,57UnitedStatesv.Velasco,andUnitedStatesv.DeNiro.9However,Glasser,Velasco,andDeNiroeachrefertothestandardofappellatereview.60UnitedStatesv.CascadeLinenSupplyCorp.ofNewJerseyPsimilarlydeclinedtofollowCamp.62Thedefendantsinabenchtrialmovedforjudgmentsofacquittalafterthecloseofthegovernmentsevidence.CampwasnotfollowedinCascadeLinenbecausethedistrictjudgeheld-withoutcitinganyauthority-thatdeterminingwhetherthegovernmentproveditscasebeyondareasonabledoubtatthecloseofthegovernmentscasewouldseverelyimpairtheorderlydispositionoftheissues.Thejudgealsoheld,againwithoutcitinganyauthority,thatdeterminingthemotionusingthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardwouldbetantamounttosubmittingtheevidencetothetrierofthefactstwice.Tothisdefendantsarenotentitled.65Thejudgefurtherindicated,withoutdiscussion,thathewasunabletounderstandthedefendantscontentionsthatthepresumptionoftheirinnocenceandtheirrighttoremainsilentandoffernoproofwereinsomewaydiminishedorimpairedbyhisruling.6FromthelanguageandtoneinCascadeLinen,itappearsthejudgewaseagertoconvictthedefendants.Indeed,afterthedefendantsrespectivemotionsforjudgmentofacquittalweredenied,thedefendantsrested.Theywerethenconvicted.68Hereinliestheproblem.Thecourtcanreadilydenyamotionforajudgmentofacquittal.Uponthisdenial,thedefendantisstilllefttospeculateandguesswhetherthegovernmentsatisfieditsburden-onthegovernmentsevidence-ofprovingthedefendantguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt.Thus,notknowingwhetherthegovernmenthasdischargeditsburdenleavesthepresumptionofinnocenceandthedefendantsrighttoremainsilentinpetitionwiththegovernmentsobligationtodischargeitsburdenwhen,infact,thesethreeaimsshouldbecooperatingwithoneanother.VI.PasstheSalt:TheInternationalTribunals-AnExerciseinImpermissibleBurdenShiftingAsaparativestudy,considerthattheproceedingsbeforeinternationalwarcrimestribunalsarebenchtrials.Althoughinanumberofinstancesthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardwasarguedbydefensecounselonamotionforajudgmentofacquittalatthecloseofthegovernmentscase,70theuseofthelegalsufficiencystandardbecamesettledlaw.Unfortunately,thiswaswithoutthebenefitofanyrealanalysis.TheAppealsChamberJudgementinProsecutorv.Jelisidistheleadingcaseamongtheinternationaltribunalsforuseofthelegalsufficiencystandardindeterminingamotionforajudgmentofacquittal-knownasRule98biS73-atthecloseoftheprosecutionsevidence.TheAppealsChamberinJelisidfollowed74itspriorAppealsChamberJudgementinProsecutorv.Delalid,whichinturncitedtheAppealsChamberJudgementinProsecutorv.Tadie,theAppealsChamberJudgementinProsecutorv.Aleksovski,nandtheTrialChambersDecisiononMotionforAcquittalinProsecutorv.Kunara78forsupport.However,thoseportionsofAleksovskiandTadidreferredtobytheDelalidAppealsChamberJudgementconcernthestandardofappellatereviewindeterminingwhetheratrialchambersfactualfindingcanwithstandappellatescrutiny-thatis,legalsufficiency.79Assuch,TadidandAleksovskiareincorrectlycitedbyDelalidforthepropositionthatthestandardatrialcourtsittingwithoutajuryshouldusetodetermineamotionforajudgmentofacquittalisalsolegalsufficiency.TheTrialChambersDecisiononMotionforAcquittalinProsecutorv.Kunara6held-citingtheTrialChambersDecisiononDefenceMotionsforJudgementofAcquittalinProsecutorv.Kordi8-thattheappropriatetesttobeappliedonamotionforajudgmentofacquittalwasnotwhethertherewasevidencewhichsatisfiedtheTrialChamberbeyondreasonabledoubtoftheguiltoftheaused(asthedefenceinthatcasehadargued),butratheritwaswhethertherewasevidenceonwhichareasonableTrialChambercouldconvict.82Allthingsconsidered,theTrialChamberinKunaraldiditsbestnottoimpugnthepriorjurisprudenceontheissue.Thus,Kunarad,shiftingtheburdenofproofofftheshouldersoftheprosecution,noted-withoutcitinganyauthority-thatiftheTrialChamberwereentitledtoweighquestionsofcreditgenerallywhendeterminingwhetherajudgmentofacquittalshouldbeentered,andifitfoundthatsuchajudgmentwasnotwarranted,theperceptionwouldnecessarilybecreated(whetherornotitisaurate)thattheTrialChamberhadaeptedtheevidenceoftheprosecutionswitnessesascredible.Suchaconsequencewouldthenleadtotwofurtherperceptions:(1)thattheausedwillbearatleastanevidentiaryonustopersuadetheTrialChambertoalteritsaeptanceofthecredibilityoftheprosecutionswitnesses,and(2)thattheausedwillbeconvictedifhedoesnotgiveevidencehimself.HewouldvirtuallyberequiredtowaivetherightgiventohimbytheTribunalsStatutetoremainsilent.83AnanalysisofKordi-thecasespawningtheseminalmisunderstandingoftheproperapplicationofamotionforajudgmentofacquittalattheinternationaltribunals-isthuswarranted.First,theTrialChamberinKordidseemedsatisfiedthatbecauseothertrialchambersattheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslaviawereusingastandardlowerthanbeyondareasonabledoubt,usingalowerstandardwastheappropriatethingtodo.Withoutanyanalysis,theTrialChamberindicatedthatimplicitinRule98bisproceedingsisthedistinctionbetweenthedeterminationmadeatthehalfwaystageofthetrial,andtheultimatedecisionontheguiltoftheausedtobemadeattheendofthecase,onthebasisofproofbeyondareasonabledoubt.TheTrialChamberfailedtoprovideanybasisorreasoningforthatdistinction.Next,theKordidTrialChamberlookedtotheTrialChambersDecisiononDefenceMotiontoDismissChargesinProsecutorv.Tadid,theTrialChambersOrderontheMotionstoDismisstheIndictmentattheCloseoftheProsecutorsCaseinProsecutorv.Delali6,theTrialChambersDecisionofTrialChamberIontheDefenceMotiontoDismissinProsecutorv.Blaikid,an