麦肯锡-加州电力-电力危机咨询报告.PPT

LighteningStrikesTwice:CaliforniaFacesaRealRiskofASecondPowerCrisis,LakeTahoeEnergyConference,July30,2004,CONFIDENTIAL,Thisreportissolelyfortheuseofclientpersonnel.Nopartofitmaybecirculated,quoted,orreproducedfordistributionoutsidetheclientorganizationwithoutpriorwrittenapprovalfromMcKinseyitisnotacompleterecordofthediscussion.,TakingTheRightStepsToEnsureAPowerfulFuture,更多免费资料，尽在,1,5stepsthatwillensurealong-termsustainablemarketforpower,THESTATEISATRISKOFANOTHERPOWERCRISIS,BUT5KEYSTEPSWILLHELPTOENSUREASUSTAINABLEPOWERMARKET,Actionneedstobetakentodaytopreventanotherenergycrisis,Newgenerationneedstobebuilttoday,giventhelongleadtime,andamechanismformarket-basedcontractswithutilitiesneedstobeintroducedCaliforniashouldintroducemandatorytime-of-usemeteringforallclassesofcustomersNewtransmissionneedstobebuiltandfacilitatedthroughaexpeditedandcoordinatedapprovalprocessbythePUC,ISO,CEC,andFERCAformalcapacitymarketcombinedwithamandatoryplanningreservetarget(e.g.,15-20%)needstobeinplaceby2006TheStateshouldre-introduceelementsofretailchoice,providinganopportunityforlargeconsumerstoshopforpower,CECestimatesindicatethatoperatingreservescoulddropbelowtypical“emergency”levelsifwehaveahotsummerUnfortunately,theCECsdemandestimatesappearlowrelativetotrendanda“highdemandcase”(i.e.,hotsummer)maybeaslikelyasa1-in-5occurrenceTakingintoaccountrealisticlevelsoffuturedemand,operatingreservescouldbeextremelytightby2006aslowas5.8%(ina1-in-5yeardemandcase),2,THESTATESENERGYAGENCIESPROJECTANEAR-TERMRISKOFLOWRESERVEMARGINSINAHOTYEAR,*Operatingreservemargincalculatedas(AvailableSupplyPeakDemand)/(PeakDemand)Source:CaliforniaEnergyCommission(July8,2004updatetoJune24,2004report),1-in-10year(hot),1-in-2year(average),CECESTIMATES,August2005,August2006,August2007,August2008,ProjectedCaliforniastateoperatingreservemargin*Percent,August2004,7%target=StageOneemergencylevel,5%target=StageTwoemergencylevel,Reservemarginsconsistentlydropbeginningin2006,Demand,3,ENERGYAGENCYFORECASTSOFFUTUREDEMANDAREOPTIMISTICCOMPAREDTOALTERNATIVEPROJECTIONS,ESTIMATESOF1-IN-2YEARPEAKDEMAND,Peakdemand(averageweather),afterconservationGW,*Regressionprojectionbasedonhistoricweather,historicGSP,currentGSPprojections(5.6%),andaverageweather*BasedonhistoricCAGRforpeakdemandgrowthbeforeincludingconservation(underlyinggrowthof1.88%for1983-2003)andadjustedforexpected2004-2008conservationinCalifornia(providedbyCEC)Source:CaliforniaEnergyCommission;BureauofEconomicAnalysis;E,Regressionmodel*,CEC-July2004,Trend*,Differentmodelsofdemand,CEC-May2003,For2006,theCECsestimateis1,000MWbelowtrend-lineestimatesand2,100MWbelowaregressionmodelestimate,4,THEPOTENTIALFORA“HIGHDEMANDCASE”ISASHIGHASA1-IN-5EVENT,RATHERTHANJUSTA1-IN-10EVENT,1in2demand,1in5demand,1in10demand,DistributionofaveragestatewidepeaktemperatureNumberofyearsobservedoverpast40years,*BasedonBAEFregression-modelestimatesof2006peakdemandSource:CaliforniaEnergyCommission,TemperaturerangeDegreesFahrenheit,8outofthelast40years(or20%),peaktemperatureshavebeen101degreesorhigherThereislittledemanddifference,though,between101degreesand101.5degrees,1in10101.5,1in5101,Potential2006peakdemand*GW,BASEDONHISTORICDATA,+3.4%,+2.7%,5,TAKINGINTOACCOUNTADIFFERENTVIEWOFFUTUREDEMAND,THERISKOFSHORTAGESISEVENSTARKER,*Operatingreservemargincalculatedas(AvailableSupplyPeakDemand)/(PeakDemand)*Asmuchas2,000MWwouldberequiredtomaintainaplanningreservemarginof15%forthe1-in-5case,whichwouldequatetoa1-in-2operatingreserveof12.1%anda1-in-5operatingreserveof9.1%Source:CaliforniaEnergyCommission(July8,2004updatetoJune24,2004report);McKinseyanalysis,1in5year,1in2year,BAEFESTIMATE,7%target=StageOneemergencylevel,750MWofnewcapacitywillbeneededbefore2006tomaintaina7%operatingreserveundera1-in-5case*Giventheleadtimefornewconstruction,permittinganddemandsidemanagementneedstobegintoday,August2005,August2006,August2007,August2008,ProjectedCaliforniastateoperatingreservemargin*Percent,5%target=StageTwoemergencylevel,Demand,6,THESTATEISATRISKOFANOTHERPOWERCRISIS,BUT5KEYSTEPSWILLHELPTOENSUREASUSTAINABLEPOWERMARKET,5stepsthatwillensurealong-termsustainablemarketforpower,Actionneedstobetakentodaytopreventanotherenergycrisis,Newgenerationneedstobebuilttoday,giventhelongleadtime,andamechanismformarket-basedcontractswithutilitiesneedstobeintroducedCaliforniashouldintroducemandatorytime-of-usemeteringforallclassesofcustomersNewtransmissionneedstobebuiltandfacilitatedthroughaexpeditedandcoordinatedapprovalprocessbythePUC,ISO,CEC,andFERCAformalcapacitymarketcombinedwithamandatoryplanningreservetarget(e.g.,15-20%)needstobeinplaceby2006TheStateshouldre-introduceelementsofretailchoice,providinganopportunityforlargeconsumerstoshopforpower,CECestimatesindicatethatoperatingreservescoulddropbelowtypical“emergency”levelsifwehaveahotsummerUnfortunately,theCECsdemandestimatesappearlowrelativetotrendanda“highdemandcase”(i.e.,hotsummer)maybeaslikelyasa1-in-5occurrenceTakingintoaccountrealisticlevelsoffuturedemand,operatingreservescouldbeextremelytightby2006aslowas5.8%(ina1-in-5yeardemandcase),7,MARKET-BASEDLONG-TERMCONTRACTSSHOULDBEADOPTEDTOFACILITATEGENERATIONCONSTRUCTION,andwhatmarket-basedpriceswouldlooklikeunderthecontracts,DWRcontractprice(2003average),CaliforniacostofgenerationDollarsperMWh,Capacitypayment*,Electricitypriceundernewmarket-basedcontracts*,ILLUSTRATIVE,*All-inwholesaleelectricitypriceincludingcapacitypayment,gasprice,energycosts*Assumes15%ROE,8%costofdebt,$450/kWCCGTinvestmentcost,10-yearreturnperiodSource:CaliforniaDWR;NYMEX;McKinseyanalysis,Howcontractswouldwork,Whowillbuy:Inthenearterm,utilitieswillberesponsibleforsigningcontractswiththewinningbidders,withguaranteedraterecoveryofcontractcosts,Whowillbuild:CompetitiveRFPprocessallowingutilityaffiliatesormerchantgeneratorstobid,Howwillcontractsbepriced:Willbemarketbasedcontracts,withanROEoncapitalinvestmentandpassthroughofvariablegenerationcostsCapacitypaymentwillprovidereturnoncapitalinvestmentEnergypaymentwillbebasedonaspecifiedplantefficiencyandindexedtonaturalgasprices,1,8,THEREAREANUMBEROFSOURCESOFCAPACITYTHATCOULDBEBROUGHTONLINEBY2006IFTHESTATEACTSNOW,*Includesprojectsunderconstructiondelayedmorethan24monthsfrominitialplannedonlinedate*Assumesmostoftheseplantsare40%complete(asofJuly2004)Source:CaliforniaEnergyCommission;McKinseyanalysis,Plantspartlyconstructed,butincompleteduetofinancingorlackofcontracts*,PlantswithpermitsfromtheCPUCbutnotunderconstruction,Plantsthathavebeenmothballed,butcouldbebroughtbackonline,Toensurenewcapacityisbroughtonlinebythesummerof2006,theCPUCmustactnowtoensurethatlong-termcontractsareavailabletogeneratorstocompleteexistingprojects,Stepstobringcapacityonline,RelaxedenvironmentalrestrictionsShorttermcontractsE.g.,Etiwanda,Mid-longtermcontracts(5-10years)E.g.,Metcalf,Pico,Longtermcontracts(5-10years)ExtendedpermitshelflifeE.g.,Tesla,SanJoaquin,3-6,8-12*,12-18,1,9,CALIFORNIALAGSOTHERSTATESINITSDEMANDSAVINGSFROMLOADMANAGEMENTPROGRAMS,Note:IncludesonlyutilitiesreportingDSMactivitiesSource:EIA;statedisclosures,Top25statesinloadmanagementDSMsavings2002annualloadmanagementsavingsaspercentof(Savings+Peak),MW,Top25statesinpeakDSMsavingsfromenergyefficiency2002annualpeaksavingsfromenergyefficiency,MW,IfCaliforniaachievedlevelsofFlorida,Itcouldseeareductionofdemandby2GWinloadmanagementalone,EventhoughCaliforniaisaleaderinenergyefficiency,thereisroomtoimproveby900MW,Florida,California,2,10,TIMEOFUSEPRICINGINCALIFORNIAISADEMANDSIDEMANAGEMENTPROGRAMTHATCOULDPAYFORITSELF,*Assumesreal-timepriceswillcauselargeCMcKinseyanalysis,Benefitsoftime-of-usepricingRatepayerswouldsaveapproximately$270million-$380millionannuallyFewernewpeakerplantsneededGasdemandreducedEnvironmentalbenefits(NOxreduction,waterconservation,etc.),10-yearsavingsfromdemandresponse(loadshiftingandcurtailing*),Total10-yearsavings,Costofprogram*,4.8-5.1,1.0-1.7,2.7-3.8,Californianswillbenefitinmanywaysfromtime-of-usepricing$Billions,2,11,MULTIPLEAGENCIESHAVEJURISDICTIONOVERTRANSMISSIONPLANS,SLOWINGSITINGANDCONSTRUCTION,Source:CECreports,Requiredapproval,Participatingtransmissionowners,SystemimpactstudyFacilitiesstudies,Typicaltime,30-60days,CAISO,CPUC,CertificateofPublicConvenienceandNecessity(above200kV),Evaluationcriteria,Scopeandcostoftransmissionupgradesnecessaryforinterconnection,Shared,Duplicate,EconomicandreliabilityimpactonoverallgridEnvironmental,societalandaestheticfactors,SystemimpactstudyandfacilitiesstudiesIntegratedgridassessment,VerifiesPTOanalysisEconomicandreliabilityimpactonoverallgrid,60-90days,12-30months,3,12,OTHERSTATESWITHRESERVETARGETSANDCAPACITYMARKETSHAVESEENSTABLECAPACITYANDLOWVOLATILITY,*Measuredbystandarddeviationdividedbyaverageofmonthlywholesaleprices.LaterofApril1998ormarketopenthroughJune2004(exceptCalifornia,throughJan2001)*Operatingreservemargincalculatedas(AvailableSupplyPeakDemand)/(PeakDemand)Source:CaliforniaPX;AlbertaPowerPool;PJMISO;CAMMESA;NewEnglandISO;NewYorkISO;PlattsPowerDat,Wholesaleelectricitypricevolatility*Percent,Mandatedquantityofreserves,Incentivepaymentsforcapacity,Nomarketconstraints,2004summerreservemargin*Percent,California(2001),Alberta,ISO-NE,NYISO,PJM,Argentina,4,13,RETAILCHOICEISSOUGHTAFTERMOSTBYLARGECONSUMERS,BUTBENEFITSALLCUSTOMERCLASSES,IntheUK,largeconsumershavebeenthemostfrequentusersofcompetitivesuppliers,Allconsumershaveseenlowerelectricitybillswithmarketrestructuringandretailchoice,Caseexample:UnitedKingdom,Industrial,Switched,Notswitched,Commercial,Switched,Notswitched,Residential,Switched,Notswitched,Estimatedsavingspercustomer*Percent,*Estimatedsavingsincustomerbillssinceprivatization/deregulationadjustingfortheeffectsofi