可操控资产计提减值的原因及结果【外文翻译】 .doc

本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译外文题目 causes and ettects of discretionary asset write-offs 外文出处 journal of accounting research vol.34 supplement 1996 外文作者 jennifer francis,j.douglas hanna,and linda vincent原文：causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offsintroductionthis paper provides evidence on the causes and shareholder wealth effects of discretionary asset write-offs. we use the term write-off to refer to both complete and partial downward asset revaluations, and we describe our sample write-offs as discretionary because over the 1989-92 period covered by the study, there was little authoritative guidance on the accounting for most types of asset impairments, other than inventory.the absence of explicit guidance for many assets permitted substantial management discretion about amounts and timing of write-offs. the american institute of certified public accountants urged the financial accounting standards board in 1980 to examine the asset impairment issue because they believed that the variety of practices, terminology, and valuation methods in use reduced the comparability and consistency of financial statements. these concerns, echoed by the emerging issues task force, the financial accounting standards advisory committee, the financial executives institute, and the national association of accoun- tants, intensified as both the frequency and the magnitude of write-offs increased during the 1980s .the fasbs response was to adopt sfas no. 121 (march 1995) which specifies criteria for determining whether impairment of long-lived assets has occurred and how much impairment should be recognized.the expressed demands for authoritative guidance on the accounting for asset impairments appear to be based on a notion that managements take advantage of the discretion afforded by the accounting rules to manipulate earnings either by not recognizing impairment when it has occurred or by recognizing it only when it is advantageous (to them) to do so. this characterization of write-offs assumes that managers have incentives to manage earnings in these ways, and that investors are somehow unable to undo these manipulations. an alternative view is that managers take write-offs not to manipulate earnings but to reflect declines in the values of assets due to poor firm performance, actions taken by competitors, changes in the economic climate, or changes in management strategies.our study provides evidence on which of these two factors (manipulation or impairment) drives write-off decisions and whether market reactions to write-offs depend on these factors. we investigate the extent to which proxies for managerial incentives to manipulate earnings and proxies for asset impairment explain write-off decisions. for the full sample of write-offs, we find that both factors are important determinants. however, when we analyze write-offs by type (inventory; goodwill; property, plant, and equipment; and restructuring charges), we find that incentives play little or no role in determining inventory and p7yiiwriteoffs but play a substantial role in explaining other, more discretionary items, such as goodwill write-offs and restructuring charges.we examine stock price responses to write-off announcements, both in aggregate and conditional on characteristics of the write-offs. while the results show that, on average, investors view write-offs as negative news, there are significant differences in market responses across the types of write-offs. for example, the results show significant negative reactions to inventory write-offs (consistent with the prediction that these announcements primarily convey information about declines in economic values) and significant positive reactions to restructuring charges (consistent with the view that the greater flexibility in measuring and recognizing restructuring charges allows management to use these items lo signal information about expected future performance).the next section details the selection of the write-off and non-write-off samples and prcnides descriptive statistics about the sample write-off announcements. section 3 describes the determinants of the write-off decision and section 4 discusses the sliareholder wealth effects of the writeoff announcements. section 5 summarizes the results and concludes.sample and descriptive informationwe identify a sample of 3,909 potential write-off announcements published by pr neuiswire hetween january 1, 1989 and december 31, 1992.we eliminate those which do not relate to asset write-downs (n = 3,078), which are preceded by an earlier announcement of the write-off (w =85), or which are made by financial institutions n = 72). for the remaining 674 announcements, we code the date of the announcement (day 0), the fiscal year and quarter in which drie write-off will be included in income, the types of assets written down, the pretax amount of the write-off, and any concurrent disclosures. we also code data on whether the write-off is precipitated by a corporate action (e.g., plant closing;discontinuance of a product line; planned sale of part of a business unit) and whether the announcement provides a positive, negative, or neutral signal about the effect of the write-off on future performance (e.g., statements that the write-off will lead to improved performance are coded as positive; statements that the poor performance which led to the write-off will persist are coded as negative; and all others are coded as neutral).table 1 summarizes information about the sample disclosures. panel a describes the distribution of the write-off announcements across fiscal years and quarters. the majority of write-offs are included in fourthquarter income: of the 433 announcements with fiscal quarter data made over 1989-91, 56% are taken in the fourth quarter. panel a also reports evidence of sample bias introduced by our focus on write-off announcements. specifically, our analyses of the causes and shareholder wealth effects of write-offs are joint tests of managements decisions to write off assets and to disclose in press releases that they have done so.market reactions to write-off announcementswrite-off disclosures potentially convey three kinds of information. the first is information about decreases in economic values of assets; under this view, we expect that unexpectedly large (small) write-offs result in decreases (increases) in market-adjusted returns. the second type of information relates to changes in management strategies; write-offs affect security returns because they are a signal of expected improvements in future performance, with larger write-offs having more positive price effects. finally, write-offs may convey information about the firms willingness and ability to exercise earnings management discretion. holding other factors constant, it is not clear whether investors react positively or negatively to this information. if investors believe this behavior obscures the firms true performance, the reaction should be negative. if, however, investors believe that earnings management improves the quality of earnings (e.g., schipper 1989) or expect the manipulation benefits them at the expense of another group,they might respond positively to management exercise of this discretion.we first investigate whether, on average, stock prices decline (consistent with write-offs revealing information about impairments) or increase (consistent with write-offs signaling improvements in performance) in response to the news in write-off annotmcements. we then compare security price reactions to different types of write-offs. our objective here is to provide evidence on stock price reactions to write-offs which we characterize as having more (less) of the impairment, signaling, and earnings management components.our analysis uses the 507 write-off announcements.for these announcements, we measure the surprise in the write-off announcement as the amount of the announced write-off. because writeoffs are rarely disclosed in isolation of other news events, we also include information about contemporaneotis disclosures. (contemporaneous earnings reports are the most common, found in 82% of the announcements. our proxy for the information conveyed by contemporaneous earnings announcements is the earnings surprise, defined as pretax, pre-write-down reported earnings minus four-quarter-ago (or last years if the firm announced annual earnings) pretax reported earnings. if the write-off was not made contemporaneously with an earnings announcement. in much smaller frequencies, we observe changes in dividends (seven observations), unusual non-write-off-related losses, and unusual gains. we proxy for the surprise in dividend as reported dividends minus last quarters dividends.because we have no expectation of an unusual gain or loss, we use the reported amount of the gain or loss as the measure of the surprise in these items.summary and conclusionthis study examines the determinants of managements write-off decisions and investigates the security price reactions to firms write-off announcements. we posit that the decisions of whether to take a writeoff and how much to take are related both to the extent of impaired assets on the firms books and to incentives the firm has to write down such assets in a particular reporting period. we find that impairment variables (proxied by the firms and its industrys historical security returns, book-to-market ratios, and return-on-asset ratios) are significant m explaining the magnitude and timing of write-offs. controlling for these factors, we find write-offs are more frequent and larger in magnitude if there has been a recent change in management and if the firm and/or its industry has taken write-offs in the past. we also find that expected write-offs are decrmsing in the poor performance of the firm and in the unusually good performance of the firm; these results are opposite the relations predicted by the big bath and smoothing argumentswe also investigate the importance of the incentive variables in explaining different types of write-offs. we predict that the importance of incentives depends on the existence of both independent sources of information for measuring impairment and authoritative guidance on when such impairment must be recognized. for example, we expect that inventory write-offs are less likely to be motivated by incentive factors than are write-offs where there is more flexibility in timing and amount. the results are consistent with the predictions that incentives have no influence on inventory write-offs, have marginal significance in explaining write-offs (where we expect the availability of market/appraised values to assist in determining impairment amounts but the lack of gaap to allow discretion with respect to recognition), and play a substantial role in explaining goodwill write-offs and restructuring charges (which have neither gaap nor independent measures of economic value).tests of the shareholder wealth effects of write-off announcements show significant negative reactions to the vwite-off announcements. we interpret this result as indicating that, on average, investors response is driven more by write-offs revealing information about asset impairments than by write-offs conveying positive signals about future performance. in subsequent tests, where we partition write-offs into those which we expect to be more influenced by impairment effects than signaling effects, we provide further evidence on the strength of these two forces by documenting that investors respond negatively to inventory write-offs (which we view as largely impairment motivated) and positively to restructuring charges (which we view as implicit signals of improved future performance).source: francis.j,hanna.j.d.,vincent.l.causes and effects of discretionary assetwrite-offsj.journal of accounting research,1996.译文：可操控资产计提减值的原因及结果介绍本文主要是分析可操控资产计提减值对股东财富的影响及其原因。我们使用“冲销”同时指代完整和部分资产重新估价，我们描述样本注销为可操控，因为在过去的1989-92的可研究涵盖期间内，没有什么权威性的指导的会计处理方法对于很多类型的资产减损，除了存货。缺乏明确指导使大量的资产冲销在数量和时间上的具有任意性。美国注册会计师协会敦促美国财务会计准则委员会在1980年检查资产减值问题，因为他们相信各种各样的实践、术语和使用中的计价方法降低了财务报表的可比性和一致性。这些被问题工作组、美国财务会计准则谘询委员会、财务主管研究所，全国会计师协会所关注的问题，在20世纪80年代资产注销增加的频率和重要性上被激化。美国财务会计标准委员会对此的提议是采取sfas第121条(1995年3月)，这一条为长期资产的价值是否发生和减值如何被认定确认了标准。权威性的指导要求的会计资产减损似乎是基于这样一个概念：管理层利用会计准则赋予的可支配的规则来操纵盈余，通过不确认资产价值的减损当实际发生时，或者通过确认资产减损当这一做法对于管理层来说是有利的时候。这种计提资产减值准备假设是管理层有利用这几种方式进行盈余管理的动机和投资者在一定程度上无法撤消这些操作。另一种观点是管理层计提减值准备不是为了进行盈余管理而是由于公司业绩不佳、经济环境的变化或管理战略上的变化以反映资产价值的变化。我们的研究为驱使做出计提资产减值准备的决定和市场对于计提资产减值的反映是否取决于这两个因素（操纵好毁损）提供了证据，我们调查了管理激励盈余管理的代理和资产减损解释资产注销决定的代理。对于全部样本，我们发现这两个因素都是很重要的决定因素。然而，当我们通过模型分析资产注销(存货，商誉，财产，工厂，设备，重组支出)，我们发现激励作用发挥很少或根本没有发挥作用在决定存货的价值方面，但是却在解释其他的，更加可以任意支配的项目上起了重要的作用，例如商誉的减值和重组支出。我们检查了股票价格对于披露计提减值准备在总量和有条件下的反映。尽管这一结果表明，平均来说，投资者对于资产减值持有负面消极的态度，然而在市场对于计提资产减值的反映却又很大的不同。例如，结果显示出对于存货价值的冲销显著的消极的反映(符合披露传递资产市场价值下降的信息的预测）和显著的对于重组费用积极的反映（符合在确认和测量重组费用中更大的灵活性使得管理层能够利用利用这些项目来表示对于预期未来业绩的期待）。样本和描述性信息我们分析了一组包含3909个样本的在1989年1月1日起至1992年12月31日之间发生的计提资产减值的公告。我们排除了与资产减值