现行企业会计准则下盈余管理分析研究外文翻译.doc

杭 州 商 学 院 财 务 与 会 计 系 本 科 毕 业 论 文外文翻译之一A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting Author： Paul M. Healy and James M. WahlenNationality：AmericaDerivation: Accounting Horizons Vol.13 No.4 365-383INTRODUCTION In this paper we review the academic evidence on earnings management. The primary purpose of this review is to summarize the implications of scholarly evidence on earnings management to help accounting standard setters and regulators assess the pervasiveness of earnings management and the overall integrity of financial reporting. This review is also aimed at identifying fruitful areas for future academic research on earnings management. Standard setters define the accounting language that management uses to communicate with the firms external stakeholders.1 By creating a framework that independent auditors and the SEC can enforce, accounting standards can provide a relatively low-cost and credible means for corporate managers to report information on their firmsperformance to external capital providers and other stakeholders.2 Ideally, financial reporting therefore helps the best-performing firms in the economy to distinguish themselves from poor performers and facilitates efficient resource allocation and stewardship decisions by stakeholders. If financial reports are to convey managers information on their firms performance, standards must permit managers to exercise judgment in financial reporting. Managers can then use their knowledge about the business and its opportunities to select reporting methods, estimates, and disclosures that match the firms business economics, potentially increasing the value of accounting as a form of communication. However, because auditing is imperfect, managements use of judgment also creates opportunities for “earnings management,” in which managers choose reporting methods andestimates that do not accurately reflect their firms underlying economics.The Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, recently expressed concerns over earnings management and its effect on resource allocation. He noted that management abuses of “big bath” restructuring charges, premature revenue recognition, “cookie jar” reserves, and write-offs of purchased in-process R&D are threatening the credibility of financial reporting. To address these concerns, the SEC is examining new disclosure requirements and has formed an earnings management task force to crack down on firms that manage earnings. The SEC also expects to require more firms to restate Reported earnings and will step up enforcement of disclosure requirements. A number of recent studies, however, sharpen the focus of their tests to examine earnings management using specific accruals, such as bank loan loss provisions, claim loss reserves for property-casualty insurers, and deferred tax valuation allowances.There is evidence that banks use loan loss provisions and insurers use claim loss reserves to manage earnings, particularly to meet regulatory requirements. There is little evidence that firms manage earnings using deferred tax valuation allowances.Much of the evidence on the capital market consequences of earnings management shows that investors are not “fooled” by earnings management and that financial statements provide useful information to investors. Current earnings, which reflect management reporting judgment, have been widely found to be value-relevant and are typically better predictors of future cash flow performance than are current cash flows.Answers to the above questions are difficult to infer from current studies for a number of reasons. First, most academic studies attempt to document earnings management, but do not provide evidence on its extent and scope. Consequently, existing evidence does not help standard setters to assess whether current standards are largely effective in facilitating communication with investors, or whether they encourage widespread earnings management. Second, most studies have examined unexpected accruals for evidence of earnings management. While this research provides a useful summary index of earnings management, it does not show which standards are effective infacilitating communication between managers and investors and which are ineffective. The studies that examine the effects of earnings management on the capital markets leave a number of unanswered questions for future research. First, as noted above, how pervasive is earnings management for capital market reasons, both among the firms sampled and for the population of firms? Second, what is the magnitude of any earnings management? Third, what specific accruals do firms (other than banks and insurers) use to manage earnings? Fourth, why do some firms appear to manage earnings whereas others with similar incentives do not? Finally, under what conditions do market participants detect and, therefore, react to earnings management, and under what conditions do they fail to detect earnings management? For example, do required disclosures that make the use of accounting judgment more transparent help to mitigate the impact of earnings management on resource allocation?In summary, the earnings management studies strongly suggest that regulatory considerations induce firms to manage earnings. There is limited evidence on whether this behavior is widespread or rare, however, and very little evidence on the effect on regulators or investors. 盈余管理文献回顾及其对标准设置的启示作者：Paul M. Healy and James M. Wahlen国籍：美国选自：会计天涯 Vol.13 No.4 365-383介绍:本文我们回顾一些关于盈余管理的相关学术的研究，本文回顾的主要目的是为了总括学者们以及会计标准的设定者和管理者评估盈余管理的普遍性以及对于财务报表的完整性，本文献同时志于对盈余管理的未来学术研究提供有用的鉴戒。标准制定者们对会计语言定义成与公司的外部股东进行交流沟通的管理用途，1通过创造出一种框架，使得独立审计师以及SEC能够加强准则标准，而同时提供相对低成本和可信赖的方式供外部资本供应者和其他的股东。2理想化来说，财务报告相应地能够帮助经营最好的企业在经济上把它们与经营不好的企业区分开来，而同时使得股东能够做好更好的资源配置和相应的投资决策。如果财务报告是为了表达管理者对企业的经营业绩的信息，那么准则必须应该允许管理者们能够在财务报表中行使判断能力。管理者因而能够使用自我的知识来对业务和对适合企业的经济情况的报告方法，估计，披露方式的选择，从而潜在地提高了会计作为一种沟通手段的价值。然而，由于审计的不完善，判断能力作为一种管理手段同样也产生了盈余管理的机会，管理者们通过选择会计方法以及会计假设，从而并不准确地反映他们公司的真实经济情况。美国证券监督管理委员会的主席，Arthur Levitt，最近发表了一项对盈余管理以及其对资源分配的影响的顾虑。他表示，“大洗澡”来重构费用作为管理手段的任意使用，收入的提前确认，“小金库”的设置以及在产品研发费用的冲销，这些都正在威胁着财务报告的可行度。为了处理这些问题，美国证券监督管理委员会正在研究一些披露的条件并已经形成处理那些进行盈余管理的公司的盈余管理工作小组。此外，该组织同时希望更多的企业能够进行整治房地产的收入，并加强对披露的各个要求的执行。然而，最近大量的研究也加强了关于通过使用特定的加息的盈余管理的关注，包括利用银行贷款的损失供应，对资产保险人损失准备金的计提，以及递延税款的价值补贴。有证据表明银行使用贷款损失量，投保人通过对损失准备金的计提来进行盈余管理， 尤其是为了满足调整的需要。也有一些证据表明企业的盈余管理可以通过递延税款的延期确认。对于资本市场盈余管理后果，有大量的证据表明投资者并没有被盈余管理所戏弄，而那些财务报表也提供了有用的信息给投资者。现金收入，作为一项能够反映管理者报告的判断，已经很大程度上对相关价值紧密联系，而同时相对于当前的现金流量，很典型地成为对未来现金流量表现的有效指示器。对于以上的问题的答案要从中推断出一些原因是困难的。首先，大多数的学术研究都是试图通过对盈余管理进行评论，但是并没有对其界限以及程度提供相应的依据。因此，相应地，当前的证据确实不能帮助准则制定者来评估是否当前的标准对于投资者的交流是很大的有效率，或者是否能够允许大范围的盈余管理的存在。其次，大多数的研究都已经认为盈余管理的证据在于不怎么预期的利润增加。尽管本文的研究为盈余管理提供了一种有用的索引性的概括，但是并没有具体地指出对于在管理者和投资者之间哪种标准更加有效率以及哪一种是没有效率的。研究结果认为关于资本市场的盈余管理的效果有很多在未来研究还是不能回答的，首先，正如上面所提到的，对于资本市场盈余管理已经成为了多么普遍的行为，无论是在案例中的企业还是企业的数量角度来说。其次，任何盈余管理的限度是怎么样的？第三，企业经常用来管理收益的特定方法是什么？（而不是银行和投保人）第四，为什么有些企业看起来能够进行盈余管理而其他类似的企业却不能？最后，市场参与者是在何种条件下发现，因此对盈余管理有所反应，以及在何种条件下他们不能发觉盈余管理?例如，所需要的披露真的能够利用会计判断在更加透明的情况下帮助企业对资源分配进行盈余管理吗？总而言之，盈余管理的研究鲜明地表明了调控性的考虑导致企业进行盈余管理，但是，关于这种行为是否普遍存在还是比较稀少的存在，以及这种行为是对管理者产生影响还是对投资者产生影响，相应的证据还是很少的，外文翻译之二Earnings Management Incentives and Techniques in Chinas Listed CompaniesAuthor：Daniel A.CohenNationality：AmericaDerivation: THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW VOL.83,NO.3 2008 757-7871IntroductionUp to date, there is no an agreed definition about earnings management. Schipper (1989) defined earnings management as “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of theprocess).” (Healy and Wahlen 1999) pointed out that “earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” According to the two definitions, earnings management is viewed as a purposeful and deliberate intervention of the external financial reporting, earnings management techniques include not only accounting methods but also non-accounting methods, for example structuring transactions etc. In addition, it is not definitely distinguished whether accounting methods violate generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or not.Scott (1997) defines earnings management as a selection of accounting policies from a set of GAAP by managers to maximize their own utility and/or the market value of the company. Ortega and Grant (2003) argue that earnings management uses the flexibility in financial reporting to alter the financial results of the company. From the two definitions, we can see that earnings management techniques only include accounting methods, and the accounting methods used in earnings management can not be permitted to violate GAAP.Levit (1998) defines earnings management as a gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company. Levit considers that earnings management is equal to earnings manipulation.Carlos Noronha and Yun Zeng (2008) view earnings management as a continuum of purposeful interventions in the external financial reporting process, from legitimate activities to fraud violating GAAP, with the intention of misleading some stakeholders about the underlying economics and performance of the company.In this study, earnings management is viewed as a purposeful intervention of the external financial reporting process, with the intention of misleading some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company.Earnings management techniques include both non-accounting methods and accounting methods within GAAP.2 Earnings Management IncentivesAs stated by Healy and Wahlen( 1999), managers mainly engage in earnings management for four kinds of incentives namely, external contract incentives, management compensation contract incentives, regulatory motivations and capital market motivations. Do the four kinds of earnings management incentives exist in Chin2.1 To avoid external-contract violations External contracts include debt contracts, dividend covenants, supplying contracts etc. As accounting data are used in external cinontracts, managers can alter accounting data by earnings management to meet the contract requirements. For example debt contract, the use of accounting data in debt contract is observed in China. Chinese banks can require companies to maintain specified levels of debt to equity, interest coverage, or working capital. If these covenants are violated, Chinese banks can impose penalties such as higher interest rates, or constraints on additional borrowing or demanding immediate repayment. Therefore, when companies are close to debt covenants and are likely to violate them, managers have incentives to use earnings management techniques to increase earnings to loosen or postpone the restrictiveness imposed by earnings-based debt covenants. On the other hand, troubled companies have incentives to reduce earnings for contractual renegotiations.2.2 Meeting management compensation contract requirementsMost management compensation contracts measure the achievement of managers by accounting data such as profit and sales scale, so management compensation contract can drive managers to engage in earning management. For example bonus plans, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) stated that managers have incentives to advance the reported earnings from the future to the current accounting period when a bonus award plan existed. (Healy 1985) provides the evidence that earnings are managed in the direction that is consistent with maximizing managers earnings-based bonus awards. When earnings will be below the minimum level required to earn a bonus, the earnings are managed upward so that the minimum is achieved and a bonus is earned. Conversely, when earnings will be above the maximum level at which no additional bonus is paid, then earnings are managed downward. The extra earnings that will not generate extra bonus this current period are saved to be used to earn a bonus in a future period. When earnings are between the minimum and the maximum levels, then earnings are managed upward in order to increase the bonus earned in the current period.With stock options incentives being applying in Chinese companies in recent years, stock option compensation is associated with earnings management. Since earnings and stock prices are positively related, managers can manage earnings down before scheduled stock option awards. The result is to arbitrarily hold down the stock price before the award, thereby lowering the exercise price and increasing the value of their stock option compensation. On the other hand, managers can also manage earnings up before abnormally large stock option exercise. Inflating earnings in the pre-exercise period can increase the cash payout from option exercises. Because option exercises occur rarely in Chinese companies, some studies on the relationship between stock option compensation and earnings management are mainly concerned with stock option awards. Yu (2009) provides the evidence that managers manage earnings down through discretionary accruals before scheduled stock option awards, and these discretionary accruals reverse in the post-award period.2.3 To avoid regulatory and minimize political costsDue to anti-trust considerations, some companies have the incentive to lower earnings in order to minimize political costs associated with being seen as too profitable. In China, anti-trust regulations and industry-specific regulations for earnings are rare. The most important regulatory motivation for Chinesecompanies is tax considerations. Especially for small sized and private ownership companies, earnings management for tax-planning purpose may be prevalent in practice in China.2.4 Due to capital market considerationsCapital market motivations have been recognized as the most important reason for managers to manage earnings. For Chinese companies, the most important capital market considerations may come from the regulatory framework, which is a series of guidelines issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).3 Earnings Management Techniques Used in ChinaManagers usually use both accounting methods and non-accounting methods to engage in earnings management in Chinas listed companies. Accounting methods mainly include accounting policy choices and changes, accounting estimates and changes etc.; managers engage in earnings management using non-accounting methods, primarily through structuring transactions to achieve, for example, asset restructuring, debt restructuring and related transactions etc.3.1Accounting methodsChinese GAAP offers some flexibility in preparing the financial statements and gives the financial managers some freedom to select among accounting policies and alternatives. Earnings management uses the flexibility in financial reporting to alter the financial results of the company so as to achieve a predetermined target set by the management.Take fixed assets for example, managers can low earnings in current year by setting aside fixed asset impairment provisions, as asset impairment losses can not be reversed, and the amount of depreciation will be re-adjusted within the remaining useful life of fixed assets, so the amount of depreciation will decrease and earnings will increase in the next year.This study concludes that earnings management is pervasive in Chinas listed companies. Earnings management makes earnings less reliable as a measure of company performance, if the true performance of the company is hidden, there is potential for less efficient resource allocation decisions.中国上市公司盈余管理的动机和方法作者：Daniel A.Cohen国籍：美国选自: 会计博览 VOL.83,NO.3 2008 757-7871简介到目前为止，还没有任何一个关于盈余管理的定义已经达成了一致。席佩尔（1989）定义盈余管理为“在外部财务报告过程盈余管理目的的干预，在获得某种私利的目的（而不是说只是促进中性操作过程）。” Healy和Wahlen （1999）指出，“盈余管理往往出现在交易中的财务报告结构，通过改变财务报告，或误导相关的一些利益相关者公司的经济表现，或影响依靠会计报告的数字来判断该合同的结果。” 根据这两个定义，盈余管理是被认为作为外部财务报告有目的的和蓄意的干预。盈余管理技术，不仅包括会计方法，而且也包括非会计方法，例如结构化交易等。此外，它没有明确区分会计处理方法是否违反公认会计准则（GAAP），斯科特（1997）定义为从一个由管理员设置的会计准则的会计政策选择盈余管理，以最大限度地发挥自己的效用和该公司的市场价值。奥尔特加（2003年）认为，盈余管理通过使用财务报告的灵活性来改变公司的财务业绩。从两个定义，我们可以看到，收入只包括会计管理技术方法，另外会计盈余管理使用的方法也不能允许违反会计准则。莱维特（1998）定义盈余管理为一个灰色领域，那是个正在变化的会计盈余管理;其中管理人员偷工减料，并在收益报告中反映了管理的基本心愿，而不是本公司的真实的财务表现。莱维特认为，盈余管理等于盈余操纵。Carlos Noronh