Hegel's Theory of Recognition From Oppression to Ethical Liberal Modernity (Continuum Studies in Philosophy)

Hegels Theory of Recognition Continuum Studies in Philosophy Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin, USA Continuum Studies in Philosophy is a major monograph series from Continuum. The series features fi rst-class scholarly research monographs across the whole fi eld of philosophy. Each work makes a major contribu- tion to the fi eld of philosophical research. Aesthetic in Kant, James Kirwan Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion, Aaron Preston Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, Christopher Brown Augustine and Roman Virtue, Brian Harding The Challenge of Relativism, Patrick Phillips Demands of Taste in Kants Aesthetics, Brent Kalar Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature, Justin Skirry Descartes Theory of Ideas, David Clemenson Dialectic of Romanticism, Peter Murphy and David Roberts Hegels Philosophy of Language, Jim Vernon Hegels Philosophy of Right, David James The History of Intentionality, Ryan Hickerson Kierkegaard, Metaphysics and Political Theory, Alison Assiter Kierkegaards Analysis of Radical Evil, David A. Roberts Leibniz Re-interpreted, Lloyd Strickland Metaphysics and the End of Philosophy, H. O. Mounce Nietzsche and the Greeks, Dale Wilkerson Origins of Analytic Philosophy, Delbert Reed Philosophy of Miracles, David Corner Platonism, Music and the Listeners Share, Christopher Norris Poppers Theory of Science, Carlos Garcia Role of God in Spinozas Metaphysics, Sherry Deveaux Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue, James Delaney Rousseaus Theory of Freedom, Matthew Simpson Spinoza and the Stoics, Firmin DeBrabander Spinozas Radical Cartesian Mind, Tammy Nyden-Bullock St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War, John Mark Mattox St. Augustine of Hippo, R. W. Dyson Thomas Aquinas PR and VPR17, by section number; and LHP, PWH, SS, VPR, and W, by vol- ume and page number. In PR, R indicates a remark by Hegel and A an addition from student notes. Works by Other Authors CHT Taylor, Charles. Comparison, history, truth, in Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. GR Honneth, Axel. Grounding recognition: a rejoinder to critical questions, Inquiry, 2002, 45, 499520. HER Williams, Robert R. Hegels Ethics of Recognition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. JPD Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. MC Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. PL Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. PoR Taylor, Charles. The politics of recognition, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. RMO Honneth, Axel. Recognition and moral obligation, Social Research, Spring 1997, 64 (1), 1635. SR Honneth, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Confl icts, trans. Joel Anderson. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. TCL Berlin, Isaiah. Two Concepts of Liberty, in Henry Hardy (ed.), Liberty. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. This page intentionally left blank Introduction Redeeming Recognition We, you and I, each of us, we are the descendants of a proud tradition of people asserting our dignity. (Urvashi Vaid)* Since the 1960s New Left emancipatory movements have claimed that women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and other social groups are oppressed. Awareness of this fact has given rise to the politics of differ ence, arguments for redressing injustices endured by some citizens because of their collective identity differences. Some theorists argue the appropriate corrective is the public acknowledgment of differences.1 On the face of it, these latter arguments run in tension with the classical liberal thesis that equality requires treating all the same in public regard- less of our differences. Still, the question of the meaning and possibility of a liberal politics of difference has occupied liberal theorists for more than three decadesat least as early as John Rawlss 1971 publication of A Theory of Justice. For Rawls and others, achieving social justice for citizens treated unjustly because of their differences is a crucial step in promot- ing democratic equality (Rawls 1999: 52ff.; PL lviiff.). Ultimately, for some liberals, this is justifi ed by the doctrine of toleration and the principle of neutrality. Compensations, for instance, by way of distributive justice or group-differentiated rights, are necessary to promote equal dignity and ensure all citizens equal chances for autonomy.2 However, treating issues related to difference ultimately as matters of toleration fails to obviate the tension, which emancipatory movements are at pains to underscore, between liberalisms advocacy of de jure equality and the persistence in liberal democracies of de facto inequality. Although liberal theorists have identifi ed essential components of a viable response to emancipatory claims (provisions for rights and distributive justice), they rarely address suffi ciently the underlying presuppositions, attitudes, and self-understandings that ultimately determine the effi cacy of such provisionsthose understandings that determine whether or not citizens, 2 Hegels Theory of Recognition in their everyday interactions, will actually treat one another in a manner consistent with liberal justice. That is, liberal proponents of difference, in attending primarily to political questions, have insuffi ciently addressed the broader social issues crucially implicated in the politics of difference. To state the problem differently, most liberal theorizing fails to take adequate account of emancipatory claims of oppression. Of course, eman- cipatory movements seek rights and economic justice; however, equally importantly, as Axel Honneth famously argued, they protest the moral injustice of their violated social relationship expectations: their reasonable belief that in a liberal democracy they will be treated as equal moral per- sons (SR 2). Accordingly, they demand the abolition of social and institu- tional practices of misrecognition that ignore or denigrate their identities. I would add that they strive to impress upon majorities that they, too, make important contributions to collective life and do so not in spite of their differ- ent and disfavored identities, but partly in virtue of themthrough agency informed by those identities. Liberal theory proclaims that differences do not matter in the public sphere (a dubious ideal), but they turn out to mat- ter very much. We require a liberal social theory that acknowledges that in societies in which differences are disfavored, political provisions for special rights and redistribution are quickly undermined by social attitudes. We require a social theoretical response to a social problem. In this book I argue, following Hegel, that political acts can only secure de facto equality for all citizens when, indeed, crucial social conditions have been met: most notably the widespread achievement of relationships of mutual recognition. Required for this achievement is the cultivation of a distinctive social and self-understanding that Hegel elucidates in the Phenomenology of Spirit: recognitive understanding. This form of understand- ing grounds individuals affi rmation simultaneously of their interdepen- dence as social members and independence as authoritative agents. It is a necessary condition of concrete freedom and de facto equality. However, the subject of recognition has recently become contentious. Some scholars argue, for instance, that because recognition essentially means assimilating the other to the same, or ultimately belies a desire for sovereignty, its proponents merely substitute one mode of domination for another (Markell 2003: 11; Oliver 2001: 23ff.). These concerns stem partly from our apparent lack of an adequate concept of recognition. Many theorists assume and do not explicitly defi ne its sense,3 so we are far from anything like a consensus as to its meaning. For care ethicists, it may des- ignate relationships of love and concern, whereas for discourse ethicists it may mean acknowledgment of the particularity and equality of discourse Introduction 3 participants (RMO 18). Some theorists suggest a strong sense of recogni- tion as acknowledgment of the equal value of all cultures,4 whereas others argue for a weaker symbolic recognition of the acceptance of different identities in public (Galeotti 2002: 10ff.). Determining whether recognition can be adequate to the task of over- coming oppression requires that we fi rst arrive at a clear conception of it. I aim both to clarify the meaning of recognition and to argue its effi cacy for overcoming oppression. I do so by reconstructing and defending Hegels conception of recognition, elaborated in the Phenomenology of Spirit and later applied to his theory of liberal institutions in the Philosophy of Right. Revealing recognitive understanding to be a necessary condition of mutual recognition and liberal freedom, Hegel lays the groundwork for a liberal social theory that can support a viable liberal politics of difference. I begin by taking the crucial question of the contemporary debate con- cerning the politics of difference, and thus the central question of this book, to be the following: Given the commitment of liberal democracies to the principles of equality, freedom and justice, are we obligated to ensure the positive public recognition of the identities of diverse individuals and groups? Scholars of various stripes have argued that recognition is required for freedom. Some cite as justifi cation Hegels ontological thesis that practical identity, or the self realized through agency, is both initially formed and subsequently actualizedfreely developed and expressed in concrete actionsonly in the context of relationships of mutual recognition.5 I review these argu- ments in Chapter 4, but I prepare now for that discussion by distinguishing two notions of identity that, being both integrally related and the objects of emancipatory demands for recognition, are of central importance in this book. First is the notion of collective identity, which every individual possesses simply by virtue of having been born with certain biological traits (e.g., sex, skin color, disability) or belonging to defi ned collectivities (e.g., a nation, ethnic group, or socio-economic class). The important point is that individuals frequently come to share certain forms of lifecertain under- standings, values, and practiceswith others so defi ned. Thus, when I speak of myself as female, American, African-American, black, working- class, heterosexual, and so on, and refer to these as my collective identity characteristics, I claim not only that they are certain of my biological and social traits, but also that my sharing these traits with other individuals has signifi cance for my way of being in the world. For one thing, inasmuch as I was raised within a particular family and specifi c cultures, my practical identitymy sense of my own agencywas fi rst constituted in the context 4 Hegels Theory of Recognition of defi nite forms of life that infl uenced my judgments, values, and choices. These forms of life have informed my understanding and agency, even if over time I have revised my judgments and values. Most signifi cantly, every- one is associated with a number of collective identities simply by virtue of having shown up in the world, whether or not we identify with them or consider them salient. However, second, every person can also be described in terms of his or her unique way of being in the world: his or her individual identity. Individual identity is informed to some degree by collective identities, whether one affi rms that association oneself, or it is ascribed to one by others. For instance, I may not identify strongly with my gender or defi ne myself in terms of it. However, this may have little effect upon how others defi ne and treat me. This identity therefore has some bearing upon my experiences and agency. Nevertheless, individual identity is not entirely determined by the collective identities that inform it. In liberal democracies individuals are free to choose the degree to which they identify with their collective identities; they are to that extent free to conceive and construct their indi- vidual identitiesto invent themselves and to be self-actualizing.6 Collective identities and the forms of life they represent are nevertheless important constituents of individual identity, not only because they form the background horizon of an individuals identity formation, but also because they continue to infl uence individuals processes of self-actualization. This is true in both the positive sense that collective identities may continue to function as signifi cant horizons of judgment and value for individuals, and in the negative sense that they may serve as the basis of discrimina- tion that limits individuals chances for self-actualization. For this reason I stress, along with Hegel and Axel Honneth, that not only does recogni- tion play the crucial role of forging practical identity and facilitating indi- viduals self-actualization, but failures of recognition are a signifi cant form of moral injury (SR 2). In fact, the harm to individual agency wrought by forms of misrecognition means, as Charles Taylor explains, that due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people . . . but a vital human need (PoR 26). It is therefore a primary good to be safeguarded by liberal democracies. But the attempt to reconcile the recognition of identity differences with liberalism poses challenges. Some liberals argue that public neutralityour commitment to treating all citizens equally regardless of their differencesis the very thing required to secure our most basic freedoms. Others cau- tion, moreover, that acknowledging differences can be a two-edged sword, for in the very attempt to recognize ethnic, gender, religious, and other Introduction 5 differences publicly, collective identities can be essentialized in ways that frustrate rather than encourage self-actualizationand self-actualization can be compromised just as effectively by positive stereotypes as by nega- tive ones. Meanwhile, many critical, postmodern, and communitarian theorists criticize liberal theory as too universalistic, atomistic, and indifferent to social issues to address the concerns of emancipatory movements. They see liberalisms commitment to neutrality as wrongly presuming that our status as merely abstract personsmembers of a society in which our differences are considered irrelevant to our essential identity as rational humansconstitutes us as free and equal. These critics are quick to point out that the very fact that countless numbers of us suffer oppression within a socio-political structure that is purportedly difference-blind gives evi- dence that what liberalism has effectively secured for many is merely a cor- responding abstract freedom, a liberty that is, in a sense, liquidated like all objects of abstraction, such that it becomes essentially an idea (see, for example, Horkheimer and Adorno 2000: 13). Some claim explicitly that liberal principles and norms are by nature culturally hegemonic, hence inherently prone not to guarantee everyone equally the concrete freedom to which we all reasonably aspire (I. Young 1999: 416). Unfortunately, none of these critics seems to have succeeded any more than liberal theorists have in recommending a viable, constructive, and practicable program for the recognition of difference. I therefore turn to Hegel. My over-arching reason for attempting to re-actualize Hegels social theory is that it is grounded in a conception of recognition that is both responsive to emancipatory demands and consistent with liberal prin- ciples. But there are four specifi c reasons I appropriate Hegel. First, he offers a precise conception of recognition as spiritual unity in its dou bling Verdopplung (PhS 178; PhG 145).7 While this formulation is far from immediately transparent, Hegels elaboration of it, occupying three chap- ters of the Phenomenology, makes possible a perspicuous reformulation. Most importantly, Hegels Phenomenology account of recognition in terms of the experience of human consciousness both corroborates the claims of emancipatory movements that their oppression is attributable to viola- tions of their social relationship expectations and indicates intrinsically how oppression may be overcome. He shows recognition to entail mutual- ity and to depend upon the cultivation of recognitive understanding. My second reason for looking to Hegels theory of recognition is that it not only indicates that mutual recognition is a necessary condition of free- dom, but also makes clear how and why this is so. Ultimately, it is because 6 Hegels Theory of Recognition freedom is socially mediated. In Hegels view, freedom is not to be con- ceived in purely individualistic terms as either the liberty to do or for- bear doing what we will, as Locke suggested (1994: 167168), or the ability to choose not to act on the basis of ones inclinations, as Kant argued (1996: 53). Rather, Hegel contends that freedom is the ability to determine ones will. That is, it is not merely the ability either to follow or to override ones inclinations, in which case one is in truth determined by them; rather, the free will makes reference to itself (PR 7).8 However, we only experi- ence ourselves as determining our own wills through relationships with other subjects. Hegel illustrates by citing the example of friendship and love, in which we are not one-sidedly within ourselves but willingly limit ourselves with reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in this limitation as ourselves. I