商务英语第二版 课文翻译9.doc

Beyond Bretton Woods 2后布雷顿森林体系2.0版WHEN the leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) countries meet in Seoul on November 11th and 12th, there will be plenty of backstage finger-pointing about the worlds currency tensions. American officials blame Chinas refusal to allow the yuan to rise faster. The Chinese retort that the biggest source of distortion in the global economy is Americas ultra-loose monetary policyreinforced by the Federal Reserves decision on November 3rd to restart “quantitative easing”, or printing money to buy government bonds (see article). Other emerging economies cry that they are innocent victims, as their currencies are forced up by foreign capital flooding into their markets and away from low yields elsewhere.当二十国集团领导人于11月11日至12日齐聚首尔，私下里纷纷指责世界货币大战。美政府官员指责中国拒绝人民币升值过快。中国人反驳称全球经济扭曲究其根源是美国的过度宽松的货币政策-美联储决定于11月3日重启量化宽松政策，或印刷纸钞购买政府债券（见报道）的举措使扭曲加剧。其他新兴经济体大呼冤枉，因为外资纷纷逃离低收益的国家并涌入其股市而迫使其货币升值。These quarrels signify a problem that is more than superficial. The underlying truth is that no one is happy with todays international monetary systemthe set of rules, norms and institutions that govern the worlds currencies and the flow of capital across borders.这些争吵凸显出远非人为原因使然。其根源是大家都对如今的国际货币体系表示不满-包括规范全球货币和资本跨境流动的规章准则及制度。There are three broad complaints. The first concerns the dominance of the dollar as a reserve currency and Americas management of it. The bulk of foreign-exchange transactions and reserves are in dollars, even though the United States accounts for only 24% of global GDP (see chart 1). A disproportionate share of world trade is conducted in dollars. To many people the supremacy of the greenback in commerce, commodity pricing and official reserves cannot be sensible. Not only does it fail to reflect the realities of the world economy; it leaves others vulnerable to Americas domestic monetary policy. 概括起来有三大不满。第一个是关于美元作为储备货币的主导地位及美联储对其管理方式。外汇交易和储备大都用美元结算，虽然美国的国内生产总值仅占全球的24%（见图表1）。世界贸易多用美元结算，与其GDP贡献率不成正比。对于大多数人来说，美元在商贸、商品定价及官方储备中所占据的主导地位也不合理。美元不仅未能反映出全球经济的现实情况；还使其他国家极易受到美国国内货币政策的影响。The second criticism is that the system has fostered the creation of vast foreign-exchange reserves, particularly by emerging economies. Global reserves have risen from $1.3 trillion (5% of world GDP) in 1995 to $8.4 trillion (14%) today. Emerging economies hold two-thirds of the total. Most of their hoard has been accumulated in the past ten years (see chart 2). 第二个受到指责之处该体系催生了大量的外汇储备，在新兴经济体中尤为如此。全球储备已从1995年的1.3万亿美元（占全球GDP的5%）升至如今的8.4万亿美元。新兴经济体占总额的2/3. 大多数储备都是在过去的十年间积累起来的（见图表2）。These huge reserves offend economic logic, since they mean poor countries, which should have abundant investment opportunities of their own, are lending cheaply to richer ones, mainly America. Such lending helped precipitate the financial crisis by pushing down Americas long-term interest rates. Today, with Americans saving rather than spending, they represent additional thrift at a time when the world needs more demand. 这些庞大的储备违背了经济学逻辑，因为这意味着自身理应充分拥有投资机会的穷国，正向富裕国家主要是美国提供低息贷款。这类贷款通过压低美国的长期利率从而促使其突然陷入危机中。如今，随着美国人多储蓄少消费，且正值全球需求扩大的情况下，他们表现得却更为节俭。The third complaint is about the scale and volatility of capital flows. Financial crises have become more frequent in the past three decades. Many politicians argue that a financial system in which emerging economies can suffer floods of foreign capital (as now) or sudden droughts (as in 1997-98 and 2008) cannot be the best basis for long-term growth. 第三个不满是资金流动的规模和波动情况。金融危机发生的次数在过去的三十年间更为频繁。许多政治家都坚称新兴经济体要么遭受到外资大量涌入（就象现在）要么突然遭受资金短缺（就像1997-98和2008），那么此种金融体系就不能为经济长期增长提供最坚实的基础。France, which assumes the chairmanship of the G20 after the Seoul summit, thinks the world can do better. Nicolas Sarkozy, the countrys president, wants to put international monetary reform at the top of the groups agenda for the next year. He wants a debate “without taboos” on how to improve an outdated system.法国继二十国集团首尔峰会后担任轮值主席国，认为世界经济将有较好表现。法国总统尼古拉斯萨科奇期望将国际货币体系列入次年集团首脑会议所要优先考虑的问题。他期望举行一场“没有禁忌的”辩论，以改进陈旧的体系。Such a debate has in fact been going on sporadically for decades. Ever since the post-war Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates fell apart in the 1970s, academics have offered Utopian blueprints for a new version. The question is: what improvements are feasible?实际上，此类辩论这几十年来也零零散散的举办过几场。战后布雷顿森林体系所实行的固定但可调整的汇率制于20世纪70年代就崩溃了，从那时起到现在学术界就在为乌托邦式的蓝图创建新的版本。问题是何种改进方案可行。The shape of any monetary system is constrained by what is often called the “trilemma” of international economics. If capital can flow across borders, countries must choose between fixing their currencies and controlling their domestic monetary conditions. They cannot do both. Under the classical 19th-century gold standard, capital flows were mostly unfettered and currencies were tied to gold. The system collapsed largely because it allowed governments no domestic monetary flexibility. In the Bretton Woods regime currencies were pegged to the dollar, which in turn was tied to gold. Capital mobility was limited, so that countries had control over their own monetary conditions. The system collapsed in 1971, mainly because America would not subordinate its domestic policies to the gold link. 任何货币体系的框架经常受到国际经济学中所谓的三难选择限制。若资本能跨境流动，那么各国就必须在采取固定汇率制和防止国内金融环境恶化间做出选择。不可兼而有之。在19世纪著名的金本位中，资金流动通常是不受制约的且货币与黄金挂钩。该体系大部分已经瓦解了，原因是它允许各国政府使其国内货币不具备灵活性。在布雷顿森林体系中，货币与美元挂钩，而美元与黄金挂钩。资本流动性受到限制，结果各国就要采取措施防止国内金融环境恶化。该体系于1971年崩溃，主要是因为美国不愿其国内政策受到金本位的制约。Todays system has no tie to gold or any other anchor, and contains a variety of exchange-rate regimes and capital controls. Most rich countries currencies float more or less freelyalthough the creation of the euro was plainly a step in the opposite direction. Capital controls were lifted three decades ago and financial markets are highly integrated. 当今的体系不与黄金或其他任何有保值功能的事物挂钩，它涵盖了形形色色的汇率体制和资本管制。大多数富裕国家的货币浮动差不多都具有自由性-虽然欧元的创建显然是向相反的方向迈进了一步。资本管制三十年前就被取消了，金融市场实现了高度一体化。Broadly, emerging economies are also seeing a freer flow of capital, thanks to globalisation as much as to the removal of restrictions. Net private flows to these economies are likely to reach $340 billion this year, up from $81 billion a decade ago. On paper, their currency regimes are also becoming more flexible. About 40% of them officially float their currencies, up from less than 20% 15 years ago. But most of these floats are heavily managed. Countries are loth to let their currencies move freely. When capital pours in, central banks buy foreign exchange to stem their rise. 新兴经济体大体上也经历了资本的更为自由的流动，原因是有了全球化还有消除了制约因素。这些经济体的民间资本的净流动今年有望达到3400亿美元，较十年前的810亿美元有较大涨幅。从理论上讲，其货币体制也正变得更具灵活性。其中，约40%由官方实行浮动汇率制，较15年前的不到20%相比有所上升。但是浮动大都受到严格管制。各国不愿意令其货币自由浮动。当资金涌入时，中央银行通过买入外汇来遏制货币升值。They do this in part because governments do not want their exchange rates to soar suddenly, crippling exporters. Many of them are worried about level as well as speed: they want export-led growthand an undervalued currency to encourage it.他们这样做部分原因的是各国政府不愿其汇率骤然飙升抑制出口。很多国家都担心其稳定性和速度，他们希望出口导向型的增长-估值偏低的货币来刺激出口。Just as important are the scars left by the financial crises of the late 1990s. Foreign money fled, setting off deep recessions. Governments in many emerging economies concluded that in an era of financial globalisation safety lay in piling up huge reserves. That logic was reinforced in the crisis of 2008, when countries with lots of reserves, such as China or Brazil, fared better than those with less in hand. Even with reserves worth 25% of GDP, South Korea had to turn to the Fed for an emergency liquidity line of dollars. 正像20世纪90年代金融危机留下的创伤所造成的重大影响一样。外资外逃引起严重衰退。许多新兴经济体的政府得出结论在经济全球化时代，安全在于积聚大量的储备。这一逻辑在2008年的危机中得到佐证，当中国或巴西等国拥有大量储备时，要比那些储备较少的国家经济运行的更好。即使韩国的资本准备金占GDP的25%，它还是须求助于美联储，来获取最高美元应急流动资金。This experience is forcing a rethink of what makes a “safe” level of reserves. Economists used to argue that developing countries needed foreign exchange mainly for emergency imports and short-term debt payments. A popular rule of thumb in the 1990s was that countries should be able to cover a years worth of debt obligations. Todays total far exceeds that. 这种体会迫使其重新思量使资本准备金达到无风险级别的基础。过去，经济学家们坚称发展中国家积累外汇储备，主要是为了紧急物资的进口和短期贷款偿付。20世纪90年代非常盛行的经验之谈是国家应有能力偿还一年期的债务。而如今却远非如此。Among emerging economies, China plays by far the most influential role in the global monetary system. It is the biggest of them, and its currency is in effect tied to the dollar. The yuan is widely held to be undervalued, though it has risen faster in real than in nominal terms (see article). And because China limits capital flows more extensively and successfully than others, it has been able to keep the yuan cheap without stoking consumer-price inflation.在新兴经济体中，中国迄今在全球货币体系中最具影响力。中国是最大的新兴经济体，其货币实际上同美元挂钩。人们普遍认为人民币币值被低估，尽管其实际汇率增速快于其名义汇率（见报道）。而且因为中国进一步对资金流动大加限制并比其他国家更为成效，中国有能力使人民币币值低估而又不会给消费品物价暴涨火上浇油。China alone explains a large fraction of the global build-up of reserves (see chart 3). Its behaviour also affects others. Many other emerging economies, especially in Asia, are reluctant to risk their competitiveness by letting their currencies rise by much. As a result many of the worlds most vibrant economies in effect shadow the dollar, in an arrangement that has been dubbed “Bretton Woods 2”.只有中国解释了大量全球外汇储备增加的原因（见图表3）。其行为也影响了其他国家。许多其他新兴经济体，尤其是亚洲，不愿拿其货币竞争力冒险使币值升高太多。结果世界上许多经济增长强劲的国家实际上紧盯美元，创建了被称为“布雷顿森林体系2.0版”的协定。History lessons 历史教训The similarities between this quasi-dollar standard and the original Bretton Woods system mean that many of todays problems have historical parallels. Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, explores these in “Exorbitant Privilege”, a forthcoming book about the past and future of the international monetary system. 这种准美元标准和原版的布雷顿森林体系之间的相似性意味着如今的许多问题都有历史相似性。加利福利亚大学（伯克利分校）的巴瑞艾森格林在即将出版的超级特权中探讨了这些相似性。该书论述了国际货币体系的前世今生。Consider, for instance, the tension between emerging economies demand for reserves and their fear that the main reserve currency, the dollar, may lose valuea dilemma first noted in 1947 by Robert Triffin, a Belgian economist. When the world relies on a single reserve currency, Triffin argued, that currencys home country must issue lots of assets (usually government bonds) to lubricate global commerce and meet the demand for reserves. But the more bonds it issues, the less likely it will be to honour its debts. In the end, the worlds insatiable demand for the “risk-free” reserve asset will make that asset anything but risk-free. As an illustration of the modern thirst for dollars, the IMF reckons that at the current rate of accumulation global reserves would rise from 60% of American GDP today to 200% in 2020 and nearly 700% in 2035. 例如，评述了新兴经济体需要把美元作为储备货币又担心主要的储备货币美元可能贬值，这种进退两难的矛盾心理在1947年由比利时经济学家罗伯特特里芬首次提出。特里芬论述到，当时世界依靠单一储备货币，该货币的母国须发行许多负债资产（通常为政府债券）来为全球贸易铺路并满足其外汇储备需求。但是它发行的债券越多，其还债的可能性越小。最后，全球对“无风险”准备资产需求的贪得无厌使得该资产绝对不是没有风险。对于当下对美元奢求的一种解释是国际货币基金组织推测全球累积储备在美国国内生产总值中的现行比例将从60%升至2020年的200%到2035年将接近700%。If those reserves were, as today, held largely in Treasury bonds, America would struggle to sustain the burden. Unless it offset its Treasury liabilities to the rest of the world by acquiring foreign assets, it would find itself ever deeper in debt to foreigners. Triffins suggested solution was to create an artificial reserve asset, tied to a basket of commodities. John Maynard Keynes had made a similar proposal a few years before, calling his asset “Bancor”. Keyness idea was squashed by the Americans, who stood to lose from it. Triffins was also ignored for 20 years. 如果这些储备能像今天一样大部分是国库券，那么美国会继续努力还债。除非美国通过借外债来冲抵其欠世界其他国家的国债，到头来将会发现自己又是负债累累。特里芬提出一种解决方案建议美国创建一笔模拟储备资金，与一揽子有价证券挂钩。约翰梅纳德凯恩斯数年前也提出了类似的建议，称全球货币为“Bancor”。凯恩斯的观点受到了蒙受损失的美国民众的猛烈抨击。而特里芬的观点有20年都没有人提起。But in 1969, as the strains between Americas budget deficit and the dollars gold peg emerged, an artificial reserve asset was created: the Special Drawing Right (SDR), run by the IMF. An SDRs value is based on a basket of the dollar, euro, pound and yen. The IMFs members agree on periodic allocations of SDRs, which countries can convert into other currencies if need be. However, use of SDRs has never really taken off. They make up less than 5% of global reserves and there are no private securities in SDRs. 但是到了1969年，随着美国的预算赤字和美元与黄金挂钩矛盾的出现，模拟储备资金才得以创建：由国际货币基金组织负责管理的特别提款权。特别提款权价值是由一揽子货币确立的，包括美元、欧元、英镑、日元。国际货币基金组织成员国同意分阶段分配特别提款权，这样获得特别提款权的国家如有需要可将其兑换为其他货币。然而，特别提款权从未真正得到广泛使用。他们只占到全球储备的不到5%而且私募证券还没有特别提款权。Some would like that to change. Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of Chinas central bank, caused a stir in March 2009 when he argued that the SDR should become a true global reserve asset to replace the dollar. Mr Sarkozy seems to think similarly, calling for a multilateral approach to the monetary system. If commodities were priced in SDRs, the argument goes, their prices would be less volatile. And if countries held their reserves in SDRs, they would escape the Triffin dilemma. 一些人希望其做出改变。中国中央银行行长周小川的2009年3月的发言引起了轰动，他坚称特别提款权应该取代美元成为真正的全球储备资产。萨科奇先生似乎与其观点类似，呼吁货币体系采取多边途径。如果商品以特别提款权定价（现在还备受争议），那么商品价格就不会出现较大的波动。如果各国以特别提款权来持有本国的外汇储备，那么他们就会摆脱特里芬的进退两难的境地。For SDRs to play this role, however, they would have to be much more plentiful. The IMF agreed on a $250 billion allocation among measures to fight the financial crisis, but global reserves are rising by about $700 billion a year. Even if there were lots more SDRs it is not clear why governments would want to hold them. The appeal of the dollar is that it is supported by the most liquid capital markets in the world. Few countries are likely to use SDRs much until there are deep private markets in SDR-denominated assets.让特别提款权发挥这样的作用，不过，他们还要发挥更大的作用。国际货币基金组织同意划拨2500亿美元来应对金融危机，此举只是其中之一，但是全球储备以每年7000亿美元递增。虽然拥有很多的特别提款权，但不清楚政府想要持有它的原因。美元的感召力在于它受到世界上最具流动性的资本市场的支持。很少有国家愿意推广使用特别提款权，除非出现以特别提款权计数的资金雄厚的自由市场。Only if the IMF evolved into a global central bank able to issue them at speed could SDRs truly become a central reserve asset. This is highly unlikely. As Mr Eichengreen writes: “No global government means no global central bank, which means no global currency. Full stop.”只有国际货币基金组织演变为全球性中央银行，有能力快速的发放特别提款权，它才能真正成为中央储备资金。这种可能性极小。正如艾森格林写道：“从来就没有全球政府意味着没有全球性中央银行，也没有一种全球性的货币（完）。”Nor is it clear that the SDR is really needed as an alternative to the dollar. The euro is a better candidate. This years fiscal crises notwithstanding, countries could shift more reserves into euros if America mismanaged its finances or if they feared it would. This could happen fast. Mr Eichengreen points out that the dollar had no international role in 1914 but had overtaken sterling in governments reserves by 1925.也不清楚特别提款权是否真的有必要代替美元。欧元是个不错的选择。尽管今年出现了财政危机，若美国对其资金管理不善，或怕自己管理不好，那么各国可将更多的储备兑换成欧元。这种情况很快就会出现。艾森格林先生指出在1914年以前美元还不是国际货币，但是到了1925年各国政府储备中美元数超过英镑。Alternatively, China could create a rival to the dollar if it let the yuan be used in transactions abroad. China has taken some baby steps in this direction, for instance by allowing firms to issue yuan-denominated bonds in Hong Kong. However, an international currency would demand far bigger changes. Some observers argue that Chinas championing of the SDR is a means to this end: if the yuan, for instance, became part of the SDR basket, foreigners could have exposure to yuan assets. 要不，中国可创建一种可与美元抗衡的货币，如若其要将人民币用于海外交易中。中国对此已经做了初步尝试，例如允许公司在香港发行以人民币标价的债券。无论如何，国际货币都在呼吁更为深远的变革。一些观察家论证到中国支持使用特别提款权，可达到这样的目的：比如，若人民币成为特别提款权一揽子货币之一，那么其他国家就会受到人民币资产的影响。More likely, China is looking for a way to offload some of the currency risk in its stash of dollars. As the yuan appreciates against the dollar (as it surely will) those reserves will be worth less. If China could swap dollars for SDRs, some exchange-rate risk would be shifted to the other members of the IMF. A similar idea in the 1970s foundered because the IMFs members could not agree on who would bear the currency risk. America refused then and surely would now.中国更有可能找寻一种途径，来部分转移美元储备的币值风险。随着人民币对美元升值（确定无疑）这些外汇储备就会贬值。如果中国将美元兑换成特别提款权，那么汇率风险就会部分转移到国际货币基金组织的其他成员身上。20世纪70年代类似的想法失败了，因为国际货币基金组织的成员国就谁将承担币值风险未能达成一致意见。美国过去没有同意现在肯定也不会同意。Rather than try to create a global reserve asset, reformers might achieve more by reducing the demand for reserves. This could be done by improving countries access to funds in a crisis. Here the G20 has made a lot of progress under South Koreas leadership. The IMFs lending facilities have been overhauled, so that well-governed countries can get unlimited funds for two years. 与其说想要创建一种全球储备资产，倒不如变革者通过减少对外汇储备的需求来得痛快。这可以通过完善各国在危机中获取储备的方式实现。现在二十国集团在韩国的领导下已取得了诸多进展。国际货币基金组织的借贷机构已经进行了彻底改革，这样外会管理完善的国家就可以不受限制地获得两年期贷款。Overcome your reserve 被外汇储备压垮So far only a few emerging economies, such as Mexico and Poland, have signed up, not least because of the stigma attached to any hint of a loan from the IMF. Perhaps others could be persuaded to join (best of all, in a large group). Reviving and institutionalising the swap arrangements between the Fed and emerging economies set up temporarily during the financial crisis might also reduce the demand for reserves as insurance. Also, regional efforts to pool reserves could be strengthened.目前只有一些新兴经济体，如墨西哥和波兰，已经签署协议，尤其是因为关于国际货币基金组织贷款的任一注意事项都存在问题。也许可以劝说其他国家加入（最好的大型集团）。使美联储和新兴经济体之间签署的交换协议再生效并且制度化（该协议是在金融危机中临时签署的）同样可能降低将储备做为保险的需求。同样，各地区应该加大力度积聚储备。However, even if they have access to emergency money, governments will still want to hoard reserves if they are determined to hold their currencies down. That is why many reformers think the international monetary system needs sanctions, imposed by the IMF or the World Trade Organisation (WTO), against countries that “manipulate” their currencies or run persistent surpluses. 然而，即使新兴经济体可以获得紧急援助资金，各国政府仍需要积聚外汇储备如果他们决心保持币值稳定。这就是为什么许多变革者认为国际货币体系需要国际货币基金组织或世界贸易组织制裁那些“操纵”汇率或不断利用盈余牟利。This is another idea with a history. Along with Bancor, Keynes wanted countries with excessive surpluses to be fined, not least because of what happened during the Depression, when currency wars and gold-hoarding made the worlds troubles worse. The idea went nowh