《公司法研究》案例资料.doc

公司法研究案例资料专题一：发起人责任某装潢公司诉某房地产开发有限公司等七家企业索要欠款纠纷案案情简介原告：某装潢公司。被告：某房地产开发有限公司等七家企业。1994年9月，某房地产开发有限公司与其余六家国内企业共同筹划建立某开发股份有限公司。资本总额确定为1200万元，七家发起企业认购其中500万元的股份，其余700万元向社会公开募集股份。同年10月，发起人企业认足了500万元的股份，其出资方式有现金、厂房、设备、土地使用权等。由于发起人作为投资的厂房需要装修，因此，由发起人共同协商成立的某开发股份有限公司筹建处向某装潢公司洽购一批装饰材料，包括墙纸、保丽板、地毯、吊灯等和成套办公用品若干套，货款总计人民币70万元。双方商定某开发股份有限公司一经成立即向装潢公司一次性付清全部货款。一周后，装潢公司按约将货物运至筹建处指定的仓库。筹建处即将该批装饰材料及办公用品投入厂房的装修。在各项准备工作均已完成的情况下，经国务院证券部门批准，某房地产开发公司等七家发起企业在当地报纸上发布招股说明书，进行公开募集。但四个月募集期限过后，仅募集到620万元，公司无法成立。某装潢公司向某房地产开发公司等七家发起企业要求偿付装饰材料及办公用品的货款70万元。七家企业以种种理由相互推诿，拒付货款。装潢公司遂以七家企业为被告向当地人民法院提起诉讼。审理结果人民法院经审理认为，由被告某房地产开发有限公司等七家企业协商成立的某开发股份有限公司筹建处与原告某装潢公司签定的合同合法有效。由于发行的股份超过募股截止期限尚未募足，某开发股份有限公司依法不能成立。依据中华人民共和国公司法第97条第1项的规定，被告作为公司发起人应对公司筹建过程中与原告发生的债权债务承担连带责任，判决某房地产开发有限公司等七家企业向某装潢公司支付货款70万元，其中，装饰材料及办公用品被用于装修其厂房的某企业承担40%，计款28万元，其余六家企业各自承担10%，即分别承担7万元。D.A.MCARTHUR V. TIMES PRINTING CO.Supreme Court of Minnesota,189248 Minn.319,51 N.W.216. December 18, 1891, Argued February 5, 1892, DecidedCASE SUMMARY :PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed a Hennepin County District Court (Minnesota) denial of its request for a new trial on plaintiffs claims for damages for breach of an employment contract.OVERVIEW: Plaintiff alleged that defendant contracted with him for a period of one year and that defendant discharged him in violation of its contract. Defendant argued that plaintiffs employment was from week to week and that he was discharged with good cause. Trial court found for plaintiff, as the evidence showed that a promoter had made the contract on behalf of defendant while defendant was contemplating organization of corporation. Evidence further showed that after organization, defendants board never took any formal action with regards to the contract, but that all of its stockholders, directors, and officers knew of the contract and they retained plaintiff without implementing any new contracts. Defendant appealed decision. Court affirmed judgment, holding that while defendant was not bound by the contract made by its promoter before its organization, after its organization, it made the contract on its own by acquiescing in plaintiffs employment by retaining him without other contracts.OUTCOME: Denial of defendants request for a new trial on plaintiffs claims of breach of employment contract affirmed. Court held while defendant was not bound by contracts made by promoters before organization of corporation; after organization, it made the contract its own by acquiescing in plaintiffs employment and retaining him without other contracts.CORE TERMS: promoter, ratification, engagements, one year, legal effect, advertising, discharged, original contract, acquiescence, ratifier, new contract, board of directors, formal action, objected MITCHELL, J: The complaint alleges that about October 1, 1889, the defendant contracted with plaintiff for his services as advertising solicitor for one year; that in April, 1890, it discharged him, in violation of the contract. The action is to recover damages for the breach of the contract. The answer sets up two defenses: (1) That plaintiffs employment was not for any stated time, but only from week to week; (2) that he was discharged for good cause. Upon the trial there was evidence reasonably tending to prove that in September, 1889, one C. A. Nimocks and others were engaged as promoters in procuring the organization of the defendant company to publish a newspaper; that, about September 12th, Nimocks, as such promoter, made a contract with plaintiff, in behalf of the contemplated company, for his services as advertising solicitor for the period of one year from and after October 1st, - the date at which it was expected that the company would be organized; that the corporation was not, in fact, organized until October 16th, but that the publication of the paper was commenced by the promoters October 1st, at which date plaintiff, in pursuance of his arrangement with Nimocks, entered upon the discharge of his duties as advertising solicitor for the paper; that after the organization of the company he continued in its employment in the same capacity until discharged, the following April; that defendants board of directors never took any formal action with reference to the contract made in its behalf by Nimocks, but all of the stockholders, directors, and officers of the corporation knew of this contract at the time of its organization, or were informed of it soon afterwards, and none of them objected to or repudiated it, but, on the contrary, retained plaintiff in the employment of the company without any other or new contract as to his services.There is a line of cases which hold that where a contract is made in behalf of, and for the benefit of, a projected corporation, the corporation, after its organization, cannot become a party to the contract, either by adoption or ratification of it. Abbott v. Hapgood, 150 Mass. 248, (22 N.E. 907;) Beach, Corp. ?198. This, however, seems to be more a question of name than of substance; that is, whether the liability of the corporation, in such cases, is to be placed on the grounds of its adoption of the contract of its promoters, or upon some other ground, such as equitable estoppel. This court, in accordance with what we deem sound reason, as well as the weight of authority, has held that, while a corporation is not bound by engagements made on its behalf by its promoters before its organization, it may, after its organization, make such engagements its own contracts. And this it may do precisely as it might make similar original contracts; formal action of its board of directors being necessary only where it would be necessary in the case of a similar original contract. That it is not requisite that such adoption or acceptance be expressed, but it may be inferred from acts or acquiescence on part of the corporation, or its authorized agents, as any similar original contract might be shown. Battelle v. Northwestern Cement & Concrete Pavement Co., 37 Minn. 89, (33 N.W. 327.) See, also, Mor. Corp. sec. 548. The right of the corporate agents to adopt an agreement originally made by promoters depends upon the purposes of the corporation and the nature of the agreement. Of course, the agreement must be one which the corporation itself could make, and one which the usual agents of the company have express or implied authority to make. That the contract in this case was of that kind is very clear; and the acts and acquiescence of the corporate officers, after the organization of the company, fully justified the jury in finding that it had adopted it as its own.The defendant, however, claims that the contract was void under the statute of frauds, because, by its terms, not to be performed within one year from the making thereof, which counsel assumes to be September 12th, - the date of the agreement between plaintiff and the promoter. This proceeds upon the erroneous theory that the act of the corporation, in such cases, is a ratification, which relates back to the date of the contract with the promoter, under the familiar maxim that a subsequent ratification has a retroactive effect, and is equivalent to a prior command. But the liability of the corporation, under such circumstances, does not rest upon any principle of the law of agency, but upon the immediate and voluntary act of the company. Although the acts of a corporation with reference to the contracts made by promoters in its behalf before its organization are frequently loosely termed ratification, yet a ratification, properly so called, implies an existing person, on whose behalf the contract might have been made at the time. There cannot, in law, be a ratification of a contract which could not have been made binding on the ratifier at the time it was made, because the ratifier was not then in existence. In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. Div. 128; Melhado v. Porto Alegre, N. H. & B. Ry. Co., L. R. 9 C. P. 505; Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 185. What is called adoption, in such cases, is, in legal effect, the making of a contract of the date of the adoption, and not as of some former date. The contract in this case was, therefore, not within the statute of frauds. The trial court fairly submitted to the jury all the issues of fact in this case, accompanied by instructions as to the law which were exactly in the line of the views we have expressed; and the evidence justified the verdict.The point is made that plaintiff should have alleged that the contract was made with Nimocks, and subsequently adopted by the defendant. If we are correct in what we have said as to the legal effect of the adoption by the corporation of a contract made by a promoter in its behalf before its organization, the plaintiff properly pleaded the contract as having been made with the defendant. But we do not find that the evidence was objected to on the ground of variance between it and the complaint. The assignments of error are very numerous, but what has been already said covers all that are entitled to any special notice.Order affirmed.专题二：越权行为C公司上诉B某行、A公司借款担保纠纷案广东省高级人民法院民事判决书上诉人（原审被告）：C科技发展有限公司（以下简称C公司）法定代表人：XXX，懂事长诉讼代理人：XXX，该公司职员被上诉人（原审原告）：B银行某支行（以下简称B某行）负责人：XXX，行长诉讼代理人：XXX，B某行XX分行职员诉讼代理人：XXX，广东XX律师事务所律师原审被告： A投资股份有限公司（以下简称A公司）法定代表人：XXX，懂事长诉讼代理人：XXX，该公司职员上诉人C公司因与被上诉人B某行、原审被告A公司借款担保纠纷一案，不服广东省S市中级人民法院（2004）S中法民初字第X号民事判决，向本院提起上诉。本院依法组成合议庭审理了本案，现已审理终结。S市中级人民法院查明：2004年1月12日，B某行与A公司签定一份编号为银（中心支）借字（2004）第（002）号的借款合同，约定：B某行向A公司贷款人民币1500万元，借款期为12个月，借款利率为5.841%，借款用于借新还旧；A公司于2004年2月11日起至2005年1月11日止每月11日偿还借款，2005年1月11日还款400万元，其余每月各还款100万元；B某行对逾期未还的借款依逾期天数按万分之二点一计收逾期利息，同时对逾期利息依逾期天数按万分之二点一计收复利；A公司于2004年1月12日一次提取借款；由C公司提供保证担保，保证合同编号为银（中心支）保字（2004）第（001）号；A公司出现未按合同约定偿还或支付到期应付本息及相关费用等违约事项，B某行有权采取宣布本合同项下的借款本息全部立即到期，并要求A公司立即偿还所欠借款本息及费用等措施；本合同经双方有权签字人签字并加盖公章后即刻生效。同日，B某行与C公司签定一份编号为银（中心支）保字（2004）第（001）号的保证合同，约定：C公司自愿为上述借款合同项下产生的债权提供保证，保证的方式为连带责任保证，保证范围为主合同约定的主债权及其利息、逾期利息、复息、违约金、损害赔偿金、手续费、实现债权的费用和所有其他应付费用；C公司所担保的主债权期限为一年，若依主合同约定债务提前到期，其提前到期日即为债务履行期限届满之日；保证期间为自主合同约定的债务履行期限届满之日起两年，主合同债务履行期限已到，而债务人未依约履行的，B某行有权要求C公司按照本合同约定承担连带保证责任。上述借款合同，保证合同上均有各方当事人法定代表人的签字及公司公章。上述合同签订后，B某行如约向A公司发放贷款人民币1500万元。B某行于2004年3月15日向S市中级人民人民法院提起诉讼称，A公司未能依约偿还2004年2月11日，3月11日两期借款各人民币100万元并已欠息，C公司因另案纠纷被多家债权人起诉，两公司均已构成违约，请求判令：1、A公司偿还借款本金人民币1500万元及利息（暂计至2004年3月22日欠付利息为65173。81元，并依合同继续计算利息至债务还清之日止）；2、C公司对以上债务的偿还承担连带保证责任；3、两公司承担本案全部诉讼费用。另查明：C公司与A公司均系独立企业法人，在签定借款合同和保证合同时两公司法定代表人为同一自然人，但相互之间不存在直接的投资或股权关系；B某行系B发展银行下属分支机构，领有金融许可证及营业执照。S市中级人民法院经审理认为：B某行、A公司签订的借款及保证合同系各方真实意思表示，合法有效，各方均应严格履行。B某行依约向A公司发放了借款，但A公司未按约定还款，已构成违约，B某行有权要求A公司提前归还借款、C公司承担连带保证责任。B某行的诉讼请求有合同和法律依据，依法应予支持。依照中华人民共和国合同法第8条、第44条、第60条、第206条、第207条，中华人民共和国担保法第18条、第31条的规定，判决如下：一、A公司应于本判决发生法律效力之日起10日内偿还给B某行贷款人民币1500万元及利息65173。81元（暂计至2004年3月22日止，2004年3月22日起至债务还清之日止的利率按借款合同约定的逾期贷款有关规定计付）；二、C公司对A公司的上述债务的偿还承担连带清偿责任，其代为清偿后有权向A公司予以追偿；一审案件受理费人民币85335.87元、财产保全费75520元，由A公司承担，C公司承担连带清偿责任。C公司不服原审判决，向本院提起上诉称：本案担保属无效担保，C公司不应承担保证责任。一、本案已超过C公司章程及有关法规许可。C公司章程明确约定对外担保应取得董事会全体成员三分之二以上签署同意或经股东大会批准。中国证监会（2003）56号通知也作了同样规定，该通知还规定上市公司对外担保总额不得超过公司净资产的50%，而C公司对外担保总额在2003年底已达到净资产的76。79%，新的担保无效。二、B某行对无效担保是明知的。B某行与C公司均为上市公司，B某行对C公司章程及中国证监会（2003）56号通知是清楚的，B银行内部制度也要求担保人提供章程并进行审核。三、C公司与A公司为关联公司，依证监会规章C公司无权为A公司提供担保，其担保无效。四、本案所涉及贷款被B某行与A公司非法挪用。本案实际贷款用途属于以贷还贷行为，违反我国金融法律法规以贷还贷的禁止性规定；B某行与A公司对C公司隐瞒真实贷款用途，将贷款用于归还案外人在B某处的贷款，这种行为是对合同标的的变更，未经担保方认可，担保方不再承担担保责任。最高人民法院关于适用中华人民共和国担保法若干问题的解释第11条规定公司法定代表人超越权限对外提供担保在相对人明知的情况下担保合同无效.因此上诉请求:1,撤消原审判决第二项;2,依法改判保证合同无效.3,B某银行承担全部诉讼费用。 B某银行答辩称:借款合同和保证合同未违反法律,行政法规强制规定,各方意思表示真实,合同合法有效,C公司在一审中已承认合同效力,现为提起上诉而否认合同效力,属自相矛盾,根据合同法第五十二条规定,只有法律,行政法规才能成为确认合同无效的根据,C公司依据的部门规章不能作为确认合同无效的根据.C公司所述理由均无证据支持,其在举证期限内没有提交任何证据.C公司在保证合同上加盖公司公章,确认公司担保行为,其关于法定代表人超出权限或违反公司内部程序的主张,不能成为对抗理由.综上,原审法院认定事实清楚,适用法律正确,C公司上诉理由没有法律依据,请求二审法院维持原判.本院认为:B某行与A公司之间签定的系当事人真实意思表示,主体适格,内容不违反法律法规强制性规定,应为有效,A公司未如约履行,应当承担违约责任.本案二审争议的焦点是本案保证合同效力问题.根据第七条“具有代为清偿债务能力的法人,其他组织或者公民,可以作为保证人”的规定,C公司作为企业法人,有代为清偿债务能力,并且其公司章程未禁止公司对外提供担保,因此具有对外提供保证的行为能力.根据第三十八条规定,法人的法定代表人代表法人行使职权,C公司在保证合同上由法定代表人签字并加盖公司公章,系公司对外作出的提供保证的意思表示,B某行审查C公司法定代表人签字及公司公章已经尽到合理的注意和诚信义务,目前没有证据显示B某行明知C公司对外提供保证具有超越权限情形而与之签约,B某行相信C公司提供保证行为并与之签约应属善意合理行为.C公司提供保证是否已经董事会或股东会决议通过,其法定代表人是否未经董事会或股东会决议而决定对外担保以及公司对外担保总额是否已经超过其净资产的章程限制性规定均属其内部决策管理事务,章程公示不能对抗第三人,要求B某行审查C公司内部管理程序并进一步检查其董事会决议或股东会决议既不合理也无必要.B某行章程要求审核担保人章程系内部规定及履行手续,是否实施属于其内部管理,也不能成为用以对抗他人或他人用以对抗的理由.根据第五十条“法人或者其他组织的法定代表人,负责人超越权限订立的合同,除相对人知道或者应当知道其超越权限的以外,该代表行为有效”之规定,C公司提供保证行为应视为其真实意思表示.C公司为A公司之间具有一定的关联性,但不存在投资或者参股关系,因此,C公司为A公司提供保证,不违反法律,行政法规强制性规定.C公司上诉辩称担保因违反中国证监会有关规定和公司章程而无效,根据最高人民法院关于适用若干问题的解释(一)第四条“合同法实施以后,人民法院确认合同无效,应当以全国人大及其常委会制定的法律和国务院制定的行政法规为依据,不得以地方性法规,行政规章为依据”之规定,中国证监会规定系部门规章,部门规章与公司章程均不能作为确认合同无效的依据,并且,上述部门规章与公司章程中并无违反有关担保规定对外签定的合同无效的规定,有关担保的限制性规定不属效力规范,违反其规定并不必然导致合同无效.B某行已经如约履行贷款义务,C公司事后又主张保证合同无效对B某行显失公平.综上,本案保证合同当事人C公司与B某行均为适格主体,双方意思表示应视为真实合法,合同内容不违反法律,行政法规强制性规定,亦不损害社会公共利益和第三人利益,保证合同应依法认定为有效.至于C公司主张本案借款合同标的用途变更一节,C公司未提供证据证明,本院不予确认.C公司上诉请求理据不足,本院不予支持,C公司应当承担保证责任.综上所述,原审判决认定事实清楚,适用法律正确,判处适当,应予维持.依照第一百五十三条第一款第(一)项之规定,判决如下:驳回上诉,维持原判。二审案件受理费人民币85335.87元,由A投资股份有限公司负担。本判决为终审判决。GOODMAN v. LADD ESTATE CO.SUPREME COURT OF OREGON，1967224 Or. 621，427 P.2d 102December 8, 1966, Argued CASE SUMMARY :PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs appealed from Circuit Court, Multnomah County (Oregon), in which the court dismissed plaintiffs complaint that sought to enjoin defendant from enforcing a guaranty agreement executed by a corporation in favor of defendant.OVERVIEW: Plaintiff shareholders brought suit to enjoin defendant corporation from enforcing a guaranty agreement executed by another corporation in favor of defendant. It was conceded that the guaranty agreement was ultra vires. Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed and they appealed. On appeal, the court concluded that it could set aside and enjoin the performance of the ultra vires contract if it deemed such a course equitable. The court applied the rule that, if a shareholder himself participated in an ultra vires act, he could not thereafter attack it as ultra vires. The court concluded that plaintiffs participated in the ultra vires act and therefore were not entitled to equitable relief.OUTCOME: The court affirmed the lower courts decision and held that plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable relief because plaintiffs participated in the ultra vires act and therefore could not thereafter attack it as ultra vires.Lusk, Justice ：Plaintiffs brought this suit to enjoin the defendant Ladd Estate Company, a Washington corporation, from enforcing a guaranty agreement executed by Westover Tower, Inc., a corporation, in favor of Ladd Estate. From a decree dismissing the suit plaintiffs appeal.In 1961 the defendant Walter T. Liles n1 held all the common shares of Westover and he, Dr. Edmond F. Wheatley and Samuel H. Martin were its directors. On September 8, 1961, Dr. Wheatley borrowed $ 10,000 from Citizens Bank of Oregon and gave his promissory note therefor, which was endorsed by Ladd Estate. Contemporaneously with this transaction Liles, individually, and Westover, by Liles as president, and Martin, as secretary, executed an agreement in writing by which they unconditionally guaranteed Ladd Estate against loss arising out of the latters endorsement of the Wheatley note to Citizens Bank. The agreement was also signed by Ladd Estate. It recited that it was made at the request of Liles and Westover and that Ladd Estate would not have guaranteed payment of the Wheatley note without the guarantee of Liles and Westover to Ladd Estate.Wheatley defaulted on his note, Ladd Estate paid to Citizens Bank the amount owing thereon, $ 9,583.61, and demanded reimbursement from Westover. Upon the latters rejection of the demand Ladd filed an action at law upon the guaranty agreement against Liles and Westover.The plaintiffs Morton J. Goodman and Edith Goodman, husband and wife, came into the case in this manner: On September 27, 1963, plaintiffs purchased all the common shares of Westover from a receiver appointed by the Circuit Court for Multnomah County who was duly authorized to make such sale. At the time of such purchase, plaintiffs were fully aware of the guaranty agreement given by Westover and Liles to Ladd Estate. It is conceded that the guaranty agreement was ultra vires the corporation. Plaintiffs, as stockholders, brought this suit pursuant to the provisions of ORS 57.040.ORS57.040 is comparable to Del.G.C.L. 124,supra It will be noticed that the court may set aside and enjoin the performance of the ultra vires contract if it deems such a course equitable. Plaintiffs argue that to deny them the relief they seek would be shocking, because Westover executed the guaranty agreement in order to enable one of its directors, Wheatley, to obtain a loan of money to be used for purposes entirely foreign to any corporate purpose. We see nothing shocking or even inequitable about it. The corporation was organized for the purposes, among others, to engage in the business of providing housing for rent or sale and to obtain contracts of mortgage insurance from the Federal Housing Commissioner, pursuant to the provisions of the National Housing Act, 12 USCA 1701 et seq. Authorized capital stock comprised 30,100 shares of which 100 shares, having a par value of $ 1 per share and designated preferred stock, were issued to the Commissioner, pursuant to 1743 (b)(1), USCA, and 30,000 shares, having a par value of $ 1 per share and designated common stock, were issued to Liles. Voting rights of the shareholders were vested exclusively in the holders of the common stock. The guaranty agreement recites that, at the request of Liles and Westover, Ladd Estate guaranteed payment of the Wheatley note. Ladd Estate made good on its endorsement when Wheatley defaulted and now calls upon Westover to honor its obligation. The ag