THE+BASIC+PROBLEMS+OF+PHENOMENOLOGY.doc

EDMUND HUSSERLTHE BASIC PROBLEMS OFPHENOMENOLOGYFrom the Lectures, Winter Semester, 19101911From the German “Aus den Vorlesungen,Grundprobleme der Phnomenologie, Wintersemester1910/1911” in Zur Phnomenologie der Intersubjektivitt,Husserliana XIII, edited by Iso KernTRANSLATED BYINGO FARINSt. Johns College, Santa FeNew Mexico, USAandJAMES G. HARTIndiana University, BloomingtonIndiana, USAA C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of CongressISBN-10 1-4020-3788-0 (PB)ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3788-7 (PB)ISBN-10 1-4020-3787-2 (HB)ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3787-0 (HB)ISBN-10 1-4020-3789-9 (e-book)ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3789-4 (e-book)Published by Springer,P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.Printed in the NetherlandsTABLE OF CONTENTSTranslators Preface. XIIIChapter 1. The Natural Attitude and the “Natural Conceptof the World”. . 1 1. The I in the Natural Attitude . 1 2. The Lived Body and the SpatialTemporalSurrounding . 3 3. The Localization of Lived Experiences in theLived Body. 4 4. Empathy and the Other I . 5 5. The Phenomenon of Space and theCorrespondence of the Appearances for DiverseSubjects in their Normal State . 6 6. Recapitulation概括 of the Preceding Discussions. 8 7. The Natural Attitude as the Attitude ofExperience. The Problem of the Evidence ofJudgments from Experience. 10 8. The Experiential Sciences (DieErfahrungswissenschaften): Physical NaturalScience and Psychology. The Natural Conceptof the World . 12 9. The Empirical or Natural Attitude and the A PrioriAttitude. Ontology of Nature and FormalOntology. 15 10. The A Priori of Nature, the NaturalWorld-Concept, and the Natural Sciences.Avenarius 阿芬那留斯“Critique of Pure Experience”. 22VVI TABLE OF CONTENTSChapter 2. Basic Consideration: The PhenomenologicalReduction as Achieving the Attitude DirectedToward Pure Experience. 29 11. The Sphere of Knowledge in the SubjectiveSense and Empirical and Rational Psychology . 29 12. The Problem of the Disengagement of theEmpirical as well as the Essential Side of Nature.The Joining of the I to the Body. 31 13. The Severability of the Empirical Connectionbetween “Res Cogitans” and “Res Extensa.” The“Distinctio Phaenomenologica”. 33 14. The Ontological Privilege of Experience overthe Natural Object. Empirical (Transcendent)Perception and Perception of Pure LivedExperiences . 35 15. The Phenomenological Attitude: Differentiatingthe Phenomenological Intuition or Perceptionof Pure Lived Experience from the InnerPerception of Psychic Experience. 39 16. Descartes Fundamental Consideration and thePhenomenological Reduction. 41 17. Independence of the PhenomenologicalJudgment from the Natural Judgment . 42Chapter 3. Preliminary Discussion of Some Objections to theAim of the Phenomenological Reduction . 47 18. The Objection Concerning Solipsism . 47 19. The Objection to the Phenomenological Possibilityof the Disengagement of the I. 48 20. Objections to the Absolute Character of thePhenomenologically Given and to the Possibilityof a Phenomenological Science and thePhenomenological Founding of Natural Science. 48 21. The Absence of Motivation for thePhenomenological Reduction. 49 22. Preliminary Thoughts for the Discussion ofObjections to the Absoluteness ofPhenomenological Knowledge. 50TABLE OF CONTENTS VIIChapter 4. Phenomenologys Move Beyond the Realm of theAbsolute Given. 53 23. The Problem of the Absolute Character ofPhenomenological Givenness. 53 24. The Absolute Givenness of the PhenomenologicallyPerceived. The Meaninglessness of aDisengagement within the PhenomenologicalPerception. 54 25. The Implied Retention in the PhenomenologicalPerception as “Transcendence” within thePhenomenological Attitude. 55 26. Phenomenological Recollection and its Possibilityof Deception. Transformation of EmpiricalMemory into Phenomenological Memory. 56 27. The Possibility of the Phenomenological, but notAbsolute, Appropriation of the Entire Region ofthe Empirical. On Expectation. 58 28. The Phenomenological Experience. Its“Transcendence in Immanence” and thePossibility of Deception. Empathy and Experienceof Oneself. 59 29. Going Beyond the Realm of Absolute Givennessas a Necessary Condition for the Possibility of aPhenomenological Science . 61 30. Immanence and Transcendence. The PolysemousNature of these Terms and the Sense ofImmanence and Transcendence in the Fieldof Phenomenology . 63Chapter 5. The Phenomenological Uncovering of the Whole,Unified, Connected Stream of Consciousness. 67 31. The Background of the PhenomenologicalObject and the Identity of the PhenomenologicalObject in Diverse Acts of Consciousness. ThePhenomenological Consciousness of Time. 67 32. Recapitulation and New Presentation: ThePhenomenological Reduction to PureConsciousness as an Individual Being and theVIII TABLE OF CONTENTSProblems of the Scope of the Reduced World ofConsciousness and the Possibility ofPhenomenological Science . 69 33. The Extension of the PhenomenologicalExperience over the Entire Unified Streamof Consciousness. 71 34. The Overcoming of an Artificial Limitation. TheUncovering of the Phenomenological Stream ofConsciousness, taking as a Starting Point theNatural Reflection on the Stream of Consciousnessand the Doubled Phenomenological Reduction. 73 35. The Transcendent Unities of Natural Experienceas Indices of Actual and Possible Pure Contexts ofConsciousness. The Transposition (Umwendung)of All Natural Experience and All Sciences intothe Phenomenological Experience . 74Chapter 6. The Uncovering of the PhenomenologicalMultiplicity of Monads. 79 36. The Intersubjective Context of Consciousness.The Question Whether the PhenomenologicalReduction Means a Restriction to IndividualConsciousness . 79 37. The Principle of the Construction of a UnifiedStream of Consciousness . 79 38. Empathy. The Contrast of Empathy WithAnalogizing Pictorial Consciousness. 82 39. The Uncovering of Other Phenomenological IsThrough a Doubled Phenomenological Reduction.Nature as an Index of the Coordination of aPlurality of I-Monads. 84Chapter 7. Concluding Considerations on the Significance ofPhenomenological Knowledge. 87 40. The Abstention from Any Judgment about theExistence of Nature in the PhenomenologicalReduction. 87TABLE OF CONTENTS IX 41. The Problem of the Possibility ofPhenomenological Science as a Science ofEssence and Science of Fact . 88 42. The Equivalence of the Knowledge of Nature tothe Knowledge of the Correlative Connectionsof Consciousness. The Application of A PrioriKnowledge of Consciousness to thePhenomenological Connections of EmpiricalKnowledge of Nature. On Psycho-Physics . 89AppendicesI (No. 5): Preparatory Notes for the Course of Lectures(19101911): Pure Psychology and theHumanities (Geisteswissenschaften), Historyand Sociology. Pure Psychology andPhenomenology The IntersubjectiveReduction as Reduction to the PsychologicallyPure Intersubjectivity (beginning of October,1910) . 91II (XXI): The Plan of the 19101911 Lectures (onIntersubjectivity) (Written Down in One of theYears Following Shortly Thereafter). 105III (XXII): Immanent Philosophy Avenarius (probablyfrom 1915). 107IV (XXIII): The Relations Between Phenomenologicaland Positive (Ontic and Ontological) Truths.The Synthetic Unity of Positive andPhenomenological Themes. Dogmaticallyand Transcendentally Elucidated Positivity.Reworking of the Footnote on p. 44 of theLecture Course on The Basic Problems ofPhenomenology (19101911) (from 1924 orsomewhat later). 113X TABLE OF CONTENTSV(XXIV): The Primacy of the Problem of the Unity ofPhenomenological Experience vis-a-vis theCritique of Phenomenological Experience.Self-Critical Reflections Concerning theKey Ideas of the Fourth and Fifth Chaptersof the Lecture Course “The BasicProblems of Phenomenology”(19101911) (probably from 1924) . 129VI (XXV): The Intersubjectivity of the Body ofKnowledge We Call Natural Science(1910) . 133VII (XXVI): Memory, Stream of Consciousness, andEmpathy. Self-Reflections on the MainIdeas of the Fifth and Sixth Chapters of theLecture Course, “The Basic Problems ofPhenomenology” (Winter Semester,19101911) (Written Down at the Time ofthe Lectures, November or December,1910) . 141VIII (XXVII): Empathy as Apperception and Appresentation.Empty Intention, Intuitive Illustration, andFulfillment in Empathy. Supplements from theSummer Semester 1921 to the Appendix VI(XXVI), “Memory, Stream of Consciousness,and Empathy” (November or December,1910) for the Lecture Course, “The BasicProblems of Phenomenology (19101911)”. 149IX (XXVIII): The Identification of the Time of Ones OwnConsciousness with that of the OtherConsciousness. The Other Is in thePhenomenological Reduction. Nature as Indexfor Empathized Systems of Experience and asCondition for the Mirroring of Monads.(Reworking of theText at pp. 8586 of theTABLE OF CONTENTS XILecture Course “The Basic Problems ofPhenomenology” from (19101911)(probably from 1921). 153X (XXIX): The Mediation of Minds through LivedEmbodiment (probably from 1912). 157XI (XXX): Considerations about the Ideas of thePhenomenological Reduction, as wellas the Autonomy and the Connectionof Monads in the Lecture Course“The Basic Problems ofPhenomenology” (19101911)(probably from 1921). 159XII (XVII of No. 5): Reflection on the Relation Between theSecond, Psychological, and the Third,Humanities-Based, Path to PureConsciousness. The Understanding ofthe Motivation of the Mind and theContexts of Motivation of IndividualMinds (around 1910). 165XIII (IV of No. 1): Empathy of the Other Consciousnessand Divine All-Consciousness (1908) . 177Index . 179TRANSLATORS PREFACEI. Historical place and content of this textIso Kern, in the Editors Introduction of Husserliana Vol. XIII(pp. XXXIIIXL), shows us how important for Husserl were thelectures, officially titled, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology(19101911), along with the 1910 Preparatory Notes (given here asAppendix I). Kern documents his claim that, apart from various referencesin Husserls published works, in his Nachlass “he probablyrefers to no other lecture so often as this one.”He refers to it by variousways besides its official title as “Lecture on Intersubjectivity,” “Lectureon Empathy and Expanded Reduction,” “On the PhenomenologicalReduction and Transcendental Theory of Empathy,” or simply“Empathy.” Although the formulations of these themes were of decisiveimportance for launching the direction of Husserls reflections,they are not treated in these lectures with the amplitude they eventuallyreceived. Kern reports that what is here translated (Number 6in Husserliana XIII, along with related appendices) does not give inits entirety the two-hour per week lectures held during the semester,but only the first part. After Christmas, Husserl began intensivelypreparing for Philosophy as a Rigorous Science that was published inLogos in 1911. The second part of the course, the contents of whichwe do not know, took the form of class discussions. This TranslatorsPreface will supplement Kerns excellent introductory remarks.By reason of its scope and size, these lectures are one of the bestintroductions to Husserls phenomenology. We must await the publicationof all the Nachlass to decide which one of the many “introductions”is the best for beginners. Husserl himself used parts ofthese lectures for courses he entitled Introduction to Phenomenology.XIIIXIV TRANSLATORS PREFACEHere, in a brief space, the classical touchstones of Husserls philosophyare presented, some for the very first time: the eidetic andphenomenological analysis and how eidetic analysis is not yet phenomenologicalanalysis; the natural attitude and the phenomenologicalattitude; the phenomenological reduction; the intersubjectivereduction; the distinction between nature or being in itself and natureor being displayed; empty and filled intentions; the interplayof presence and absence; the interplay of transcendence and immanence;manifestation through intentionality and the non-intentionalpre-reflexive manifestation; the various senses of “I” depending onthe position of the phenomenological observer; the “halo” or horizonof experience; world as the full concrete positivity of experience;the incommensurability of the properties of mind and displaywith the properties of displayed physical objects; body-thingversus lived body; knowledge of other minds through empathy; theunique intentionality of empathy; the phenomenology of communicativeacts; temporality and time-consciousness; the consciousness ofthe time-consciousness of others; universal monadology; the natureof transcendental-phenomenological philosophy vis-a-vis science andother forms of philosophy, etc.These lectures also are a good source for getting clear on howtranscendental phenomenology is different from “pure psychology,”“eidetic psychology,” “eidetics of the spirit,” etc., and inwhat respectstranscendental psychology is transcendental phenomenology. What iscrucial, of course, for determining transcendental phenomenology iswhether the transcendental reduction is in play. But in order that thereader is not misled, it must be said that, as is typical with Husserl, littleconsideration is given to the fact that most of the young universitylisteners were novices. Nevertheless, because the issues are emergingfor Husserl with an original freshness, they often make what is atstake more accessible than, e.g., the very dense Cartesian Meditations.Moreover, in some respects, these lectures speak to the novicebetter in part because they cast a wider net in regard to both readersand themes than do the texts comprising The Crisis of EuropeanSciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Clearly, the lecturesare aimed at bright novices as well as the more seasoned studentsof phenomenology, who, at that time, included some of the giftedyoung people who later were to be called “The Gottingen-Munich”TRANSLATORS PREFACE XVor “realist” phenomenologists. The lectures were given two years beforethe programmatic Ideas I, and at least 10 years after Husserldiscovered the correlation between being and manifestation, or, moreprecisely, between what appears, its appearings, and the acts by whichthe appearings of what appears appear. And they occur about threeyears after the decisive discovery of the “reduction” (if one assumesthat occurred around 1907) as theway to secure the philosophical attitudethat opens up the field for philosophy as the field of what appearsin its appearings correlated to the agency and agent of manifestation.It must be stressed that the Appendices and most of the footnotes areintegral to the text. These texts, which stem mostly from the 1920s,are further intriguing because they enable the reader to enter intodialogue with Husserl in a lively way by permitting the reader to bea witness to Husserls responses to the puzzlement of students or hisown dialogue with himself. Furthermore, although the Appendicesre-present and work over discussions in the body of the text, they are,by no means, mere repetitions because they bring clarification, newdevelopments, and new insights. Moreover, throughout the footnotesand Appendices, there are fine pithy formulations that give the gist ofcomplex issues.II. The problem of absolute beingIn these lectures as elsewhere, Descartes is heralded as the forerunnerof the reduction. Husserl here (16) uses the phrase that alsocharacterizes the famous second section of Ideas I, “the fundamentalconsideration,” to point to Descartes cogito as what “inauguratesthe entire course of development of modern philosophy (. . . ), thebeginning of all authentic scientific philosophy, and the point of originof all genuine philosophical problems” which is nothing otherthan “the staging of a phenomeno