破产成本与融资租赁决策[文献翻译].doc

外文题目： Bankruptcy Costs and the Financial Leasing Decision 出 处： FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 作 者： Sivarama Krishnan and Charles Moyer 原 文：Abstract: The theory of financial leasing views financial leases as substitutes for secured debt. Empirical studies have reported a high positive correlation between lease ratios and debt ratios and that lessors earn higher rates of return than lenders. These results contradict traditional leasing theory. They are explained in this paper by recognizing the role bankruptcy costs play in the lease/borrow decision and the nature of the assets to be acquired by a firm. Leasing is shown to involve lower bankruptcy costs than borrowing. Our empirical analysis shows that lessee firms have lower retained earnings relative to total assets, higher growth rates, lower coverage ratios, higher debt ratios, and higher operating risk than non-lessee firms. Lessee firms also have significantly lower Altman Z-scores, a measure of bankruptcy potential. Overall, our results indicate that as bankruptcy potential increases, lease financing becomes an increasingly attractive financing option. We also find evidence to support an industry clientele effect in financial leasing. This paper re-examines the lease/borrow decision, giving explicit recognition to the role bankruptcy costs play and to the relative transactions costs of leasing and borrowing. Our focus is on noncancellable, long-term financial leases because they are most nearly the equivalent of debt financing. We limit our consideration of financial leasing to capital leases, as defined in FASB Statement #13. Because capital leases generally do not meet the lease definition requirements of the Internal Revenue Service (Revenue Procedure75-21), they provide a unique opportunity to test non-tax theories of leasing. The paper emphasizes lessee firm characteristics that induce significant leasing behavior, rather than the characteristics of specific lease contracts. Leasing is shown to have lower expected bankruptcy costs to the lessor than borrowing has to the lender, resulting in lower financing costs for the lessee than the borrower, ceteris paribus. Offsetting the lower bankruptcy costs associated with leasing are the generally higher transactions costs of leasing relative to borrowing. The tradeoff between bankruptcy costs and transactions costs may explain the preference for borrowing by more creditworthy firms and for leasing by less creditworthy firms. We find support for the bankruptcy cost argument as an explanation for the lease versus borrow decision. Our results are consistent with a pecking order theory of financing where firms with greater financial distress potential and high debt leverage, ceteris paribus, may find financing alternatives to leasing unavailable. Also, we find that leasing is a significantly less common method of financing for firms in manufacturing industries, where asset specificity is greater, than for firms in most other major industry groupings.1.Literature Review The theory of financial leasing (e.g. Bower (1973),Brealey and Young (1980), Brick, Fung, and Subrahmanyam(1987), Lewellen, Long, and McConnell (1976), Miller and Upton (1976), and Myers, Dill, and Bautista (1976)traditionally has focused on the differential tax position of the lessee and the lessor as the primary rationale for leasing. Brick, Fung, and Subrahmanyam (1987) extended the tax-based analysis to consider economies of scale in Structuring lease contracts and the cost of managing cash flows in the presence of default risk and interest rate uncertainty. De la Torre and Benjamin (1991), Krahan and Meran (1987), and Lease, McConnell, and Schallheim(1990) consider the role of information asymmetries between the lessee and the lessor regarding the residual value of the leased asset as a further explanation for lease financing. Empirical studies of leasing, including Crawford, Harper, and McConnell (CHM) (1981), Gudikunst and Roberts(1978), Roenfeldt and Henry (1979), Schallheim, Johnson,Lease, and McConnell (1987), and Sorensen and Johnson(1977) have reported high ex ante returns for lessors, and by implication, high lease rates paid by lessees. For example, Crawford, Harper, and McConnell found that lessors ex ante rates of return were significantly higher than the yield on BBB-rated bonds during the same time period. Lease,McConnell, and Schallheim (1990) documented high realized returns on financial leasing contracts, although the realized returns were less than the expected returns. Further, they found that realized salvage values tended to exceed greatly the actual salvage values on which the lease contract was based. In addition, Ang and Peterson (1984) and Bowman (1980)found that debt and lease financing were significantly, positively correlated, implying that debt and lease financing are complements not substitutes. Ang and Peterson found that tax rate differences between leasing and non-leasing firms cannot explain the complementary relationship between debt and lease financing. Marston and Harris (1988)provide one possible explanation for this apparent anomaly. They studied changes in the debt ratio and lease ratio for individual firms over time and found them to be inversely relatedconfirming that debt and lease financing are substitutes. That is, for each firm, debt and lease financing are substitutes, but firms employing lease financing typically use higher levels of debt compared to firms that do not use lease financing. Finucane (1988) also found evidence of a positive relationship between debt and lease financing. Finucane shows that firms in certain industries, including air transportand retailing, rely more heavily on lease financing than others. A cross-sectional analysis revealed that the lease ratio(capitalized leases to total assets) is related to several variables, including the level of mortgage debt and the bond rating for the firm. Firms with lower bond ratings were found to lease more frequentlya result that is consistent with our expected bankruptcy cost hypothesis. Tax-related factors were not found to be important in explaining the level of leasing by a firm. Vora and Ezzell (1991) found significant tax rate differences between lessees and lessors, although they found that the lessees tax rate is not necessarily lower than the respective lessors.Smith and Wakeman (1985) offer a comprehensive analysis of the rationale for leasing that helps to explain many of these seemingly anomalous empirical findings. For example, the high rates of return expected and actually earned by lessors may be attributed to either a comparative advantage of the lessor in disposing of assets at the termination of a lease or the ability of the lessor to exercise market power and to price discriminate among various asset user groups. Smith and Wakeman argue further that the Ang and Peterson finding that leasing and borrowing are complementary can be explained across firms by examining the characteristics of firms investment opportunity sets.Lewis and Schallheim (1992) model the debt/lease financing decision as a substitution between debt and non-debt tax shields. In their model, non-debt tax shields are sold, via leasing, thereby reducing the potential redundancy with interest deductions and making the marginal value of debt positive. The lessee responds by issuing additional debt, which accounts for the positive relationship between debt and lease financing. The benefit from leasing in this model is realized even if the marginal tax rate is the same for the lessee and lessor.In the next section we present a non-tax rationale for financial (capital) leasing that offers additional insight regarding the relationship between debt and lease financing.II. A Non-Tax Rationale for LeasingBarro (1976), Benjamin (1978), Jackson and Kronman(1979), Scott (1977), and Smith and Warner (1979) suggest that secured debt is a financial contracting mechanism aimed at reducing the potential agency costs of debt. Stulz and Johnson (1985) formalize the earlier analysis and show that secured debt reduces potential risk-taking behavior of the borrower and thus reduces monitoring costs to the lender. Leeth and Scott (1989) found that secured debt is positively associated with loan default probability, asset marketability, and loan size. Retaining the option to issue secured debt also controls the underinvestment problems identified by Myers(1977).Many of the properties of secured debt can be extended to financial (capital) leasing, because capital leases impose consequences on a firm that are similar to secured debt financing. Following Leeth and Scott (1989) and Scott(1977), it can be argued that leases have lower expected bankruptcy costs for the lessor than secured debt has for the lender, thereby making leasing a preferred financing alternative for firms with a higher potential for financial distress. The legal treatment of the claims of lessors is different from the treatment of the claims of secured lenders in bankruptcy. The claims of secured creditors are diluted considerably more than comparable claims of lessors in bankruptcies followed by reorganization. A debtor may file a petition for relief either under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for the purpose of reorganization or under Chapter 7 for liquidation. Upon filing the petition, the debtor obtains immediate relief in the form of an automatic stay that prevents creditor actions or enforcements against the debtor. While the stay is in force, creditors (and lessors) are not able to enforce liens. The stay also prevents any act to obtain possession of any property, regardless of who holds the title. The stay is terminated at the end of 30 days unless the bankruptcy court orders its continuance. The treatment of lessors and secured creditors appears to be identical at this stage. In subsequent states of the reorganization proceedings however, there are significant differences.The claims of the secured lender enjoy priority in the distribution of the proceeds of the collateral. If the value of the collateral is less than the amount of the debt, the secured lender is entitled to the value of the collateral, and the difference is treated as an unsecured claim. The secured creditor may suffer when the asset is retained in reorganization. In most reorganizations, the secured creditor must settle for an exchange of securities that erodes the value of the secured creditors claims. Warner (1977) discusses the implications of this treatment for the period prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the”1978”Act). The 1978 Act has improved the protection available to secured creditors, but protection of secured creditors is substantially less than that afforded lessors in similar circumstances.A lessor also suffers an erosion of rights in the event of bankruptcy by the lessee. Normally, it is not possible to take enforcement action during the period of the automatic stay. Furthermore, the event of bankruptcy itself does not represent a default on the terms of the lease, per se. The 1978 Act provides that the debtor or the bankruptcy court can enforce continuance of a lease. While a debtor is in reorganization, the debtor must agree to assume the lease, subject to bankruptcy court approval, within 60 days of the date the bankruptcy petition is filed, although this period may be extended by the court. However, the debtor may not assume the lease if there has been any default, unless the debtor (1) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the debtor will promptly cure, the default; (2) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the debtor will promptly compensate, the lessor for any actual pecuniary loss arising from such default; and (3) provides adequate assurance of the future performance under the lease contract. Curing the default requires payment to the lessor of all past-due claims and compliance with any other obligations. The debtor must guarantee that the lease payments will be kept current and that the lessees other obligations under the lease will be fulfilled (Mapother (1984). Also, the Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the right to reject any executory contract(including leases) within 60 days of filing.外文题目： Bankruptcy Costs and the Financial Leasing Decision 出 处： FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 作 者： Sivarama Krishnan and Charles Moyer 译 文：破产成本与融资租赁决策摘要：金融租赁理论观点认为金融租赁是融资租赁担保债务的替代品。实证研究报告指出，租赁比率和债务比率有着一个很高的正相关性，出租人比放款人得到更高的回报。这些结果违背传统的租赁理论。这些都将在，租赁/借进情形中破产成本所扮演的角色被认可和一个公司取得的资产的性质中，被解释。租赁比起借贷来，破产成本有所降低。我们的实证分析表明，有承租人的公司比起无承租人的公司，总资产方面有较低的留存收益，较高的成长率，较低的覆盖率，和较高的经营风险。总的来说，我们的结果表明，随着破产潜力的增加，融资租赁变得越来越有吸引力。我们也找到证据来支持产业顾问在金融租赁业的影响。本文重新审视如何做租赁/借用的决定，对破产成本和相对交易租赁及借贷成本所发挥的作用，给予了明确承认。我们的重点是不可撤销的长期的金融租赁，因为它们和金融债务最相像。我们限制金融租赁中资产租赁需要考虑的因素，如财务会计准则委员会的第13号声明。由于融资租赁一般不符合美国国税局租赁定义的要求，他们提供了一个独特的机会来检验租赁的非税收理论。该文件强调了承租人公司的特征，包括具体的租赁合同和重大的租赁行为的特征，而不是具体租赁合同的特点。租赁的定义证明，其它条件不变，承租人向出租人借款比借款人向贷款人借款，有较低的预期破产成本，这便造成了降低融资成本的结果。相对借款，租赁抵消了较低的破产与租赁相关的费用，有普遍较高的交易成本。破产成本和交易成本之间的权衡可以为越来越有信誉的企业接待和租赁公司的资信较差的偏好作解释。我们发现破产成本参数被作为解释借用和租赁决定的一个依据。我们的研究结果符合融资顺位理论，其他条件不变，企业会发现融资租赁的替代品无法一致则有更大的潜在的财务危机和高负债的杠杆作用。此外，我们发现，金融租赁在资产专用性比其他主要行业更大的制造企业来说，是不普遍但作用显著的一个办法。1.文献回顾金融租赁理论（如：鲍尔(1973), 巴里和约昂(1980), 贝利克,凡和苏伯拉曼(1987),拉威力,隆,和麦克奈尔(1976),米勒和阿普顿(1976),和马耶尔, 迪尔,和巴蒂斯塔(1976)）,传统上侧重在赋税低位不同的承租人和出租人的不同租赁的主要理由上。贝利克, 凡,和苏伯拉曼(1987)扩大了税收基础的分析，考虑规模在构建租赁合同和管理中的违约风险和利率的不确定性存在的现金流量的成本效益。达拉托里和本杰明(1991), 卡拉汉和马拉(1987),和里斯, 麦克奈尔, 和斯科菲(1990)考虑进一步解释承租人与出租人之间的信息不对称给租赁资产的残值租赁融资带来的作用。实证租赁的研究，包括克拉夫特, 哈勃, 和麦克奈尔(CHM)(1981), 古蒂卡斯特和罗伯特(1978), 罗菲特和亨利(1979),斯科菲,约翰,里斯和麦克奈尔(1987), 塞拉森和约翰森(1977)，报告了出租人事前的高回报，并暗示了由承租人支付的高利率租金。例如，克拉夫特, 哈勃,和麦克奈尔发现出租人事前的回报率在同一时间段上明显高于BBB级债券的收益率。里斯, 麦克奈尔和斯科菲(1990)记录实现金融租赁合同的高回报，尽管现实收益均高于预期回报。此外，他们还发现，可实现的残值往往大大超过以租赁合同为基础实际残值。此外，昂、皮特森(1984)和鲍曼(1980)发现，债务和融资租赁成正相关，这意味着债务和融资租赁是互补的，而不是替代的。昂和皮特森发现，在租赁和非租赁公司税率差异不能解释债务和融资租赁之间的互补关系。玛斯顿和哈里斯(1988)提供了一个关于研究负债率和出租率随着时间的推移的可能解释，个别公司改变了这种明显的差异，并发现它们可能是负相关，这就确认了债务和融资租赁的替代品的观点。也就是说，对于每个企业来说，债务是融资租赁的替代品，而采用租赁融资公司的债务通常要比不使用融资租赁的公司的债务高。菲努克(1988)也发现了债务与融资租赁正相关的证据，他指出，在某些行业包括航空运输和零售业的公司，比其他行业更多地依靠租赁。一个横断面分析显示，租赁比率（总资产资本租赁），是与包括抵押贷款债务水平和公司债券评级几个变量有关的