20100817-8月美国核电站故障-Sima.doc

B&W Energy Tech & Asset (Shanghai) Ltd. Structural Integrity Associates, Inc1. Loss Of Emergency Siren应急警报器故障Facility: PALO VERDERegion: 4State: AZUnit: 1 2 3Event Date: 07/30/2010On July 30, 2010, at approximately 0720 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Emergency Planning Department discovered that public warning system siren No. 17 was not responding, and therefore, is out of service. The loss of siren No. 17 could potentially impact a population of approximately 1196 people in the 5-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). Since the loss of siren No. 17 could impair Arizona Public Service Companys ability to inform greater than 5% of the population within the EPZ, this notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). If an event occurs while siren No. 17 is out of service, the Palo Verde Emergency Plan has a contingency for dispatching Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (MCSO) vehicles with loud speakers to alert persons within the affected area. The MCSO is prepared to implement this contingency should it become necessary. Troubleshooting to determine the cause of the failure has commenced. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.2. Unit 1 Entered A TECH SPEC Required Shutdown After Declaring EDG 102 Inoperable应急柴油发电机102意外故障导致1号机组按照技术规范要求进行停堆Facility: NINE MILE POINTRegion: 1State: NYUnit: 1 Event Date: 08/03/2010Nine Mile Point Unit 1 entered a Technical Specification (TS) Required Shutdown due to unplanned inoperability of Emergency Diesel Generator EDG 102 during planned maintenance on opposite division Liquid Poison pump 12. In accordance with TS 3.0.1, Limiting Condition for Operation LCO Applicability and TS 3.1.2, Liquid Poison System, normal orderly shutdown commenced at 1551 EDT which was within one hour of declaring Emergency Diesel Generator 102 inoperable. The unplanned inoperability of EDG 102 was caused by the failure of its lube oil circulating pump due to thermal overload. The licensee is pursuing restoration of EDG 102 and the Liquid Poison pump 12 in order to exit the LCO Action Statement. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The Nine Mile Point Unit 1 TS required shutdown was suspended at 1929 EDT upon restoration of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 102 to operable. With operability of EDG 102 restored, Liquid Poison Pump 11 was also made operable. Accordingly, the TS shutdown action for an inoperable liquid poison system was exited. The lowest power level reached was 92.5% of the licensed thermal power limit. Power ascension is in progress, and the licensee expects to be at rated power by 2200 EDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco)3. Potential Safety System Functional Failure Of The Accident Mitigating Function安全系统潜在的事故缓解功能故障Facility: SOUTH TEXASRegion: 4State: TXUnit: 2 Event Date: 08/03/2010On 8/3/10 South Texas Project Unit 2 was in a scheduled A Train work week with the following equipment inoperable for planned maintenance; Essential Cooling Water Pump, Essential Chiller, Component Cooling Water Pump, Engineered Safety Function (ESF) Diesel Generator (DG), High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump, Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump, and Containment Spray (CS) pump.At 0754 CDT on 8/3/10 the B train sequencer trouble alarm was received. The immediate operability determination was the sequencer remained operable. It was later identified during testing that the sequencer was inoperable. The B train sequencer was declared inoperable at 1506 CDT on 8/3/10. Due to loss of the automatic load sequencing support function, all associated train B safety equipment that is sequenced on the B train 14.16 kv bus during a Mode 1 Safety Injection (SI) was also declared inoperable. This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on two out of three safety trains for the accident mitigating function including the A and B train HHSI, LHSI, and CS pumps. All C train safety injection pumps remained operable. Pending a formal operability determination, this is conservatively considered to be a safety system functional failure of the accident mitigating function. This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The B train trouble alarm, an auto test feature, was discovered by operators during their rounds. The licensee entered their configuration risk management plan within the 1 hour as required. Currently, the licensee is working on completing the scheduled A train maintenance and restoring operability sometime in the morning. Also, a work package is under development to repair the faulty B train sequencer. The risk based time limit for restoring operability requires completion by 0449 CDT on 8/8/10. Unit 1 is unaffected and continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.4. Momentary Loss Of Secondary Containment Due To Personnel Passing Through Open Airlocks员工通过开启的气闸门导致二级安全壳瞬时故障Facility: MONTICELLORegion: 3State: MNUnit: 1 Event Date: 08/05/2010On August 5, 2010 at 1145 CDT, both doors in Airlock 413 from Secondary Containment (SCT) to the 985 ft Radwaste Pump Room were simultaneously open for a period of approximately five (5) seconds and subsequently reclosed. This condition caused an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.A for SCT. The condition could have prevented the Standby Gas Treatment system from developing a negative pressure with SCT following a design basis accident. This negative pressure is required to prevent ground level release of radioactivity and to minimize onsite and offsite dose consequences following an accident. The Standby Gas Treatment system remained operable throughout the event. The licensee will inform the State and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.5. Loss Of All Power And Emergency Response Function At The Technical Support Center Due To Scheduled Maintenance计划中的维护导致维护期间技术支持中心电力和应急反应功能的丧失Facility: CALLAWAYRegion: 4State: MOUnit: 1 Event Date: 08/05/2010The Technical Support Center (TSC) will be without power during performance of planned maintenance activities starting at approximately 1500 CDT on August 5, 2010. The maintenance activities, including electrical isolation and restoration, are expected to last approximately 12 hours. Contingency plans for emergency response situations have been established and the Emergency Response Organization members have been notified of their contingency actions. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this constitutes a loss of an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance activities. Region IV was notified of this planned outage. The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. The Technical Support Center was restored to functional status at 0407 EDT. All systems verified operational. The licensee will notify State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Hagar) notified.6. Technical Support Center (TSC) Planned Maintenance Activity技术支持中心计划中的维护Facility: MONTICELLORegion: 3State: MNUnit: 1 Event Date: 08/06/2010On 8/6/10 at 0700 CDT the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plants MNGP Technical Support Center uninterruptible power supply will be isolated to perform a planned maintenance activity. The maintenance activity requires implementation of compensatory measures to maintain TSC functions during the activity. The compensatory measures include having the Emergency Director report to the Control Room and co-locating the remaining TSC staff at the EOF should an event be declared requiring ERO activation. The ERO has previously successfully demonstrated the ability to implement these compensatory measures. The maintenance activity is scheduled to be completed with the TSC returned to full functionality by the end of the dayshift on 8/6/10. The Site Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the maintenance activity and instructed on the planned compensatory measures to be implemented during the activity. MNGP will notify the NRC upon completion of the activity restoring full TSC operability. This event is considered reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will inform both State and local agencies.On 8/6/10 at 1705 CDT the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plants Technical Support Center was returned to full operability. The Monticello Emergency Response Organization has been notified and the compensatory measures that were in effect have been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will inform both State and local agencies. Notified R3DO (Stone).7. Manual Reactor Trip After Reactor Coolant Pumps High Vibration反应堆冷却剂泵高频振动导致反应堆手动事故保护停堆Facility: OCONEERegion: 2State: SCUnit: 1 Event Date: 08/07/2010At 1451 on 8/7/2010, Oconee Unit 1 initiated a manual reactor trip from approximately 17% power due to indicated vibrations on 1A1 and 1A2 reactor coolant pumps RCP reaching the high vibration trip criteria. All systems responded normally following the reactor trip. Unit 1 is currently stable in MODE 3. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the elevated reactor coolant pump vibrations. All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Steam generator water level is being maintained with main feedwater. There is no evidence that the PORVs or safety valves lifted. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. There were no indications on the loose parts monitor except for the RCP high vibration. There was no affect on units 2 or 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.8. Technical Support Center Declared Out Of Service For Planned Maintenance技术支持中心计划中的维护导致暂时丧失其功能Facility: VOGTLERegion: 2State: GAUnit: 1 2 Event Date: 08/09/2010A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the TSC HVAC. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.The planned maintenance of the TSC HVAC was completed and the Technical Support Center was returned to functional status as of 8/9/10 at 1153 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).9. Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions Do Not Contain Two Required Operator Manual Actions附录R安全停堆手册未包括两项必须的操作员手动操作Facility: BROWNS FERRYRegion: 2State: ALUnit: 1 2 3Event Date: 08/09/2010The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions provide manual actions to limit diesel loading. From the Tennessee Valley Authoritys review of the design input calculation, Appendix R - Auxiliary Power System Alignments and Diesel Generator Loading, it was determined that two 4 kV breakers (one in each of two fire scenarios) that should be tripped and/or tripped and isolated during a postulated Appendix R event were not part of the BFN Safe Shutdown Instructions. Without additional operator manual actions to trip and/or trip and isolate the affected breakers, spurious closure of the breakers could overload the credited emergency generator. Interim actions to trip and/or trip and isolate these breakers for Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions are being put in place. This event is reportable within 8 hours under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A) - any event or condition that results in the condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. This event is also reportable within 60 days under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) - as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. This condition was self-identified. The condition has been documented in the BFN Corrective Action program as Service Request 228891. Unit 1, 2, and 3 remain at power and are not affected by this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.10. 4160 VAC Control And Transfer Breaker Switch Defect4160伏特直流控制和转换断路器的开关存在缺陷Facility: COOPERRegion: 4State: NEUnit: 1 Event Date: 08/09/2010On August 9, 2010 at 12:30 CDT, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) completed a reportability determination which concluded that certain General Electric - Hitachi (GEH) Type SB-1 Control and Transfer Switches, contained a defect that would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of safety related 4160 VAC breakers at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS), had the switches been installed as received. NPPD has concluded this condition is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21. Specifically, GEH supplied 23 Type SB-1 Control and Transfer Switches under GEH part number Q16SB1EB4G75SSS1C142 to CNS. 14 of the 23 switches exhibited a failure to maintain the established contact logic when implementing the logic feature of these switches. This condition was discovered during pre-installation testing in support of a station modification of 4160 VAC breaker control. The defect would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of the essential affected 4160 VAC breakers. This would have prevented the transfer of the essential 4160 VAC switchgear from the normal station service transformer to either source of offsite power or the emergency diesel generators and the sequential loading of emergency core cooling system pumps in response to a design basis accident LOCA. All of the switches have been returned to GEH, and none were installed in the station. Therefore, the condition is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73. These switches were designed and supplied by GEH as a safety related part, specifically for CNS. NPPD is unaware as to if this specific switch design has been supplied to any other licensee. The condition is being reported under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). The Responsible NPPD Corporate Officer has been notified of this condition per 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) on August 9, 2010 at 15:45 CDT- Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) written notification is due to the NRC within 30 days of this notification. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.11. Alert Declared Due To Freon-12 Leak In Reactor Building Chiller反应堆厂房冷却器Freon-12泄露引起的警报Facility: SUSQUEHANNARegion: 1State: PAUnit: 1 Event Date: 08/10/2010At 0911 EDT, the Susquehanna LLC Shift Manager was notified that a member of the SSES Susquehanna Steam Electric Station work force was feeling ill effects from a Freon-12 leak located in a plant vital area. This met the declaration criteria for an Alert under EAL OA-7 of the emergency plan which was declared at 0922 EDT. The affected area has been evacuated and recovery actions are in progress to isolate the leak. No personnel were injured or medical attention was required. The leak is in the 1A Reactor Building chiller unit. At the time of notification, the leak was still active. The licensee is preparing a team to enter the area to investigate. No outside assistance is required. Notified DHS (Hill), FEMA (Heyman), DOE (Smith), USDA (Mitchell) and HHS (Rolle). At 2335 EDT on 8/10/10, the Alert was terminated. The Chiller has been evacuated of Freon-12. Freon detectors show no presence of Freon-12 on U1 Reactor Building Elevation 749 feet, except in the immediate vicinity from the leak site with temporary ventilation in service. All state and local agencies have been advised, the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and a press release will be made. Agencies that the licensee notified included the Columbia County Emergency Management Agency, the Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Notified R1DO (Ferdas), NRR EO (Nelson), IRD Manager (Gott), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (OConnell), DOE (Morrone), HHS (White), and USDA (Timmons).12. Unit 1 Reactor Automatic Scram Due To Turbine Trip汽轮机跳闸导致1号机组反应堆自动紧急停堆Facility: QUAD CITIESRegion: 3State: ILUnit: 1 Event Date: 08/12/2010While performing a main condenser flow reversal at 0358 CDT on August 12, 2010 the Unit 1 reactor received an automatic scram on turbine stop valve closure. Turbine stop valve closure was initiated from a turbine trip on low vacuum. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -3 inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit One remains in Mode 3, maintaining reactor pressure with reactor water level in the normal level band. The cause of the event is still under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All rods fully inserted. Normal feedwater is supplying the reactor with decay heat removal via the turbine bypass valves. No safety relief valves lifted du