Economic growth model for emerging markets essay.doc

述新古典增长模型及其对发展中国家经济增长的借鉴意义。 鉴于哈罗德多马模型得出了经济不稳定的结论。经济学家在各个方面对其进行了修正。索洛等人创立的新古典增长模型就是其中最为重要的一例。新古典增长模型主要包含以下假定：（1）全社会使用劳动和资本两种生产要素只生产一种产品；（2）劳动与资本之间可以相互替代，但并不能完全替代；（3）生产的规模收益不变；（4）储蓄率，即储蓄在收入中所占的比重保持不变；（5）不存在技术进步，也不存在资本折旧；（6）人口按照一个固定速度增长。利用人均生产函数的形式y=f(k)，新古典增长模型可以概括为：sf(k)+nk式中：k为人均资本占有量；s为储蓄率；n为人口（或劳动力）增长率，k为单位时间内人均资本的改变量。上述模型表明，一个经济社会在单位时期内（如1年）按人口平均的储蓄量被用于两个部分：一部分为人均资本的增加k，即为每一一个人配备更多的资本设备；另一部分是为新增加的人口配备按原有的人均资本配备nk。第一部分称为资本的深化，而后一总值发则称为资本的广化。基于上述模型，新古典增长理论认为，当社会的人均储蓄大于为新增人口配备资本仍有剩余时，即sf(k)nk，每个人都可以继续增加人均资本量，即k0；相反，则人均资本占有量减少。这表明，经济中自发的作用将使人均资本量维持在k=0的水平上。此时，经济会因为劳动力的增加而稳定增长。因此，新古典增长模型得出的结论是，经济可以处于稳定增长的状态，其增长率为人口增长率，如图215所示。新古典增长模型也具有明显的政策含义。从图215中可以看出，实现人均产出量增加有三种途径。（1）在人均资本占有量既定的条件下提高技术水平，从而增加总产出。（2）提高储蓄率，使得人均资本量增加。（3）降低人口出生率。这些对于发展中国家提高经济增长速度都具有一定借鉴意义。参考资料：/user21/jedi6675/blog/20880447.html据阿根廷金融界报10月15日报道：国际货币基金组织（IMF）总裁拉加德警告称，最近几周“负发展”的经济情况，可能从发达国家蔓延至新兴国家，其主要原因是当前欧洲经济情况的不确定性。拉加德在面对二十国集团（G20）财长发表关于经济形势的分析时指出，在巴黎会议后的新闻发布会上，各国一致同意解决当前问题的基本条件是欧洲给出一个关于三个基本问题的解决方案，即银行问题、金融安全网问题和希腊债务问题。研究发现尽管最近几天全球市场已有所好转，但最近三周全球经济是“负发展”，而且有消极的风险预测认为发达国家的经济疲软正在影响新兴国家。对于欧委会提出的“欧洲银行需要使核心资本充足率提高到9%”的说法，拉加德拒绝透露资本重组方式。在最后公报中，二十国集团对7月21日的首脑会议提出的“欧元区国家采取必要行动来落实承诺”表示欢迎，希望由此增加欧洲金融稳定基金会的能力和灵活性。Economic growth model for emerging markets essay Clear statementSupported argumentProper use of graphsPreper citationAfter reading the article on page 724, you will be required to choose one of there three emerging countries to write about (Malaysia, indonesia or the Philippines)and based on the information from the interwiew, class notes and a minimum of five external sources, decide which economic growth model is best for your country of choice.The paper should be include the nessary graphs to support your model.经济增长模型对新兴市场的文章明确的声明支持的论点正确使用图正确的引用阅读文章后在724页，你将被要求选择一个有三个新兴国家写（马来西亚，印度尼西亚和菲律宾）和信息的基础上从访谈形式，课堂笔记和至少五个外部来源，决定选择最适合你国家的经济增长模式。文章应该包括必要的图表来支持你的模型。Most of your work has been on business cycles and other high-frequency phenomena. Can you begin by reviewing the costs of recessions? robert lucas says that postwar U.S. recessions have cost very little.Do you agree?你的大部分工作已出现商业周期和其他高频现象。你可以通过审查经济衰退的成本开始了么？罗伯特卢卡斯说，战后美国经济衰退的成本很小。你同意吗？No but Im not sure robert lucas was really trying to say that. My sense is that he was trying to push the profession to focus a bit more on long-run growth issues. Putting down the costs of recessions was a useful debating device to make his important point.不但我不确定罗伯特卢卡斯是那个意思。我的感觉是，他试图推动行业去更多地关注长期增长问题。减少经济衰退的成本是一个有用的辩论策略才是他的重点。I believe that the statement that recessions are not costly is incorrect. First, I think his calculation of this magnitude reflects some fundamental flaw in the way the workhorse models we use in economics fail to account for the costs of risk and volatility. This flaw shows up in many different puzzle in economics, including the well-known equity premium puzzle. Economic models underestimate, by an order of magnitude, how unhappy agents are about facing uncertainty. Second, it is highly unlikely that recessions and medium-term growth are completely separable. In particular, the ongoing process of restructuring, which is central to productivity growth, is severly hampered by deep recessions.我相信，经济衰退不昂贵的陈述是不正确的。首先，我认为他对这一规模的计算反映了一些根本的缺陷在这种我们用的主力车模型，在经济学无法计算风险和波动性的成本。这一缺陷出现在许多不同的经济学难题中，包括著名的股权溢价之谜。对经济模型估计不足，由一个数量级，代理人面对不确定因素是如何不幸。其次，经济衰退和中期增长是完全分开是极不可能的。特别是，目前的改革进程是中央对生产率增长，严重阻碍了经济衰退。Recessions are costly because they waste enormous resources, affect physical and human investment decisions, have large negative distributional consequences, influence political outcomes, and so on.经济衰退是昂贵的，因为他们浪费大量的资源，影响身体和人类的投资决策，有很大的负面的分配后果，影响政治的结果，等等。What about the costs of recessions in other parts of the world,especially latin america?经济衰退的费用在世界其他地区怎么样，特别是美国的？The cost of recessions grows exponentially with their size and the countrys inability to soften the impact on the most affected. Less developed economies suffer much larger shocks beause their economise are not well diversified, and they experience capital out-flows that exacerbate the impact of recessionary shocks. Their domestic financial sectors are small and often become strained during recessions, making it difficult to reallocate scarce resources toward those who need them the most.衰退成本呈指数增长的规模和国家无力使大多数影响的冲击力软化。不发达经济体受到更大的冲击，因为它们的经济不是多样化的，而且他们的经验资本出流，加剧的了衰退的冲击力对其的影响。他们国内金融部门很小，往往在衰退的时候变得紧张，因此很难分配稀缺的资源给那些最需要的人。To make maters worse, the governments ability to use fiscal policy is also out of the question when the currency is in free fall and liabilities are dollarized. There are many things that we take for granted in the United States that simply are not feasible for emerging markets in distess. One has to be careful with extrapolating too directly the countercyclical recipes used for developed economise to these countries.更为糟糕的是，当货币自由落体和负债美元化时政府利用财政政策的能力也出现了问题。我们在美国理所当然做的很多事情对于在痛苦中的新兴市场根本是不可行。有一点需要注意，反周期的配方用于这些国家的经济发展的外推太直接。Your first work, in your M.A. dissertation,was to builda macroeconomic model of the economy of chile. What do we learn by comparing economies?你的第一个工作，在你的硕士论文，是建立宏观经济模型，智利的经济。我们通过比较经济学习什么？Does the Chilean economy behave essentially like the U.S. economy or are there fundamental differences?是智利经济行为和美国经济基本一样，还是有根本的区别？Chile is a special economy among emerging markets. It began pro-market reforms many years before the rest and has had very prudent macroeconomic management for several decades by now. For that reason, it is a bit more “like the U.S. economy” than most other emerging market economies. However, there are still important differences, of the sort described in my answer to the previous question. 智利在新兴市场上是一个特殊的经济。它休息之前很多年就开始市场改革并且至今为止已经非常谨慎的宏观管理了几十年。因为这个原因，它比大多数其他新兴市场经济更加“像美国经济“。然而，仍有一些重要的差异，这种差异会在我对这一问题的答案中描述。Beyond the specifics of Chile, at some deep level, macroeconomic principles, and economic principles more generally , are the same everywhere. It is all about incentives, tradeoffs, effort, commitment, discipline ,transparency, insurance, and so on, and hence the practice of economics has plenty of diversity.除了智利，在诸多深层次，宏观经济的原则，和其他更普遍的经济原则，到处都是一样的。它是所有关于奖励，权衡，努力，承诺，纪律，透明度，保险，等等，因此经济学的实践具有丰富的多样性。Youve studied situations in which capital suddenly stops flowing into an economy from abroad. What are the lessons youve learned from this research?你研究资本突然停止从国外流入的经济情况。那么你从这研究中学到了什么？First things first. I think we need to get used to the presence of speculative bubbles. The reason is that the world today has a massive shortage of financial assets the savers can use to store value.Because of this shortage, “artificial” assets are ready to emerge at all times. Specific bubbles come and go-from the NASDAQ, to real estate, to commodities-but the total is much more stable.第一件事第一。我想我们需要适应投机泡沫的存在。原因是，今天的世界有一个巨大的金融资产的短缺，储存者可以使用存储的值。由于这一短缺，“人工”资产准备随时出现。具体的气泡来来去去-从纳斯达克，到真正的房产，商品-但都会更加稳定。I do not think the distinction between bubbles and fundamentals is as clear-cut as people describe. Probably outside periods of liquidity crises, all assers have some bubble component in them. The question is how much.我不认为气泡和基础之间的区别像人们描述的那么明确。可能外面流动性危机时期，所有资产都会有一些泡沫成分在里面。问题是多少。The most basic lesson for emerging markets is that capital flows are volatile. Sometimes they simply magnify domestic problems, but in many other cases, they are the direct source of volatility. However, the conclusion from this observation is not that capital flows should be limited, just as we do not close the banks in the United Staes to eliminate the possibility of bank runs. On the contrary, much of the volatility comes from insufficient integration with international capital markets, which makes emerging markets illiquid and the target of specialists and speculators.在新兴市场里资本流动是反复无常波动的是我所学到的最基本的。有时他们只是放大国内问题，但在许多其他情况下，他们是波动的直接来源。然而，通过观察得出的这一结论不应限制资本流动，就像我们不会在美国关闭的银行来排除银行挤兑的可能性。反之，大部分的波动来自新兴市场流动性和 专家以及投机者的目标 与国际资本市场 非一体化。For the short and medium run, the main policy lesson is that sudden stops to the inflow of capital must be put at the center of macroeconomic policy design in emerging markets. This has deep implications for the design of monetary and fiscal policy, as well as for international reserves management practices and domestic financial markets regulation.The U.S. current account drficit has been large and increasing for many years, and dollar debt levels around the world have increased. Do you see any danger in this process for either the United Staes or the rest of the world?I believe the persistent current account deficits in the United States are not the result of an anomaly that, as such, must go away in a sudden crash, as theatractive to international private and public investors.About major shocks, this process may still last for quite some time. But of course shocks do happen, and in that sense, leverage is dangerous. However, there isnt much we can or should do, short of inolementing structural reforms around the world aimed at improving growth potential in some cases and domestic financial development in others.Youve suggested that an inssiable appetite for safe securities is the root cause of the global financial crisis and that governments must accept a larger resposibility for bearing risk arising from the financial system. Would you expain this idea?Foreign centarl banks and investors and U.S. financial institutions have an instiable demand for safe securitise, which puts enormous pressure on the U.S. financial system. The gldbal financial crisis was the result of an interaction between the intial tremors caused by the tise in subprime mortgages to feed the demand for safe-assers.By 2001, the demand for safe assers began to exceed their supply, and financial institutions searched for ways to create safe assers from previously untapped and riskier ones. Subprime mortgages(and other risky assers, ranging from auto loans to student loans)ino safe assets, “banks” created complex securities made from large numbers of risky morrgages broken into tiers of increasing risk.How did these new complex securitise get out of conteol and lead to the real estate bubbe and financial crisis?A positive feedback loop was created: Supplied with safe assers,funds flowed into banks to finance real estate purchases financed by mortgages. Real estate prices rose rapidly, which reinforced the belief that the securities created from mortgages were indeed safe. But for the banking system and economy,the new-found source of”safe” assets was not safe at all. Combining a large number of risky mortgages to create a safe security works if the risk of default by the initial borrower is uncorrelated with that of others. But in the environment of 2007, the risks were highly correlated. There was one source of default-generally falling home prices.The triggering event was the crash in the real estate “bubble” and the rise in subprime mortgage defaults htat followed it. But this cannot be all of it. The global financial system went into cardiac arrest in response to a relatively small shock which was well within the range of possible scenarios. The real damage came from the unexpected and sudden freezing of the entire securitization industry. Almost instantaneously, confidence vanished and the complexity which made possible the “multiplication of bread” during the boom., turned into a source of counterparyt risk, both real and imaginary. Fear fed into more fear,causing relucance to engage in financial transactions, even anmong the prime financial institutions. Safe interest rates plunneted to record low levels.Addressing these issues requires governments to exlicitly bear a greater share of systempic risk. There are two prngs within this approach the first prong is for the countries that demand safe financial instiutions. Safe interest plummeted to record low levels. Addressing these issues requires governments to explicitly bear a greater share of systemic risk.There are two prngs within this appr