国际事务外文文献英文

Morality self interest and leaders in international affairs Mark Clarence Walker School of International Service American University 4400 Massachusetts Ave NW Washington DC 20016 8071 USA Abstract Critics of the morality associated with transforming leadership have begun to note the qualities of transactional and strategic leaders The case of international affairs highlights the role transactional leaders play in providing structure and moral substance in an environment that lacks both This study takes note of the competing schools of thought in international relations the concept of a rational basis for cooperation and four approaches to resolving moral disputes in political theory In sum this study shows how the pursuit of mutual self interest over the long term and not absolute moral principles has usually provided an effective and morally sound international system that serves the greater good D 2006 Elsevier Inc All rights reserved Keywords Transactional leadership Transforming leadership Morality Self interest International 1 Introduction bThe point is ladies and gentleman is that greed for lack of a better word is good Q states Michael Douglas in the Hollywood movie Wall Street from 1987 He uses this message as a way to inspire the stockholders of a company to wrest it from the grip of managers who have little of their own money invested in the corporation The stockholders must recognize their interests and demand better management That is the lesson of the free market and the legacy of bthe Carnegies the Mellons the men that built this great industrial empire who made sure of it because it was their money at stake Q It is a plea based upon a desire not only for effectiveness but also to do what is right on behalf of individuals with interests But is it really bgood Q Continuing doubts over the nature of morality in transforming leadership Bass Price 2003 has led some scholars e g Ciulla 2004 to consider if there is a certain form of morality associated with transactional leadership and if so to inquire of its nature This inquiry begins with the recognition that although transactional or strategic leadership has traditionally been studied within leadership scholarship separately from moral leadership theory an integrated study of strategy and morality is possible moreover many of the most successful examples of leadership have been both moral and strategic Walker submitted for publication This article will show that the morality associated with transactional behavior in the case of leaders in international affairs which is underpinned by the calculation of mutual self interest over the long term is significantly inclusive highly effective and usually serves the greater good This study develops its central thesis that there is moral grounding for transactional leadership that goes beyond its practical benefits through a series of logical arguments and presentations This article first highlights literature that 1048 9843 see front matter D 2006 Elsevier Inc All rights reserved doi 10 1016 j leaqua 2005 12 002 Tel 1 202 246 5589 fax 1 202 885 2494 E mail address mcwalker alum mit edu The Leadership Quarterly 17 2006 138 145 places the individual agent at the center of the debate on morality self interest and leadership Second it builds on the role of individuals as leaders by discussing the distinction made by James MacGregor Burns between transactional and transforming leaders Third it introduces the example of the international system and how transactional leadership has built its governing institutions Fourth it analyzes international institution building in depth by showing how and why actors on the world stage cooperate Fifth it emphasizes the role of leaders as opposed to other individuals in this process and links the pursuit of a state s national interest to a morality of transactional leadership Sixth it argues that the morality associated with transactional leadership may be best described as consequentialist while that of transforming leadership may be best described as absolutist In its conclusion this study offers a wrap up and re states some caveats The study of morality associated with transactional behavior begins with an examination of a rational basis for morality on the level of the individual agent Scholarship on economic theory and collective action Downs 1957 Olson 1965 cooperation Axelrod 1984 Gauthier 1986 and social contracts Donaldson Hobbes 1651 1986 are the precursors and beneficiaries of this perspective and taken as a whole form a coherent discussion of this topic Nevertheless all observers have not been convinced that purely rational self interested individuals simply begin to act morally either because of the possibility of deception Sayre McCord 1991 satisfying the moral skeptic Copp 1991 or because of basic flaws in the entire enterprise Smith 1991 These negative arguments however can be overcome by careful examinations that highlight the circumstances in which a form of morality can be derived from rational action Actors who have simply chosen to act normatively have the ability to change the noncooperative behavior of those around them into cooperation Kondo 1990 Actors who have decided to follow a moral program can also change the behavior of those around them by choosing to exit out of a situation instead of simply bdefecting Q This situation also begins to enforce moral behavior among those interacting with the moral actor because it costs them when the moral actor exits Vanberg Zimmermann Machiavelli would argue that true virtue is accomplishing one s goals or ends on behalf of one s constituents no matter the means Mansfield 1996 Burns however does not make the argument that transactional and transformational leadership are mutually exclusive In fact Burns was spurred to think about this distinction because of his attempt to explain the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt who demonstrated both transactional and as he would later identify transformational or transforming leadership Burns 2003 Nevertheless transforming leadership as Burns now refers to it has become indistinguishable from moral leadership in general it emphasizes the moral aspects of means and ends and to a lesser degree the success of attaining particular goals M C Walker The Leadership Quarterly 17 2006 138 145139 Moreover Burns himself considers transactional leadership to be moral Burns takes pains to distinguish between leaders and power wielders only power wielders manipulate and influence the behavior of the people for their own purposes with no regard for the needs and wants of the people All leadership is moral according to Burns to the bdegree that leaders engage with followers on the basis of shared motives and values and goals on the basis that is of the followers dtrueT needs as well as those of leadersQ Burns 1978 p 36 3 The case of leaders in international affairs Several defining characteristics of the international system make it a uniquely valuable environment in which to study leaders First there is no supreme or governing authority in the international system no world government in other words The closest thing that comes to a world government is the United Nations UN but it cannot enforce its will unilaterally It does not have a standing army but rather a security force constituted from member countries Moreover it is a standing committee of the UN the Security Council that has the authority to sanction the use of force The Security Council s five permanent members the United States the United Kingdom France Russia and China have veto power over every decision taken in the Council and thus final oversight Second because of the lack of true world government some characterize the nature of the international system as one of anarchy This characterization has profound effects upon the role of international leaders there is essentially no higher authority to turn to for security or cooperation than themselves Many scholars have thus viewed the international system based upon the unlikeliest of factors human behavior and human nature Scholarly views in general have coalesced essentially into six schools of thought realism idealism liberalism neoliberalism feminism postmodernism and constructivism Realists believe that human nature is selfish and that states behave according to the rational pursuit of self interest over the short term States within an anarchic international system are the most important actors Realism in short explains the international system in terms of power there are a number of prominent scholars practitioners and works associated with it Sun Tzu and The Art of War Thucydides and the History of the Peloponnesian War Thomas Hobbes Karl von Clausewitz Hans Morgenthau Henry Kissinger and some would argue Machiavelli and The Prince For centuries this was the dominant perspective Idealists believe that human nature is altruistic and that the international system is better characterized as a community Idealists point to the psychological motives of leaders as the source of state behavior Immanuel Kant may be the best known classical thinker associated with this school In arguing that the principles of international relations must flow from morality Goldstein 2004 p 55 idealists can come in diverse political stripes The most famous scholar and practitioner of this theory in the twentieth century was political scientist and U S President Woodrow Wilson Similarly more than a few would argue that U S President George W Bush has demonstrated a neo Wilsonian idealism beginning a year after September 11 Nye 2003 However neither realism nor idealism fully captures what is going on in international affairs and the critiques of these schools have been substantial The attempt to describe better how things really work in the international system has its expression in neoliberalism Designed as a reaction to the opposing ideal types of realism and idealism neoliberalism is the school of thought that best mirrors the actual functioning of the international system Political scientists empirically observed that conflict in international affairs was relatively uncommon and that most states and the leaders of those states cooperated with one another Neoliberalism accepts as fact that human nature is essentially selfish and that the international system is defined at least in the first instance by anarchy But it says that this anarchy is tempered by institutional norms and regimes that offer structure to the system In neoliberalism although states are the most important actors in international affairs it is the leaders of states and their beliefs that help form and maintain the international institutions that give the system structure Specifically individual leaders and elite are described as rationally pursuing mutual gain over the long term for the benefit of their respective states this is the essence of neoliberalism Milner 1992 Nye 1988 Oye 1986 Ruggie 1993 These ideas are in part rooted in the theories of liberal economics and its theoretical holdings that wealth creation around the world is not a zero sum game and that all bboats shall riseQ as a product of worldwide economic growth through liberal policies Other critiques of realism and idealism exist beyond neoliberalism Neorealism a perspective that builds upon realism and has similarities to neoliberalism may or may not constitute a separate school of thought It essentially M C Walker The Leadership Quarterly 17 2006 138 145140 agrees with neoliberalism that the international system has structure but that this structure is based more heavily upon the relationship between states and the balance of power they have created Waltz 1979 Feminism postmodernism and constructivism place even greater emphasis upon the individual All three of these schools of thought too large and complex for me to do adequate justice to here believe the most important actors in international affairs are individuals because of the over determination of characteristics like gender race class and nationality States behave the way that they do based either upon a masculine culture that has been engrained in the system Gilligan 1982 Goldstein 2001 Tickner 1992 a non objective multiple reality Rosenau 1992 or the language and symbols employed by actors Onuf 1998 Constructivists argue that the entire international system has been created by the discourse between individuals based upon language norms rules and culture But it is neoliberalism that resonates on a consistent empirical basis Specifically it is the set of norms and regimes that give substance to the international system and allow it to operate on a daily basis These norms and regimes have been agreed to and created by individuals and individual leaders whose beliefs skills and actions matter greatly These institutions include but are not limited to the following World Bank International Monetary Fund IMF World Trade Organization WTO and UN International regimes are sets of rules norms and procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in a single issue area Goldstein 2004 examples are the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Ballistic Missile Technology Control Regime Far beyond the usual distinctions between common political notions of liberalism and conservatism these beliefs are challenged on a regular basis only by the tenets associated with Marxian dependency theory true blue mercantilism or the actions of brogueQ states 4 Strategies of cooperation As it turns out the study of neoliberalism and cooperation dove tailed in the 1980s in the works of Robert Axelrod 1984 1997 and Axelrod Gauthier 1986 An illustration of this game in the context of this discussion follows below while a more general discussion can be found in Morrow 1994 The solutions to the Prisoner s Dilemma game show how cooperation can be achieved In the classic Prisoner s Dilemma game actors can either cooperate with or defect on one another The game is often illustrated with the storyline of two prisoners who have been arrested for a crime they committed together A prosecutor attempts to convince one or both of the prisoners to turn states evidence against the other he does not have enough evidence to convict one or both on a serious felony charge but just enough for a misdemeanor Cooperation by the prisoners means that they both choose not to turn the other in or squeal to the prosecutor this behavior brings about the second best payoff for the actors a misdemeanor charge and 2 years in prison But if one actor cooperates while another defects on the other i e squeals to the prosecutor on his partner in crime then the cooperator is penalized with the absolute worst payoff of a felony count worth 15 years in prison while the defector receives the absolute best payoff of immunity and no jail time If both decide to defect on each other they both will receive the next to last worst payoff of a felony charge worth 5 years in prison If this game is played once then there is a great incentive for both to defect because the cost of cooperation is too high and defection in general brings about a solid benefit It is individually rational for both prisoners in fact to defect and the simple solution of the game shows this A prisoner can easily find himself using the following logic If my partner is going to squeal on me then I should squeal on him because I will get a slightly shorter sentence that way If my partner is not going to squeal then I should still squeal on him because I will go free that way instead of serving a short sentence Goldstein 2004 p 88 Over time however these actors learn that cooperation sticking to their common story and sticking together can bring them both considerable benefits The barriers to this learning though high can be overcome with the application of several strategies that with repeated rounds of the game create a greater incentive to cooperate An example of one of these strategies in international affairs is strict reciprocity or btit for tat Q Essentially the strategy calls for uncompromising retaliation against a player who defects so that a player understands that any defection on his or her part will invoke a similar defection aimed back at the player in response Axelrod 1984 Axelrod 1997 Axelrod Goldstein 2004 p 118 The strategy of reciprocity brings about international M C Walker The Leadership Quarterly 17 2006 138 145141 cooperation in security and trade without the authority of a world government or sovereign This strategy helps to enforce the norms and rules of the just war doctrine and liberal market practices Goldstein 2004 p 118 Walzer 1992 Besides the strategy of reciprocity there are also strategies based upon pure normative behavior and exit If actors understand that a particular actor will follow a certain cooperative behavior no matter the circumstances this has been shown to have the ability to convince other actors to follow suit in order to achieve greater benefits Kondo 1990 An example of this in international affairs are various nongovernmental organizations NGOs like the International Red Cross and Crescent who have been granted access to conflict zones because of their unwavering commitment to the treatment of the injured no matter who they might be or what they have done Likewise actors like the UN and its various food and relief programs often threaten to leave a hostile situation if their protection cannot be guaranteed by exiting or threatening to exit they often secure cooperative behavior 5 Transactional leadership in international regime formation Nevertheless these strategies of cooperation alone are probably not sufficient to bring about agreement One crucial key to this understanding is recognizing that neither Axelrod nor Gauthier for example make distinctions between individuals in the logic of the decision making processes they study Individuals though capable of rational cooperati