波兰的公司治理与财务绩效[文献翻译].doc

原文：Corporate Governance and Financial Performance of Companies in PolandAbstract The research presented in the paper is aimed at examining the relationship between the level of corporate governance and the financial performance of listed companies in Poland. The corporate governance degree is expressed by the outcomes of a rating of 2003 performed by Polish Corporate Governance Forum. The attempted models are of ordered multinomial type. Endogenous variable represents the rating outcome (A-, B+, B, B-, and C+), while the exogenous variables include various financial indicators evaluated on the basis of the 2002 financial statements. The estimated ordered logit models show that the level of corporate governance of companies in Poland is associated with their ability to cope with the financial distress, as expressed by the degree of liquidity, profitability and the financial leverage variables. (JEL C10, O57, G30)Corporate Governance Ratings for Polish Companies From the perspective of a company, the corporate governance means: independent and efficient supervising body, transparent and accurate books, strong shareholders rights and equal treatment of all owners groups. Mechanism of corporate governance minimizes the agency costs, i.e., reduces the companys market value loss resulting from a potential conflict between the managers and the owners (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). In Poland, the corporate governance questions have been addressed since the beginning of the first decade in 21st century, both legally and operationally. Good source of information on current issues in this area is Polish Corporate Governance Forum (PCFG) founded in 2000 by the Institute for Market Economics (.pl/). Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) has adopted the corporate governance principles on the Polish market since 2002, with all listed companies declaring that they would observe most of the best practice rules (.pl/). Since then, the new document, entitled Best practices in public companies 2005 has been accepted for implementation. The Best practices express the corporate governance standing of WSE based on practical experience, opinions and suggestions of market participants over the period of 2003Y2004 and the recent European Commission recommendations in this field. Polish Corporate Governance Forum performed two ratings of the companies quoted on Warsaw Stock Exchange, the first in 2001 and the second in 2004 (Tamowicz et al., 2001; Dzierzanowski et al., 2004). These two ratings are not really comparable, since the authors significantly changed the scope and methodology for the second rating. The last rating of 2004 was carried out for 53 companies with largest capitalization on WSE. The data on legal standing of the companies corporate governance issues were collected as of November 2003. According to the authors description, the 2004 rating was based Bon the analysis of statutes, internal regulations (by-laws) concerning functioning of supervisory and management boards and shareholders meetings and content of the companies websites. The very important sources of information were the companies declarations of compliance with the Warsaw Stock Exchange Code and especially the commentaries to particular rules. Authors of PCFG rating indicate at least 60 characteristics that were taken into account for each company in order to obtain appropriate picture of companys corporate governance level. The indicator variables for the rating were taken from the following areas:1. composition and competence of supervisory board incl. independent board members2. supervision over party-related transactions3. general shareholders meeting accessibility4. functioning of the management board5. Auditors independence6. lack of anti-takeover defences7. regulations on trading in own shares8. Companiesdeclared goals and intentions9. transparency arrangements, including information available from the companieswebsites.The disclosed rating uses five categories from A- to C+. These were assigned to 53 companies. The authors indicate that the full range of categories include ratings from A to E. The rating is presented in Table 1. There are five companies rated C+, 17 companies with a B- rating, 14 companies with B, 13 with B+, and 4 with A-. Econometrics and the Corporate GovernanceTABLE 1：PCFG 2004 Rating of Corporate Governance for the Companies Listed on WSEA-Amica, Agora, BZWBK, OrbisB+ BPH-PBK, BRE, Computerland, Eldorado, FORTE, KGHM, LPP, Netia, Pekao, Polfa Kutno, Prokom, TPSA, Stomil SanokBDebica, Elektrim, Groclin, Impexmetal, INGBSK, Jelfa, Kety, Kruszwica, Mennica, PGF, PKNOrlen, Polifarb CW, Rafako, SoftbankB-Bank Handlowy, BIG BG (Millenium), Budimex, Comarch, Farmacol, EFL, Grajewo, Kogeneracja, Kredyt Bank, Krosno, Lentex, Mostostal SDL, Okocim,Orfe, Rolimpex, Sokolow, SterprojektC+Cersanit, Echo, Hoop, Swiecie, Z ywiecThe econometric research on corporate governance concerns mainly the relationships between various categories representing firms performance and the variables describing the governance level, such as ownership structure or the composition of supervising body. Surveys of such research are presented, e.g., in Bhagat and Jefferis (2002), Boersch-Supan and Koeke (2002), and Gugler (2001). Main factors influencing the corporate governance level, which are usually considered in empirical research, are: 1. composition of the supervisory board (degree of dependence on management, boards structure)2. ownership structure (diluted ownership, concentration of ownership, corporate owners, institutional owners, managerial ownership)3. acquisitions (including managerial acquisitions) and CEO changing4. equity structure (debt structure)5. managerial compensation Boersch-Supan and Koeke (2002) formulate a number of weak points of econometric research concerning corporate governance, such as:1. Structural Reverse Causality: For example, it is not clear what is the direction of causality between ownership structure and firms performance; more concentrated ownership can improve firm performance, but the reverse relation is also possibleYfirms well assessed by the market could also attract investors.2. Missing Variables: In the area of corporate governance it is customary that major explanatory variables may not be included into the model; moreover, the linear3.Specification of the equations excludes the presence of higher order terms.3. Sample Selectivity: Most empirical studies on corporate governance analyze only the largest companies, usually the listed ones; such samples are selected by the performance variable and Y in effect Y the studies have sample selection bias.4. Measurement Error in Variables: For example, the companys performance can be measured by different variables, such as market value, ROA, ROE, EBIT, Tobins Q; these variables are sometimes uncorrelated, i.e., they measure the same performance in different way. To properly deal with some of these dangers of econometric modeling in corporate governance it is necessary to use panel data on companies. Boersch-Supan and Koeke (2002) indicate several such databases for Germany.Corporate Governance and Economic PerformanceThe recent survey of corporate governance in OECD countries (Corporate governance, 2004) indicates that Bstudies that are considered to be best practice econometric techniques indicate that the corporate governance is an important determinant of performance (.).Survey authors quote three studies showing significant association between the level of governance and the firms performance. In another study, Bhren and degaard (2001) analyze the relationship between Tobins Q for the companies quoted on Oslo stock exchange in 1989Y1997 (217 companies by the end of 1997) and several variables representing corporate governance. Their results indicate e.g., that ownership concentration has negative effect on performance, while the effect of insider ownership is positive. Increasing board size and the use of nonvoting shares decrease performance. The direct ownership has stronger effect on performance than institutional or state ownership.Similar outcomes are presented in a study by Lehman and Weigand (2000) for the sample of 361 German companies in 1991Y1996. In their research, companys performance measured by ROA is related to a number of corporate governance variables. The panel regression results confirmed that ownership concentration has negative effect on ROA, while the positive impact of ownership concentration is found for firms with financial institutions as large shareholders.Corporate governance indices constructed for various countries also have been examined with respect to their association both with economic and market performance of companies. The examples may be found in Gruszczynski (2003). In the next section, an attempt is made towards examining the relationship between the corporate governance rating and companys financial performance.Ordered LogitThe corporate governance rating represents a typical dependent variable suitable for ordered response models. The categories are ranked in ascending order and the distances between neighboring categories are not set as equal. For the exposition we assume that the observed corporate governance rating variable y can be equal to one of five rating categories, as appearing in the 2003 Polish rating.It is assumed that this ordinal variable y is related to the continuous latent variable y* that indicates the companys degree of corporate governance. The values of y* are unknown.The values of y* determine the outcome represented by y in the following manner:yi =1 or C+ if0yi * 1yi =2 or B- if1yi * 2yi =3 or B if2yi * 3yi =4 or B+ if3yi * 4yi =5 or A- if4yi * 5The s are thresholds (cutpoints), with the values for exteme categories equal to0 =- and5=.The linear model for the unobserved y* is as follows:yi *=xi+iwhere xi is typical (k + 1) *1 vector of values on k explanatory variables (plus constantterm) for the ith observation (ith company).The use of the observed y values requires the assumption about distribution of errors i. Let F be the cumulative distribution function (cdf). The probability of outcome y = m (m = 1, ., 5) can be written as:P(yi=mxi, , )=F(m- xi)-F(m-1- xi)whereis the vector of cutpoints. In the equation for P(yi=mxi, , ), the second term on the right-hand side is equal 0. Also, in P(yi=mxi, , ), the first term equals 1.For the ordered probit model, erroris distributed normally with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. For the ordered logit model, errorhas logistic distribution. For the sake of models identification, either constant term or1 is set as equal 0. In the ordered logit: F(m- xi)=em- xi/(1+ em- xi)The probability pi for each category of y for the ith company (i = 1,2,.,n) is equal to: P(yi=1xi, , ) if y=1pi= P(yi=mxi, , ) if y=m P(yi=5xi, , ) if y=5The pis lead to form the likelihood function, the max I mum of which is attained for the ML estimates of vectorsand.Sample and ModelsFor the purpose of explaining corporate governance rating y of Polish listed companies, the ordered logit models were specified. Since the rating of 2004 was based on the November 2003 legal standing, the explanatory variables for financial performance were calculated on the basis of financial statements for the year 2002.The sample includes 37 out of 53 rated companies. As many as 16 companies have been excluded from the sample: Eight banks, one other financial institution, two companies with the first quotation after January 1, 2002, and five companies excluded for other reasons (data not accessible, financial statements with missing information). The endogenous variable y has been defined as:(1) variable CG with all five ranking categories appearing in original sample; (2) variable CG1 with only three categories (first two and the last two have been combined).The reason for considering also simpler ranking CG1 is the small size of the sample as compared to the number of parameters to be estimated in the logit model. There are 20 financial ratios that have been considered as explanatory variables. The ratios, calculated on the basis of the companies 2002 financial statements are as follows: Profitability ratios: P102 gross profit from sales margin, P202 operating profit margin, P302 gross profit margin, P402 net profit margin, ROE02 return on equity, and ROA02 return on assets.Liquidity ratios: L102 current ratio, L202 quick ratio, and L302 acid test.Activity ratios: A102 amount due turnover, A202 inventory turnover, A302 operating cycle, A402 liabilities turnover, A502 cash conversion cycle, A602 current assets turnover, and A702 assets turnover.Debt ratios: D102 fixed assets cover ratio, D202 debt margin, D302 EBITDA/ financial expenses, and D402 debt/EBITDA.Source: Markek Gruszczynski*,“2006.Corporate Governance and Financial Performance of Companies in Poland”. International Advances in Economic Research, vol.12,pp. 251259.14 / 14二、翻译文章译文：波兰的公司治理与财务绩效摘要本文目的是研究波兰上市公司的治理水平和财务业绩之间的关系。公司治理的水平由2003年波兰公司治理论坛进行的评级来表示。本模型为复合式模型。内生变量表示评级结果（A-, B+, B, B-, 和 C+），而外生变量为以2002年财务报表为基础的各种财务指标。多元Logit模型的估计结果显示，波兰上市公司的企业治理水平是与他们应对财务困境的能力、盈利能力及财务杠杆变量相关联。（JELC10，O57，G30）波兰上市公司的公司治理评级从一个公司的角度来看，公司治理是指：强大的股东权利和平等待遇的所有业主群体组成的机构对公司独立和高效的监督。公司治理机制的代理成本最小化，即减少了公司的管理人员和业主之间由于市场价值损失而造成的潜在冲突（Shleifer和Vishny，1996）。在波兰，自21世纪第一个十年开始时，无论在法律上还是业务上，公司治理问题已经得到解决。在当前问题的这一领域很好的信息来源是年由市场经济研究所于2000年成立的波兰公司治理论坛(PCFG)（.pl/）。华沙证券交易所（WES）自2002年起通过了关于波兰市场的企业管治原则，所有上市公司也宣布，他们将遵守大部分的最佳实践规则（.pl/）。从那时起，就产生新的文件，题为2005年上市公司的最佳做法已经被接受并执行实施。最佳做法显示，WSE公司治理委员会在企业实践经验的基础上，意见和与会者建议超过了2003-2004期间的和最近的欧洲委员会在这方面的建议。 波兰公司治理论坛对华沙证券交易所进行了两次公司评级，第一次在2001年，第二次在2004年（Tamowicz 等,2001；Dzierzanowski 等, 2004年）。这两个级别中并没有真正可比性，因为提交的第二次评级，大大改变了范围和方法。2004年的最后评级是对华尔街上最大市值的53家公司所进行的。这些对公司的管治事项的法律地位的数据收集时间为2003年11月。根据作者的描述，2004年的排名是基于法规的分析、内部规定（附例）中关于监督和管理董事会的运作和股东大会以及公司网站的内容。非常重要的信息来源是公司的声明与华沙证券交易所守则，尤其是特定规则的评注。波兰公司治理论坛的创始人的评级表明，为了获得公司的企业管治水平相应的图像，每个公司至少有60个特征被送往考虑。评级的指标变量是从以下几个方面：1. 债务重组协议和监事会能力，独立董事成员2. 党有关的交易监督3. 一般股东大会的可达性4. 运作管理委员会5. 审计的独立性6. 反收购防御的缺乏性7. 购买自己股票的规定8. 公司声明的目标和意图9. 透明安排，包括信息公司的网站查阅。公开披露的评级有五类，从A-到C+。这些被使用到53家公司。作者指出，信用评级的门类齐全，包括从A至E的等级评分。有五家公司的评级为C+，17家是B-的评级，另外还有14家是B，13家是B+， 4家是A-。计量经济学与公司治理表1：2004年在华尔街上市的公司治理评级A-Amica, Agora, BZWBK, OrbisB+ BPH-PBK, BRE, Computerland, Eldorado, FORTE, KGHM, LPP, Netia, Pekao, Polfa Kutno, Prokom, TPSA, Stomil SanokBDebica, Elektrim, Groclin, Impexmetal, INGBSK, Jelfa, Kety, Kruszwica, Mennica, PGF, PKNOrlen, Polifarb CW, Rafako, SoftbankB-Bank Handlowy, BIG BG (Millenium), Budimex, Comarch, Farmacol, EFL, Grajewo, Kogeneracja, Kredyt Bank, Krosno, Lentex, Mostostal SDL, Okocim,Orfe, Rolimpex, Sokolow, SterprojektC+Cersanit, Echo, Hoop, Swiecie, Z ywiec对公司治理的经济学研究涉及各方的代表公司各类的业绩水平和变量描述的治理水平之间的主要关系，如股权结构，或监督机构的组成。这些研究调查多次被提出，例如，在Bhagat和Jefferis(2002)，Boersch-Supan和Koeke（2002）和Gugler（2001）。影响公司治理水平主要因素，通常认为在实证研究中被证实，主要有：1. 监事会的构成（对管理层，董事会的结构依赖度）2. 所有权结构（稀释后的所有权，所有权集中，企业业主，机构投资人，管理权）3. 收购（包括经理收购）和首席执行官变化4. 产权结构（债务结构）5. 经理薪酬Boersch-Supan和Koeke（2002）制定的关于公司薄弱治理的计量研究，有这几个问题：1. 反向结构因果关系：例如，目前还不清楚股权结构与公司业绩的因果关系的方向是什么，较集中的所有权可以提高公司绩效，但反向关系也可能广受市场评估，也可以吸引投资者。2. 缺失变量：在公司治理方面的习惯，主要是解释变量可能不被纳入模型中；此外，该方程linear3.的规格排除了高阶项的存在。3. 样品选择性：大多数公司治理的实证研究通常只分析上市的大公司，这样的样本会选择有效的业绩变量和选择研究样本偏差。4. 测量中的变量错误：例如，该公司的表现可通过不同的变量，就像市场价值，资产报酬率，净资产收益率，税前利润，托宾Q值；这些变量有时是不相关的，也就是说，他们用不同的方式衡量相同的性能。要正确处理在公司治理中的这些计量经济模型的危险，必须使用公司的面板部分数据。Boersch-Supan和Koeke（2002）说明了德国几个这样的数据库。公司治理与经济绩效最近在经合组织国家对公司治理的调查(企业管理，2004)表明，学习那些计量技术被认为是最好的实践，而计量经济学方法是公司治理性能的一个重要决定因素。三项研究显示，公司治理水平和企业的经营状况之间存在着相关性。 在另一项研究，Bhren和degaard（2001）分析了在奥斯陆证券交易所上市的公司在1989到1997年的托宾Q值和代表公司治理的几