nicholson微观经济理论（答案+ppt+习题库）-200-03-033593-0

GAMETHEORYMODELSOFPRICINGMANYOFTHESTRATEGICISSUESTHATARISEUNDERIMPERFECTCOMPETITIONCANBEADDRESSEDUSINGMODELSFROMGAMETHEORYINTHISCHAPTER,THEREFORE,WEUSETHECONCEPTSOFGAMES,STRATEGIES,ANDEQUILIBRIUMRSTPRESENTEDINCHAPTER10TOSTUDYPRICINGINIMPERFECTLYCOMPETITIVEMARKETSFORTHEMOSTPARTWEWILLDEALONLYWITHTWORMGAMESTHATIS,DUOPOLIESMANYOFTHERESULTSCANBEEASILYGENERALIZEDTOGAMESWITHMANYRMS,HOWEVER20CHAPTERPRICINGINSTATICGAMESWEBEGINOURANALYSISBYLOOKINGATTHESIMPLESTDUOPOLYSUPPOSETHEREARETWORMS,AANDB,EACHPRODUCINGTHESAMEGOODATACONSTANTMARGINALCOST,CTHESTRATEGIESFOREACHRMCONSISTOFCHOOSINGPRICES,PAANDPB,SUBJECTONLYTOTHECONDITIONTHATPAANDPBMUSTEXCEEDCNORMWOULDOPTTOPLAYAGAMETHATPROMISEDACERTAINLOSSPAYOFFSINTHISGAMEWILLBEDETERMINEDBYDEMANDCONDITIONSBECAUSEOUTPUTISHOMOGENEOUSANDMARGINALCOSTSARECONSTANT,THERMWITHTHELOWERPRICEWILLGAINTHEENTIREMARKETFORSIMPLICITYWEASSUMETHATIFPAH11005PB,THERMSSHARETHEMARKETEQUALLYBERTRANDNASHEQUILIBRIUMINTHISMODELTHEONLYNASHEQUILIBRIUMISPAH11005PBH11005CTHATIS,THENASHEQUILIBRIUMISTHECOMPETITIVESOLUTIONEVENTHOUGHTHEREAREONLYTWORMSTOSEEWHY,SUPPOSERMACHOOSESAPRICEGREATERTHANCTHEPROTMAXIMIZINGRESPONSEFORRMBISTOCHOOSEAPRICESLIGHTLYLESSTHANPAANDCORNERTHEENTIREMARKETBUTBSPRICE,IFITEXCEEDSC,STILLCANNOTBEANASHEQUILIBRIUM,BECAUSEITPROVIDESAWITHFURTHERINCENTIVESFORPRICECUTTINGONLYBYCHOOSINGPAH11005PBH11005CWILLTHETWORMSINTHISMARKETHAVEACHIEVEDANASHEQUILIBRIUMTHISPRICINGSTRATEGYISSOMETIMESREFERREDTOASA“BERTRANDEQUILIBRIUM”AFTERTHEFRENCHECONOMISTWHODISCOVEREDIT1CAPACITYCONSTRAINTSTHECOURNOTEQUILIBRIUMTHESIMPLICITYANDDENITENESSOFTHEBERTRANDRESULTDEPENDCRUCIALLYONTHEASSUMPTIONSUNDERLYINGTHEMODELIFRMSDONOTHAVEEQUALCOSTSSEEPROBLEM201ORIFTHEGOODSPRODUCEDBYTHETWORMSARENOTPERFECTSUBSTITUTES,THECOMPETITIVERESULTNOLONGERHOLDSOTHERDUOPOLYMODELSTHATDEPARTFROMTHEBERTRANDRESULTTREATPRICECOMPETITIONASONLYTHENALSTAGEOFATWOSTAGEGAMEINWHICHTHERSTSTAGEINVOLVESVARIOUSTYPESOFENTRYORINVESTMENTCONSIDERATIONSFORTHERMSINEXAMPLE191WEEXAMINEDCOURNOTSEXAMPLEOFANATURALSPRINGDUOPOLYINWHICHEACHSPRINGOWNERCHOSEHOWMUCHWATERTOSUPPLYINTHEPRESENTCONTEXTWEMIGHTASSUMETHATEACHRMINADUOPOLYMUSTCHOOSEACERTAINCAPACITYOUTPUTLEVELMARGINALCOSTSARECONSTANTUPTOTHATLEVELANDINNITETHEREAFTERITSEEMSCLEARTHATATWOSTAGEGAMEINWHICHRMSCHOOSECAPACITYRSTANDTHENPRICEISFORMALLYIDENTICALTOTHECOURNOTANALYSISTHEQUANTITIESCHOSENINTHECOURNOTEQUILIBRIUMREPRESENTANASHEQUILIBRIUMBECAUSEEACHRMCORRECTLYPERCEIVESWHATTHEOTHERSOUTPUTWILLBEONCETHESECAPACITYDECISIONSAREMADE,THEONLYPRICETHATCANPREVAILISTHATFORWHICHTOTALQUANTITYDEMANDEDISEQUALTOTHECOMBINEDCAPACITIESOFTHETWORMSTOSEEWHYBERTRANDTYPEPRICECOMPETITIONWILLRESULTINSUCHASOLUTION,SUPPOSECAPACITIESAREGIVENBYQH33526AH33526ANDQH33526BH33526ANDTHATPH33526H11005DH110021QH33526AH33526H11001QH33526BH33526,201WHEREDH110021ISTHEINVERSEDEMANDFUNCTIONFORTHEGOODASITUATIONINWHICHPAH11005PBH11021PH33526202554PARTVIMODELSOFIMPERFECTCOMPETITION1JBERTRAND,“THORIEMATHEMATIQUEDELARICHESSSOCIALE,”JOURNALDESAVANTS1883499508ISNOTANASHEQUILIBRIUMWITHTHISPRICE,TOTALQUANTITYDEMANDEDEXCEEDSQH33526AH33526H11001QH33526BH33526,SOANYONERMCOULDINCREASEITSPROTSBYRAISINGPRICEABITANDSTILLSELLINGQH33526AH33526SIMILARLY,PAH11005PBH11022PH33526203ISNOTANASHEQUILIBRIUMNOWTOTALSALESFALLSHORTOFQH33526AH33526H11001QH33526BH33526ATLEASTONERMSAY,RMAISSELLINGLESSTHANITSCAPACITYBYCUTTINGPRICESLIGHTLY,RMACANINCREASEITSPROTSBYTAKINGALLPOSSIBLESALESUPTOQH33526AH33526OFCOURSE,BWILLRESPONDTOALOSSOFSALESBYDROPPINGITSPRICEABITTOOHENCE,THEONLYNASHEQUILIBRIUMTHATCANPREVAILISTHECOURNOTRESULT2PAH11005PBH11005PH33526204INGENERAL,THISPRICEWILLFALLSHORTOFTHEMONOPOLYPRICEBUTWILLEXCEEDMARGINALCOSTASWASTHECASEINEXAMPLE191RESULTSOFTHISTWOSTAGEGAMEARETHEREFOREINDISTINGUISHABLEFROMTHOSEARISINGFROMTHECOURNOTMODELOFTHEPREVIOUSCHAPTERTHECONTRASTBETWEENTHEBERTRANDANDCOURNOTGAMESISSTRIKINGTHEFORMERPREDICTSCOMPETITIVEOUTCOMESINADUOPOLYSITUATION,WHEREASTHELATTERPREDICTSMONOPOLYLIKEINEFCIENCIESTHISSUGGESTSTHATACTUALBEHAVIORINDUOPOLYMARKETSMAYEXHIBITAWIDEVARIETYOFOUTCOMESDEPENDINGONTHEPRECISEWAYINWHICHCOMPETITIONOCCURSTHEPRINCIPALLESSONOFTHETWOSTAGECOURNOTGAMEISTHAT,EVENWITHBERTRANDPRICECOMPETITION,DECISIONSMADEPRIORTOTHISNALSTAGEOFAGAMECANHAVEANIMPORTANTIMPACTONMARKETBEHAVIORTHISLESSONWILLBEREECTEDAGAININSOMEOFTHEGAMETHEORYMODELSOFENTRYWEDESCRIBELATERINTHISCHAPTERREPEATEDGAMESANDTACITCOLLUSIONINCHAPTER10WESHOWEDTHATPLAYERSININNITELYREPEATEDGAMESMAYBEABLETOADOPTSUBGAMEPERFECTNASHEQUILIBRIUMSTRATEGIESTHATYIELDMOREFAVORABLEOUTCOMESTHANSIMPLYREPEATINGALESSFAVORABLENASHEQUILIBRIUMINDENITELYFROMTHEPERSPECTIVEOFDUOPOLYTHEORY,THEISSUEISWHETHERRMSMUSTENDURETHEBERTRANDEQUILIBRIUMPAH11005PBH11005CINEACHPERIODOFAREPEATEDGAMEORMIGHTTHEYACHIEVEMOREPROTABLEOUTCOMESTHROUGHTACITCOLLUSION3WITHANYNITENUMBEROFREPLICATIONS,ITSEEMSCLEARTHATTHEBERTRANDRESULTREMAINSUNCHANGEDANYSTRATEGYINWHICHRMA,SAY,CHOOSESPAH11022CINPERIODTTHENALPERIODOFFERSBTHEOPTIONOFCHOOSINGPAH11022PBH11022CHENCEASTHREATTOCHARGEPAINPERIODTISNONCREDIBLEBECAUSEASIMILARARGUMENTAPPLIESTOANYPERIODPRIORTOT,ITISCLEARTHATTHEONLYSUBGAMEPERFECTEQUILIBRIUMINTHENITEL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APOTENTIALENTRANTWASVIEWEDASBEINGCONCERNEDONLYWITHTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENPREVAILINGMARKETCHAPTER20GAMETHEORYMODELSOFPRICING5576SEEJTIROLE,THETHEORYOFINDUSTRIALORGANIZATIONCAMBRIDGE,MAMITPRESS,1988,CHAPTER6PRICEANDITSOWNAVERAGEORMARGINALCOSTSWEASSUMEDTHATMAKINGTHATCOMPARISONINVOLVEDNOSPECIALPROBLEMSSIMILARLY,WEASSUMEDRMSWILLPROMPTLYLEAVEAMARKETTHEYNDTOBEUNPROTABLEUPONCLOSERINSPECTION,HOWEVER,THEENTRYANDEXITISSUECANBECOMECONSIDERABLYMORECOMPLEXTHEFUNDAMENTALPROBLEMISTHATARMWISHINGTOENTERORLEAVEAMARKETMUSTMAKESOMECONJECTUREABOUTHOWITSACTIONWILLAFFECTMARKETPRICEINSUBSEQUENTPERIODSMAKINGSUCHCONJECTURESOBVIOUSLYREQUIRESTHERMTOCONSIDERWHATITSRIVALSWILLDOWHATAPPEARSTOBEARELATIVELYSTRAIGHTFORWARDDECISIONCOMPARINGPRICEANDCOSTMAYTHEREFOREINVOLVEANUMBEROFPOSSIBLESTRATEGICPLOYS,ESPECIALLYWHENARMSINFORMATIONABOUTITSRIVALSISIMPERFECTSUNKCOSTSANDCOMMITMENTMANYGAMETHEORETICMODELSOFTHEENTRYPROCESSSTRESSTHEIMPORTANCEOFARMSCOMMITMENTTOASPECICMARKETIFTHENATUREOFPRODUCTIONREQUIRESRMSTOMAKECAPITALINVESTMENTSTOOPERATEINAMARKETANDIFTHESECANNOTEASILYBESHIFTEDTOOTHERUSES,ARMTHATMAKESSUCHANINVESTMENTHASCOMMITTEDITSELFTOBEINGAMARKETPARTICIPANTEXPENDITURESONSUCHINVESTMENTSARECALLEDSUNKCOSTS,DENEDMOREFORMALLYASFOLLOWSSUNKCOSTSSUNKCOSTSAREONETIMEINVESTMENTSTHATMUSTBEMADETOENTERAMARKETSUCHINVESTMENTSALLOWTHERMTOPRODUCEINTHEMARKETBUTHAVENORESIDUALVALUEIFTHERMEXITSTHEMARKETINVESTMENTSINSUNKCOSTSMIGHTINCLUDEEXPENDITURESSUCHASUNIQUETYPESOFEQUIPMENTFOREXAMPLE,ANEWSPRINTMAKINGMACHINEORJOBSPECICTRAININGFORWORKERSDEVELOPINGTHESKILLSTOUSETHENEWSPRINTMACHINESUNKCOSTSHAVEMANYCHARACTERISTICSSIMILARTOWHATWEHAVECALLEDXEDCOSTS,INTHATBOTHTHESECOSTSAREINCURREDEVENIFNOOUTPUTISPRODUCEDRATHERTHANBEINGINCURREDPERIODICALLY,ASAREMANYXEDCOSTSHEATINGTHEFACTORY,SUNKCOSTSAREINCURREDONLYONCEINCONNECTIONWITHTHEENTRYPROCESS7WHENTHERMMAKESSUCHANINVESTMENT,ITHASCOMMITTEDITSELFTOTHEMARKET,ANDTHATMAYHAVEIMPORTANTCONSEQUENCESFORITSSTRATEGICBEHAVIORSUNKCOSTS,FIRSTMOVERADVANTAGES,ANDENTRYDETERRENCEALTHOUGHATRSTGLANCEITMIGHTSEEMTHATINCURRINGSUNKCOSTSBYMAKINGTHECOMMITMENTTOSERVEAMARKETPUTSARMATADISADVANTAGE,INMOSTMODELSTHATISNOTDEFINITION558PARTVIMODELSOFIMPERFECTCOMPETITION7MATHEMATICALLY,THENOTIONOFSUNKCOSTSCANBEINTEGRATEDINTOTHEPREPERIODTOTALCOSTFUNCTIONASTCTH11005SH11001FTH11001CQT,WHERESISTHEPERPERIODAMORTIZATIONOFSUNKCOSTSFOREXAMPLE,THEINTERESTPAIDFORFUNDSUSEDTONANCECAPITALINVESTMENTSFISPERPERIODXEDCOSTS,CISMARGINALCOST,ANDQTISPERPERIODOUTPUTIFQTH110050,TCTH11005SH11001FT,BUTIFTHEPRODUCTIONPERIODISLONGENOUGH,SOMEORALLOFFTMAYALSOBEAVOIDABLENOPORTIONOFSISAVOIDABLE,HOWEVERTHECASERATHER,ONERMCANOFTENSTAKEOUTACLAIMTOAMARKETBYMAKINGACOMMITMENTTOSERVEITANDINTHEPROCESSLIMITTHEKINDSOFACTIONSITSRIVALSNDPROTABLEMANYGAMETHEORYMODELS,THEREFORE,STRESSTHEADVANTAGEOFMOVINGRST,ASTHEFOLLOWINGEXAMPLEILLUSTRATESEXAMPLE202FIRSTMOVERADVANTAGEINCOURNOTSNATURALSPRINGSLETSRETURNAGAINTOCOURNOTSNATURALSPRINGDUOPOLYWESTUDIEDINEXAMPLES191AND192UNDERTHESTACKELBERGVERSIONOFTHISMODEL,EACHRMHASTWOPOSSIBLESTRATEGIESTOBEALEADERPRODUCEQIH1100560ORAFOLLOWERPRODUCEQIH1100530PAYOFFSUNDERTHESESTRATEGIESWEREDENEDINEXAMPLE192ANDAREREPEATEDINTABLE201ASWENOTEDBEFORE,HERETHELEADERLEADERSTRATEGYCHOICEFOREACHRMPROVESTOBEDISASTROUSAFOLLOWERFOLLOWERCHOICETHECOURNOTEQUILIBRIUMISPROTABLETOBOTHRMS,BUTTHISCHOICEISUNSTABLEBECAUSEITGIVESEACHRMANINCENTIVETOCHEATTHISGAMEISNOTLIKETHEPRISONERSDILEMMASEECHAPTER10,HOWEVER,BECAUSETHELEADERLEADEROPTIONISNOTANASHEQUILIBRIUMIFRMAKNOWSTHATBWILLADOPTALEADERSTRATEGY,ITSBESTMOVEISTOBEAFOLLOWERITISTHISFEATUREOFTHESPRINGSDUOPOLYGAMETHATGIVESRISETOARSTMOVERADVANTAGEWITHSIMULTANEOUSMOVES,EITHEROFTHETWOLEADERFOLLOWERPAIRSREPRESENTSANASHEQUILIBRIUMBUTIFONERMSAYBHASTHEOPPORTUNITYTOMOVERST,ITCANBYCHOOSINGQBH1100560DICTATEWHICHOFTHETWONASHEQUILIBRIAARECHOSENBSABILITYTOCHOOSEALARGEPLANTCAPACITYRSTFORCESAINTOTHEFOLLOWERROLEQUERYSUPPOSETHESPRINGSDUOPOLYGAMEWEREREPEATEDMANYTIMESSAY,BYTHESAMERIVALSENTERINGMANYDIFFERENTMARKETS,WHATKINDSOFADDITIONALOUTCOMESMIGHTBEOBSERVEDOTHERSITUATIONSINWHICHARSTMOVERMIGHTHAVEANADVANTAGEINCLUDEINVESTINGINRESEARCHANDDEVELOPMENTORPURSUINGPRODUCTDIFFERENTIATIONSTRATEGIESININTERNATIONALTRADETHEORY,FOREXAMPLE,ITISSOMETIMESCLAIMEDTHATPROTECTIONORSUBSIDIZATIONOFADOMESTICINDUSTRYMAYALLOWITTOENTERANINDUSTRYRST,THEREBYGAININGSTRATEGICADVANTAGESIMILARLY,PURSUITOF“BRANDPROLIFERATION”STRATEGIESBYEXISTINGTOOTHPASTEORBREAKFASTCEREALCOMPANIESMAYMAKEITMOREDIFCULTFORCHAPTER20GAMETHEORYMODELSOFPRICING559PAYOFFMATRIXFORTHESTACKELBERGMODELBSSTRATEGIESLEADERFOLLOWERQBH1100560QBH1100530LEADERA0A1,800QAH1100560B0B900ASSTRATEGIESFOLLOWERA900A1,600QAH1100530B1,800B1,600TABLE201THOSEWHOCOMELATERTODEVELOPASUFCIENTLYDIFFERENTPRODUCTTOWARRANTAPLACEINTHEMARKETTHESUCCESSOFSUCHRSTMOVERSTRATEGIESISBYNOMEANSENSURED,HOWEVERCAREFULMODELINGOFTHESTRATEGICSITUATIONISREQUIREDTOIDENTIFYWHETHERMOVINGRSTDOESOFFERANYREALADVANTAGESENTRYDETERRENCEINSOMECASESRSTMOVERADVANTAGESMAYBELARGEENOUGHTODETERALLENTRYBYRIVALSINTUITIVELY,ITSEEMSPLAUSIBLETHATTHERSTMOVERCOULDMAKETHESTRATEGICCHOICETOHAVEAVERYLARGECAPACITYANDTHEREBYDISCOURAGEALLOTHERRMSFROMENTERINGTHEMARKETTHEECONOMICRATIONALITYOFSUCHADECISIONISNOTCLEARCUT,HOWEVERINTHESPRINGSDUOPOLYMODEL,FOREXAMPLE,THEONLYSUREWAYFORONESPRINGOWNERTODETERALLENTRYISTOSATISFYTHETOTALMARKETDEMANDATTHERMSMARGINALANDAVERAGECOSTTHATIS,ONERMWOULDHAVETOOFFERQH11005120ATAPRICEOFZEROTOHAVEAFULLYSUCCESSFULENTRYDETERRENCESTRATEGYOBVIOUSLY,SUCHACHOICERESULTSINZEROPROTSFORTHEINCUMBENTRMANDWOULDNOTREPRESENTPROTMAXIMIZATIONINSTEAD,ITWOULDBEBETTERFORTHATRMTOACCEPTSOMEENTRYBYFOLLOWINGTHESTACKELBERGLEADERSHIPSTRATEGYWITHECONOMIESOFSCALEINPRODUCTION,THEPOSSIBILITYFORPROTABLEENTRYDETERRENCEISINCREASEDIFTHERMTHATISTOMOVERSTCANADOPTALARGEENOUGHSCALEOFOPERATION,ITMAYBEABLETOLIMITTHESCALEOFTHEPOTENTIALENTRANTTHEPOTENTIALENTRANTWILLTHEREFOREEXPERIENCESUCHHIGHAVERAGECOSTSTHATTHEREWOULDBENOADVANTAGETOITSENTERINGTHEMARKETEXAMPLE203ILLUSTRATESTHISPOSSIBILITYINTHECASEOFCOURNOTSNATURALSPRINGSWHETHERTHISEXAMPLEISOFGENERALVALIDITYDEPENDS,AMONGOTHERFACTORS,ONWHETHERTHEMARKETISCONTESTABLEIFOTHERRMSWITHLARGESCALESOFOPERATIONSELSEWHERECANTAKEADVANTAGEOFPRICESINEXCESSOFMARGINALCOSTTOPRACTICEHITANDRUNENTRY,THEENTRYDETERRENCESTRATEGYWILLNOTSUCCEEDEXAMPLE203ENTRYDETERRENCEINCOURNOTSNATURALSPRINGIFTHENATURALSPRINGOWNERSINOURPREVIOUSEXAMPLESEXPERIENCEECONOMIESOFSCALEINPRODUCTION,ENTRYDETERRENCEBECOMESAPROTABLESTRATEGYFORTHERSTRMTOCHOOSECAPACITYTHESIMPLESTWAYTOINCORPORATEECONOMIESOFSCALEINTOTHECOURNOTMODELISTOASSUMEEACHSPRINGOWNERMUSTPAYAXEDCOSTOFOPERATIONSIFTHATXEDCOSTISGIVENBY784ACAREFULLYCHOSENNUMBER,ITISCLEARTHATTHENASHEQUILIBRIUMLEADERFOLLOWERSTRATEGIESREMAINPROTABLEFORBOTHRMSSEETABLE201WHENRMAMOVESRSTANDADOPTSTHELEADERSROLE,HOWEVER,BSPROFITSARERATHERSMALL900H11002784H11005116,ANDTHISSUGGESTSTHATRMACOULDPUSHBCOMPLETELYOUTOFTHEMARKETSIMPLYBYBEINGABITMOREAGGRESSIVESINCEBSREACTIONFUNCTIONEQUATION1918ISUNAFFECTEDBYCONSIDERATIONSOFXEDCOSTS,RMAKNOWSTHATQBH110052010ANDTHATMARKETPRICEISGIVENBYPH11005120H11002QAH11002QB2011120H11002QAH5007H50072560PARTVIMODELSOFIMPERFECTCOMPETITIONHENCEAKNOWSTHATBSPROTSAREH9266BH11005PQBH11002784,2012WHICH,WHENBISAFOLLOWERTHATIS,WHENBMOVESSECOND,DEPENDSONLYONQASUBSTITUTINGEQUATION2010INTO2012YIELDSH9266BH11005H20898H208992H110027842013CONSEQUENTLY,RMACANENSURENONPOSITIVEPROTSFORRMBBYCHOOSINGQAH11350642014WITHQAH1100564,RMABECOMESTHEONLYSUPPLIEROFNATURALSPRINGWATERBECAUSEMARKETPRICEIS56H11005120H1100264INTHISCASE,RMASPROTSAREH9266AH1100556H1108064H11002784H110052,800,2015ASIGNICANTIMPROVEMENTOVERTHELEADERFOLLOWEROUTCOMETHEABILITYTOMOVERSTCOUPLEDWITHTHEXEDCOSTSASSUMEDHEREMAKESENTRYDETERRENCEAFEASIBLESTRATEGYINTHISCASEQUERYWHYISTHETIMEPATTERNOFPLAYINTHISGAMECRUCIALTOTHEENTRYDETERRENCERESULTHOWDOESTHERESULTHERECONTRASTWITHOURANALYSISOFACONTESTABLEMONOPOLYINEXAMPLE195ENTRYANDINCOMPLETEINFORMATIONSOFAROURDISCUSSIONOFSTRATEGICCONSIDERATIONSINENTRYDECISIONSHASFOCUSEDONISSU