The-East-Asian-Dollar-Standard-and-China鈥檚-Exchange-RatePPT课件

.,1,TheEastAsianDollarStandardandChinasExchangeRate,RonaldMcKinnonStanfordUniversityApril,2005,.,2,TheExchangeRateDebateinthe1990s,Before1997,EastAsiancountries,exceptforJapan,“softly”peggedtheirexchangeratestotheU.S.dollar.1997-98Crisis:Thailand,Indonesia,Philippines,Korea,andMalaysiaareattackedanddevaluewithbankruptciesandeconomicdownturnsspreadingcontagiously.TheIMFblamesthesoftpeggingforencouragingoverborrowingandcurrentaccountdeficitsleadingunsustainabledollarandyendebts.Itwarnsagainstanyreturntodollarpegging.Williamson(2000),Kawai(2002),OgawaandIto(2002)suggestweightingtheJapaneseyenmoreheavilyinthecurrencybasketsofthesmallerEastAsianeconomiesinthefaceofwidefluctuationsintheyen/dollarrate.,.,3,TheDebateIntheNewMillennium,By2003into2005,theEastAsian“crisis”andnoncrisiseconomieshadreturnedtosoftdollarpegging.ChinaandHongKongretainedhardpegsthroughthecrisis,andMalaysiapeggedinSept1998at3.8ringgitperdollar.Eventheyen/dollarrateismorestable.ButnowallEastAsiancountriesrunlargecurrentaccountsurplusesevenwithnetinflowsofFDI(China).In2003and2004,onlymassiveofficialinterventionskepttheirexchangeratesfromappreciating.IntensifiedpressurefromtheIMF,theG-7,andtheU.S.Treasury,forChinatoappreciate:“Thereshouldbemoreflexiblecurrencies,notonlyforChinabutthewholeofAsia”RodrigodeRato,IMFManagingDirector,29Sept2004atIMF-WorldBankMeetingsinWashington.,.,4,Table3:EastAsianCurrentAccountsinComparisontotheU.S.,1990-2003,Datasource:IMF:IFS.*PreliminaryfromEIUdata,.,5,ThisPaperandMcKinnonBook(2005)TheCaseforAsianDollarPegs,EastAsianeconomiesHavesufficientfiscalandmonetarycontroltotargetexchangerates,buthavemoredifficultytargetingdomesticinflationindependently.Arebecominghighlyintegratedeconomicallywithmorethan50%oftradewitheachother.Theyneedstablecrossratesofexchange.Underdevelopeddomesticbondandforwardexchangemarketsmakecurrencyrisksmoredifficulttohedge.Currentaccountsurplusesneednotdiminishifcurrenciesappreciate,asislikelyunderfloating,.,6,TheRiseofIntraRegionalTradeinEastAsia,1980-2002(shareoftotalexports),EastAsia:China,HongKong,Indonesia,Japan,Korea,Malaysia,Philippines,Singapore,Taiwan,andThailand,.,7,TheRiseofIntraRegionalTradeinEastAsia,1980-2002(shareoftotalimports),EastAsia:China,HongKong,Indonesia,Japan,Korea,Malaysia,Philippines,Singapore,Taiwan,andThailand,.,8,InvoiceCurrenciesinKoreanTrade,19802002(percent),Source:BankofKorea:MonthlyStatisticalBulletin.Tradeinservicesisnotincluded.DMrepresentstheeurostartingfrom2000.,.,9,Figure1:EastAsianExchangeRatePegsagainsttheDollar,1980:01-2004:04(Monthly),.,10,Figure1(Continued)CrisisEconomies,1980:01-2004:04(Monthly),.,11,FrankelandWeiRegression(1994),Problem:ForanyoneEastAsiancurrencyotherthanJapan,howdoyoumeasuretheweightofeachmajorcurrencythedollar,yen,oreuroinitscurrency“basket”?Answer:Chooseanoutsidecurrencyasnumeraire,e.g.,theSwissFranc,tomeasureallexchangeratesintheaboveregression.,.,12,Figure2:DollarsWeightinEastAsianCurrencyBaskets,130-Trading-DayRollingRegressions,1990:01-2004:05(Daily),.,13,Figure2:DollarsWeightinEastAsianCurrencyBaskets,130-Trading-DayRollingRegressions,1990:01-2004:05(Daily),.,14,Table1:StandardDeviationsofDailyExchangeRateFluctuationsagainsttheDollar,Datasource:Datastream.Percentchanges.Pre-crisis=02/01/9405/30/97,crisis=06/01/9712/31/98,post-crisis=01/01/9905/17/04,2003/2004=01/01/0305/17/04.,.,15,DollardominanceinEastAsia,OriginalsinUnderdevelopeddomesticbondmarketorinsomecasesdevelopeddomesticbondmarket(India)Debtorscannotborrowinowncurrencynorcantheyhedgetheirnetdollarindebtedness.Currencymismatchandmaturitymismatch.EichengreenandHausmann1999,HausmannandPanizza2003ConflictedvirtueCreditorscannotlendintheirowncurrenciesnorcantheyhedgetheirnetdollarassets.CurrencymismatchbutnonecessarymaturitymismatchMcKinnonandSchnabl2004,McKinnon2005,.,16,FunwithTranslation名词翻译,ConflictedvirtueHigh-savingdilemma:高储蓄两难Originalsin:原罪(Christian)Sinfromthepastlife:前世之罪(Buddhist),.,17,Conflictedvirtue,High-savingcountriesruncurrentaccountsurplusesbutlendindollars.However,astheirstocksofdollarclaimscumulate:Foreignersstartcomplainingthatthecountrysongoingflowoftradesurplusesisunfairandtheresultofhavinganundervaluedcurrency.Domesticprivateholdersofdollarassetsworrymoreaboutaself-sustainingrunintothedomesticcurrencyforcinganappreciation.Domesticinterestratesarebiddown,perhapstozero,.,18,Conflictedvirtue:Toappreciateornottoappreciate,Asrunsintothedomesticcurrencyoutofdollarsbegin,thegovernmentis“conflicted”because(repetitive)appreciationcouldsetintrainseriousdeflationendingwithazerointerestliquiditytrap(Japan)Butfailuretoappreciatecouldelicittradesanctionsfromforeigners.A“free”floatbecomesanindefiniteupwardspiral,.,19,ThestoryofJapan(I),Therewererepetitiveappreciationsofyenfrom1970stomid-90sundermercantilepressurefromtradepartnersparticularlytheUnitedStates.Buttradesurplusescontinuedtocumulate.Reason:Exchangeratechangesonlydeterminedomesticinflationordeflation,nottradebalance.Thesimple-mindedelasticitiesapproach(Marshall-Lernercondition)todeterminingthetradebalanceisinvalidinfinanciallyopeneconomies.McKinnonandOhno1997,.,20,ThestoryofJapan(II),NegativeriskpremiumGoyalandMcKinnon2003Tomaintainportfoliobalance,Japanesefinancialinstitutionsdemandahigherreturnondollars(whichisriskiergiventhevolatilityinexchangerate).Buttheinterestrateondollarassetsisdeterminedinternationally.Thustheinterestrateonyenassetswasforceddownleadingtoazerointerestliquiditytrapbytheendof1996.,.,21,IsChinalikeJapan?,ChinahasabigadvantageoverJapan:TheRMBexchangeratehasbeen,andcanbe,morecrediblymaintainedatthecurrentlevelwithoutdisturbingdomesticpricelevel.Andadisadvantage:ChinasnetFDIinflowsaremuchlargerthanJapans.FDIcanbeseenasilliquidliabilitiesbutaddstoliquiddollarclaims.,.,22,Figure7:InternationalInvestmentPositionofJapan(BillionsofDollars),Source:Japan:MinistryofFinance.,.,23,TheYen-DollarNominalExchangeRate,1970-2005,Source:InternationalFinancialStatistics,IMF,.,24,ImplicationsforInterestRates:TheNegativeRiskPremium,Tosustaintheinterestdifferentialbetweenyenanddollarassets,consideranaugmentedinterestparityrelationship:Fromthe70stothemid90s,theinterestdifferential,ii*,wasdrivenprimarilybythenegativetermfromtheerraticallyappreciatingyen,whichpeakedinApril1995.Sincethemid-90s,0andtheinterestdifferentialhasbeendrivenprimarilybytheterm,whichisalsonegative(GoyalandMcKinnon2003,McKinnon2005).,.,25,Figure8:InterestRatesintheUSandJapan,Long-Term:10-YearUSTreasuriesandJGBs,1980-2004,.,26,Figure8:InterestRatesintheUSandJapan,Short-Term:MoneyMarketRates,1980-2004,.,27,InterestDifferentials,PortfolioBalance,andtheImpossibilityFreeFloating,Asdollarclaimsaccumulate,asufficientlylargeinterestdifferentialtoinduceprivateportfolioholdingsofdollarsbecomesunsustainableasinJapanwhenyeninterestratesapproachzero.TheproblemworsenswhenUSinterestratesareunusuallylow,asin2003and2004.Then,increasingofficialforeignexchangereservesbecomethedominantmodeoffinancingAsiancurrentaccountsurpluses.Andtheprivateunwillingnesstoholddollarsmakesafreefloatimpossible.,.,28,Table4:EastAsianCurrentAccounts(CA)andChangesinForeignReserves(RC):1997-2003,Datasource:IMF:IFS.*PreliminaryfromEIUdata,.,29,Figure10:USandcumulativeEastAsianCurrentAccounts(BillionsofUSDollars),Datasource:IMF:IFS.,.,30,“RevivedBrettonWoods”EAExchangeRatesdeliberatelyundervaluedtogenerateatradesurplus.Exportsaredesiredtopromote“development”,particularlyinmanufacturing.AsiangovernmentsarewillingtoinvestinverylowyieldUSTreasuries,andtoacceptAmericanFDIwithhighprofitrepatriation.USgetsfinanceforitsfiscaldeficitsTheongoingUScurrent-accountdeficitneednotbecorrectedinthenearfuture,TheDollarStandardandEastAsiasTradeSurplus:TheDFGInterpretation*,*Dooley,Folkerts-Landau,andGarber(2003)-(2004).,.,31,TheDollarStandardandEastAsiasTradeSurplus:TheMCKInterpretation,I,Thecurrentregime:Withthedollarasinternationalmoney,theefficiencyofworldtradeandpaymentsincreases.WithastableU.S.pricelevel,peripheralcountrieswillpegtothedollartoanchortheirownpricelevelsparticularlyEastAsiancountrieshighlyintegratedintrade.Theyconvergetorelativepurchasingpowerparity(PPP)ifnominalexchangeratesremainfixed:noexchangerate“undervaluation”,.,32,TheDollarStandardandEastAsiasTradeSurplus:TheMCKInterpretation,II,ProposedEastAsianexchangeratechanges:discreteappreciationorfloatingNopredictableeffectonnettradebalancesAnyappreciationwillsloweconomicgrowthandleadtodeflationLossofcredibilitytomaintaintheexchangerateatanylevelPossibilityofanindefiniteupwardspiralinthedollarvalueofEastAsiancurrencies,.,33,TheDollarStandardandtheUnitedStates:MCKInterpretation,TheunlimitedUScreditlinewiththerestoftheworldsoftensborrowingconstraintsonUShouseholds,andthefederalgovernment.Federalfiscaldeficitsarefinancedbysellingdollarbondstoforeignersatlowinterestrates.Largecurrentaccountdeficitsaresustainable“indefinitely”becauseofthecentralinternationalmonetarypositionoftheUnitedStates.Theupshotofeasyforeignborrowingis:fallingUSsaving,bothgovernmentandprivate,formorethan20years.deindustrialization,lossofjobsinmanufacturing,leadingtoprotectionistpressure.,.,34,USCurrentAccountandManufacturingSectorTradeBalance:1965-2004,(PercentageofGDP),.,35,ProjectionofLaborGrowthinManufacturingunderBalancedManufacturingTrade:1965-2004,(ShareofUSLaborForce),.,36,AmericanFiscalandTradeDeficits,TheFedcreatesthedefinitiveinternationalmoney.AnattackonthedollarisunlikelybecauseUSdebtsaredenominatedinitsowncurrency.ButheavyUSforeignborrowingistransferredinrealtermsthroughlargeAmericantradedeficits,mainlyinmanufactures.TheAmericanconcernwithde-industrialization,i.e.,undulyrapidjoblossesinmanufacturing,shouldbelinkedtoFederalfiscaldeficitsandlowAmericanpersonalsaving.,.,37,TheExchangeRateandInternationalAdjustment,TwoContradictoryViewsAflexibleexchangerateisusefulforadjustingthenettradebalancetonetinternationalcapitalflowsAfixedexchangeratecananchorthedomesticpricelevelbyinducingmoneywagegrowththatbalancesdifferentialproductivitygrowthacrosscountriesThispaperpursues2.onthepresumptionthat1.isfalseandmisleadingforopeneconomiesMcKinnonandOhno(1997)Chs6and7,.,38,BalancingInternationalCompetitiveness:TheScandinavianModel(SM),WageadjustmentandrelativePurchasingPowerParity(PPP)underafixedexchangerateSweden,1948to19715.17kronorperdollarJapan,1949to1971360yenperdollarChina,1994to20058.28yuanperdollar,.,39,ScandinavianModel,Assumptions:Inflationintradablessectorconvergestoworldinflationplusanyexchangeratedepreciation(relativePPP)Wagebargainingisinitiatedinthehigh-productivity-growthtradablessector(manufactures)subjecttotheexchangerateconstraintLabor“solidarity”:wagegrowthinothersectorswithlowerproductivitygrowthfollowsthatintradablesResult:Internationalcompetitivenessbetweenfast-andslow-growingeconomiesisautomaticallybalancedbydifferentialgrowthinwages.,.,40,SMDefinitions,.,41,SMAssumptions,RelativePPPWagebargainingintradables:constantfactorsharesLaborsolidarityNontradablespricebasedonlaborcostGeneralpriceindex(CPI)withconstantweightsHigherproductivitygrowthintradables,.,42,SM:GeneralSupply-SideInflation,Noindependentdemand-sidenationalmonetarypolicyTradablepriceincreasesaretransmitteddirectlyintodomesticinflationthroughtheforeignexchangesAdditionalgeneralpriceinflationisproportionaltothedifferenceinproductivitygrowthbetweenthetwosectorsweightedbytheimportanceofnontradablesEvenwhenexchangeratesarefixed,inflationcandifferacrosscountrieswithdifferentproductivitygrowth.,ImportedInflation,StructuralInflation,ExchangeRateInducedInflation,.,43,China,ConvergenceofCPIInflationwiththeUnitedStates:RelativePPP,(Source:EIU),.,44,DeterminantSMWageBargainingwithaFixedDollarExchangeRate,Dollaristhekeycurrency:mosttradeisinvoicedindollarswith“pricingtomarket”U.S.pricelevelisstablewithrelativePPPWagebargainingBiddingforworkersintradablesconstrainedbythefixedexchangerate.MoneywagegrowthreflectsongoingproductivitychangeinthetradablessectorWagesthengrowsimilarlyinothersectorsCompareJapan1949-1971toChina1994-2005,.,45,Table1:KeyeconomicindicatorsforJapanandtheU.S.underafixedyen/dollarexchangerate,1950-1971,a1952-1971.b1953-1971.c1951-1971.,(averageannualpercentchange),.,46,Figure1:NominalManufacturingWageGrowthforUSandJapan:19501971,.,47,Figure2:InflationandWageDifferentialsbetweenJapanandUS,andYen/DollarRate,.,48,IndeterminantWageBargainingintheSMwithaFloatingExchangeRate,Whentheexchangeratefluctuates:RelativePPPwillnotholdcontinuouslyExchangeratenolongeranchorsthedomesticpriceleveltoworldinflation.Needforanindependentnational(demand-side)monetarypolicy.Moneywagebargainingoverproductivitygainsnowisinlimbo.Bargainerscannotjudgethecourseofdomesticinflationrelativetomovementsintheexchangerate.Thetradablessectorneednolongerbetheleadingsectorforwagedetermination.,.,49,Table2:KeyeconomicindicatorsforChinaandtheU.S.underafixedyuan/dollarexchangerate,1994-2003,aEx-factorypriceindex.b2003dataonmanufacturingwagesisprojectedfromoverallaveragewagesfrom1997-2003.c1994-2002.d1994-2001.ZhangandTane1994-2002.R.Fernholz,(averageannualratesofchange),.,50,Figure3:NominalManufacturingWageGrowthforUSandChina:19942003,.,51,Figure4:China:NominalWagesAcrossDifferentSectors:19942002,.,52,ReconsideringtheScandinavianModel:ASummary,.,53,ConclusionsforEastAsia,Mutualexchangestabilityisapublicgoodamongintegratedeconomies.Becausean“Asianeuro”isbutadista