关于2012年度正高级专业技术职务任职 .

28-Jan-18,1,Spacepowers Role in Addressing Earthly Security ChallengesPete Hays, SAIC,The Future of Space Exploration: Solutions to Earthly Problems?Boston University,12-14 April 2007,28-Jan-18,2,National Defense University Spacepower Theory Study,Originated during 2005 QDRFeb 06 OSD Letter with TOR to NDUStudy DesignYearlong effort: due Summer 07Seminars, Workshops, ConferencesProduct: Two BooksVolume I: Concise Spacepower TheoryVolume II: Comprehensive Spacepower Theory,28-Jan-18,3,Edited Volume: Comprehensive Spacepower Theory,VOLUME II CHAPTERS AND AUTHORSForeword: Implications of Spacepower for Geopolitics and Grand Strategy Section I: Introduction to Spacepower TheoryChapter 1: On the Nature of Theory: Harold R. WintonChapter 2: International Relations Theory and Spacepower: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.Chapter 3: Landpower, Seapower, and Spacepower: Jon T. SumidaChapter 4: Airpower, Cyberpower, and Spacepower: Benjamin S. LambethSection II: Spacepower and GeopoliticsChapter 5: Orbital Terrain and Space Physics: Martin E.B. France Robert Zubrin,28-Jan-18,4,Edited Volume (cont.),Section V: Security Space PerspectivesChapter 16: History of Security Space Activity and Spacepower: James LewisChapter 17: Increasing the Military Uses of Space: Henry F. Cooper, Jr. & Everett C. DolmanChapter 18: Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens & Michael Katz-HymanChapter 19: Balancing Security Interests: Michael E. OHanlonSection VI: International PerspectivesChapter 20: Russia: James E. ObergChapter 21: China: Dean ChengChapter 22: Europe: Xavier PascoChapter 23: Emerging Actors: Randall R. CorrellSection VII: Evolving Futures for SpacepowerChapter 24: Evolving U.S. Structures: John M. LogsdonChapter 25: Organizational Drivers for Spacepower: John M. CollinsChapter 26: Technological Drivers for Spacepower: Taylor DinermanChapter 27: Building Human Capital for Spacepower: S. Peter WordenAfterword: The Future of Spacepower: AppendixesSpace Law: Outer Space Treaty, Registration Convention, Rescue and Return Agreement, Liability Convention, Moon Treaty, PAROS Proposals, IADCOrbits and Orbital MechanicsBasics of Space System DesignPossibly Bibliographic Essay, Annotated Bibliography (assembled from COP), and Comprehensive Bibliography,28-Jan-18,5,Requirements for Concise Spacepower Theory,Account for the structure of the field: the divergent world views of each sector and the dynamics of their interactions Define the boundary conditions of the theory:Cis-Lunar space as opposed to all of spaceInternational perceptions of spacepower and their effect on US policyAsk the key, fundamental questions regarding the uses and purposes of space to extract underlying principles. Question hypotheses and present conditions.Test counterfactualsConstruct a framework that integrates divergent points of view and takes into account potential future scenarios. Roles of Theory: Define Construct Explain Connect Anticipate,28-Jan-18,6,Upcoming Conference,Capstone Symposium: 25-26 April 07, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.Initial presentation of Concise Spacepower TheoryFor more info or to sign up: ; Community of Practice Website:/group/spacepower-theory,28-Jan-18,7,RORSAT,EORSAT,DS-P1-M Target Satellite,Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT,Energia carrying Skif DM (Polus) prototype “battle station”,Co-Orbital ASAT,28-Jan-18,8,Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT,Many details about this system remain classified or are lost to history. The system used two types of satellites: co-orbital active killers (Istrebitel or killer) and passive targetsThe first tests, Polyot-1 and Polyot-2, were conducted in 1963 and 1964. There were subsequently 19 target satellite tests and 22 killer satellite tests. The system reached full operational capability in 1972. The last test was on 18 Jun 1982Killer satellites tested in the 1970s were ready for launch within 90 minutes (using a Tsiklon booster) and could close within less than one kilometer of target satellites within 40-50 minutesOn 23 Mar 1983 Yuri Andropov announced a moratorium on design, construction, and testing of the system; the moratorium ended in Sep 1986In May 1987 Michael Gorbachev visited Baikonur and saw the co-orbital killer satellite and the prototype of the anti-satellite and anti-missile platform called Narvad (Guard). General Zavalishin, who escorted Gorbachev, used the opportunity to advocate resumption of testing. Zavalishin pointed at similar developments in the US and promised to cover up ASAT launches so no one would suspect tests were taking place. As Zavalishin recalls, “.Gorbachev issued incoherent and wordy explanations, which concluded with a polite, but resolute refusal.”Ironically, only few days after this conversation, on 15 May 1987, the first heavy-lift Energia rocket blasted off from Baikonur, carrying Skif DM (Polus) spacecraft, which was later described as a prototype “battle station” in space. Due to a software glitch, the 90-ton-class spacecraft never made it into orbit,28-Jan-18,9,US ASAT Systems and Residual Capabilities,28-Jan-18,10,US ASAT Testing and Systems,Bold Orion air-launched, nuclear-tipped ASAT tested in late 1950s; worlds first known test 19 Oct 1959Programs 505 and 437 ground-launched, nuclear-tipped ASATs operationally deployed 1963-70NSDM 345 in Jan 77 called for development of air-launched KEW ASATMHV ASAT successfully tested on 13 Sep 1985; Congressional restrictions led to cancellation in 1989; KEASAT was follow-on systemMIRACL tests in Oct 1997; highlighted satellite vulnerability to DEW ASAT potential of BMD systems: BP and ABL,28-Jan-18,11,ASAT Arms Control Efforts,Development and testing of ASAT capabilities not covered by OST or other space agreementsTwo-Track Diplomacy with three rounds of US-USSR ASAT negotiations 1978-79USSR testing moratorium 1982-86; Congressional restrictions on MHV ASAT testingDST was only “bucket” of AC that did not lead to agreements during 1980s-90sPAROS efforts at CD and UNGA Resolutions,28-Jan-18,12,28-Jan-18,13,Growth in SATCOM Demand,28-Jan-18,14,Military Satellite Communications Grids,28-Jan-18,15,28-Jan-18,16,28-Jan-18,17,Major Military Space Program Investments (Millions of 2006 dollars),28-Jan-18,18,Gain or MaintainSpace Control,Provide Freedom ofAction in Space for Friendly Forces,Deny Freedom of Action in Space to Enemy Forces,PROTECTIONEmploy active andPassive defensivemeasures to ensure US and friendly space systems operate as Planned,SURVEILLANCEDetect, identify, assess, and track space objects and events,PREVENTIONEmploy measures to prevent adversary use of data or services from US and friendly space systems for purposes hostile to the US,NEGATIONDisrupt, deny, degrade, deceive, or destroy adversary space capabilities,28-Jan-18,19,28-Jan-18,20,28-Jan-18,21,28-Jan-18,22,28-Jan-18,23,Attributes of Military Space Doctrines,Primary Value and,Functions of Military,Space Forces,Space System,Characteristics and,Employment Strategies,Conflict Missions,of Space Forces,Appropriate,Military,Organization for,Operations and,Advocacy,Sanctuary,Enhance Strategic,Stability,Facilitate Arms,Control,Limited Numbers,Fragile Systems,Vulnerable Orbits,Optimize for NTMV,Limited,NRO,Survivability,Above functions plus:,Force,Enhancement,Force,Enhancement,Degrade,Gracefully,Major Command or,Unified Command,Control,Control Space,Significant Force,Enhancement,Control Space,Significant Force,Enhancement,Surveillance,Offensive, and,Defensive,Counterspace,Unified Command,or Space Force,High Ground,Above functions plus:,Decisive Impact on,Terrestrial Conflict,BMD,Terrestrial Backups,Distributed,Architectures,Autonomous Control,Hardening,Redundancy,On,-,Orbit Spares,Crosslinks,Maneuver,Less Vulnerable Orbits,Stealth,Attack Warning Sensors,5 Ds: Deception,Disruption, Denial,Degradation,Destruction,Reconstitution,Capability,Defense,Convoy,Above functions plus:,Decisive Space,-,to,-,Space and,Space,-,to,-,Earth,Force,Application,BMD,Space Force,28-Jan-18,24,28-Jan-18,25,28-Jan-18,26,28-Jan-18,27,28-Jan-18,28,28-Jan-18,29,28-Jan-18,30,28-Jan-18,31,28-Jan-18,32,28-Jan-18,33,28-Jan-18,34,28-Jan-18,35,Backup Slides,28-Jan-18,36,Missile Defense Share of Total DoD Budget and R&D Budget,28-Jan-18,37,Three Major Objectives of Current U.S. Missile Defense Program,1) “Maintain and sustain an initial capability to defend the U.S., allies, and our deployed forces against rogue attacks.” MDA plans by 2013 to:Complete fielding of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska and CaliforniaEnhance Early Warning Radars in Alaska, California, and United KingdomField Sea-Based X-Band Radar in the PacificField a forward-transportable radar in JapanExpand command and control, battle management, and communications capabilitiesAugment GBI midcourse defense capability by deploying Aegis BMD interceptors and engagement ships2) “close the gaps and improve this initial capability;” MDA plans by 2013 to:Add more Aegis BMD sea-based interceptorsField four transportable Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) unitsIntroduce land and sea variants of the Multiple Kill Vehicle programUpgrade the early warning radar in GreenlandEstablish a GBI site and corresponding radar capability in Europe3) “develop options for the future;” MDA plans to:Continue development of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)Maintain two programs, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and the Airborne Laser (ABL), one of which is to be selected as the boost-phase missile defense element by 2010Develop a Space Test Bed to examine space-based options for expanding the coverage and effectiveness for future BMD systems,28-Jan-18,38,U.S. Missile DefenseProgrammatic Issues and Challenges,European third site for GBI and associated radar$206M requested for FY08 but Congress cut funding last year; political issues in host nations; objections raised by RussiansAirborne LaserFully funded at $632M in FY07; FY08 request is $549M. Initial airborne attempt to intercept boosting missile pushed back to last quarter of FY09Kinetic Energy InterceptorCongress cut FY07 request of $406M by $48M; program restructured and scheduled for FY08 flight test but may not offer a significant new capability such as boost phase inte