信息不对称的市场.ppt

,第17章,信息不对称的市场,Chapter17,Slide2,本章要讨论的问题,质量不确定性与柠檬市场市场信号道德风险委托代理问题,Chapter17,Slide3,本章要讨论的问题,一体化企业的管理激励问题劳动力市场的信息不对称:效率工资理论,Chapter17,Slide4,引言,我们将研究不完全信息对资源配置和价格机制所产生的影响。,Chapter17,Slide5,质量不确定与柠檬市场,在购买一辆二手车时，由于信息不完全，将增加购买的风险并降低消费者的效用；,Chapter17,Slide6,二手车市场假定买卖双方都能鉴别高质量和低质量的车；将会出现两个市场；,质量不确定与柠檬市场,柠檬问题,PH,PL,QH,QL,Chapter17,Slide8,TheMarketforUsedCarsWithasymmetricinformation:Lowqualitygoodsdrivehighqualitygoodsoutofthemarket.Themarkethasfailedtoproducemutuallybeneficialtrade.Toomanylowandtoofewhighqualitycarsareonthemarket.Adverseselectionoccurs;theonlycarsonthemarketwillbelowqualitycars.,QualityUncertaintyandtheMarketforLemons,Chapter17,Slide9,ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformation,MedicalInsuranceQuestionIsitpossibleforinsurancecompaniestoseparatehighandlowriskpolicyholders?Ifnot,onlyhighriskpeoplewillpurchaseinsurance.Adverseselectionwouldmakemedicalinsuranceunprofitable.,TheMarketforInsurance,Chapter17,Slide10,ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformation,AutomobileInsuranceQuestionsWhatimpactdoesasymmetricinformationandadverseselectionhaveoninsuranceratesandthedeliveryofautomobileaccidentinsurance?Howcanthegovernmentreducetheimpactofadverseselectionintheinsuranceindustry?,TheMarketforInsurance,Chapter17,Slide11,ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformation,TheMarketforCreditAsymmetricinformationcreatesthepotentialthatonlyhighriskborrowerswillseekloans.QuestionHowcancredithistorieshelpmakethismarketmoreefficientandreducethecostofcredit?,Chapter17,Slide12,ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformation,TheImportanceofReputationandStandardizationAsymmetricInformationandDailyMarketDecisionsRetailsalesAntiques,art,rarecoinsHomerepairsRestaurants,Chapter17,Slide13,ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformation,QuestionHowcantheseproducersprovidehigh-qualitygoodswhenasymmetricinformationwilldriveouthigh-qualitygoodsthroughadverseselection.AnswerReputation,Chapter17,Slide14,ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformation,QuestionWhydoyoulookforwardtoaBigMacwhentravelingeventhoughyouwouldneverconsiderbuyingoneathome.HolidayInnonceadvertised“NoSurprises”toaddresstheissueofadverseselection.,Chapter17,Slide15,LemonsinMajorLeagueBaseball,AsymmetricinformationandthemarketforfreeagentsIfalemonsmarketexists,freeagentsshouldbelessreliable(disabled)thanrenewedcontracts.,Chapter17,Slide16,PlayerDisability,AllPlayers4.7312.55165.4Renewedplayers4.769.68103.4Freeagents4.6717.23268.9,Chapter17,Slide17,FindingsDaysonthedisabledlistincreaseforbothfreeagentsandrenewedplayers.Freeagentshaveasignificantlyhigherdisabilityratethanrenewedplayers.Thisindicatesalemonsmarket.,LemonsinMajorLeagueBaseball,Chapter17,Slide18,QuestionIfyouareateamowner,whatstepswouldyoutaketoreducetheasymmetricinformationforfreeagents?,LemonsinMajorLeagueBaseball,Chapter17,Slide19,MarketSignaling,Theprocessofsellersusingsignalstoconveyinformationtobuyersabouttheproductsqualityhelpsbuyersandsellersdealwithasymmetricinformation.,Chapter17,Slide20,MarketSignaling,StrongSignalTobeeffective,asignalmustbeeasierforhighqualitysellerstogivethanlowqualitysellers.ExampleHighlyproductiveworkerssignalwitheducationalattainmentlevel.,Chapter17,Slide21,MarketSignaling,ASimpleModelofJobMarketSignalingAssumeTwogroupsofworkersGroupI:Lowproductivity-APB=.3Qf+.2(Q-Qf)IfQQf;B=.3Qf-.5(Qf-Q),Chapter17,Slide62,IncentiveDesigninanIntegratedFirm,Output(unitsperyear),2,000,4,000,6,000,10,000,0,10,000,20,000,30,000,40,000,Bonus($peryear),8,000,Chapter17,Slide63,AsymmetricInformationinLaborMarkets:EfficiencyWageTheory,Inacompetitivelabormarket,allwhowishtoworkwillfindjobsforawageequaltotheirmarginalproduct.However,mostcountrieseconomiesexperienceunemployment.,Chapter17,Slide64,Theefficiencywagetheorycanexplainthepresenceofunemploymentandwagediscrimination.Indevelopingcountries,productivitydependsonthewageratefornutritionalreasons.,AsymmetricInformationinLaborMarkets:EfficiencyWageTheory,Chapter17,Slide65,TheshirkingmodelcanbebetterusedtoexplainunemploymentandwagediscriminationintheUnitedStates.AssumesperfectlycompetitivemarketsHowever,workerscanworkorshirk.Sinceperformanceinformationislimited,workersmaynotgetfired.,AsymmetricInformationinLaborMarkets:EfficiencyWageTheory,Chapter17,Slide66,UnemploymentinaShirkingModel,QuantityofLabor,Wage,Chapter17,Slide67,EfficiencyWagesatFordMotorCompany,LaborturnoveratFord1913:380%1914:1000%Averagepay=$2-$3Fordincreasedpayto$5,Chapter17,Slide68,EfficiencyWagesatFordMotorCompany,ResultsProductivityincreased51%AbsenteeismhadbeenhalvedProfitabilityrosefrom$30millionin1914to$60millionin1916.,Chapter17,Slide69,Summary,Asymmetricinformationcreatesamarketfailureinwhichbadproductstendtodrivegoodproductsoutofthemarket.Insurancemarketsfrequentlyinvolveasymmetricinformationbecausetheinsuringpartyhasbetterinformationabouttheriskinvolvedthantheinsurancecompany.,Chapter17,Slide70,Summary,Asymmetricin