7外文原文及译文

.北京联合大学毕业论文外文原文及译文题目： 浦发银行核心竞争力研究 专业： 金融学 指导教师：刘迎春 学院： 商务学院 学号： 2012030403041 班级： 金融1202S 姓名：方杨阳 一、外文原文What Drives the Persistent Competitiveness of Small BankBill Bassett, Tom Brady.Finance and Economics Discussion Series (Vol.5 2002), 24-30Thedeclineintherealvalueofdepositinsurance,however,isonlyoneofseveraltrendsinthefinancialindustrythatcouldhaveweakenedthecompetitivenessofsmallbanksinrecentyears.Amongtheseotherdevelopmentshavebeenthereturntohealthoflargebanknumerousmergersthathaveincreasedthesizeandscopeoflargebanks,andthecontinuedincreaseincompetitionfrommutualfundsandothernonbankfinancialcompanies.MergersandacquisitionshavereducedthenumberofbanksintheUnitedStatesfrommorethan14,000in1985toabout8,300attheendof2000,andduringthistimetheshareofdomesticbankingassetsheldbythelargest100banksrosefromabouthalftoalmostthree-fourths(Chart2).Studiesofconsolidationinthebankingindustryandofitsimpactonsmallbankcompetitivenesshavereacheddifferingconclusions.However,consolidationinteractswiththedeclineintherealvalueofdepositinsurancetocreateanotherpotentiallyadverseimpactonthecompetitivenessofsmallbanks.Thecreationof“mega-banks”increasesthepossibilitythatdepositorswouldconsidertheselargerbankstobe“toobigtofail”(TBTF),whichwouldimplicitlyconferagreaterlevelofdepositinsuranceuponlargebankcustomersthanthoseofsmallbanks.SmallerbankscontendthatanincreaseinthenominalvalueofdepositinsuranceisneededtohelpoffsetthisperceptionofaTBTFpolicy(IndependentCommunityBankersAssociation2000).Theevolutionoflarge,complexbankingorganizationshasledfederalbankregulatorstowarnthattheseinstitutionscreatethepotentialforunusuallylargesystemicriskstothenationalandinternationaleconomiesshouldtheyfail(Greenspan1999).However,theFederalDepositInsuranceCorporationImprovementActof1991(FDICIA)circumscribedregulatorsabilitytoinvokeTBTF.ItrequiredthattheFDICpursuetheresolutionmethodthatposestheleastcosttoitsinsurancefundwhendealingwithafailedbank,andstipulatedthatexceptionstothe“leastcost”methodmustgarnertheapprovalofsupermajoritiesofboththeFederalReserveandFDICboardsplusthatoftheSecretaryoftheTreasuryinconsultationwiththePresidentoftheUnitedStates.AngbazoandSaunders1997foundthecostoffundstolargebanksincreasedafterFDICIAwasimplemented,suggestingthatbankcreditorsbelievedthatFDICIAreducedthelikelihoodofalargebankbenefitingfromaTBTFpolicy.Moreover,bankregulatoryagenciesmaintainthatnobankistoolargeforshareholdersandnondepositliabilityholderstofacecompleteloss,andforuninsureddepositorstobesubjecttolessthan100percentreimbursement,shouldthedeclineinbankassetvaluesbelargeenough(Greenspan2001).Inadditiontotheconsolidationofthebankingsystem,thecontinuedgrowthofnonbankfinancialinstitutionsmayhaveweakenedthecompetitivesituationofsmallrelativetolargebanksinrecentyears(DAristaandSchlesinger1993).Althoughsavingsandloanassociations,creditunions,mutualfundsandfinancecompaniescompetewithbanksofallsizes,theylikelyposeagreatercompetitivechallengetosmallerbanks.Inadditiontobeingmoredependentondepositfundingthanthelargerbanks,smallbanksalsotendtobemoreconcentratedthanlargebanksinthetypesofloansextendedbyfinancecompanies(Dynan,Johnson,andSlowinski2002).Overtheperiodstudied,however,anoutrightdeclineinthriftindustryassetsoffsettheaddedcompetitionfromothertypesofnonbankfinancialcompanies,particularlymoneymarketmutualfunds.Inthelate1980sandearly1990s,thecompetitivepositionofsmallbankslikelywasboostedasaresultofthemoreseveredeteriorationinassetqualityatlargebanks,andthewidergapatlargebanksbetweenactualcapitallevelsandthosebeingdemandedbymarketsandthenewBasleaccord(Chart3).However,thesubsequenteconomicrecoveryandbriskexpansionofthesecondhalfofthe1990scauseddelinquencyratestodropdramatically,particularlyatlargebanks.Atthesametime,thegapbetweentheleverageratiossmallbanksandlargebanksalsonarrowednoticeably,aslargebanksboostedtheircapitalfollowingtheimplementationoftheBasleAccordsin1991.Despitetheaforementionedheadwindsaffectingsmallbankscompetitiveness,BassettandBrady2001foundthatsmallbankshavegrownmorerapidlythanlargerbanksovertheperiodfrom1985to2000.Moreover,theyshowedthatsmallbankshavelargelymaintainedorevenincreasedtheirlevelsofprofitabilitythroughoutmuchoftheperiodstudied,despitepayingincreasinglylargepremiumsontheirdepositsrelativetolargebanksinordertofundtheirmorerapidassetexpansion.Thepurposeofthisstudyistoextendthisresearchbymoreformallyexaminingthedifferentialimpactoftheinfluencesmentionedaboveonthecompetitiveperformanceofsmallbanksovertheperiodfromthemid-1980sto2001.First,weemployanarbitragemodeltoexaminetherelationshipbetweenrelativeaverageinterestratesondepositsatsmallandlargebanks,thelevelofdepositinsurance,bankfailurerates,andperceptionsaboutTBTF.ThemodeldemonstratesthatthesensitivityofrelativedepositratestothelevelofdepositinsuranceorviewsabouttheimportanceofTBTFisquitelowwhenbankfailureratesarelow,astheyhavebeeninrecentyears.Wethenpresenteconometricevidencesuggestingthattherisingrelativecostofdepositsatsmallbanksvis-vislargebanksoverthepastdecadelargelyreflectssmallbanksneedtoattractfundingtosustaintheiraggressiveandprofitableassetexpansion.Theshareofuninsureddeposits,whichhasrisenastherealvalueofdepositinsurancehasdeclined,andamarkedimprovementinthebalancesheethealthoflargebanksduringthe1990splayedsomewhatsmallerrolesinboostingdepositratesatsmallbanks.Thenextsectiondescribesthedatausedinthearticleandidentifiessomekeybalancesheetdifferencesbetweenlargeandsmallbanks.SectionIIIillustratesthatsmallbankshavebeenabletogrowfasterthanlargebanksbyofferingbetterdepositratesandthatthepremiumtheypayhasbeenrisingovertime.SectionIVpresentsanarbitragemodelofdepositpricingatlargeandsmallbanksthatincorporatesdepositinsuranceand“TooBigToFail”effects.SectionVpresentsregressionestimatesfromareducedformmodelofdepositratedeterminationatlargeandsmallbanks.ConclusionsarepresentedinsectionVI.II.DataandSummaryStatisticsExceptwhereotherwiseindicated,datainthispaperarefromthequarterlyReportsofConditionandIncome(CallReports)forthedomesticofficesofinsureddomesticallycharteredcommercialbanksandnondeposittrustcompanies(hereafter,banks).Inthisarticle,largebanksarethoseranked1through100basedonassetsatthestartofeachquarter.Smallbanksarethoserankedoutsideofthelargest1,000.Atthestartofthefourthquarterof2000,largebankshadassetsofatleast$6.94billion,whileallsmallbankshadassetsoflessthan$331million.A.Keybalancesheetdifferencesbetweensmallandlargebanks.Smallbanksrelyconsiderablymoreondepositsthandolargebanks.Inparticular,smalltimedeposits(thoseissuedinamountsoflessthan$100,000)fundedalmost30percentofloansandotherassetsatsmallbanksin2000,whileatlargebanksthesharewas10percent(Table1).Theshareofsmallbanksassetsfundedwithlargetimedeposits,13percent,alsoexceedsthatatlargebanks,8percent.Otherinterest-bearingdeposits,whichconsistofsavingsandtransactionsaccounts,alsoweresomewhatmoreimportantfundingvehiclesatsmallbanks,whilenoninterest-bearingdepositsfundedcomparablesharesofsmallandlargebanksassetsin2000.Largebanksfundedaboutone-thirdoftheirassetswithothernondepositliabilitiesin2000,whereasatsmallbanksthesharewasjust3percent.SmallbanksavailedthemselvessomewhatmoreofFHLBadvances,althoughtheserepresentafairlysmallshareofliabilitiesatbothgroupsofbanks.Equityalsofundedalargershareofassetsatsmallthanatlargebanks,10.3percentand8percentrespectively.Relianceondepositschangedlittlebetween1987and1992,butbothbankgroupsshiftedtowardnondepositliabilitiesandcapitalassourcesoffundingduringthe1990s.Between1992and2000,depositsasashareofassetsfellabout4percentagepointsatsmallbanksand10percentagepointsatlargebanks.Forbothbankgroups,otherinterest-bearingdepositswasthedepositcategorythatfellmostinthe1990s,althoughatlargebanks“non-interest-bearingdeposits”declinedalmostasmuch.Smalltimedeposits(whicharefullyinsured)declinedbysimilaramountsatbothbankgroups,adropprobablyreflectingtheincreasedpopularityofalternativehouseholdinvestmentvehiclessuchasmutualfunds.However,theshareofassetsfundedbylargetimedepositsactuallyincreasedatbothbankgroups,withalargerincreasepostedatsmallbanks.Atsmallbanks,thetypeandaveragesizeoflargedepositaccounts(allthoseofatleast$100,000)arenotablydifferentfromthoseatlargebanks(table1,memo).Atlargebanks,onlyabout30percentofsuchbalanceswereheldaslargetimedepositsin2000;theremaining70percentwereintransactionandsavingsaccounts.Atsmallbanks,largebalancesaresplitaboutevenlybetweenlargetimeandotherdeposits.Theaveragesizeoflargedepositsatlargebanksin2000was$425,000,andatsmallbanksitwas$229,000;however,overthe1990stheaveragesizedeclinedatlargebanksandroseatabouttherateofinflationatsmallbanks.B.Growthpatternsforlargeandsmallbanks.Asnoted,themergersthathavebeenthevehicleofconsolidationtypicallyhaveinvolvedtheacquisitionofsmallerbanksbymuchlargerbanks.This,ofcourse,boostsmeasuredgrowthoflargebanksanddiminishesthatofsmallbanks.Toaccountforthisinexaminingthebalancesheetgrowthandprofitabilityofsmallvis-vislargebanks,wemerger-adjustdatafromthequarterlyReportsofConditionandIncome,filedbyallfederallyinsuredcommercialbanks.Balancesheetdataadjustedformergersshowthatsmallbanksgenerallyhavegrownfasterthaneithermedium-sizedorlargebanksoverthepastfifteenyears(chart4,toppanel).Indeed,ineveryyear,thegrowthofassetshasbeensignificantlyfasteratsmallbanksthanatlargebanks.Ofcourse,bankssecuritizeandsellasignificantportionoftheconsumerandrealestateloansthattheyoriginateandtherebymovethemofftheirbalancesheets.Butdataavailablesince1997indicatethatrestoringsecuritizedcreditcardloanstolargebanksbalancesheetswouldnotnarrowthedifferenceingrowthratessignificantly.Ofcourse,addingsecuritizedassetstothebalancesheetforpurposesofcomparisonpresumesthatthesecuritizingbankstillwouldhavechosentooriginatetheloanseveniftheopportunitytosecuritizewasnotavailable.Inaddition,anaverageofabout350new,ordenovo,bankswereformedeachyearduringthe1997-2000period,comparedwithabout150peryearduringtheprecedingfouryears.Althoughdenovobankstendtogrowrapidly,thegrowthrateofallsmallbanksisnotsignificantlyaffectedifdenovobanksareexcludedfromthecalculation.Moreover,theacceleratedpaceofentryintoafastgrowingsectorprovidessubstantialevidenceoftheattractivenessofsmallbankstoinvestors.Assuggestedbytherelativeratesofmerger-adjustedassetgrowth,theexpansionoftotaldepositsatsmallbankshasalsoexceededthegrowthrateatlargebanksineveryyearsince1985,afteradjustingformergers(chart4,middlepanel).Uninsureddepositsalsogrewsignificantlyfasteratsmallbanksthanatlargebanks(chart4,bottompanel).Furthermore,thegrowthrateofuninsureddepositsatsmallbankshasbeenhighandsteadilyincreasingduringthesecondhalfofthepastdecade,whereasatlargerbanksthegrowthoftheseliabilitiesshowsnotrend.However,thegrowthofassetstendedtoexceedthatofdeposits,astheuseofnondepositliabilitiesgrewforallbanksizegroups. 二、译文是什么推动中小银行的持久性竞争力Bill Bassett, Tom Brady.财经讨论系列 (2002年第5期), 24-30在金融行业，存款保险的实际价值下降，削弱了一些小银行竞争力，成为近年来的趋势之一。在其他方面，有许多通过并购健康增长的大规模影响范围广的银行，从共同基金和其他非银行金融公司的竞争中获得不断增加的回报。与1985年14000多个银行相比，2000年底的通过兼并和收购，银行数量已经减少到8300多个。在此期间，国内银行由最大的100家银行持有的资产的份额上升到近四分之三（图2）。综合研究银行业和其对小银行竞争力的影响已达到不同的结论。但是，巩固交互中的存款保险的实际价值下降，导致了另一个对小银行的竞争力可能造成的不良影响。对“超级银行“创造的可能性，增加存款的客户会考虑将这些大银行“太大而不能倒“（TBTF），这将隐式授予后的存款比小银行的大银行客户的保险更高水平。规模较小的银行声称，在存款保险的名义价值增加需要帮助抵消了TBTF政策的看法（独立社区银行家协会2000）。大型、复杂的银行组织演变，导致联邦银行监管机构警告说，对于国家和国际经济来说，这些机构创造了非常大的系统性风险，一旦他们失败（格林斯潘1999）。然而，联邦存款保险公司1991年的改进法（FDICIA）监管机构的能力援引TBTF。它要求联邦存款保险公司追求的决议方法，银行交易以最少的成本构成其保险基金与失败时，并规定了“最低成本“的方法，必须争取超级多数联邦储备委员会和联邦存款保险公司的批准，该库务司在与总统协商美国。FDICIA实施，这意味着债权银行认为，FDICIA减少了一大，从一TBTF政策受益银行的可能性。此外，银行监管机构认为，没有银行股东和非存款债权持有人要面对完全的损失，未保险存款人受不到百分之百报销，应在银行资产价值下降必须足够大（格林斯潘2001）。对于大型银行来说，除了银行制度的巩固之外，近来年非银行金融机构继续增长可能削弱了相对竞争的局面（德阿里斯塔和施莱辛格1993）。虽然储蓄和贷款协会，信贷工会，共同基金和财务公司竞支持所有规模的银行，规模较小的银行可能造成更大的竞争挑战。与大银行相比，除了对更多的存款的资金依赖，小银行也往往比大银行集中在金融公司提供的贷款类型(丹尼,约翰逊和斯沃斯科2002)。但是，在此期间的研究表明，储蓄行业资产直接下降抵消了非银行金融企业，尤其是货币市场共同基金的其他类型的竞争。在19实际80年代末和90年代初，由于资产质量的恶化情况比大银行严重，实际资本水平之间的差距，和正在推动的新巴塞尔协议的要求，小银行的竞争地位受到巨大影响（图3）。然而，随之而来的经济复苏和19实际90年代后半迅速扩张造成的拖欠率急剧下降，特别是在大型银行。同时，小银行和大银行杠杆比率之间的的差距也明显缩小，因为大银行提高资本继1991年巴塞尔协议的实施。尽管有影响小银行竞争力的上述不利因素，巴塞特和布雷迪2001发现，从1985年至2000年期间，小银行比大银行的增长更迅速。此外，他们还发现，在整个研究期间，尽管支付越来越大的存款保费给相对大的银行以资助他们更快速的资产扩张，大部分小银行已经基本上保持盈利水平。本研究的目的是在上述差别的前提下，延长小银行80年代中期至2001年期间竞争绩效的影响。首先，我们利用套利模型来探讨在小型和大型银行之间的相对平均存款利率的关系，主要影响因素包括存款保险，银行倒闭率，TBTF认知水平。该模型表明，相对存款利率敏感性的存款保险或意见有关TBTF重要性水平相当低时，银行故障率很低。然后，我们目前的经济计量证据表明，相对于过去十年来说，存款的相对成本上升，在可见的小银行很大程度上反映了小银行需要吸引资金，以维持其侵略扩张和盈利资产的大型银行。1990年代在大银行的资产负债表显示，对未投保的存款，已经作为存款保险的实际价值增加的份额下降，起到了显着的改善和促进小规模的银行存款利率健康的作用。下一节介绍的文章中使用的数据，并确定一些平衡小银行与大银行之间差异的关键。第三节说明提供更好的存款利率，小银行已经能够比大银行更快地成长通过，而他们缴纳保险费已随着时间的推移不断上升。第四节论述大、小银行的存款保险和结合“大到不能倒“效应的存款定价套利模型。第五节提出从降低存款利率表上的对大，小银行模型进行回归估计。第六节结论。除非另有说明，本文数据来自（公开报告）国内特许商业银行和非存款信托公司（以下简称银行）国内办事处的季度报告。在这篇文章中，大银行的资产指的是，排名1到100的基础上每个季度开始的资产。而那些小银行则排名的1000之外。截至2000年第四季度初，大型银行至少69.4万美元的资产，而所有小银行总资产低于3.31亿美元。相当多的小银行比大型银行更依靠存款。特别是，小额定期存款为主的小型银行在2000年近30%的贷款依赖与存款（金额少于10万美元的发行者），而