学习者与专家译者处理学术语篇中定语从句翻译毕业论文.doc

学习者与专家译者处理学术语篇中定语从句翻译毕业论文目 录致 谢ii摘 要ivAbstractv目 录vi前 言1源语语篇3译语语篇23翻译评论371 文献综述371.1 学术语篇的语言特点371.2 学术语篇中定语从句的理解381.2.1 把握英汉两种语言的差异381.2.2 学术语篇中定语从句的理解392 研究设计402.1 研究目的402.2 研究对象402.3 研究方法413 结果与讨论413.1 对学术语篇中定语从句翻译的处理413.2 造成差异的原因463.2.1 语言能力和理解能力欠缺473.2.2 理论知识与实践的脱节473.2.3 译者主体性的发挥不够484 结论48结语49参考文献5049前 言翻译西方学术文献（文章和专著）的主要目的在于促进国内外的学术交流，国内读者可以省去阅读原文的麻烦，及时了解和把握西方最新学术研究动向，消化海外学者的研究成果并在此基础上发表自己的见解（肖英，吕晶晶，2007；74）。然而，并非所有的译文都能达到这样的效果，一些译文虽然能够遵守原文语言的句法结构和行文顺序，但读起来却并不通顺，很多时候还不如直接阅读原文省事省力。这一现象已引起我国学术界的关注，然而目前学术界的讨论尚未达到一定的理论高度，难以给翻译工作者提供可借鉴的指导原则。长句翻译是构建篇章翻译的较大单位，长句的翻译处理好了，篇章的翻译质量才有所保证。由于英汉两种语言的多方面差异，学术语篇中的长句，尤其是结构复杂的定语从句，一直是翻译中的难点，翻译起来往往无从下手，在翻译教学的过程中和实际翻译过程中，容易产生翻译腔。笔者通过对Language Policy and Language Planning（Sue Wright, 2004）中一章的翻译，发现学术语篇惯用长句尤其是定语从句，且由于学术语篇用词准确严谨，翻译难度较大，因而对于英语学习者，尤其是今后投身于翻译工作的学习者们来说是一大难题和挑战。在笔者进行翻译实践的过程中，产生了有必要对于学术语篇的语言特点以及翻译手法进行研究，达到指导实践与教学的想法，由此形成了学习者与专家译者处理学术语篇中定语从句翻译策略的对比研究。通过对比研究，不仅可以总结专家译者对于学术语篇中定语从句的翻译策略，也能够通过分析，找出学习者与专家译者采取不同翻译策略导致结果差异的原因，从而达到缩小差距，总结规律的目的。通过对文献资料的梳理，笔者发现，近年来关于学术语篇的研究越来越多，但学者们大多从事的是关于语言学（姜亚军、赵刚等）、评价体系（张跃伟、伍敬芳等）、模糊限制语（刘鸽、伍敬芳等）、人际互动层面（Swales，Bakhin等）等方面的研究，而关于学术语篇中定语从句翻译策略以及对比研究的论述尚不全面。由于Language Policy and Language Planning一书的中文译本尚未出版，目前没有专家译者的译例与学习者的译文相对比，因此，笔者选取了科技类学术文本科技英语翻译技巧一书中专家译者王泉水已译好的定语从句为例与学习者的翻译结果进行对比，力求从学术语篇中定语从句的翻译策略角度进行尝试性的探讨，并通过比较学习者与专家译者的译法差异，对于学术语篇中定语从句翻译的策略进行归纳总结，希望对于翻译的实践与教学有所启发。本篇论文拟从以下几个方面进行论述。第一部分为文献综述。对学术语篇语言特点进行分析，从把握英汉两种语言差异角度出发，理解学术语篇中定语从句。第二部分为研究设计。交代本研究的研究目的、研究对象以及研究方法。第三部分为结果与讨论。首先通过实例比较专家译者和学习者对于学术语篇中定语从句处理的策略，其次分析导致翻译结果差异的原因：对译者语言与理解能力、理论水平与实践的投入以及译者主体性的发挥进行比较。通过比较，提出学术语篇中定语从句翻译策略选择：顺序法、逆序法、分译法和综合法，以及对于翻译学习以及教学的意义。第四部分对论文进行总结并指出研究的局限性。源语语篇8 Language in a Postnational Era: Hegemony or Transcendence?This chapter focuses on the apparent consensual acceptance of English as a lingua franca and examines its role as the medium of globalisation. It includes an analysis of globalisation which considers how far it can be said to be a new phenomenon which brings us into a Postnational period where supranational and transnational structures have started to replace the brief consideration of the sites which are resisting any move to postnationalism. The discussion then moves to the intellectual resistance to the spread of English and to the difficulties in countering the negative aspects of English language spread while retaining a language that can fulfill the lingua franca role.8.1 The phenomenon of globalisationPerhaps the first task in any discussion of language and globalisation is to establish whether there is any reason for believing that we are at the beginning of a new postnational, global period and to arrive at an understanding of what globalisation actually is. Investigating the phenomenon presents a number of difficulties. The first hurdle will be to decide which of the very many views of globalisation to adopt since it is a very contested concept in the social sciences. The second hurdle will be to evaluate the evidence, since globalisation has sparked a large body of literature some of which has been widely attacked as: steeped in oversimplification, exaggeration and wishful thinkingconceptually inexact, empirically thin, historically and culturally illiterate, normatively shallow and politically naive. (Scholte 2000: 1)So, with little consensus and much political and economic literature that is highly speculative, it will not be an easy matter to arrive at the definition of globalisation that can help us understand the paradigm in which the language question will develop in the twenty-first century. It does seem essential to attempt this, however, because the failure to deal in depth with the developing political and economic dimensions of globalisation is what has undermined some of the work on global English in the past.The divergence of views on what globalisation might actually be is extreme. One group of social scientists sees globalisation as a civilising force which promotes modernity and prosperity (cf. Levitt 1983; Ohmae 1990 and 1995;Wriston 1992;Guehenno 1995). An opposing group portrays it as a destructive force born of unfettered Capitalism and dehumanising technology (cf. Callinicos 1994;Greideer 1997; Rodrik 1997; Mittelman 2000). Some economists take an extreme view and suggest that the world now has the capacity to act as a single economic unit (cf. Luard 1990; Ohmae 1995; Cstells 1996; Albrow 1997). Others are sceptical and remind us that history is cyclical and that, arguably, foreign trade represented as great a proportion of states economic activity in 1900 as in 2000 (cf. Gordon 1988; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Wade 1996; Weiss 1998). Some social theorists argue that advocacy and pressure groups now act in a completely transnational way with environmental pressure groups, rights groups, womens liberation movements, unconstrained by borders (cf. Robertson 1992; Albrow 1997;Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000;). Others remind us that this is hardly new; the struggle for female suffrage, the abolition of slavery and the rights of trade unions were fought for by international movements (Keck andSikkinlt51998). The debate about the long-term effects is equally fractured and there is no consensus on whether globalisation will be pernicious or beneficial in economic and political terms. The jury is still out, and it may well be that the final outcome of globalisation will be fudged a complex mixture of benefit and harm.One aspect of globalisation, however, is not contested. The group that characterises the phenomenon as the conquest of geographical space and real-time interaction on a global scale (cf. Giddens 1990; Mittelman 1996; Held et al. 1999) has clear evidence to illustrate that the multidirectional cross border flows of goods, services, money, people, information and culture are going faster and further than ever before. The difference in rate and kind between the contacts that accompany globalisation and those provoked by imperialism and world trade in the past are clear. Flows from one part of the globe to another are almost instantaneous. All those who possess the hardware and have access to the electricity that permits use of audio-visual and information technology are constantly informed of what is taking place in other parts of the world. It is essential to underscore the necessity for such a proviso. In discussing the flow and networks of globalisation that audio-visual and information technologies have made possible, it would be wise to remember the claim that was prevalent in the late 1990s: that there were as many telephone lines in Manhattan as there were in the whole of Africa. Globalisation is thus far an affair that touches elites far more than other groups, and having access to the technology divides the world into the haves and have-nots. However, for the former, for those with access, feelings of involvement are now increasingly global; the images of famine, drought, flood, earthquake and war from all continents are in our living rooms and news is presented as if from the global village. The immediate knowledge of events elsewhere in the world changes us psychologically and it is difficult to be detached when we see conflict, protest or disaster in real time. This is actuality not history, and we are within a time frame where our reaction could conceivably affect events.In the programmes that promote fantasy rather than the real world, viewers also share experience. Soap operas from one part of the globe may be watched in another, causing us to resolve some of our dilemmas and review some of our emotions through the filter of a shared fiction. Sports programmes often have a global audience. If we know nothing else about our neighbours, we know their sports teams.Moreover, the group involved in this is growing fast. The expansion in availability of information technology is phenomenal and recent surveys suggest that one in five of the worlds population will soon have access to the Internet (NUA 2002) and that 514 million people already have an email address (NUA 2002). In parts of the world where there has been low participation (e.g. Africa and South America), Internet access is increasing at about 20 per cent a year (NUA 2002) which suggests that disparities may narrow if not close. Only the most isolated communities are completely untouched by this phenomenon. The cyber cafe has penetrated to some remote places and the proportion of humanity totally unaffected by television or film becomes an ever smaller minority. Thus new ideas, new theories, new approaches, new techniques, whether helpful or harmful, can be disseminated to enormous numbers very quickly. In short, with the provisos noted above, these technologies have redrawn the imagined communities that we construct. Andersons (1983) idea that we perceive our national group as we read the daily national newspaper or the latest fiction in the national language may no longer hold to the same extent as in the recent past. We may be just as disposed to construct our identities in relation to the transnational networks we belong to as we cross former boundaries for our information, contacts and exchanges. The satellites television channels we watch, the websites we access, the email groups we belong to may well be as influential in the construction of group identity as our national media. Once there is access to audio-visual and information technologies, it is only language that constrains the choice of news source and virtual group. The old system in which national media disseminated national news in the national language is slowly disappearing and as it does so, a powerful shaper of national identity disappears too.Another undisputed facet of globalisation is the spread of the neo-liberal economic model that we began to discuss in the previous chapter. In the Communism, economic and political pressure has been brought to bear on states to adopt this model and there has been global (re)structuring of both private and public enterprise within the Capitalist paradigm. However, economic globalisation does not necessarily mean economic convergence. The gap between the poorest and the richest state has widened considerably despite the general move to a single economic system; the disparity in per capita income was five times as great in 1990 as in 1870(Guillen 2001). The financial crises in south-east Asia in the final years of the last century and in South America in the first years of this have brought criticism of the Western development model and of US-led policies seen to be insensitive if not malevolent (Gordon 2001: 129). However, although the subsistence peasant farmer has far from disappeared, some 50000-60000 multinational corporations and enterprises now account for between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of world output and perhaps as much as 60 percent of all world trade. In the view of some, these are historically unique; they are not national firms working internationally but organisations that coordinate production and distribution transnationally without this being for the exclusive benefit of any one centre (Held et al. 1999). Globalisation has not meant that the economic system treats us all equally but it has that one global system affects the vast majority of humanity.Globalisation has brought about some convergence in political expectations (Meyer et al. 1997). People in most societies now expect that there will be state effort to provide some education for the young, some welfare provision including health care and old age support, a degree of respect for basic human rights and the rule of law. Where this does yet exist, there are lobbies to demand them. Where societies do not have democratic representation this too is an increasingly autocratic authority remain they are increasingly challenged. There is a heated debate over the ability of globalisation and market economies to deliver these expectations (Rodrik 1997; Mishra 1999; Guillen 2001). Some authorities claim that ability to provide the welfare now expected depends on a move to the liberal model and others maintain market economies restrict welfare systems. On the one hand, it is argued that they are the only systems which generate enough wealth to do so; on the other, they are held not to promote the societal solidarity necessary for general acceptance of welfare responsibility. However, divergence here does not result from lacks of information. The advances in audiovisual and information technologies and their continual spread throughout societies have aided the circulation of ideas and knowledge in ways that change society as profoundly as the invention of writing and printing did in the past.Globalisation is also definable as an erosion of the sovereignty of states and the growth of international organisanions. The tendency is towards an agreed common core of rights and duties that govern the individuals relation with the state; and an increasing propensity for international courts, organisations and institutions to superimpose international standards in political life (Sorenson 2002). As rights and the rule of law are accepted as a common platform, states that fail to respect the rights of minorities on their territory, or who contravene the minimum standards of the international community in terms of the rule of law, are increasingly likely to find themselves sanctioned in some way (Jett 1999). However, the process is not yet uniform and some states remain undisciplined. While others are constrained to comply; the discrepancies are related to the power or the state in question and whether the big political players see chastisement as politically expedient or not (Richmond 2002).For a period at the end of the last century, globalisation in the guise of global Capitalism seemed to have no challengers. The disappearance of Communism as a force and the apparent victory of the Western worldview led to the claim that there were no alternatives to free market neo-liberalism and the democratic paradigm. This was a state from which the human race could not progress and against which there was no opposing force. In the intervening decade this analysis has been revealed as a simplistic view and alternatives to the American Capitalist vision clearly do exist. However, the challenges (militant Islam, Balkan nationalism) that have surfaced have, up till now, been forced down by the Western world, either in the form of action by the United States supported by some of its allies or by action taken under the aegies of the NATO or the Western lobby in the United Nations.In the light of these various developments, it is difficult to agree with those skeptics who contest globalisation as a phenomenon; it may not be so developed as some hyperglobalist commentators imagine; it is, however, a greater force than the minimalist position allows. And while the jury may still be out on which groups will actually benefit from globalisation, there is no real doubt that the extensity of global networks, the intensity of the interconnectedness and the velocity of flows are all greatly increased in the last decades. The political scientist, David Held expressed it in the following way:Globalisation can best be understood as a process or a set of processes rather than a singular condition. It does not reflect a simple linear developmental logic, nor does it prefigure a world society or a world community. Rather it reflects the emergence of interregional networks and systems of interaction and exchange. (Held 1999: 27)We can be fairly sure that whatever other outcomes result from globalisation, greater contact between language groups is an indisputable and major effect of the phenomenon.8.2 The weakening of the stateSo, having accepted that there is increased activity at the trans-and supranational level which may have a language effect, is there any evidence that there is a parallel weakening of the nation state system, that would contribute to such change bottom-up as well as top-down? One clear signal of postnationalism is seen in the numerous pressures that undermine the absolute sovereignty of the state.Scholte (2000) summed up how the situation appeared to be evolving at the beginning of the twenty-first century. He argued that, although national governments retain an important role in governance, globalisation has caused several shifts in how they exercise it. First, the affective hold of the state over its citizens has loosened in a world where radio, satellite television, telephone and Internet contact do not halt at the state boundaries. Such contacts have allowed various non-territorial identities and communities to develop alongside the national. Second, this process has been exacerbated as the acceptance of free market philosophy and the concept of individual responsibility weakens the relationship between citizen and the state, with the latter ceasing to be cradle to grave protector and provider of health care, education, nutrition, minimum income and other welfare. Third, the legal hold of states over their citizens has loosened in a world where citizens can appeal to international courts and rulers be held to account for crimes against humanity committed on their sovereign territory. Fourth, the state is no longer sheltering its domestic market to the same degree, as general pressure for free trade and the power of transnational corporations (TNCs) make protectionism impossible. Fifth, wars are much more likely to be civil war within the state than conflict between states. This is in part because of economic global interconnectedness which is a strong disincentive to interstate strife for powerful groups and in part because of the power and terribleness of the arms in states arsenals.Events since the publication of Scholtes book mean that this last claim has to be re