Williamson(1979)transaction-cost economics交易费用经济学-合同关系的治理(中英文)

TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS: THE GOVERNANCE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS交易费用经济学：合约关系的治理The new institutional economics is preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs. 新制度经济学都已经先研究了交易费用的起源、发生、和分支。Indeed, if transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any advantages one mode of organization appears to hold over another will simply be eliminated by costless contracting. 事实上，如果交易费用是可以忽略的，经济活动的组织就是不相关的，因为一种组织模型对于另一种的优势将仅被低成本的合约所消除。But despite the growing realization that transaction costs are central to the study of economics,1 skeptics remain. 但是怀疑主义说坚持说，尽管日益增长的事实，交易成本仍是经济研究的中心。 Stanley Fischers complaint is typical: Transaction costs have a well-deserved bad name as a theoretical device. partly because there is a suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified transaction costs.2 Stanley Fischer的抱怨是典型的：交易成本作为理论设计拥有一个罪有应得的恶名。这（部分）因为，对于任何东西都可以通过适当引入指定的交易成本而使其合理化这个观点，表示怀疑。Put differently, there are too many degrees of freedom; the concept wants for definition. 换句话说，自由有太多的角度；这个概念需要定义。Among the factors on which there appears to be developing a general consensus are: 在这些因素里发展了一个普遍一致性是：(1) opportunism is a central concept in the study of transaction costs;3（1）机会主义是交易成本研究的核心概念； (2) opportunism is especially important for economic activity that involves transaction-specific investments in human and physical capital;4（2）机会主义对于经济活动特别重要，包括涉及对人力和物质资本的交易专用性投资；(3) the efficient processing of information is an important and related concept;5 and （3）信息的有效加工过程是一个重要且相关的概念；(4) the assessment of transaction costs is a comparative institutional undertaking.6 （4）交易成本的评估是相对制度上的任务。Beyond these general propositions, a consensus on transaction costs is lacking.除了这些一般的假设，还是缺失交易成本的一致意见。 Further progress in the study of transaction costs awaits the identification of the critical dimensions with respect to which transaction costs differ and an examination of the economizing properties of alternative institutional modes for organizing transactions. 交易成本研究的进一步发展，需要对关于交易成本有什么不同的关键维度的识别，以及对组织交易的替代制度模式性质的节约属性进行检验。Only then can the matching of transactions with modes be accomplished with confidence. 只有这样，随后交易和模式的匹配才能很好地完成。This paper affirms the proposition that transaction costs are central to the study of economics, identifies the critical dimensions for characterizing transactions, describes the main governance structures of transactions, and indicates how and why transactions can be matched with institutions in a discriminating way. 这篇文章验证了这个假设：交易成本是经济研究的核心，确认了交易的关键维度，描述了交易的主要治理结构，表明了交易如何以及为什么能以一种有差别的形式与制度相匹配。I am mainly concerned with intermediate-product market transactions. 我主要关心中间产品市场交易。Whereas previously I have emphasized the incentives to remove transactions from the market and organize them internally (vertical integration),7 the analysis here is symmetrical and deals with market, hierarchical, and intermediate modes of organization alike. 然而之前我已经强调了从市场转移交易的激励，和组织它们内部化（垂直一体化），这篇文章是解决市场，层级，和类似于中间组织的模式。The question of why there is so much vertical integration remains interesting, but no more so than the question of why there are so many market- (and quasi-market) mediated transactions. “为什么有这么多的垂直一体化”这个问题仍然非常有趣，但是更主要的问题是“为什么有那么多的市场-（和准市场）中间交易”。A discriminating analysis will explain which transactions are located where and give the reasons why. 我们将会使用判别分析解释是哪一种交易位于哪里，以及给出为什么的理由。The overall object of the exercise essentially comes down to this: for each abstract description of a transaction, identify the most economical governance structure-where by governance structure I refer to the institutional framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided. 这篇文章本质上的主要目标可以归纳为：对于每一种关于交易的抽象描述，识别最经济的治理结构在这里的治理结构我指的是决定了交易完整性的制度框架治理结构的定义。Markets and hierarchies are two of the main alternatives.市场和层级是两种主要的替代物。Some legal background to the study of transactions is briefly reviewed in Section I. 交易研究的一些法律背景主要在第一部分进行简要回顾。Of the three dimensions for describing transactions that I propose, investment attributes are the least well understood and probably the most important. 我提出的描述交易的三个维度，其中投资的特征是最少被理解的，但可能是最重要的。The special relevance of investments is developed in the context of the economics of idiosyncrasy in Section II. 投资的特殊相关性是在第二部分的经济学的特质中进行研究。A general contracting schema is developed and applied to commercial contracting in Section III. 一般的合约模式在第一部分进行研究，并在第三部分应用于商业的合约中。Applications to labor, regulation, family transactions, and capital markets are sketched in Section IV. 劳动，规则，家族交易，和资本市场的应用在第四部分进行概述。Major implications are summarized in Section V. 第五部分总结主要的启示。 Concluding remarks follow.结论紧接着之后。I. SOME CONTRACTING BACKGROUND一些合约背景 Although there is widespread agreement that the discrete-transaction paradigm-sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance8-has served both law and economics well, there is increasing awareness that many contractual relations are not of this well-defined kind.9尽管广泛地认可这个离散的交易范式“通过清晰的协议而产生；通过清晰的绩效发生”已经很好地服务于法律和经济中，但已逐渐地意识到有很多的合约关系并没有被很好地进行定义合约关系的定义缺失。 A deeper understanding of the nature of contract has emerged as the legal- rule emphasis associated with the study of discrete contracting has given way to a more general concern with the contractual purposes to be served对于 随着离散合约研究与法律规则重点结合而产生的对合约本质更深入的理解，已经让路于对于合约目的的更普遍的关注。Ian Macneil, in a series of thoughtful and wide-ranging essays on contract, usefully distinguishes between discrete and relational transactions.11 Ian Macneil ，在一系列有深度的和广泛的关于合约的论文中，有效地去区分离散的和相关的交易。He further supplies twelve different concepts with respect to which these differ. 12 关于它们的不同，他进一步提供了12个不同的概念。Serious problems of recognition and application are posed by such a rich classificatory apparatus. 这种丰富的分类提出了识别和应用的一些严肃问题。More useful for my purposes is the three-way classification of contracts that Macneil offers in his most recent article, where classical, neoclassical, and relational categories of contract law are recognized. 对这篇文章目标中最有用的是麦克尼尔在他最近文章中提出的合约三种方式的分类，分别是古典的，新古典主义，和关系类别的合约法，并被认可了。A. Classical Contract Law古典合约法As Macneil observes, any system of contract law has the purpose of facilitating exchange. 就像Macneil所观察的那样，合约法的任一系统有促进交换的目的。 What is distinctive about classical contract law is that it attempts to do this by enhancing discreteness and intensifying presentiation,13 where presentiation has reference to efforts to make or render present in place or time; to cause to be perceived or realized at present.14古典合约法的特色是试图通过优化离散性和增强“陈述”来完成交易，在这儿“陈述”涉及到努力“在出现的地方或时间中去完成或渲染; 在现在去引起感知或认识”。The economic counterpart to complete presentiation is contingent-claims contracting-which entails comprehensive contracting whereby all relevant future contingencies pertaining to the supply of a good or service are described and discounted with respect to both likelihood and futurity.15完成陈述的对应经济人/物是偶然索赔的合约包含综合的合约，在这儿描述了所有关于货物或服务供应的未来意外事件，和关于可能性和未来性的贴现。Classical contract law endeavors to implement discreteness and presentiation in several ways. 古典合约法努力以一些方式来落实离散性和陈述。For one thing, the identity of the parties to a transaction is treated as irrelevant. In this respect it corresponds exactly with the ideal market transaction in economics.16 第一，识别一个交易的当事人被认为是毫不相关的。在这个方面它很精准地符合经济学中“理想的市场交易”。Second, the nature of the agreement is carefully delimited, and the more formal features govern when formal (for example, written) and informal (for example, oral) terms are contested. 第二，协议的本质被仔细地划定了界线，当正式（如，书面）和非正式（如，口头）的条目被提出了质疑时，更正式的特质会来进行治理。 Third, remedies are narrowly prescribed such that, should the initial presentiation fail to materialize because of nonperformance, the consequences are relatively predictable from the beginning and are not openended.17 第三，补救措施被狭隘地规定了，由于违约初始陈述未能实现,其后果是从一开始就可相对地预测，且并不是无限制的”。Additionally, third-party participation is discouraged.18 The emphasis, thus, is on legal rules, formal documents, and self-liquidating transactions.此外，不鼓励第三方参与。因此，重点在于法律法规、正式的文件，和自偿性交易。B. Neoclassical Contract Law新古典合约法Not every transaction fits comfortably into the classical-contracting scheme. 并不是所有的交易都能很好地满足古典合约方案。In particular, long-term contracts executed under conditions of uncertainty are ones for which complete presentiation is apt to be prohibitively costly if not impossible. 尤其在不确定条件下执行长期合约，完全陈述是非常昂贵的，这不是不可能的。Problems of several kinds arise. 那么，一些问题就出现了古典合约法会出现的问题:第一，未来很多事件不可完全预料；第二，要做出何种调整，只有当问题真正出现时才知道；第三，由于各种不确定性，纠纷就会出现。First, not all future contingencies for which adaptations are required can be anticipated at the outset. 首先，并不是所有在将来需要做出应变意外事件都可以事先被预料。Second, the appropriate adaptations will not be evident for many contingencies until the circumstances materialize. 第二，直到情况出现，否则适当的适应对于很多意外之事是不明显的。Third, except as changes in states of the world are unambiguous, hard contracting between autonomous parties may well give rise to veridical disputes when state-contingent claims are made. 第三，除了世界的改变是明确的，当存有正式的索赔时，在自主政党之间的硬性合约可能会出现纠纷。In a world where (at least some) parties are inclined to be opportunistic, whose representations are to be believed?在这个世界上（至少部分）政党倾向于机会主义，那么谁的陈述可以被相信呢？Faced with the prospective break down of classical contracting in these circumstances, three alternatives are available. 在这些情况下面古典合约的分解，有三个可行的替代方法。One would be to forgo such transactions altogether. 一是放弃这种交易。A second would be to remove these transactions from the market and organize them internally instead. Adaptive, sequential decision making would then be implemented under common and with the assistance of hierarchical incentive and control systems. 第二种是将这些交易从市场中移除，并用组织内部化作为替代。自适应的、序贯决策将在常见分层激励和控制系统的援助下实现。Third, a different contracting relation which preserves trading but provides for additional governance structure might be devised. This last brings us to what Macneil refers to as neoclassical contracting.第三，可能会设计出一种，保存了交易但提供了额外治理结构的不同的合约关系。这最后一种给我们带来了Macneil所涉及的新古典主义合约。As Macneil observes, Two common characteristics of long-term contracts are the existence of gaps in their planning and the presence of a range of processes and techniques used by contract planners to create flexibility in lieu of either leaving gaps or trying to plan rigidly.19就像Macneil 所观察的，“长期合约的两个共同特征：第一，他们的计划中空白的存在，第二，存在合约计划者用以去创建代替留下缺口和试图严格地计划的灵活性，而使用的一系列流程和技术的存在。”Third-party assistance in resolving disputes and evaluating performance often has advantages over litigation in serving these functions of flexibility and gap filling.解决争端和评估绩效的第三方援助，通常对于这些灵活性和填补空白的功能的诉讼有利。Lon Fullers remarks on procedural differences between arbitration and litigation are instructive: 朗富勒关于仲裁和诉讼的程序区别的言论具有启发意义：（诉讼会使关系破裂，而仲裁不会） there are open to the arbitrator . . quick methods of education not open to the courts. 对仲裁员开放。教育的快速方法对法庭不开放。An arbitrator will frequently interrupt the examination of witnesses with a request that the parties educate him to the point where he can understand the testimony being received. 仲裁员会经常打断对证人审问，要求教育与他到可以理解的点，且能被接受的证词。This education can proceed informally, with frequent interruptions by the arbitrator, and by informed persons on either side, when a point needs clarification. 这个教导可以在非正式的情况下进行, 当某点需要被澄清时，可以被仲裁员、另一方的知情人频繁中断。Sometimes there will be arguments across the table, occasionally even within each of the separate camps.在桌旁有时会有争吵,有时甚至在每个单独的营地争吵。The end result will usually be a clarification that will enable everyone to proceed more intelligently with the case. 最终的结果通常会是一个阐明,这会使大家更明智地进行这个案件。There is in this informal procedure no infringement whatever of arbitrational due process.20在这个非正式的程序中，没有任何的关于仲裁过程的侵权。A recognition that the world is complex, that agreements are incomplete, and that some contracts will never be reached unless both parties have confidence in the settlement machinery thus characterizes neoclassical contract law. 世界是复杂的、协议是不完全的、一些合约永远不会达成除非双方都有信心解决机械，这些认识是新古典合约法的特点。One important purposive difference in arbitration and litigation that contributes to the procedural differences described by Fuller is that, whereas continuity (at least completion of the contract) is presumed under the arbitration machinery, this presumption is much weaker when litigation is employed.21在仲裁和诉讼中一个重要的且有目的的不同（导致了Fuller所描述的程序上的差异）是,连续性(至少合同的持续性)是在仲裁机械下假定, 当诉讼被采用时这个假设是非常弱的。C. Relational Contracting 关系合约The pressures to sustain ongoing relations have led to the spin-off of many subject areas from the classical, and later the neoclassical, contract law system, e.g., much of corporate law and collective bargaining.22维持持续关系的压力“已导致许多学科领域从古典主义、以及后来的新古典主义、合约法律制度中，繁衍出副产品, 如,许多公司法律和集体谈判”。Thus, progressively increasing the duration and complexity of contract has resulted in the displacement of even neoclassical adjustment processes by adjustment processes of a more thoroughly transaction-specific, ongoing- administrative kind.23 因此，逐步增加合约的“持续性和复杂性”，已导致了新古典主义的调整过程被更加彻底的特定性交易、持续的行政种类的调整过程所取代。The fiction of discreteness is fully displaced as the relation takes on the properties of a minisociety with a vast array of norms beyond those centered on the exchange and its immediate processes.24不连续性的谎言可以完全被取代作为建立在小型社会属性上的关系，这个小型社会有一系列超出那些围绕交换和其中间处理过程为核心的规范。By contrast with the neoclassical system, where the reference point for effecting adaptations remains the original agreement, the reference point under a truly relational approach is the entire relation as it has developed. through time. This may or may not include an original agreement; and if it does, may or may not result in great deference being given it.25与新古典主义系统相比，在这儿影响适应性的参考点仍然是原协议，当它已经发展很好时真实关系方法下的参考点是整个关系；这可能或不可能包括一个原协议，如果是这样的话,可能会或可能不会导致巨大的差异。 239-244翻译（红色字体表示非常不确定的翻译）刘芝兰II. 特质经济学Macneils three-way discussion of contracts discloses that contracts are a good deal more varied and complex than is commonly realized26.麦克尼尔关于合同的三方讨论揭示了合同是一个很好的协议，它比人们对合同的普遍认识更加多变和复杂。It furthermore suggests that governance structures-the institutional matrix within which transactions are negotiated and executed-vary with the nature of the transaction.这进一步表明，治理结构合约谈判和执行中的制度矩阵随着交易的本质而变化。But the critical dimensions of contract are not expressly identified, and the purposes of governance are not stated. Harmonizing interests that would otherwise give way to antagonistic subgoal pursuits appears to be an important governance function, but this is not explicit in his discussion.但是并不能明确地识别出合同的关键维度，也没有规定治理的目的。否则，让路给敌对的子目标追求的利益协调似乎是一个重要治理活动（功能），但是在它的讨论中并没有明确这点。That simple governance structures should be used in conjunction with simple contractual relations and complex governance structures reserved for complex relations seems generally sensible.简单的治理结构结合简单的合同关系使用，复杂的治理结构预留给复杂的合同关系通常是明智的。Use of a complex structure to govern a simple relation is apt to incur unneeded costs, and use of a simple structure for a complex transaction invites strain.使用一个复杂的结构来治理简单的关系，可能会产生不必要的成本，而使用一个简单的结构来治理复杂的交易则需要耗费大量力气，且需随机应变。But what is simple and complex in contractual respects? Specific attention to the defining attributes of transactions is evidently needed.但是在合约方面什么是简单的，什么是复杂的呢？特别注意对交易特性的定义，显然是必要的。As developed in Section III, the three critical dimensions for characterizing transactions are (1) uncertainty, (2) the frequency with which transactions recur, and (3) the degree to which durable transaction-specific investments are incurred. 第三部分中讨论的，描绘交易特性的三个关键维度是：1）不确定性；2）再次发生交易的频率；3）引发持久的交易专用性投资的程度。 Of these three, uncertainty is widely conceded to be a critical attribute27; and that frequency matters is at least plausible28.在这三者中，不确定性是被广泛认可的最关键的属性。The governance ramifications of neither, however, have been fully developednor can they be until joined with the third critical dimension: transaction-specific investments.然而，治理既没有也不能被完全发展，直到与第三个关键维度“交易专用性投资”结合。Inasmuch as a considerable amount of the action in the study of governance is attributable to investment differences, some explication is needed.因为作为在治理研究中，归因于投资差异的一个相当多数量的“行动，”是需要一些解释的。A. General The crucial investment distinction is this: to what degree are transactionspecific (nonmarketable) expenses incurred.这个关键的投资区别是这样：到何种程度会引发交易专用性（不可流通的）费用。Items that are unspecialized among users pose few hazards, since buyers in these circumstances can easily turn to alternative sources, and suppliers can sell output intended for one order to other buyers without difficulty29.用户中非专用化的项目造成了一些危害，因为在这种环境下的买者很容易转向替代资源，而供给者可以毫无困难地将一个本属于这个订单的商品卖给另一个买家。Nonmarketability problems arise 27 when the specific identity of the parties has important cost-bearing consequences. Transactions of this kind will be referred to as idiosyncratic.当交易方的专用身份有重要的成本承载后果时，非适销性（Nonmarketability）问题就出现了。这种类型的交易将被称为特质。Occasionally the identity of the parties is important from the outset, as when a buyer induces a supplier to invest in specialized physical capital of a transaction-specific kind.有时当事人的身份从一开始就非常重要，因为当一个买者诱导一个供应商投资一个专用性交易的专用性物质资本时。Inasmuch as the value of this capital in other uses is, by definition, much smaller than the specialized use for which it has been intended, the supplier is effectively locked into the transaction to a significant degree.因为根据定义，这个资本在其他使用者那的价值，比已经打算专门使用时的价值更小，供应者已经很大程度有效地“锁定”在这个交易上了。This is symmetrical, moreover, in that the buyer cannot turn to alternative sources of supply and obtain the item on favorable terms, since the cost of supply from unspecialized capital is presumably great.30 The buyer is thus committed to the transaction as well.而且这是对称的，对于买者无法转向替代供应来源，并以优惠条件获得这个项目的情况，因为来自非专用性资产的供应成本可能非常大。因此买者也会致力于这个交易。Ordinarily, however, there is more to idiosyncratic exchange than specialized physical capital. 然而，通常情况下，相比于专用性物质资本，特质交换会更多一些。Human-capital investments that are transactionspecific commonly occur as well. 专用性投资的人力资本投资也常常发生。Specialized training and learning-by-doing economies in production operations are illustrations.在生产经营中的专业化培训和做中学经济也常常发生。Except when these investments are transferable to alternative suppliers at low cost, which is rare, the benefits of the set-up costs can be realized only so long as the relationshi