世界经济论坛-地缘政治之沙的转移竞争合作还是冲突英文-2020 1-78页 pdf

1、Special ReportShaping a Multiconceptual World 2020World Economic Forum 91-93 route de la Capite CH-1223 Cologny/Geneva SwitzerlandTel.: +41 (0)22 869 1212Fax: +41 (0)22 786 2744E-mail: Copyright 2020 by the World Economic ForumAll rights reserved. No part of this pu

2、blication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or otherwise without the prior permission of the World Economic Forum.ISBN-13: 978-2-940631-02-5The Report is available at .2Shaping a Multicon

3、ceptual WorldShaping a Multiconceptual World 2020Brge BrendeWorld Economic ForumFyodor LukyanovCouncil on Foreign and Defense PolicyJohn R. AllenRobin NiblettChatham HouseBrookingstitutionYoichi FunabashiAsia Pacific InitiativeSamir SaranObserver Research FoundationL. Enrique Garca R.Council on Fore

4、ign Relations of Latin America and the Caribbean (RIAL)Amos Yadlintitute for National Security StudiesQi ZhenhongJane HarmanWoodrow Wilson International Center for ScholarsChinatitute of International StudiesShaping a Multiconceptual World3The 50th anniversary of the World Economic Forum coincides w

5、ith a period of profound global change. These events prompted the Forum to draw on its network of diverseexperts heads of leading global think tanksand researchtitutions and present 10chapters that explore the emerging shape ofgeopolitics in the new era.4Shaping a Multiconceptual WorldContents063260

6、Chapter NineThe Future Balance: The Geopolitical Impacts of GDP, Population and Climate ChangeYoichi FunabashiChapter One The Expansion of GeopoliticsBrge BrendeChapter Five Culture, Identity and the Evolution of GeopoliticsQi Zhenhong12Chapter Two Disrupting the International OrderJohn R. Allen38Ch

7、apter Six Navigating the Digitization of GeopoliticsSamir Saran66Chapter Ten Economic and Trade Challenges for a World in TransitionL. Enrique Garca R.20Chapter Three Multilateralism in an Ungoverned WorldFyodor Lukyanov44Chapter Seven The Upcoming Technological Revolution on the Battlefield? Not So

8、 FastAmos Yadlin74About the Authors26Chapter Four Managing the Rising Influence of NationalismRobin Niblett78Acknowledgements52Chapter EightBuilding Climate IntelligenceJane HarmanShaping a Multiconceptual World5The Expansion of GeopoliticsBrge Brende, President, World Economic ForumThe world appear

9、s to be on the brink of a new era not since theend of the Cold War three decades ago has the global landscapebeen primed to be redrawnuch a significant way. New centresof power, new alliances and new rivalries are emerging, puttingpressure ontitutions governing global trade and security.As power is

10、shifting and dispersing, domafor geopoliticalcompetition or cooperation are also expanding.The expansion of geopolitics can be seen across a number of areas economic,environmental, technological where it is an open question whether powers will6Shaping a Multiconceptual Worldcollaborate to address fa

11、st-approaching challenges, adopt a posture of rivalry in a bid togain advantage or take an approach that is some combination of the two.Understanding the trajectory of geopolitics is a prerequisite for navigating the new global environment. That is why the World Economic Forum asked heads of think t

12、anks fromaround the world to explore the direction of global relations, focusing on how geopoliticstoday is expanding to include new actors as well as new domaacross which powerdynamics are operating. The interdisciplinary and multiconceptual nature of this analysis isfit for purpose only by explori

13、ng the full dimension of global relations through a diversityof perspectives can we hope to gain practicalight into the geopolitics of our new era.Domafor competition or cooperationThat the world is in a period of significant transition is apparent. In approximately a decade, seven of the worlds 10

14、largest economies are expected to be from current emerging markets.1 Alongside the rise of new economic powers, increased military spending by several of these countries is creating new regional and global dynamics.2 The shifting distribution of global power, according to John R. Allen, President of

15、 the Brookingstitution, is “creating a moment of genuine danger in international affairs” one that callsfor a reassertion of Western-led multilateralism. But Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, feels the sun has set on the ageof a stable post-Cold

16、 War order.tead, he argues, there are likely to be more “ad hoccoalitions of countries” as the “efficiency” of 20th-century globaltitutions declines.Indeed, the identity of the global community and the very idea of a community itself is being contested. Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House, exam

17、ines the rise of nationalism around the world, arguing that the trend stems from ingrained, even primal, tendencies among states to support national mythologies. Paradoxically, the only way to achieve a cooperative geopolitical framework, Niblett argues, is through governing structures at the state

18、and local levels that accommodate strong national identities. QiZhenhong, President of the Chinatitute of International Studies, makes the case thatglobal frictions particularly those between the West and non-West are largely the result of values-based alliances that have served to exaggerate differ

19、ences between cultures. The path towards stronger multilateral cooperation, for Qi, is through respect for diversecultures, as well as through a collective global identity.When it comes to technology, digitalization across industries and societies is becoming a matter of course what has come to be k

20、nown as the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Breakthroughs in technology are offering powers opportunities to coordinatein unlocking new possibilities, but these sameThe expansion of geopolitics can be seen across a number of areas economic, environmental, technologicalShaping a Multiconceptual World7a

21、dvances can tempt powers to seek strategic advantage.3 Samir Saran, President of the Observer Research Foundation, argues that because digital technology will be a frontline of geopolitical competition, the formation of a “D20” group, comprised of the leadingtechnology companies and global powers, i

22、s necessary to mitigate conflict. But AmosYadlin, Executive Director of thetitute for National Security Studies, offers a dose ofscepticism about the power of digital technologies to upend the balance of military power. In arguing that the strategic advantages of artificial intelligence in a militar

23、y context may be short-lived, Yadlin counsels stakeholders not to place excessive faith in a single defensesystem, even if it appears promising.On the environment, the window for stemming the effects of climate change is closingand the world is entering a stage in which the repercussions of our acti

24、ons or inactions is becoming apparent. Yet, it remato be seen whether the most pronounced effectsof global warming the melting of ice caps in the Arctic, fortance will serve as awake-up call for ambitious multilateral action or as an opportunity to exploit new resources for strategic advantage. Inde

25、ed, Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO of the WilsonCenter, sees a climate-changing world as one thatoffers areas for both geopolitical cooperation as well ascompetition. Focusing on reducing global emissions is vital, she states, but so too is viewing the effects of a changing climate through

26、 a prism of national security. “The winner of the green technology race will find tremendous economic and geopolitical rewards at the finish line,” Harman says. Yoichi Funabashi, Chairmanof the Asia Pacific Initiative, sees the effects of risingOne only needs to look to the recent past to see the va

27、lue of a cooperative geopolitical frameworktemperatures as a geopolitical X-factor of sorts. Because states will capture advantages that come with new shipping routes in the Arctic or new market opportunities for sustainable infrastructures but will also face dangers from rising seas and stronger st

28、orms, Funabashi argues it is difficult to identify which states will be most impacted by climatechange and in which way.The economic landscape is the area in which the road ahead, in terms of geopolitical rivalry or cooperation, is perhaps the most uncertain. Global growth in the near term is expect

29、ed to soften and the International Monetary Fund has called for “synchronized policy action” to stem a slowdown.4 But some powers have used the tools of an integrated global economy trade, foreign direct investment, protocols around cross-border data flows to coerce global rivals rather than advance

30、 shared prosperity. Within this context,L. Enrique Garca R., President of the Council on Foreign Relations of Latin America andthe Caribbean, makes the case for developing economies, such as those in Latin America,to resist taking sides andtead to play the long game by focusing on the fundamentalsof

31、 building stronger intra-regional ties and producing more globally competitive products.8Shaping a Multiconceptual WorldShaping the futureAs domafor global cooperation or rivalry expand, shaping the direction of geopoliticsbecomes ever more complicated. To be sure, stakeholders can cooperate acrossi

32、ndividual domawhile competing across others. But over time, cooperation willlikely beget cooperation and rivalry will likely beget rivalry. The more powers compete and pursue strategic advantage at the expense of addressing shared technological, environmental and economic challenges, the more likely

33、 it will be that a broader sense of friction will develop across the global system. A rivalrous global system will in turn make itmore unlikely that shared priorities are fulfilled.One only needs to look to the recent past to see the value of a cooperative geopolitical framework. Whether it was stre

34、ngthening security protocols in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks or preventing a global depression in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, multilateral efforts were key to advancing safety and prosperity. As the world becomes even more interconnected in terms of flows of in

35、formation, capital and people, states will be more reliant on one another to realize positive outcomes forthemselves and the global community. At a time when power dynamics are in flux, there is an opportunity for stakeholders to make the decision to shape geopolitics in a cooperative,rather than co

36、mpetitive, manner.Shaping a Multiconceptual World9References1 Yen Nee Lee, “Here Are 4 Charts that Show Chinas Rise as a Global Economic Superpower”, CNBC, 23 September 2019, /2019/09/24/how-much-chinas-economy-has-grown-over-the-last-70-years.html, accessed 31 October 2019; Enda

37、Curran, “These Could Be the Worlds Biggest Economies by 2030”, Bloomberg, 8 January 2019, https:/www. /news/articles/2019-01-08/world-s-biggest-economies-seen-dominated-by-asian-ems-by-2030, accessed 31October 2019.2 Kemal Dervi, “Global Power is Shifting. Is it the End of Multilaterali

38、sm?”, World Economic Forum, 24 July 2018, https:/www. /agenda/2018/07/is-this-the-end-of-multilateralism/, accessed 31 October 2019.3 Eric Rosenbach and Katherine Mansted, “The Geopolitics of Information”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 28 May

39、 2019, /publication/geopolitics-information, accessed 31 October 2019.4 Kristalina Georgieva, “Decelerating Growth Calls for Accelerating Action”, International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings 2019 “Curtain Raiser” Speech, 8 October 2019, /en/News/Articles/

40、2019/10/03/sp100819-AMs2019-Curtain- Raiser, accessed 31 October 2019.10Shaping a Multiconceptual WorldShaping a Multiconceptual World11Disrupting the International Order12Shaping a Multiconceptual WorldUnsplash/Michael AfonsoJohn R. Allen President, Brookingstitution, USAThroughout modern history,

41、established regional or international orders have been overturned when a shift in technology has enabled or amplified a change in the balance of military or economic power. That was true when new technologies and techniques of sail vaulted Portugal past the larger European powers to becomethe first

42、Western nation to establish a major presence inthe Indian Ocean; when steam and the invention of the loom and new financial techniques powered the English industrial revolution; and when new approaches to mass production catapulted the United States to the top of the world economy and then to the fo

43、refront of the defenceof the free world in World War II and during the Cold War.Shaping a Multiconceptual World13The American-led arrangements that emerged have been the backbone of internationalorder ever since, and the systems of alliances and multilateraltitutions that havesupported this order ha

44、ve been the bulwark of international stability. But as we near the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II and mark the 30th anniversary of the end of the Cold War, a combination of economic and technological shifts is once again drivinggeopolitical change.Some of these changes arise from hugely

45、 positive developments: integrating intothe global economy and undergirded by liberaltitutions like the World TradeOrganization, emerging markets have pulled morethan a billion people out of poverty and forged a globalEconomic and technological developments over the past three decades are creating a

46、 moment of genuine danger in international affairsmiddle class. During the same period,titutionslike the United Nations, driven by the West but encompassing genuinely global collaboration, made sustained progress on reducing the ills of civil war, infectious disease and humanitarian crises. But for

47、all the positives, there is no escaping the reality thatthe cumulative effect of changes fuelled by economicand technological developments over the past three decades are creating a moment ofgenuine danger in international affairs.Technological change and the rebalancing of powerThe technological ad

48、vances and an economic rebalancing under way are causing the world to enter a new phase one where the non-Western powers, as well as some non-state actors, see low-cost and relatively low-risk opportunities to weaken the United States and the Western alliance.One area where this danger is pronounced

49、 is in East Asia. As Chinas growth has vaulted it into the top ranks of global economic power, it has progressively shed its strategy of “hide and bide” and begun to exert itself in political and strategic affairs,in its region and beyond. The economic and export prowess of China is intricallychalle

50、nging the dominance of the Western model in international affairs. Agaome ofthis is productive: Chinas surge into Africa in the 1990s,earch of food, mineral andenergy resources to power its growth, helped to pull more than a dozen African nations into middle-income status. But with global economic r

51、each comes global interests and the temptation to project global power; now China has moved into a new phase ofexpansion into a global network of ports, technology plays and infrastructure assetsthatome theatres seem purposefully designed to challenge the West.14Shaping a Multiconceptual WorldREUTER

52、S/Edgar SuAdded to this are powerful changes in the technological sphere: not only the deeper and now pervasive integration of cyber networks into military technology but also the wide penetration of social networks and above all qualitative leaps in the effectiveness and power of supercomputing, ar

53、tificial intelligence and biotechnology. Any one of these technologies could amplify shifts in the balance of geopolitical power especially amidst a lapse in US global leadership and a weakened and disorganized multilateral order. The current US Administration has usefully focused on the China chall

54、enge; but it has chosen to react to these developments not by deepening its commitment to democratic values and securing or expanding its alliance structure, but by alienating its closest friends and weakening multilateral arrangements just when they are most susceptible to concertedpressures from a

55、uthoritarian states and most needed for global stability.The risks from technological and economic change are not limited to the realm of great power relations. In regional conflicts, technologies like the remote management of drone swarms, precision strike missiles, and enhanced cyber- and artifici

56、al intelligence-supported influence operations in the information sphere can lift the power of lesser adversaries, and even of non-state actors like the Islamic State who have used the information domain to spread their influence and network across most civil wars in the Middle East, North Africa an

57、d into South-East Asia. The danger is made graver, though, by the escalation of great power tensions; for while civil and regional wars were often the subject of international cooperation during the last quarter century, we are now watching a return to the behaviour of the worlds top military powers treating these conflicts as zones for proxy competition with disastrous results in terms of human suffering, as weve experienced in Yemen, Syriaand Venezuela.Shaping a Multiconceptual World15Getting the assessment rightWhile new technologies are unlikely to radically change the military balanc