美国经济分析：美国经济：走出困境1203

1、 2012 年 12 月 1 日 issue no: 12/48 美国经济分析 研究报告 2013-2016 年美国经济：走出困境 我们预计 2013 年上半年美国经济增速仍在 2%以下。财政紧缩步伐加快的 不利影响可能会超出私营部门复苏和桑迪飓风过后经济状况好转的积极影 响。我们预测面临的风险趋于下行；财政悬崖最严重的后果可能是导致经济 再次陷入衰退。 然而我们更新后的财政收支模型显示，2013 年下半年经济增长可能开始改 善。房屋建造开始强劲复苏，企业部门应会提高现金流支出比例，个人储蓄 率可能会进一步小幅下降。 总的来说，私营部门可能会将 2014-2015 年 gdp 推高约 1个百分

2、点。即 使在财政政策继续拖累的情况下，经济增速也应会达到高于趋势水平的 3% （或更高）。按照以往周期的标准来看这样的复苏仍不是非常迅速，但无疑 会好于目前为止增速为 2%-2%的复苏。 增长加速可能仅会使经济逐步摆脱疲软状况。根据我们的预测，就业率较潜 在水平低 4%左右，随着更多人重新加入劳动力大军，失业率仅会缓慢下 降。而这可能会令工资增长非常缓慢。鉴于大宗商品价格将比前几年更为稳 jan hatzius (212) 902-0394 高盛集团 alec phillips (202) 637-3746 高盛集团 jari stehn (212) 357-6224 高盛集团 kris da

3、wsey (212) 902-3393 高盛集团 david mericle (212) 357-2619 高盛集团 shuyan wu (212) 902-3053 高盛集团 定，我们预计通胀率仍将略低于美联储 2%的目标。 美联储政策仍将倾向于推动就业市场复苏。我们预计即使在扭曲操作结束 后，美联储也会以约 850 亿美元/月的速度继续购买按揭抵押证券和长期国 债。此外，美联储还可能调整联邦基金利率指引，但一季度之前可能不会发 生。 投资者不应视本报告为作出投资决策的唯一因素。 有关分析师的申明和其他重要信息，见信息披露附录，或参阅 高盛集团 2 2012 年 12 月 1 日美国经济分析

4、 the us economy in 2013-2016: moving over the hump the key theme of our 2013-2016 economic forecasts is the “great race” between recovery in the private sector and an offsetting contraction in the government sector. our baseline forecast is that this race will end in a draw in 2013that is, trend or

5、slightly below-trend growthwith risks that tilt to the downside if the resolution of the fiscal cliff results in even more retrenchment than the 1%-2% of gdp that we currently assume. beyond 2013, however, we see a pickup to an above-trend growth pace as the fiscal drag abates to %-1% of gdp. this s

6、tory is based on the financial balances model that we introduced last year. it starts from the accounting identity that one persons spending is always another persons income. this means that in the economy as a whole, total income must equal total spending, and the financial balancesthe gaps between

7、 income and spendingof the different sectors of the economy must add up to zero. in turn, this means that the financial balance of the us private sector plus the financial balance of the us public sector must equal the financial balance of the rest of the world vis-vis the us. since the latter is eq

8、ual to the us current account balance, this implies private sector balance + public sector balance = current account balance exhibit 1 shows the current configuration of these financial balances. but while the equation above must always hold ex post in terms of national income accounting, it need no

9、t hold ex ante in terms of the spending intentions of the different sectors of the economy. if all sectors taken together try to reduce their financial balancei.e. increase spending more than income and finance the difference by borrowing more or running down cash balancesthe economy will tend to gr

10、ow above potential. conversely, if all sectors taken together try to increase their financial balancei.e. increase spending less than income and use the difference to accumulate cash or pay down debtthe economy will tend to grow below potential. exhibit 1: private sector surplus offsets government d

11、eficit percent of gdp 10 5 0 -5 percent of gdp 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 financial balances: private sector government foreign* -10 -15 70758085909500051015 *inverse of current account balance. source: department of commerce. for example, if an asset price boom induces households and firms to reduce their f

12、inancial balancei.e., increase their spending relative to their income and finance the difference by increased borrowingand this move is not offset by public-sector restraint, there is an ex ante excess of spending over income and the economy will tend to grow above trend. the strength in economic a

13、ctivity results in stronger output and employment growth, which continues until total 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究 3 2012 年 12 月 1 日美国经济分析 income in the economy has caught up with total spending and the accounting identities hold on an ex post basis. conversely, if concerns about fiscal sustainability induce gove

14、rnments to cut their budget deficits on a cyclically adjusted basis, and this move is not offset by private-sector expansion, there is an ex ante shortfall of spending versus income and the economy will tend to grow below trend. the weakness in economic activity continues until income has fallen to

15、the level of spending in the economy as a whole and the accounting identities hold on an ex post basis. from a practical forecasting perspective, the key challenge is to identify and predict the drivers of ex ante changes in financial balances. the approach taken in our financial balances model is t

16、o break up the overall national income accounting identity into a few major piecespersonal saving, net residential investment, the nonfinancial corporate sector, government, and the rest of the worldand then to estimate econometric equations that explain each piece with financial and real economic v

17、ariables that we can project into the future with a reasonable degree of confidence. today we present a refined version of our financial balances model. the most important change is that we have added one “residual” category that closes the national income accounting identity and captures the financ

18、ial balance of the financial and noncorporate sectors as well as the statistical discrepancy between overall income and spending. in addition, we have re-estimated some of the other equations, specifically those for net residential investment and the nonfinancial corporate sector. we also use a slig

19、htly different measure of the fiscal impulse, namely the change in the cyclically adjusted primary deficit in the general government sector as estimated by the imf, adjusted for our assumption that the upper-income bush tax cuts will lapse at the end of 2012. in what follows, we discuss the outlook

20、for each of the components of the national income accounting identity. a shrinking financial surplus in the household sector we break the household sector financial balance into two pieces, which we model separately, namely personal saving and net household (mainly residential) investment. we explai

21、n personal saving by three variables: the ratio of household net worth to disposable income, the availability of credit as measured by an accumulated version of the proportion of banks indicating greater willingness to make consumer installment loans, and the unemployment rate. our specification clo

22、sely follows that suggested in the 2010 economic report of the president and leaves important roles for both wealth effects and credit availability in the determination of personal saving. as shown in exhibit 2, this model fits the personal saving data remarkably well. it explains the large decline

23、in the personal saving rate in the period from around 1990 to 2007 with the increase in the wealth/income ratio and the increase in the availability of credit. after 2007, the model explains the moderate increase in the saving rate with the fall in the wealth/income ratio and the deterioration in cr

24、edit availability. going forward, it implies a moderate decline in the saving rate assuming the wealth-income ratio moves sideways to higher (as implied by our house price and equity market forecasts) and credit availability improves a bit further. 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究 66 4 2012 年 12 月 1 日 exhibit 2: pers

25、onal saving is likely to edge down further 美国经济分析 percent of gdp 10 personal saving in percent of gdp: percent of gdp 10 8 6 4 2 0 actual predicted forecast 8 6 4 2 0 80828486889092949698000204060810121416 source: department of commerce. gs global ecs research. the other side of the household sector

26、 balance is the outlook for homebuilding (or more precisely, net household sector investment). our approach is a more reduced-form version of our recent analysis of the homebuilding outlook, and assumes that homebuilding depends on the homeowner vacancy rate, the real mortgage rate, and bank lending

27、 standards for residential mortgage loans. as shown in exhibit 3, homebuilding is likely to improve substantially based on better news on all of these factors; in fact, our model would already have pointed to a greater improvement than what we have seen and is now calling for a significant amount of

28、 catch-up growth. our confidence in this improvement is relatively high. exhibit 3: a forceful recovery in homebuilding percent of gdp net household investment: percent of gdp 5 4 3 2 1 0 actual predicted forecast 5 4 3 2 1 0 959799010305070911131517 source: department of commerce. gs global ecs res

29、earch. 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究 5 2012 年 12 月 1 日 美国经济分析 as well as the business sector we also expect a decline in the corporate financial surplus, as business investment is likely to grow more quickly than corporate cash flow. we explain the nonfinancial corporate financial balance (the inverse of the “fina

30、ncing gap” in the feds flow of funds tables) by the level of baa credit spreads, “tobins q” (the ratio of the market value of corporate equity to its replacement cost), and banks willingness to lend to commercial and industrial borrowers. as shown in exhibit 4, nonfinancial corporations are running

31、a financial surplus that is unusual by historical standards. we expect this surplus to diminish as credit spreads decline, tobins q increases in line with our more-upbeat equity market forecasts for 2013 and beyond, and bank lending standards continue to ease modestly. for similar reasons, we expect

32、 a decline in the currently unusually largesurplus in the residual “other” category, which includes the financial sector, the noncorporate business sector, and the statistical discrepancy in the nipas. net external trade significantly cushioned the output effects of the 2008 collapse in us demand, b

33、ut is unlikely to play a large role in the us business cycle over the next few years. we expect a slight deterioration as stronger us demand growth sucks in more imports. exhibit 4: corporate sector likely to move back to small deficit percent of gdp 4 percent of gdp 4 3 nonfinancial corporate balan

34、ce: actual 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 predicted forecast 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 959799010305070911131517 source: department of commerce. gs global ecs research. pulling it all together our analysis implies that the reduction in the ex ante private sector balance has delivered a modest boost to us gdp growth sin

35、ce 2010, and that this boost will grow in 2013-2014. exhibit 5 shows that all parts of the domestic private sector are likely to contribute to this boost. if the private sector impulse had been the only driver of growth, our estimates imply that real gdp growth would have been slightly above trend o

36、ver the past few years. 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究 1 1 6 2012 年 12 月 1 日 exhibit 5: private sector impulse turns more positive 美国经济分析 percent of gdp 4 2 0 private sector impulse percent of gdp 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10 total saving rate residential investment corporate trade other forecast -2 -4 -6 -8 -10 200920102

37、01120122013201420152016 source: gs global ecs research. however, the actual growth pace has only been around a trend pacea little slower than trend if we look at the gdp data and a little faster than trend if we look at the labor market data. the reason is the increasing drag from fiscal policy, ill

38、ustrated in exhibit 6. we measure fiscal drag as the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance of the general government (federal, state, and local) as estimated by the imf. once we include fiscal policy, the predicted impulse from ex ante changes in financial balances disappears, and the ov

39、erall picture becomes consistent with trend growth. exhibit 6: a transition to above-trend growth percent of gdp 4 2 0 private and public sector impulse percent of gdp 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 net impulse private sector public sector forecast -2 -4 -6 20092010201120122013201420152016 source: gs global ecs res

40、earch. we adjust the series for differences between the imfs fiscal policy assumptions and our own. in particular, we assume that the upper-income bush tax cuts will expire in 2013, while the imf assumes another one- year extension to 2014. 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究 7 2012 年 12 月 1 日美国经济分析 what can we expect i

41、n coming years? if our estimates and assumptions are correct, 2013 is likely to be a more extreme version of 2010-2012, with a bigger positive private sector impulse that is offset by a bigger negative public sector impulse but still leaves growth around trend. but we expect the net impulse to turn

42、positive in subsequent years, assuming that 2013 marks the peak rate of fiscal contraction. by 2014-2015, the decline in the ex ante private sector balance should be contributing around 1 percentage points to the overall growth impulse, but we currently assume that fiscal policy will subtract only -

43、1 percentage point, for a net impulse of - 1 point. this ought to be a recipe for clearly above-trend growth. jan hatzius sven jari stehn 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究 8 2012 年 12 月 1 日 the us economic and financial outlook (% change on previous period, annualized, except where noted) 美国经济分析 2011201220132014201520

44、1620122013 (f)(f)(f)(f)(f)q1q2q3q4q1q2q3q4 output and spending real gdp consumer expenditure residential fixed investment business fixed investment structures equipment little rock, ar tuedec 04 17:00 lightweight motor vehicle sales (nov) 17:00 domestic motor vehicle sales (nov) 10:45 fed gov tarull

45、o spks at brookings institution conf; wash dc 15.0m 11.6m 14.8m 11.5m 14.2m 11.1m wed thu fri dec 05 dec 06 dec 07 8:15 adp employment change (nov) 8:30 nonfarm productivity (q3 final) unit labor costs 10:00 factory orders (oct) 10:00 ism nonmanufacturing index (nov) 8:30 initial jobless claims 8:30

46、 continuing claims 8:30 unemployment rate (nov) 8:30 nonfarm payrolls (nov) 8:30 average hourly earnings (nov) 9:55 reuters/u. mich consumer sentimentprel (dec) 15:00 consumer credit (oct) n.a. n.a. n.a. +0.2% 54.0 n.a. n.a. 7.9% 75,000 +0.1% 82.5 n.a. 125,000 +2.7% -0.9% flat 53.5 380,000 3,275,000

47、 7.9% 95,000 +0.2% 82.0 +$10.0bn 158,000 +1.9% -0.1% +4.8% 54.2 393,000 3,287,000 7.9% 171,000 flat 82.7 +$11.4bn source: gs global ecs research. 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究 10 2012 年 12 月 1 日美国经济分析 信息披露附录 分析师申明 我们，jan hatzius、 alec phillips、 jari stehn、 kris dawsey、 david mericle、 shuyan wu，在此申明，本报告所表述的所有观点准确反映

48、了我们的个人看 法，没有受到公司业务或客户关系因素的影响。 高盛信息披露 全球产品；分发机构 高盛全球投资研究部在全球范围内为高盛的客户制作并分发研究产品。高盛分布在其全球各办事处的分析师提供行业和公司的股票研究，以及宏观经济、货 币、商品及投资组合策略的研究。本研究报告在澳大利亚由 goldman sachs australia pty ltd（abn 21 006 797 897）分发；在巴西由 goldman sachs do brasil corretora de ttulos e valores mobilirios s.a.分发；股票及其他研究在加拿大由高盛集团分发；在香港由高盛（

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50、盛相关的披露，本研究报告是基于我们认为可靠的目前已公开的信息，但我们不保证该信息的准确性和完整性，客 户也不应该依赖该信息是准确和完整的。我们会适时地更新我们的研究，但各种规定可能会阻止我们这样做。除了一些定期出版的行业报告之外，绝大多数报 告是在分析师认为适当的时候不定期地出版。 高盛是一家集投资银行、投资管理和证券经纪业务于一身的全球性综合服务公司。高盛全球投资研究部所研究的大部分公司与我们保持着投资银行业务和其它 业务关系。美国证券经纪交易商高盛是 sipc 的成员()。 我们的销售人员、交易员和其它专业人员可能会向我们的客户及我们的自营交易部提供与本

51、研究报告中的观点截然相反的口头或书面市场评论或交易策略。我 们的资产管理部门、自营交易部和投资业务部可能会做出与本报告的建议或表达的意见不一致的投资决策。 本报告中署名的分析师可能已经与包括高盛销售人员和交易员在内的我们的客户讨论，或在本报告中讨论交易策略，其中提及可能会对本报告讨论的证券市场 价格产生短期影响的推动因素或事件，该影响在方向上可能与分析师发布的股票目标价格相反。任何此类交易策略都区别于且不影响分析师对于该股的基本评 级，此类评级反映了某只股票相对于报告中描述的研究范围内股票的回报潜力。 我们以及我们的关联机构、高级职员、董事和雇员，不包括股票分析师和信贷分析师，将不时地对本研究

52、报告所涉及的证券或衍生工具持有多头或空头头寸， 担任上述证券或衍生工具的交易对手，或买卖上述证券或衍生工具。 在任何要约出售股票或征求购买股票要约的行为为非法的司法管辖区内，本报告不构成该等出售要约或征求购买要约。本报告不构成个人投资建议，也没有考 虑到个别客户特殊的投资目标、财务状况或需求。客户应考虑本报告中的任何意见或建议是否符合其特定状况，以及(若有必要)寻求专家的意见，包括税务意 见。本报告中提及的投资价格和价值以及这些投资带来的收入可能会波动。过去的表现并不代表未来的表现，未来的回报也无法保证，投资者可能会损失本 金。外汇汇率波动有可能对某些投资的价值或价格或来自这一投资的收入产生不良影响。 某些交易，包括牵涉期货、期权和其它衍生工