会计英文文献076：企业商业信用违约与流动性供给

1、外文翻译：企业商业信用违约与流动性供给外文来源：trade credit defaults and liquidity provision by firms european central bank, 2007更多原创经管论文及英文文献与翻译请访问：http:/经管论文.com/ ,并提供定制服务译文正文：1简介我们使用新的法国企业调查数据在企业间商业信用的联系作用。我们发现的证据表明他们在违约链的结果，认为这些连锁店在分配可能成为一个从外部获取资金的大企业流动资金的信用约束的企业有益的作用。通过对商业信用违约，信用约束的企业能够减轻特有的流动性冲击的影响。我们证明了一个流动性冲击很大一部分

2、最终因无法获得外部资金降低企业商业信用链的进一步吸收。有证据支持的理论，作为对信用资金的重要来源认为商业信用约束的企业。许多公司以前与梅尔策（1960）曾研究的文献。以前的很多与梅尔策（1960）曾研究经验文献证实，是否增加他们对企业的商业信用在不利的情况下开始使用开始。梅尔策（1960年）表明，货币紧缩政策，流动性大公司的时期增加额扩大商业信用。同样，对以后的工作经验的商业信用融资的作用，在总体水平之间的商业信用和银行贷款的替代效应为重点。根据假设，商业信用是银行贷款替代，文献一般认为，同时减少银行贷款和商业信用增长表明，企业无法从银行获得，而且商业信用工程减轻企业的财务约束。本文提出了一种

3、新的企业所面临的不利冲击的经验鉴定计划。因此，它补充了文献表明，商业信用是反经济周期的总体水平的。我们发现，在商业信用违约链存在的证据。公司面临违约本身更可能违约。该公司估计，更可能是信用约束能够通过一个以上的可能的流动性冲击第四次商业信用拖欠，而大，接触到外界的资金流动性的公司不会把他们所面临的商业信用违约。我们的发现与解释的商业信用作为提供金融信用约束的企业存在的理论是一致的。结果尤其使人相信丘纳特的（2006）流动性保险理论与客户和供应商之间谁容纳默认共享租金的存在。在本文中我们不考虑其他企业在这个时候是否延长大型企业流动在新的经济或更多的商业信用。相反，我们估计在何种程度上约束企业信用

4、不良的流动性冲击，他们面对经过他们的供应商违约的话。我们使用一个企业级面板数据集，其中包含关于公司间的商业信用违约季度的信息。我们的数据提供了一个独特的机会，探讨企业间的流动性，因为它们使我们的分配，以确定企业所面临的特有的流动性冲击，并分析企业的后续跟踪回应这些冲击的企业，通过沿商业信用公司部门的联系他们。我们发现，在商业信用违约链存在的证据。公司面临违约本身更可能违约。估计数显示，公司能够通过一个以上由商业信用拖欠其可能的流动性冲击第四。大，有液体进入外部金融公司不会把他们所面临的商业信用违约，尽管他们面临着在数据的默认值的大部分。我们的发现与解释的商业信用作为提供金融信用约束的企业（如比

5、艾与吉勒1997年;存在的理论是一致的，彼得森和拉詹，1997年;弗兰克和马克斯强调，1998年;伯卡尔特和埃林森，2004年和丘纳特，2006）。结果尤其使人相信丘纳特的（2006）流动性保险理论与客户和供应商之间，谁容纳默认共享租金的存在。然而，在这个文件中记录了企业部门的互动更不是简单的双边客户供应商关系复杂。结果表明，不仅有相互而且多边保险以及企业之间提供流动资金。所有类型的企业，包括信用约束的企业，提供流动性保险为他们的客户。信用约束的企业都不能保证他们的客户，因为他们本身是由他们的供应商投保。我们证明了流动性冲击下的商业信用传送链，直到他们达到进入外部金融公司（“深口袋”），最终承

6、受冲击。通过扩大商业信用年期的违约客户，深口袋不仅放宽其直接客户所面临的财政困难，而是由他们的客户的客户和其他公司也面临着那些他们没有直接的业务关系是利用大企业的外部资金注入新鲜的企业部门的流动性。我们的研究结果显示：（一）信用约束是法国小企业之间普遍存在;（二）该选项默认许可证商业信用约束的企业的流动资金，以应付不利的冲击信用;（三）我们解释为流动性通过商业信用保险机制;（四）因为我们有证据表明公司继续提供除了提供这种流动风险保险和非信用约束的企业注入新的流动性的企业制度；（五）通过公司内商业信用部门的默认链分配这种流动性。21 introductionwe use new data on

7、french firms to investigate the role of trade credit links among firms. we find evidence that they result in chains of default, and argue that these chains may serve a useful role in allocating liquidity from large firms with access to outside finance to credit constrained firms. by defaulting on tr

8、ade credit, credit constrained firms are able to alleviate the effects of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. we show that a large portion of liquidity shocks are ultimately absorbed by firms with access to outside finance further down the trade credit chain. the evidence supports theories that view tra

9、de credit as an important source of financing for credit constrained firms.trade credit is the single most important source of external finance for firms. it appears on everybalance sheet and represents more than one half of businesses short term liabilities and a third of all firms total liabilitie

10、s in most oecd countries. yet, trade credit tends to be very expensive with implicit annual interest rates of about 40%.1 this has sparked a large literature on why firms use trade credit despite its high cost. many recent theories emphasize that firms use trade credit because they are unable to obt

11、ain funds from the financial sector. a number of reasons have been offered why suppliers may still be willing to lend when banks are not, including that suppliers have more accurate information about their customers than banks (biais and gollier, 1997; petersen and rajan, 1997), that suppliers have

12、advantages in liquidating collateral (mian and smith, 1992; frank and maksimovic, 1998; longhofer and santos, 2003), that moral hazard and cash diversion problems may be less important for interfirm relationships than for bank-firm relationships (burkart and ellingsen, 2004) and that suppliers and t

13、heir customers may have a common interest in mutual survival due to shared rents from long standing business relationships (wilner, 2000; cuat, 2006). this paper not only shows that there seems to be interfirm lending via trade credit links to credit constrained firms, but that trade credit serves t

14、wo distinct functions. one, suppliers may insure their customers against liquidity shocks and second, liquidity is allocated within the corporate sector along trade credit chains to where it is needed most, i.e. where credit constrained firms experienced adverse shocks.we find evidence in favour of

15、the existence of trade credit default chains. firms that face defaults arethemselves more likely to default. the estimates suggest that firms more likely to be credit constrained are able to pass on more than one fourth of their unexpected liquidity shocks by defaulting on trade credit, while large,

16、 liquid firms with access to outside finance do not pass on trade credit defaults they face. our findings are consistent with theories explaining the existence of trade credit as providing finance to credit constrained firms. the results particularly lend credence to cuats (2006) liquidity insurance

17、 theory and the existence of shared rents between customers and suppliers, who accommodate defaultsmuch of the previous empirical literature, starting with meltzer (1960) has examined whether firms. much of the previous empirical literature, starting with meltzer (1960) has examined whether firms in

18、crease their use of trade credit under adverse circumstances. meltzer (1960) showed that in periods of monetary tightening, large liquid firms increase the amount of trade credit extended. in the same vein, subsequent empirical work has focused on the financing role of trade credit and the substitut

19、ion effects between trade credit and bank loans at the aggregate level. under the assumption that trade credit is substitutable to bank loans, the literature generally argues that simultaneous decreases in bank loans and increases in trade credit indicate that firms are unable to obtain financing fr

20、om banks (kashyap et al., 1993) and that trade credit works to mitigate the effects of firms financial constraints (calomiris et al., 1995). this paper proposes a new empirical identification scheme for firms facing adverse shocks. hence, it complements the literature showing that trade credit is co

21、unter-cyclical at an aggregate levelin this paper we do not examine whether large and liquid firms extend new or more trade credit to other firms in the economy during bad times. instead, we estimate the extent to which credit constrained firms pass on adverse liquidity shocks they face by defaultin

22、g on their suppliers. we use a firm-level panel data set that contains quarterly information on inter-firm trade credit defaults. our data provide a unique opportunity to investigate the allocation of liquidity among firms because they enable us to identify the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks faced b

23、y firms and to analyze firms subsequent response to these shocks tracking them through the corporate sector along trade credit links of firms. further, our data permit to ascertain whether the supplier/customer relationship continues even after defaults.we find evidence in favour of the existence of

24、 trade credit default chains. firms that face defaults are themselves more likely to default. the estimates suggest that firms are able to pass on more than one fourth of their unexpected liquidity shocks by defaulting on trade credit. large, liquid firms with access to outside finance do not pass o

25、n trade credit defaults they face, even though they face the bulk of the defaults in the data. our findings are consistent with theories explaining the existence of trade credit as providing finance to credit constrained firms (e.g. biais and gollier, 1997; petersen and rajan, 1997; frank and maksim

26、ovic, 1998; burkart and ellingsen, 2004 and cuat, 2006). the results particularly lend credence to cuats (2006) liquidity insurance theory and the existence of shared rents between customers and suppliers, who accommodate defaults. however, the interactions within the corporate sector documented in

27、this paper are more complex than simple bilateral customer-supplier relationships. the results suggest that there is not only mutual but also multilateral insurance as well as liquidity provision among firms. all types of firms, including credit constrained firms, supply liquidity insurance to their

28、 customers. credit constrained firms can afford to insure their customers because they are themselves insured by their suppliers. we show that liquidity shocks are transmitted down trade credit chains until they reach firms with access to outside finance (deep pockets), which ultimately absorb the shocks. by extending the maturity period of trade credit to their defaulting cu