社会保险外文翻译 重新引入代际均衡波兰养老保险制度节选 其他专业

1、附录原文Reintroducing Intergenerational Equilibrium: Key Conceptsbehind the New Polish Pension SystemAbstractPoland adopted a new pension system in 1999. This new pension system allowsPoland to reduce pension expenditure (as a percent of GDP), instead of increasing itas is projected for the majority of

2、other OECD countries. This paper presents theconceptual background of the new system design. The new system s long-termbjective is to ensure intergenerational equilibrium irrespective of the demographicsituation. This requires stabilisation of the share of GDP allocated to the entire retiredgenerati

3、on. Traditional pension systems aim, instead, at stabilisation of the share ofGDP per retiree. The change in demographic structure observed over the past for acouple of decades and this historic attempt to stabilise the share of GDP per retiree ledto severe fiscal problems and negative externalities

4、 for growth, as observed innumerous countries. Many countries have tried to reform their pension systems indifferent ways to try to resolve the issue of these ever-increasing costs. Although thePolish reform uses a number of techniques applied elsewhere, its design differs fromthe typ ical app roach

5、es - and the less ons and results are pro mis ing for all OECDcountries. This paper presents the theoretical and practical application of thisalternative approach and as such, the key features of the new Polish pension systemdesign.IntroductionDemographic transition together with myopic policies has

6、 caused severe problems inthe area of pensions in many countries around the world. Elements of traditionalpension systemsdesign include a weak link of benefits to contributions and the lackof control over costs of the system. Inclusion of these elements in the pension systemdesign led to the explosi

7、on of costs, caused negative externalities for growth andcontributed to persistently high unemployment. As such, the quest for pension reformis now on the top of policy agendas around the world, and especially in Europe.However, very few countries have been able to introduce fundamental reforms in t

8、hearea of pensions to this time. In this case, the definition of reform is crucial. For thepurposes of this paper, “ reform ”means changing the system in order to removetructural in efficie ncies -and not just p layi ng at the margi ns with con tributi on rates and retirement ages to adjust the syst

9、empsarameters for short-term fiscal andpolitical reasons.Traditional pension systems have proven to be inefficient in providing societies withsocial security. At the same time attempts to cure these systems are hampered by alack of consensuson what could replace the traditional system. Discussions o

10、n thisissue involve confusion stemming from the ideological context of the discussionparticipants, as well as from overuse of such concepts as “pa-yas-you-go”versus “fundingor”“, public v”ersus “private w”hi,le at the same time ignoring a number ofimportant economic issues.Furthermore, economists ha

11、ve traditionally ignored pensions. Designing and runningpension systems was left to non-economists, who were not extensively concernedwith how to finance pensions in the long-term or with how to counteract these pensionsystems negative externalities. The new Polish pension system belongs to very sma

12、llnumber of successful attempts to apply modern thinking in the area of pensions. Thisdoes not mean-as some may assume-giving up social security goals. Rather, thekey idea was to give up the inefficient methods of delivering social security in orderto save its goals and principles.This paper consist

13、s of two parts. The first focuses on a discussion of general issuesthat need to be addressed when designing a pension system. These issues arepresented in a way that goes beyond the traditional way of thinking on pensions.In regards to this second part of the paper, it is important to point out that

14、 mostcountries in the current EU member states and candidate countries have pensionsystems that are essentially the same at the basic policy level. As such, the solutionsin one member state or candidate country can be expected to be the same.Like European states such as France, Germany, Italy, the C

15、zechRepublic, Hungaryand other European states, Poland and Sweden over the past decades and until the late1990 dseveloped inefficient, costly pension systems. As such, in part two of thepaper we shall examine how Poland has now successfully implemented the approachpresented in the first part of the

16、paper, and created a fundamentally strong and neutralpension system.Selected general issuesPension system design has to take into account a number of issues. Their fullpresentation and discussion goes beyond the scope of this paperThis paper presentsonly a list of the issues for consideration and th

17、e most important observations.The pension system: externalities versus neutralityThe description of a pension system depends strongly on both the aggregated andindividual viewpoint.From the aggregated perspective, the pension system is a way of dividing currentGDP between a part kept by the working

18、generation and a part allocatedto the retired generation.From the individual perspective, the pension system is a way of income allocationover a person lisfe cycle.The above holds irrespective to the technical method applied or the ideologicalviewpoint. The pension system - as defi ned above -is not

19、 n ecessarily p ay-as-you-goor fun ded. Such features stem from technical elements additionally applied on the topof the pension system, rather than from the system itself. If the pension system designassumes anonymous participation and a substantial scale of redistribution then weusually call this

20、system pay-as-you-go. If the pension system design uses financialmarkets, then we usually call it funded.However, these two typically used concepts do not exhaust all possible combinationsof anonymous versus individualised participation and financial versus non-financialpension system design techniq

21、ues used. The dualistic pay-as-you-go versus fundedapproach leaves aside the combination of individual participation in a system thatdoes not use financial markets. This approach also neglects the fact that usingfinancial markets means investment (pension portfolio consists of private equities) orde

22、ferring taxes (pension portfolio consists of government bonds), which is obviouslynot the same.Adding redistribution or financial markets to the pension system generatesexternalities. These externalities can be positive and negative. Redistribution withinthe pension system can generate positive exte

23、rnalities if the system is inexpensive,namely the part of GDP allocated to the retired generation is not large. If theredistribution is large, then it generates negative externalities, such as contributing topersistently high unemployment and weak growth. Using financial markets causespositive exter

24、nalities for growth if the pension system spends contribution money oninvestment. If the contributions are spent on government debt they may lead tonegative externalities similar to those of large redistributive system, namely more taxdistortions. This can happen if the rate of return on government

25、debt is persistentlyabove the rate of GDP growth.There exists yet another option, namely to bring the pension system as close toeconomic neutrality as possible. This option requires, among other things, combiningindividual participation in the system with dividing GDP between generations basedon rea

26、l economy developments, such as has been done in Poland and Sweden.Demographic structure: consequencesof the change .Irrespective of the pension system design technique used, the pension systemexchangesa right of the retired generation for a part of the product of the workinggeneration. The exchange

27、 can be organised in various ways and also the rights can beexpressedin various ways. In particular, the rights can be either traded in the financialmarkets, or defined in relation to some economic variables, or just based on politicalpromise. In all of these cases there is a kind of market for pens

28、ion rights. The workinggeneration finances contributions in order to purchase the rights; the retiredgeneration sells the rights in order to get a part of the product of the workinggeneration. The various types of pension systems create an institutional framework forthis market.Key features of the n

29、ew Polish pension systemThe new Polish pension system design is a good example of applying the abovedescribed way of thinking in practice. The system named “ Security throughDiversity ” started on 1 January 1999. It entirely replaced previous regulations on oldagepensions for majority of working pop

30、ulation. Designing the new system fromscratch provided the unique opportunity to avoid complicating the system. Instead, thenew system design is simple and transparent. The main goal was to design a systemthat can be neutral or at least close to neutrality for economic growth irrespective ofpopulati

31、on ageing.The design of the new system does not copy any other pension system existingelsewhere. Strong similarity can be found only to the new Swedish pension systembasedon similar principles and started on the same day.16 At the same time, withinthis general framework the new Polish system uses a

32、number of technical conceptsdeveloped in other countries. This brief presentation of the new Polish pension systemfocuses on the general economic design of the system, while leaving aside mosttechnical details.The following bullets help in grasping the essence of the concept of the new Polishsystem

33、design.Focusing on the universal part of the pension system;Separation of the old-age part of social security from the non-old-age parts ofsocial security ; and segmenting the flows of revenue;Termination of the part of the previous system;Creation of a new pension system, entirely based on individu

34、al accounts;Accrual accounting within the system;NDC, seco nd accou nt-FDC);Annuitisation of account values at the moment ofretirement;Minimum pension supplement on the top of both annuities if their sum is below certain level (financed out of the state budget).It should be strongly stressed that bo

35、th accounts are annuitised at the same momentand play exactly the same role within social security. In particular there is no suchelement of the system as a“basic state pension ”. Social redistribution exists but ithasbeenmoved out from the pension system. The sole role of the pension system isprovi

36、ding working generation with an efficient method of income allocation over theirlife cycle.The contribution rate for the entire social security system has not changed. Howeverworkers salaries were“grossed up ” in order to introduce to themthe idea that theypay part of the contribution and to build t

37、heir awarenessof the overall cost of thepension system. As such, since 1 January 1999 both workers and employers share thecost of contributions without any real change in the size of the total contributions. Thewhole operation affected percentagesbut not real flows of money. Thus the newsystem is ba

38、sed on the same contribution inflow as the previous system.Final remarksProviding people with social security -including financing consumption of the retiredgeneration out of the product of the working generation - is very high on the list of social priorities in most countries. It is especially imp

39、ortant in European societies.However, the inefficiency of traditional pension systems put achieving this goal atrisk. Social and populist rhetoric suggests to the public that changeswithin thepension system are dangerous for social goals. In reality, for most countries in theworld, it is just the op

40、posite. The longer the traditional pension systems are held up,the more socially damaging effects will be created.Poland belongs to a non-numerous group of countries that are prepared for one of themost difficult challenges of our time, namely the ageing of the population. The newpension system will

41、 not only stop the increase of costs of the pension system but willalso allow for their reduction. This will leave more resourcesavailable fordevelopment, which, in turn, will contribute to stronger growth and the increase ofliving standards of both the working and the retired generation.The example

42、 of the new Polish pension system, as well as the Swedish one, isinteresting for yet another reason. This type of system contributes to labour mobility,which is particularly needed in Europe. Free movement of labour cannot be achievedif moving from one country to another affects expected retirement

43、income. As such,aiming at pension system neutrality will be more and more important for Europeanintegration.附录译文重新引入代际均衡：波兰养老保险制度摘要波兰于 1999 年通过了新的养老金制度。这种新的养老保险制度允许波兰， 以减少退休金支出（占 GDP 的百分比），而不是增加它 -正如预计的经合组织 其他大多数国家。 本文介绍了概念背景的新系统的设计。 新系统的长期目的是确 保人口代际平衡， 不论情况。 这需要稳定的国内生产总值的份额分配给整个退休 一代。传统的养老金制度的目的， 相

44、反，在稳定的份额人均国内生产总值退休人 员。在人口结构的变化观察到，在过去的一夫妻几十年，这历史性的尝试，以稳 定为首占 GDP 的比重为退休人员严重的财政问题和经济增长负外部性，如观察 许多国家。许多国家曾试图改革其养老金制度不同的方法来尝试解决这些不断增 加的费用问题。 虽然波兰改革采用了其他地方应用技术， 它的设计不同于典型的 做法和教训， 结果是有希望的所有经合组织国家。 本文介绍了这一理论和实际应 用另一种方法，因此，新的波兰养老保险制度主要特点设计。 导言人口结构的转型与政策过于短视一起造成了严重的问题在全世界许多国家 地区的养老金。传统的要素养老金制度的设计包括对捐款的薄弱环节和

45、利益缺乏 超过该系统的成本控制。 这些因素列入养老保险制度导致爆炸的设计成本， 造成 了负增长的外部因素和导致失业率持续高企。 因此，养老金改革的追求现已在世 界各地，特别是在欧洲的政策议程的顶部。 然而， 很少有国家能够在引进根本性 的改革面积到了这个时候养老金。 在这种情况下， 改革的定义是至关重要的。 对 于本文的目的， “改革”是指改变系统，以消除而不是仅仅在边缘玩的贡献率 - 结构性效率低下和退休年龄调整为短期财政和系统的参数政治传统的养老金制 度已被证明是低效率的提供与社会保障。 在同一时间试图治愈这些系统阻碍了缺 乏共识什么可以取代传统的制度。 讨论这问题涉及混乱的思想背景下产生

46、的讨论 参与者，以及从这些概念作为过度使用“支付即用即付”与“资金”，即“公” 与“私”，而在同一时间，忽略了数重要的经济问题。此外，经济学家们忽略传统的养老金。 设计和运行养老金制度是留给非经济学家， 谁没有广泛关注与如何资助长期或如何弥补这些养老金养老金系统的负外部性。 波兰新养老保险制度属于非常小的成功的尝试次数适用于现代思想的地区。 这并 不意味着如某些人承担放弃社会安全目标。 相反，关键想法是放弃提供社会保障 的低效率的方法，以挽救其目标和原则。本文由两部分组成。 第一个重点是一般性问题的讨论需要解决的养老保险制度设 计时。这些问题是提交方式， 超出了传统思维方式对养老金去。 在这方

47、面的论文 的第二部分，重要的是要指出， 最在目前的欧盟成员国和候选国的国家养老金系 统，基本上是在政策层面基本相同。 因此， 解决方案在一个会员国或候选国可以 预期是相同的。比如，在法国，德国，意大利，捷克共和国，匈牙利的欧洲国家 和其他欧洲国家， 波兰和瑞典在过去的几十年， 直到晚 1990 年的开发效率低下， 成本高昂的养老金制度。 因此，在部分二论文中， 我们会研究如何波兰现在已经 成功实施的办法列于论文的第一部分， 并建立了一个强大的和中立的根本养老保 险制度。选择一般问题养老保险制度的设计已经考虑到了一些问题。 它们的充分介绍和讨论超出了 这个范围，本文提出仅列出审议的问题和最重要的

48、意见。 养老保险制度： 外部性 与中立养老保险制度的一个描述很大程度上取决于双方的汇总和个人观点。 从聚 合的角度，养老金制度是当前的划分方式国内生产总值之间的部分工作所保存的 一代和部分分配对退休一代。从个人的角度 ，养老金制度是收入分配方式对一 个人的生命周期。 不论持有上述方法应用的技术或思想观点。 养老保险制度， 上 述定义的， 并不一定是随收随付即付或资助。 这些功能源于同时在技术内容上的 应用退休金制度， 而不是从系统本身。 如果养老保险制度设计匿名参与和承担的 再分配规模相当庞大， 然后我们通常称此系统随收随付友去。 如果养老保险制度 设计采用财务市场， 那么我们通常称之为资助。

49、 然而，这些通常用于两个概念不 用尽一切可能的组合匿名与个性化的参与和金融与非金融类养老保险制度设计 使用的技术。 二元随收随付即付与资助拨开树叶方法在一个系统中， 个别参与相 结合不使用金融市场。这种方法还忽略了一个事实， 即使用金融市场是指投资 （私 募基金的投资组合养老金组成）或延税（养老政府债券投资组合的组成），这显 然是不一样的。 添加再分配或金融市场产生的养老保险制度外部性。 这些外部可 以是积极的和负面的。 在再分配养老保险制度可以产生积极的外部性， 如果该系 统是价格便宜，即 GDP 的一部分分配给退休一代并不大。如果再分配是大，那 么它会产生负外部性， 如促进失业率持续高企和增长疲弱。 利用金融市场的原因 增长的正外部性， 如果养老保险制度的贡献钱花费投资。 如果捐款是政府债务支 出就可能会造成类似的大型再分配制