股利政策和组织的资本市场【外文翻译】

1、本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译原文：dividend policy and the organization of capital markets how firms determine their dividend policy has been a puzzle to financial economists for many years. miller and modigliani (1961) (m&m), showed that under certain assumptions the payment of a cash dividend should have no

2、impact on a firms share price. m&m assumed that the firms investment is fixed, since all positive net present value projects will be financed regardless of the firms dividend policy. consequently, the firms future free cash flow is independent of the firms financial policies, so that the dividen

3、d is the firms residual free cash flow. the fact that this result flies in the face of casual empiricism, not to mention most empirical studies,1 was called the dividend puzzle by fischer black (1976).several strands of research have developed to explain actual dividend policies,focusing on relaxing

4、 some of the m&m assumptions. brennan (1970), for example,relaxed the equal tax assumption. however, in brennans model the higher thedividend the higher the tax penalty. consequently, a tax wedge drives up the pre-tax investor required rate of return for high payout firms. despite extensive empi

5、rical investigation this hypothesis does not seem to be borne out by the data.moreover,poterba (1987) has documented the remarkable stability of dividend payouts throughout periods of extensive tax changes in the usa.while the impact of taxes remains inconclusive, increasing attention has been given

6、 to the problem of information asymmetries. miller and modigliani explicitly suggested that dividend changes could have an informational impact.subsequent research by watts (1973) and others have documented that initiating a dividend increases the share price and cutting a dividend generally leads t

7、o a price decline. information asymmetries have also given rise to agency cost explanations for paying dividends. with the increased separation of ownership from control, managers frequently face very little supervision. in this context, a commitment to a high dividend policy attenuates managerial o

8、pportunism and forces the firm to frequently interact with the capital market.a central message of asymmetric information models is that dividend payments are important both as a pre-commitment device to reduce agency costs and as a signal of managements expectations of future earnings. both models

9、have been used to justify lintners observation (1956) that actual dividend policies tend to follow a slowly adaptive process. however, the viability of both of these mechanisms depends on other aspects of the institutional and contracting environment. for example, if the firm is closely held there m

10、ight be easier and less costly ways of communicating information than by paying a dividend. similarly, managerial control issues may be less severe in a bank centric market characterized by constant monitoring of corporate activities by lending officers.there are a variety of ways of characterizing

11、institutional differences, but mayer(1990) hit on one key difference: the anglo-saxon capital markets model compared to the continental-german-japanese banking model. the critical difference as rajan (1992) pointed out is that the capital markets perspective relies onarms length contracting by uninf

12、ormed investors, whereas bank debt is a contract between an informed investor frequently privy to confidential information not available in the capital market. we would expect these marked differences in the organization of the financial system to impact corporate financial policy, particularlythe u

13、se of dividends as both a signaling and pre-commitment device.in this paper, we take advantage of the recent development of an international database by the world bank that allows for cross-country comparisons of dividend policy. financial data is available for the largest firms from eight emerging

14、market countries: korea, india, pakistan, thailand, malaysia, turkey and zimbabwe between1980 and 1990. we analyze the dividend policies of firms from these countries, as well as the key institutional features of each country, and compare them with a control sample of us firms. dividend signaling mo

15、dels offer valuable insights about the role of dividends. in particular they explain why dividends are more stable than earnings and why firmsare reluctant to cut dividends. in the former case, as long as underlying permanent earnings are more stable than actual earnings, the dividend will also be m

16、ore stable,since management is signaling its view as to the underlying permanent earnings. inthe later case, a dividend cut indicates that the corresponding earnings decline ispermanent, not temporary and cyclical.informational asymmetries and contracting costs can also generate agency costs.conside

17、r, for example, a firm that is financed with 100% equity with insiders or management as a control group and a widely dispersed group of outside stockholders. jensen and meckling (1976) illustrate that with little external control, managers and insiders will indulge in excessive perquisite consumptio

18、n either through outright consumption of corporate resources or through inefficient management and inappropriate investment policies. in such a framework outsiders may prefer a high dividend policy: better a dividend today than a highly uncertain capital gain from questionable future investment. in

19、the absence of a strong contractual and legal framework to discipline insiders, for example by elections of outside directors, a pre-commitment to pay significant dividends may be the only way that insiders can raise capital. in the extreme case, a 100% dividend payout forces the firm to bid back th

20、e lost equity capital on the open market.5 consequently, a high dividend payout helps in minimizing agency costs.the implication of both these arguments is that dividend payments will be higherwhere there are dispersed outsider investors, as long as the firm is in continuous need of equity capital a

21、nd thus forced to interact with the capital market.the role of the institutional structure through which the firms raises capital is thus important for dividend policy.rajan (1992) showed the difference between bonds and bank debt is in theinformation acquisition process and the potential for renego

22、tiating the contract. thekey is that bank debt is a contract between an informed provider of debt capital whohas access to current corporate information, much of it confidential. the banking relationship usually requires the filing of quarterly financial information in a standardized form, as well a

23、s regular site visits by the lending officer, so that the lending officer is familiar with the company. moreover, much of the bank debt is either short term or involves material adverse conditions clauses that effectivelygive the bank an almost continuous call option on its loan. consequently, there

24、 is asignificant reduction in the extent of the moral hazard problem, as well as of agency costs. this risk reduction is accentuated by the practice of recovering the loan principal through monthly mortgage type payments. in essence this practice serves the same pre-commitment function as a dividend

25、. it is not surprising therefore, that james (1987) found that the announcement of a credit facility was accompanied by a 1.7% 2-day abnormal equity return. in many ways initiating a banking relationship is equivalent to the initiation of a dividend: both signal higher quality firms and a pre-commit

26、ment to cash outlays.in contrast to bank debt (inside debt), diamond (1991) characterizes public debt or bonds as involving less monitoring. as a result there is less emphasis (and cost) on information gathering and on the renegotiation process discussed by rajan. the key features instead are the ex

27、istence of a track record and a public reputation. in stark contrast to bank debt, bond investors tend to rely heavily on public information reflected in bond ratings, a history of dividend payments, and simple financial ratios. in such a context the pre-commitment to pay dividends may be more impor

28、tant than for a firm relying solely on bank debt, particularly when many institutions are restricted to investing in the public debt of dividend paying firms only. consequently, dividend policy may be a more useful pre-commitment and signaling mechanism in financial systems that are more heavily rel

29、iant on arms length transactions.we term this role for dividend payments the substitute hypothesis, in the sense that the dividends substitute for direct communication with the external investors in the firm, both debt and equity. this substitute hypothesis implies that there should be significant d

30、ifferences in dividend policy across countries with different institutional structures. in particular, dividend policy should be more important for firms operating in arms length capital markets, rather than in internal bank centric markets. dewenter and warther (1998) made a similar point when they

31、 argued that stable dividend payments may not be as important for firms in japan that are part of a keiretsu network, due to the close ties between managers and investors. in contrast to the substitute hypothesis, one could argue that dividends reinforce rather than substitute for other mechanisms i

32、n controlling agency and information problems. we term this the complement hypothesis. la porta et al(1998) argue that the lack of transparency, inadequate legal infrastructure, and weak investment protection in emerging markets all enhance the role of dividends as a reputation mechanism. in this ca

33、se, and despite the close banking relations and closely held nature of the firms, the payment of a dividend is necessary to attract capital.with the substitute hypothesis we would expect dividends to be more predictable in arms length capital markets to provide the assurance to external investors th

34、at the firms operations are sound. in contrast, in bank centric markets we would expect this communication to be immediate and the dividends to reflect the firms unpredictable internal cash flow. in particular, we test1) do firms in these emerging markets have less predictable dividend paymentsthan

35、firms in the usa? and2) are dividends for firms in emerging markets less sensitive to past dividends and more sensitive to current earnings than us firms?we know that lintner style dividend smoothing characterizes the policy of many us firms and that this stems from an arms length capital markets pe

36、rspective. with the substitute hypothesis we would not expect lintners model to hold as well for emerging market firms.these hypotheses are inter-related, but if we find the answer is generally yes, we take this as support for the substitute theory of dividend policy. on the other hand, if we find t

37、hat dividend policy in these emerging markets is predictable and can be characterized quite accurately by a lintner model, we take this as support for the complement theory of dividend policy.table 4 provides summary statistics on dividend policy and some key financial ratios for companies in each o

38、f our eight emerging countries and the usa. since all the values are ratios, they are sometimes skewed when dividing by small numbers. for this reason the median and mean are both reported, along with the standard deviation. as well, all observations lying outside three standard deviations from the

39、mean were removed. the standard ratios for analyzing dividend policy are the dividend yield, which in this case is the annual dividend divided by the average of the years high and low stock price, and the dividend payout, which is the ratio of the dividend paid to the earnings per share.17 key finan

40、cial ratios are the return on equity (roe) as a measure of profitability, the debt ratio and the interest coverage ratio as measures of credit worthiness and the current ratio as a measure of liquidity.for the eight emerging markets the median payout ratios are similar to those of the us firms, with

41、 only turkish companies obviously higher, and pakistani firms lower. in contrast, median dividend yields are higher in all these emerging market countries than in the usa. this indicates that the emerging market firms tend to payout approximately the same as their us counterparts but the much greate

42、r depth in the us stock market values these dividends much higher. this again is an indicator of the relative under-development of stock markets in these countries. interestingly again malaysia is closest to the usa with a median dividend yield of 2.0%, while the big difference in the korean mean an

43、d median dividend yields is mainly a function of time: in the earlier period the moribund state of korean markets lead to high dividend yields that were erased by the end of the period. a major conclusion from the discriminant analysis and the sample statistics is that there is greater dividend inst

44、ability, in the sense of unpredictability, in our sample of emerging market firms than there is in the us control sample. this is consistent with our prior theorizing that bank centric financial systems place less weight on the dividend as either a signaling or pre-commitment device. contrary to our

45、 financial systems taxonomy, this conclusion is as valid for korea and malaysia, which we regarded as most like the us as it is for jordan, which we regarded as the most developed bank oriented system. in all these emerging markets it appears that other control mechanisms serve the dividend signalin

46、g and agency reduction role it play in the us arms length capital markets system.this paper examined the dividend behavior of companies in eight emerging markets between 1980 and 1990, and compared the results to those for 100 us companies. we reached the following conclusions:1) generally it is mor

47、e difficult to predict dividend changes for these emerging market firms. the quality of firms cutting dividends were much more similar to those increasing dividends, than for the us control sample.2) regression results suggested that current dividends are much less sensitive to past dividends than f

48、or the us control sample of firms.3) the lintner model does not work very well for this sample of emerging market firms, with adjusted r squares of the lintner regression model well below what we expect for us firms.these results provide support for the substitute theory of dividends over the comple

49、ment theory in our sample of emerging market firms. in other words, the results support the premise that the institutional structures of these developing countries make corporate dividend policy a less viable mechanism for signaling future earnings, and for reducing agency costs than for us firms op

50、erating in capital markets with arms length transactions.source：aivazian , laurence booth ,sean cleary . “dividend policy and the organization of capital markets “.j. of multi. fin. manag. 13 (2003) .pp.101-121.译文： 股利政策和组织的资本市场多年来，公司如何制定他们的股利政策对于财务经济学家是个难题。米勒和莫迪里阿尼(1961)(mm理论),表明在一定假设条件下的现金股利不会影响公司的

51、股票价格。mm理论假设,公司的投资是固定的,因为所有有利的净现值的项目将会提供资金而不管公司的股利政策如何。因此,该公司的未来净现金流是独立的公司的财政政策，这样的股息是公司的剩余自由现金流。事实上这样的结果与事实经验是相悖的，更不用说实证研究了，这被费希尔·布莱克(1976)称为股利之谜。一些股利理论研究已发展到实际股利政策,以摆脱mm理论的假设。例如布伦南(1970)，摆脱了相同税率的假设。然而,在布伦南模型中股利越高税务越高。因此,一个税收因素的推动税前投资者要求选择股利回报率高的公司。尽管广泛的实际调查似乎至今无法证实这一假说.而且, 波特伯(1987)记录了美国在税收政策改

52、革时卓越而稳定的股利政策。在税收不确定影响下，信息不对称的问题越来越受到人们的重视。米勒和莫迪里阿尼明确表明股利的变化产生信息的影响。美国瓦茨(1973)和其他人后续研究证明了增加股利使股价上升和削减股利通常会导致股票价格下降。信息不对称也会产生代理成本的增加。加强所有权和分离的控制,经理人面对非常小的监督。在这种情形下,保证高股利政策下减弱管理投机机会和加强资本市场的相互影响。信息不对称的模型的一个中心信息是股利支付问题，它对约束代理成本和为管理层传递股票未来盈利的预期信号都具有重要性。两种模式被用来证实林特纳(1956)的观察,实际股利政策倾向于遵循缓慢自我适应的过程。然而,这两种机制的可

53、行性取决于其他方面的制度和制约的环境。例如,如果公司紧紧地抓住这一点，可能是比支付股利更加容易和成本更低的交流信息的方式。同样,管理控制中可能遇到没那么严峻的问题在具有持续监控的中央银行按贷款公司活动的人员。有不同的方法可以描述制度差异,但是迈耶(1990)提出一个关键的区别:“盎格鲁-撒克逊”资本市场模型与“欧洲-德国-日本”银行业模式相比。拉詹(1992)指出最关键的差异,资本市场观点依赖于“无知”投资人的缔结短期市场契约，然而银行债务是与一个经常得知机密信息的消息灵通的投资者之间订立的合同，而没有利用资本市场。我们将认为这些组织的金融体系的差别显著影响公司金融股利政策,特别是将股利作为一

54、个信号传递和约束。在本文中,我们利用了近年来最新发展的国际数据库,这是被世界银行允许跨国比较股利政策的数据库。财务数据是从8个新兴市场国家中最大的公司提取出来的:韩国、印度、巴基斯坦、泰国、马来西亚、土耳其和津巴布韦在之间1980年至1990年的。分析了企业的股利政策，也分析了每个国家关键制度特色,并与美国公司控制抽样调查进行对比。 股利信号模型提供有价值股利政策观点。它的特殊性在于解释了为什么股息是稳定性优于收入和为什么公司不愿意削减股息。在以往的情况下,只要潜在的永久性的收益稳定性优于实际收益,股息也将更加稳定。因为从管理者的角度看股利是潜在收入的信号。在之后的情形里,红利削减表明,相应的

55、收益永久下降,而不是暂时的和周期性的。信息不对称和缔约成本都可以产生代理成本。考虑一下,例如在一个公司,100%的股权融资与业内人士作为实验对照组,和遍布世界各地的外部股东相比。杰森和梅克林 (1976)表明,外部控制少,管理者和业内人士将沉迷于过度消费或者通过直接做公共资源的消费或通过低效的管理和不正确的投资政策。在这样一个框架，外部人员可能更喜欢高股利政策:比今天从资本收益高度不确定的未来投资获得股息更好。在缺乏强力的合同和法律框架的学科业内人士认为,例如通过外部董事选举,发放股利是企业内部人员筹集资金的唯一方法。在极端的例子,100%派息迫使公司出价召回在市场上失去的权益资本。因此,一个

56、高派息率有助于减少代理成本。这两个观点的暗示着，股利发放更高的地方就有分散外部投资者,只要公司连续需要股权资本,从而迫使对资本市场产生作用。制度结构所扮演的角色是通过它来增加资本，因此是重要的股利政策。拉詹(1992)指出在债券和银行贷款之间的差异，在于信息的获取过程和继续协商合同的可能性。这关键在于银行之间的债务合同是一个通知人提供一个通知债券资本获取当前公司信息,而且大部分都保密。银行关系通常需要申请季度财务信息以标准的格式,以及定期拜访工地贷款官员,使贷款官员熟悉公司。此外,许多银行债务,要么是短期或包括“重大不利条件”条款有效，因为给银行几乎持续看涨期权其贷款。因此,存在显著下降的道德风险程度问题,以及代理成本。这种风险减少主要通过参加每月恢复抵押贷款主要类型付款。在本质上，这个行为与股息支付有相同的约束作用。因此也就不足为奇的是,詹姆斯(1987)发现1.7%为期两天的异常股权回报导致信用透支。与银行发生关系的许多方法是相当于开始发放股利:两者都标志着高质量的公司和约束现金支出。与银行债务相反，戴蒙德(1991)描述国债或债券涉及较少的监督。由于有较少强调(费用)信息收集和与暨南拉詹的过程讨论。主要特点则反而被记录的存在并公开的声誉。与银行债务形成鲜明对比,债券投资者往往依赖公共信息债券评级评定，股利发放的历史,一些简单的财务比率。在这样一个背景下,