关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究

1、本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译外文题目 Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud 外文出处 Internal Auditor 外文作者 Green, Scott 原文：Fighting Financial Reporting FraudCONGRES PASSED THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT of 2002 with the goal of rebuilding investor confidence and protecting capital markets. It recognized that strong internal

2、controls were an important component of confidence building. Section 404 of the act addresses this component by mandating an annual evaluation of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting and requiring management to assess and certify the effectiveness of these controls.In addition Sa

3、rbanes-Oxley requires a company's external auditor to complete a separate report that attests to management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting. In short, the external auditor must perform testing to validate management's assessme

4、nt of the internal control structure. A strong internal audit function can provide both management and the public accountants with comfort that the control structure is being evaluated regularly and that deficiencies are remedied. Documenting and evaluating a company's processes and related cont

5、rol structure are traditional internal audit tasks that protect the enterprise. However, the degree to which internal auditors focus on the accuracy of their organization's financial reporting presentation and disclosure, in addition to operational audits, is a matter of judgment. Critical facto

6、rs that will determine the scope of internal auditing involvement in the financial reporting process include the strength and experience of the external auditors as well as the extent of their reliance on the internal control function the transparency and culture of the enterprise and audit prioriti

7、es based on solid risk analysis. There are three steps every auditor should take-regardless of their level of' involvement-to help protect the organization from fraudulent financial reporting: * Listen to rogues and whistleblowers. * Ask focused questions that may lead to red flags of financial

8、reporting trouble. * Watch for financial oddities by benchmarking performance. Investors depend on interim financial reports and need to believe these reports are fair and accurate. Internal auditing can provide valuable oversight to organizations by helping to ensure that communications arc free fr

9、om inappropriate financial engineering.THE ART OF LISTENING One of the problems with financial reporting scandals is that an unscrupulous chief financial officer (CFO) and members of his or her team are unlikely to announce their intentions. In fact, a common thread running through World Com, Enron,

10、 and other high-profile financial sandals is that each company had a strong, respected CFO who kept the number of people involved in the scandal to a minimum, exerted incredible control over the working group and commanded the group's loyalty above all other ethical considerations. These CFOs re

11、portedly rewarded those who supported them and intimidated, excluded, and punished those who did not. No auditor can reasonably expect such II tightly knit group to volunteer that their boss is playing with the numbers. The CFO's sycophants will court his or her approval at the expense of all el

12、se even the total destruction of the enterprise. The good news is that, in recent cases, there were outsiders who were willing to step forward. At Enron, for example, Sherron Watkins, a corporate vice president, specifically told both Andersen and senior executives of her concerns regarding the conf

13、lict of interest between Enron and the special purpose entities (SPEs) the CFO administered as well as the perception of improper accounting at many of the SPEs he created. She also raised the possibility of the complete financial collapse of the company. Had they listened to Watkins, the fraud migh

14、t have been identified earlier, thereby limiting the damage to the company and its employees. The lesson for auditors is clear: Listen the rogues who complain. Particu1arly to where constructive criticism is viewed as an act of disloyalty, those who arc not viewed as a part of the team can be a terr

15、ific source information. It is often too easy to dismiss the grumbling of those who arc perceived as outsiders or on the fast track to termination. Internal auditors should resist passive behavior and listen, evaluate, and, if warranted, investigate what they hear.IDENTIFY RED FLAGS Although the num

16、ber of possible disclosure omissions and financial presentation errors are many, internal auditors can look for patterns to help focus their activities to where they will be most effective. Uncovering these red flags may take some digging and may require the auditor to ask tough questions.AGGRESSIVE

17、 REVENUE RECOGNITION POLICIES A typical red flag is revenue that is matched to future performance or expense. Qwest Communications has stated that, between 1999 and 200l, it incorrectly accounted for more than $1.1 billion in transactions. Revenues were contingent on the purchase of fiber capacity a

18、nd future services, but they were improperly booked as earned.Unify Corp, a provider of software products, reportedly went even further when it boosted revenue by loaning money to customers. Those customers then bought Unify's products with no reasonable expectation of ever repaying the loans. A

19、 $15 million profit was eventually restated into a 57 million loss. Understanding when revenues are recognized is the first step to comprehending the quality of the revenue stream. Revenues of the highest quality are those that are booked after the customer has received, accepted, and paid for the p

20、roduct or service without any further performance requirement or contingency. To identify aggressive accounting and contingencies, auditors can: * Make a direct inquiry to management ns to the existence of loans to customers or asset- swap agreements. * Conduct a detailed analysis or debt obligation

21、s, which may uncover undisclosed contingencies. * Evaluate alternative revenue recognition methodologies available to the company and ask the CFO and external auditors why these were rejected in favor of the current practice. Such inquiry is not a sign of ignorance, but instead demonstrates prudence

22、 and due diligence. The revenue policy applied must have a sound business rationale that is easily understood by senior management and directors. If it doesn't, this issue should be raised with the audit committee. EVER-PRESENT NONRECURRING CHARGES Companies are continually making provisions exp

23、enses, even if they are not sure of their exact amount. There has been an epidemic of merger. Product return, lawsuit, obsolete inventory, and bad loan expenses that usually give rise to reserves or nonrecurring charges. The Center for Business Innovation reports that the number of Standard and Poor

24、's 500 (S&P 500) firms declaring special losses grew from 68 in 1982 to Z33 in 2000. 1 n other words, a whopping 47 percent of the S&P 500 had nonrecurring charges in 2000. There arc many legitimate nonrecurring expenses - due to acts of nature, mergers, and asset sales. So how does an a

25、uditor identify the misuse of this accounting method to hide underlying weaknesses in operating results? One clue is if a company regularly reverses reserves, such as reorganization expenses, back into operating income. This type of activity creates inflation in reported results. To identify such ac

26、tivity, an auditor should ask probing questions such as: * Why the charge nonrecurring and not a part of normal operating income? * How was the amount of the charge determined and how accurate is it? * What is the likelihood that all or a portion of the charge neither will nor be used? * What will b

27、e disclosed about the charge in the financial statements? Confusing or hesitant answers be investigated further. Auditors should have responses documented and on hand future meetings. If nonrecurring for charges are reversed at a later date, auditors should and challenge detailed explanations regard

28、ing this treatment.REGULAR CHANGES TO RESERVE, DEPRECIATION, AMORTIZATION, OR COMPREHENSIVE INCOME POLICY Frequent changes in accounting guidance can also mask manipulation of the numbers. It is to be expected that the dollar amount of reserves will change with the business c1imare, bur the method u

29、sed to calculate reserves should not. If an increase in sales results in an increase in accounts then a corresponding and proportional increase in reserves and bad debt expenses would be expected. I f there does not seem to be a direct correlation; internal auditors should challenge the consistency

30、of the reserve calculation. Likewise, capitalized costs should not increase at a rate greater than revenue over time. There may be a lag in related revenue until after major capitalized projects are completed. Auditors should question capitalization techniques that appear aggressive. Any change in m

31、ethodology should be just; 6ed by long-term trends, not short-term needs.RELATED·PARTY TRANSACTIONS Related panics are entities whose management or operating policies can be controlled or influenced by another party. Although related-parry transactions are particularly difficult to identify, th

32、ere are auditors can regularly several activities undertake to help reveal this red flag. As discussed earlier, ongoing communications with rogues can be effective; however, quarterly procedures should also include activities designed to conflicts, such as: * Maintaining open communications with out

33、side auditors. * Conducting periodic balance-sheet analyses. * Scheduling regular management interviews. At Enron, the external auditors were intimately involved in the creation of SPEs and were aware of the potential conflicts of interest associated with them. SPEs can be effective financing and ri

34、sk management vehicles if used correctly. A parent company's debt level or other can hinder the capability of risk factors a strong: business segment to obtain favorable interest rates to finance its operations. In such a situation, the parent can create an SPE and transfer the asset to it with

35、the goal of receiving more favorable lending rates. As long as there is another independent third-party investor that has contributed at least 3 percent of the assets, the PE does not be consolidated into the parent have to for financial-reporting purposes. Furthermore, if the assets in the SPE are

36、of high quality, banks will perceive the entity as a desirable borrower, resulting in lower lending rates. The SPE will then use this money to pay the parent for the asset received. The bottom line is that the company obtains the money it requires, bur pays less to obtain it than it would without th

37、e SPE. Enron ran out of quality assets, so the company transferred inferior assets and pledged Enron stock as a guarantee of payment to the banks. According to the Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Powers Report), Enron reported

38、earnings from the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2001 of almost $1 billion more than should have been reported us a result of this shell game. External auditors routinely request that management attest to and disclose their knowledge of related-party transactions. Simply asking t

39、he external auditors about their knowledge of related-party transactions would identified this potential threat to the organization. Such inquiries can be easy for the internal audit department if it maintains it strong relationship with the external auditors. Insightful analyses of balance sheet mo

40、vements, particularly at year-end when the pressure to report strong results is at its peak, might also identify related-party transactions. The asset movements at Enron were large, and inquiry into their removal from the balance sheet would have uncovered the SPEs and the conflicts of interest with

41、 the CFO. Internal auditors need to: ask management directly about any related-party activities and, where appropriate, raise their existence to the audit committee. COMPLEX PRODUCTS Some companies provide complex financial products, such as structured financia1 instruments containing derivatives, o

42、r use hedging strategies that few understand. When a star performer produces complex products, few want to challenge this success or reveal that they don't understand how the system works. This is evidenced by the Joe Jett story, the infamous trader who executed seemingly profitable trades that,

43、 in reality, had no economic benefit. These trades caused the investment bank Kidder Peabody to port more than S300 million in bogus profits. No one was sure how Jett made his margins, but no one - from supervisors, to auditors, to finance staff wanted to admit their ignorance. Several internal cont

44、rols should have identified this control break; however, simply requiring that the process be documented in derail may have dissolved the mirage of profitability. An auditor can insist that managers or their employees map out complex strategies. Jett's supervisor would not have able to do this b

45、ecause he did not been know how Jett made money on his trades. Likewise, Jett would not be able to document the process, as the fraud has been discovered.Green, Scott. Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud J. Internal Auditor, 2003, 60(6).译文： 关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究美国于2002年通过了萨班斯-奥克斯利法案，旨在重建投资者的信心和保护资本市场的有效运行。法案

46、认为强烈的内部控制防范财务报告舞弊的重要组成部分，对于树立投资者信心有重要的作用。萨班斯-奥克斯利法案404条款是管理层对内部控制的评估，要求内部控制报告应表明公司管理层有建立和维持财务报告内部控制系统及相关控制程序充分有效的职责，包含财政年度年底对财务报告内部控制系统及有效性进行评估的结果。此外萨班斯-奥克斯利法案需要一个公司的外部审计人员来完成一个单独的报告,以确保对内部控制系统和财务报告程序进行有效性评估。简而言之,外部审计人员必须执行测试,以确认管理评估的内部控制结构。一个强大的内部审计部门可以为管理层和会计师提供舒适感，记载和评价一个公司的控制程序并且定期测试其控制结构是传统内部审计

47、任务，可以保证公司内部控制的有效运行以保护企业。然而，从某种程度上的内部审计人员关注财务报告演示和披露的精确性，对于经营审计是一个很重要的判断。关于在财务报告程序中，确定内部审计的关键因素的范围和对外部审计的实力和经验的积累都有助于内部控制功能的透明性和企业的精神文化的弘扬。企业和审计重点建立在坚实的风险分析上。不管审计师们的水平如何，有三个步骤每个审计师都应该采取，来帮助维护财务报告的真实性，使财务报告免受舞弊因素的影响：*广泛听取各方意见 *集中关注那些导致典型财务报表舞弊的问题*通过对比相关性能，关注金融异常情况。投资者主要是依靠中期财务报告获取信息，审计师的需要确保这些报告是公平的和准

48、确的。内部审计通过帮助确保沟通自由和查找出不恰当的金融工程提供了宝贵监督。倾听的艺术财务报告舞弊的问题之一是，一个不负责的财务总监(CFO)和他或她的小组成员们不太愿意公布他们公司的真正情况。事实上，像世通、安然等其他这样很有影响力的金融巨头的强大的、受人尊敬的首席财务官，怂恿他们的员工参与财务舞弊，进行集体造假，利用他们对企业的忠诚，吩咐他们执行一些违背职业道德的行为来为他们的舞弊行为服务。难以置信的是这类丑闻层出不穷，不见衰退。据相关报道，有些首席财务官奖励那些支持参与舞弊和造假的员工，胁迫、排斥、惩处那些不服从者，使得越来越多的公司员工成为帮凶。没有哪个审计师会奢望选取的审计志愿者小组会

49、出卖自己的老板，透露真实的公司财务数据，背叛自己的老板。若首席财务官夫妇与法院有些交情，而法院对他们的行为不予治理的代价将会是彻底毁灭企业的一切。好消息是，在最近的情况下，有局外人愿意站出来维护公道。安然为例，Sherron Watkins，一家公司副总裁，明确地告诉安达信和高层管理人员，以她的角度考虑到安然和SPEs的利益冲突，感知到首席财务官的管理以及会计处理的许多不当之处。她对此问题的提出将可能瓦解那些公司，而那些公司的崩溃将可能对金融界造成剧烈的动荡。他们听取了Sherron Watkins意见，证实了安然公司的欺诈行为，因此也能尽早的制止其员工的集体造假行为，遏制对公司的破坏性。这个

50、教训使审计人员更清楚地认识到：广泛听取“叛徒”的抱怨的重要性。特别是在建设性的批评意见上，也许在其他人开来这被看作是一种行为不忠，但那些没有被看作是团队的一份子的人们，可以是很棒的搜索资料的来源。通常情况下很容易把那些抱怨看作是外来者为顺利终止其代理权而做出的行为。内部审计人员应该顶住压力，关注这些被动的行为，广泛的听取意见来做出评估和，如果需要的话，则应勇于调查他们听见的东西。识别典型问题虽然一些披露可能出现遗漏，金融报告错误也会很多，内部审计人员可以寻找当中的关键模式来帮助他们关注自己应在哪些方面进行活动，这些是最有效的。发现这些典型问题可能需要下一番功夫，可能需要审计师治理棘手的问题。积

51、极政策收入确认一个典型的问题往往与收入或费用的未来表现相匹配的。美国奎斯特通信公司已经指出，在1999年到2001年之间，它错误的虚构了超过11亿美金的交易。这些资金用来购买光纤和预付未来的服务，但他们订购与收入相当，并没有显示获利。统一公司是一家主要开发软件产品的公司，据说还通过向他们产品的消费者提供借贷来获取收入。那些顾客通过购买他们的产品获得循环贷款然后再买统一的产品，使得这些借贷额度超过了理性预期而无法偿还贷款。1,500万美元利润最终成为重达5700万的损失。可以理解，质量是获取源源不断的收入的第一步。收入的最高质量形式是那些用户已经收到，接受并支付了产品或服务价款，且这些产品无任何

52、的性能要求上的缺失或者会发生意外事故的可能。在识别咄咄逼人的会计事项和不可预见的会计事项如或有收费时，审核人员可以：*对于管理贷款给客户或是资产就是交换协议作一个直接询问调查。*对于未披露过的意外事故进行详细的分析或者揭示其债务情况。*通过对收入确认评估的两种方法的分析，告知给公司首席财务官和外部审计人员为什么这些情况拒绝支持当前的惯例。查询并不意味着无知，而是展示了会计谨慎性职业原则和对工作尽职尽责。税收政策的应用必须有一个正确的商业的理论基础，使之易于被高级管理人员和领导者理解，如果它不能被有效理解，这个问题应该提交到审计委员会。经常存在的偶生费用公司不断地划归费用，即使他们不确定这些费用

53、确切数额。这像是具有传染性的。产品返还、诉讼、过时的库存、坏账费用，经常触碰到偶生费用的雷区，遭到指控。以报告业务创新中心的数量指标和标准普尔指数为衡量标准，厂商宣布他们的特别损失从1982年到2000年飞速增长。换句话说，在2000年以标准普尔指数500衡量有高达47%的用于偶生费用。也有许多合理的偶生费用，像是由于天然形成的、合并和资产销售等产生的费用。如何使一个审计师识别滥用这种会计核算方法来隐藏潜在的弱点经营业绩行为呢？如果一个公司颠倒定期保留顺序，如进行常规收费、重组颠倒储备费用、收回营业收入等式审计师识别这种行为的一条线索。这种类型的活动，滋生了通货膨胀。关于确定这样的活动，审计师应该问一些