关于技术性贸易壁垒的世界贸易组织协定

1、本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目： The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 出 处： CONSUMER POLICY REVIEW 作 者： Dr James Mathis 原 文：As one of the Mulitlateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement is subscribed to by all World Trade Organization members. The Agreement's provi

2、sions apply to the technical regulations and standards of the characteristics of products. This article looks at the implications of this Agreement and the development of a set of international standards for standards bodies, how they can govern themselves and the possible implications for consumers

3、Efforts by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-47 Contracting Parties to harmonize product regulations and standards and address more subtle forms of nontariffbarriers, led to the conclusion of the original GATT Tokyo Round Standards Code (1980). This plurilateral (limited membership) agre

4、ement was updated and concluded in the course of the Uruguay Round as the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).As one of the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, the TBT is subscribed to by all WTO members and fully subject to the provisions o

5、f the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The DSU allows for panel and Appellate Body (AB) reviews for any dispute between WTO Members. The TBT Agreement applies to all products including industrial and agriculture products, but not for government purchasing requirements and sanitary and phy

6、tosanitary measures designed to protect food, plant and animal health, covered by the The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). Its provisions apply to product technical regulations (mandatory) and product standards (non-mandatory) for requirements

7、that deal with the characteristics of products, including their contents, appearance and labelling. The prevailing view appears to be that the agreement does not cover standards describing product processes that are not directly incorporated or related to the end product, except possibly for product

8、 labels that designate production processes.The original Standards Code extended the reach of GATT law in two ways, both of which continue on as part of the WTO single undertaking:Firstly, it established a new legal theory for complaints based on unnecessary obstacle to trade' which focuses on t

9、he inherent trade restrictiveness of a regulation. (This is not the same as GATT national treatment that requires nondiscrimination between domestic and imported like products.)Secondly, it obliged signatories to use applicable and relevant international standards as a basis for their own domestic p

10、roduct regulations.The first standard above has yet to be examined in a WTO case. The second has received treatment in the European Commission (EC) Sardines case.In a more procedural sense, the WTO TBT Agreement encourages WTO members to: participate in international standard setting; ensure their c

11、onformity systems are open to the products of all Members on an equal basis; and ensure the transparency of technical regulations.It also requires members to notify their technical regulations to the TBT Committee: if they have a significant effect on trade; if no international standard exists; and

12、when a domestic a domestic regulation is not 'in accordance' with an existing international standard. This notification process allows for other member review and consultation.There is no obligation for any country to establish any national product requirements but when regulating, countries

13、 are encouraged to adopt an international standard. This is done by the 'safe harbour' provision found in TBT Article 2.5. Members are presumed to not be creating unnecessary obstacles to trade when they enact their domestic regulations in accordance with an existing international standard.

14、This only available for the national objectives of: ensuring the quality of exports; the protection of human, animal or plant life or health; protection of the environment; or for the prevention of deceptive practices. WTO cases have ruled that 'in accordance' means conformity with the inter

15、national standard.EC Sardines The EC Sardines case concerned a claim by Peru that the EC failed to apply a Codex standard for its labelling regulation. The European regulation only permitted pilchards to carry the name 'sardines' on the label. The Codex standard allows other varieties to als

16、o be labelled called sardines if they also state the variety or a geographical designation (for example, 'Peruvian Sardines', 'Eastern Pacific Sardines', and so on). The case provides a first substantive ruling on a TBT case and also the first ruling on the stated requirement for Mem

17、bers to use international standards as a basis for their own domestic regulations. Although much commentary on the TBT Agreement tends to emphasise the TBT provisions that 'encourage' the use of international standards, like the safe harbour provision noted above, this ruling is far more dir

18、ect in applying the rather unambiguous and obligatory text of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement in order to resolve the dispute. This subparagraph reads:'Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their completion is imminent. Members shall use them, or

19、 the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical fact

20、ors or fundamental technological problems.Not all implications are negative for international standards. This case is notable for the value added contributed by a consumer organization letter attached to the Peru submission. The organization argued strongly against the value of the EC regulation and

21、 the panel used this resource to assess whether or not the EC's deviation from the international Codex standard served any legitimate objective in protecting consumer interest. In this case, the international standard and the WTO rule obliging its use as a 'basis' would have to be said t

22、o be within the European consumer interest overall.Since standards generated by international bodies have an otherwise non-binding legal character, the TBT provisions, as interpreted by the panel and the Appellate Body, generate implications for global governance issues. While participation legitima

23、cy in rule making should be of interest to States and standard bodies, it is of particular importance to the ultimate consumers of products and to the organisations that seek to secure their interests before domestic and international rule-making bodies.International standardsDevelopment of internat

24、ional standardsThe term 'international standard' is a WTO creation for the purpose of the TBT Agreement, Since legal obligations flow from the term, there has to he some sort of criteria to determine what qualifies as an international standard. For the SPS Agreement, international bodies are

25、 designated. The TBT Agreement only has a single provision that defines an international body or system as one 'whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members.The clear emphasis throughout is to ensure that all WTO members have rights of participation in those bodies, an

26、d to raise the participation of developing members in particular. Given the focus on 'WTO members' in the TBT definition, one would not expect to see any particular accommodation in the decision for non-state actors and there is nothing in the decision that can be read to suggest that an int

27、ernational body should elevate the participation of a consumer organisation (or any other non-governmental actor). Since this document controls the definitional gateway of what may or may not qualify as an international standard, what is not considered in the recommendations raises as many questions

28、 as what has been included. Similar, the committee process of consultation and from whom it did or did not receive comment, also raises process considerations for what is an example of WTO committee rulemaking. These are governance issues. The value of the Committee decision as a source of law for i

29、nterpretation in a dispute settlement case is recognised even though the language of the decision uses the term 'should' rather than 'shall'. The issue of whether a standard qualifies as an international standard can definitely be raised in a case and the Committee decision would be

30、used to assess whether a standard meets the enunciated criteria. The EC referred to the decision in the Sardines case for its (unsuccessful) argument that a consensus was required in the standard body process in order to qualify as an international standard.'Unfortunately, the decision does not

31、require that the members actually solicit and receive comments from interested parties, just that they be given time to do so. This is a significant deference to sovereignty, especially as it is combined with an obligation on draft standards to give notice to members only. Receiving input from inter

32、ested parties is completely the choice of a member and any requirements for members to take up comments remains a matter between the members and the standard bodies. One single point of reference in the Triennial Report does however refer to the larger community of interest, here in the context of d

33、eveloping countries.Even though this democracy issue has not fallen within the field of interest of the TBT Committee, the manner by which states and international bodies respond to the gap will have an impact on the longer term credibility of the TBT Agreement's obligation to use international

34、standards irrespective of the decision. This suggests that further enhancements and evolution in the criteria are possible and perhaps likely.Governance and consumer implicationsThe implications for consumers and consumer organisations are complex and in some cases appear contradictory. Where intern

35、ational standards facilitate trade, consumers are offered some consistency in information and the benefits of lower prices generated by competitive imports. At the same time, where consumers of the importing country support a variation from international standard, as their national choice, the benef

36、its of diversity may be at risk. Given the obligation to review and amend national requirements, the entire field of existing technical regulations is open for consideration. This presents a myriad of challenges and opportunities for consumers seeking to affect the outcome of national regulations.St

37、ates have their own systems for passing laws and regulation and vary in the degree of democratic participation and procedural due process they adopt. These domestic procedures are probably eroded, even where participation guarantees are given, when a binding rule is established by a body beyond a st

38、ate's domestic rule making system.To the extent that the TBT Agreement has upgraded international standards to obligations, it is also apparent that this has raised the profile of trade interests in standard setting processes. If standards are designed to reflect only trade interests then the ob

39、jectives of health and safety are challenged. There is a need, therefore, for consumers to be engaged at the institutional level of standard bodies to ensure diversity of representation and ensure that objectives remain balanced. States are aware that WTO claims can be filed against non-conforming r

40、egulations and many will seek to avoid even minor non-conformities if there is a chance that they will be accused of barriers to trade. The tendency would be to ensure that their own trade interests are reflected in standard body delegations. While the legitimate objectives incorporated in standard

41、body preambles remain in place, the constitutional realities on the ground suggest a more trade-oriented disposition in the process and probably more trade-sensitive substantive outcomes as well.If consumer organisations want to have more input into this process and a seat at the table when internat

42、ional standards are being set, then they have to be able to understand these governance issues and coordinate their focus at their national levels, at the international standard bodies . and at the WTO.译 文： 关于技术性贸易壁垒的世界贸易组织协定 作为在货物贸易多方协定之一，技术性贸易壁垒协定被所有世贸组织成员签署并高度关注。这个协定的规定适用于产品的技术法规和特点标准。本文着眼于本协定的影响

43、和一项国际标准，它们是如何管理自己并有可能的去影响消费者。贸易和关税的总协定的努力(GATT)-47缔约方统一产品法规和标准和地址，更微妙的形式非关税障碍，导致了原来关贸总协定东京回合的标准守则的结论（1980年）。诸边（限会员）协议的更新，并在乌拉圭回合世界贸易组织（WTO）有关贸易技术壁垒协定（TBT协定）进行总结。作为在商品的多边贸易协定之一，技术性贸易壁垒是所有世贸组织签署成员和充分受该规定世贸组织的争端处理机构（DSU）。在争端处理机构中允许专家组和上诉机构（AB公司）世贸组织成员之间的任何争端评论。贸易技术壁垒协定适用于所有产品包括工业和农业产品，但没有政府采购的要求和卫生与植物卫

44、生措施，以保障食品，植物和动物的健康，覆盖了WTO协定中的应用卫生与植物卫生措施（SPS的协定）。其应用产品的技术愿景法规（强制性）和产品标准（非强制性）的要求，处理着产品的特点，包括其内容，外观和标签。当时看法似乎是，该协议不包括标准流程，描述产品成立或没有直接关系到年底产品，可能除了产品标签指定的生产流程。 关贸总协定的原始标准代码范围扩大在两方面，两者都继续作为世贸组织的一揽子承诺的一部分：首先，它基于不必要的障碍投诉贸易的于固有的贸易限制的重点的规例建立了一个新的法律理论。（这是不一样的关贸总协定的国民待遇，要求非歧视国产与进口同类产品。）其次，它必须签署使用适用和有关国际标准他们自己

45、国内的产品法规为基础。第一个标准上面还有待研究在世贸组织的情况。第二个有在欧共体沙丁鱼接受治疗的案件。在一个更程序意义上说，世贸组织技术性贸易壁垒协议鼓励世贸组织成员：参与国际标准制定;确保其符合系统是开放的在平等基础上的所有成员的产品;确保技术法规的透明度。它还要求成员国通知其技术在TBT委员会规定：如果他们有一个对贸易产生重大影响，如果没有国际标准存在，而当国内的国内调控不是'根据'与现有的国际标准。那么此通知程序允许其他成员的审查和协商。没有义务对任何国家建立任何国家的产品需求，但是当调节，鼓励各国采取国际标准。这是由安全港区在TBT规定符合第2.5条。议员被推定为不造成

46、不必要的贸易障碍时，他们制定了按照与现有的国内法规的国际标准。这仅适用于国家目标：确保质量出口；人类，动物或植物保护生命或健康，保护环境；或对防止欺诈行为。 WTO案例已经作出裁决，根据是指符合国际标准的。欧共体沙丁鱼案件欧共体沙丁鱼案件涉及秘鲁索赔，欧共体未能应用的法典标准标签规例。欧洲只规管允许非鱼类进行命名为“沙丁鱼”的标签。食品法典委员会标准允许其他品种也可称为沙丁鱼标签，如果他们还规定品种或地理标志（为例如，'秘鲁沙丁鱼'，'东太平洋沙丁鱼'，等等）。案件提供了第一技术性贸易壁垒的实质性裁决一案，也是第一裁决规定的向议员要求使用国际标准来作为他们自己国

47、内法规的基础。虽然很多在技术性贸易壁垒协定的评论倾向于强调技术性贸易壁垒规定'鼓励'的国际使用。如安全港规定的标准，指出以上，这项裁决是哎应用更为直接而明确的和强制性的贸易技术壁垒协定2.4文字条款式为了解决争议。本项内容： “在哪里的需要技术法规，有关国际标准已经存在或完成已迫在眉睫。各成员应使用它们，或其中的相关部分作为其技术法规的基础，除非这些国际标准或有关部分将是无效的或为履行不适当的合法手段追求为目标，因为基本气候或地理因素或基本技术问题。” 并非所有的国际标准有负面影响。这一案例由消费者在秘鲁提交的信件上显着价值贡献。该组织主张强烈反对欧共体规则的价值，监管和利用这

48、一资源来评估是否欧共体国际食品法典委员会标准送达的任何合法的保护消费者利益的目标出现偏差。在这情况下，国际标准和WTO规则迫使其作为一个基础的使用将不得不说是在欧洲消费者的利益整体当中。由于所产生的国际标准机构有一本不具约束力的法律性质，技术性贸易壁垒的规定，由解释小组及上诉机构，产全球治理问题生的影响。当参加在制定规则的合法性应感兴趣的国家和标准机构，它对于最终消费者产品特别重要的意义和寻求以确保他们的利益在国内和国际制定规则的机构的组织。国际标准制定国际标准术语国际标准是世界贸易组织建立了贸易技术壁垒协定的目的，因为法律义务从术语中流出，他一定要对标准进行排序来确定哪些有资格成为国际标准。

49、对于卫生和植物检疫协议，国际机构指定。技术性贸易壁垒协定是只有一个单一的条款一个国际机构，它定义为一个国际身躯或系统其成员是有关机构至少所有议员开放的。这明确的重点是确保确保整个所有世贸组织成员都有权参与这些机构，并提高特别是发展中成员的参与率。鉴于关注关于世贸组织成员在技术性贸易壁垒的定义，一个不希望看到任何特别的在非国家住宿的行为者和决策决定中有没有设立一个国际机构参与消费者组织（或任何其他非政府演员）。由于这文件控制网关的定义是什么可能会或可能不符合国际标准，什么是已经提出了很多问题包括在内的建议。类似的，咨询委员会的程序和谁做了或没有收到评论，也引起了对于那些什么是世贸组织的规则制定委员会的例子的注意事项的过程。这些都是管理问题。该委员会决定，作为法律的起缘在争端解决案件中是被公认的，尽管决定语言使用的是应该应这些术语。使用术语'应该'而不是'应'。这一个标准的问题是否有资格作为国际标准一定能够提出一个案例，委员会决定将用于评估是否符合标准的阐述标准。教统会的决定中提到的沙丁鱼案在ITS（不成功）的说法，一个共识在标准的机构进程中被要求，以有资格作为国际标准。不幸的是，这个决定并不要求实