巴菲特致股东信

1、巴菲特2013年致股东信 (2013-03-02 20:02:40)巴菲特致股东的信是最好的投资学习资料 巴菲特2013年致股东公开信(要点全译) 2013年03月02日 新浪财经 新浪财经讯北京时刻3月2日晚间消息，股神巴菲特已在伯克希尔-哈撒韦网站上公布2012年致股东公开信。鉴于发表于2013年，媒体一般称为巴菲特2013年致股东公开信，但信中要紧讨论的是伯克希尔2012年得失。对价值投资者来讲，巴菲特每年致股东信是宝贵的学习资料，新浪财经将这封长达24页信件的要点部分全部翻译附后。依照惯例，第一页是伯克希尔业绩与标普500指数表现的对比，2012年伯克希尔每股账面价值的增幅是14.4%

2、，而标普500指数的增幅为16.0%，伯克希尔跑输1.6个百分点。然而，从长期来看，1965-2012年，伯克希尔的复合年增长率为19.7%，明显超过标普500指数的9.4%，而1964-2012年伯克希尔的整体增长率是令人吃惊的586817%(即5868倍以上)，而标普500指数为7433%。巴菲特致股东信第1页对比企业绩效与标普500指数表现与此前部分市场人士推测的不同，巴菲特在2013年股东信中明确表示不派发股息。在译文的最后部分对此有专门阐述。以下是股东信要点全文翻译：致伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司的股东：2012年伯克希尔为股东制造的总收益是241亿美元。我们使用了13亿美元来购买我们的股票

3、，因此我们去年净增值228亿美元。我们每A类和B类股的账面价值增长14.4%。在过去48年中(即目前治理层上任以来)，每股账面价值已从19美元增至114214美元，复合年增长率为19.7%。(注：本文所有的每股数据均为适用于A类股数据，B类股对应数据为A类股的1/1500。)去年伯克希尔有专门多成绩，但首先我们讲讲要紧的坏消息。* 在1965年我的合伙企业操纵伯克希尔之时，我可能连做梦都可不能想到，我们一年赚钞票241亿美元依旧没有跑赢大盘，请参照我们在第一页贴出的对比表。然而，我们确实没有跑赢。在过去48年中，2012年伯克希尔账面价值的百分比增幅第九次低于标普500指数的涨幅(后者的计算包

4、括了股息以及股价上涨)。应指出的是，在这九年中的八年，标普500指数的涨幅为15%甚至更高。在大市不行时我们的表现要出色一些。迄今为止，我们从来没有过在5年时段的表现不及大盘，在48年中我们已有43次的5年表现超越标普500指数。然而，标普500指数在过去4年中每年都上涨，整体表现已超过我们这4年的业绩。假如市场在2013年接着上涨，我们5年业绩跑赢标普500指数的纪录将终结。有一件情况你们能够放心，不管伯克希尔的业绩如何，我的合伙人、公司副主席查理-芒格和我可不能改变我们的绩效标准。我们的工作确实是以超过标普500指数涨幅的速度来提升企业内在价值，而我们使用账面价值这一显著低估了内在价值的尺

5、度来衡量它。假如我们做到了，伯克希尔的股价将随着时刻推移跑赢标普500指数，尽管年度间的表现是难以预测的。然而，假如我们没有做到，我们治理层没有给投资者带来价值，投资者能够自己购买低成本的指数基金来获得与标普500指数相同的回报。查理和我相信，伯克希尔的内在价值随着时刻推移将小幅跑赢标普500指数。我们的自信是因为我们拥有一些出色的企业，一批极为出色的经营治理者和以股东为尊的文化。然而，在市场下跌或持平常，我们的相对表现几乎确信会超越大盘，但在市场特不强势的年份，可能我们的表现将不及大盘。* 2012年第二件令人失望的情况是我们没有完成一桩大型收购。我曾追逐好几只大象，但最终空手而归。但幸运的

6、是，今年初我们已有了改变。今年2月，我们同意收购拥有亨氏公司全部股份的一家控股公司50%股权。另一半股权将归属一个以雷曼(Jorge Paulo Lemann)为首的小规模投资人集团，他是一位倍受尊敬的巴西商人和慈善家。我们不可能找到一家比这更好的公司了。雷曼是我的多年好友，是一位出色的经理人。他的集团和伯克希尔每家将贡献约40亿美元收购这家控股公司50%的一般股。伯克希尔还将投资80亿美元购买股息率为9%的优先股。这些优先股还有两项可显著增加其价值的特点：在某个时刻它们将以大幅溢价的方式被赎回，这些优先股附有权证，同意我们以名义价格收购该控股公司5%的一般股。我们总计约120亿美元的投资花掉

7、了伯克希尔去年所赚资金的专门大一部分。然而，我们依旧拥有充足现金，同时正在以良好步调产生更多的现金。因此工作又恢复正常了，查理和我已再次穿好我们的狩猎装备，重新开始搜寻大象。现在讲讲2012年的一些好消息：* 去年我差不多通告你们，我们五个最赚钞票的非保险类公司：伯灵顿北圣达菲铁路公司(BNSF)、伊斯卡机械公司(Iscar)、路博润化学品公司(Lubrizol)、美联集团(Marmon Group)和中美能源公司(MidAmerican Energy)在2012年可能赚得超过100亿美元的税前利润。它们做到了。尽管美国经济增长缓慢，世界大部分地区的经济放缓，我们的“盈利5强”总计赚钞票101

8、亿美元，较2011年多出约6亿美元。在5强中，仅有中美能源是伯克希尔8年前收购的，当时它的税前利润为3.93亿美元。此后，我们用纯现金的方式收购了5强中的3家。在收购第5家，即伯灵顿北圣达菲时，我们购款中约70%是现金，而剩下的来自发行股票，这导致我们的在外流通股增加6.1%。因此，这5家公司交给伯克希尔97亿美元年盈利的同时仅产生了专门小稀释作用。这符合我们的目标，即不仅仅是简单增长，而是要增加每股的业绩。除非美国经济崩盘，事实上我们可能这可不能发生，我们的盈利5强在2013年应会交出更高利润。五位经营这5家公司的优秀CEO将负责办到。* 尽管我在2012年没有进行一桩大型收购，但我们子公司

9、的经理人做得比我好得多。我们的“补强收购”创下了历史纪录，斥资约23亿美元收购了26家公司，它们已融合到我们现有的企业之中。这些交易是在伯克希尔没有发行任何股票的条件下完成的。查理和我都专门观赏这些收购：一般而言它们差不多上低风险，可不能给总公司带来任何负担，拓展的是我们成熟经理人熟知的领域。* 我们的保险企业去年表现出色。它们不仅提供给伯克希尔730亿美元的自由资金进行投资，还交出了16亿美元的承保收益，承保业务连续第十年盈利。这确实是鱼与熊掌兼得。GEICO表现领先，它接着赢取市场份额同时没有牺牲承保规则。自1995年我们获得GEICO的操纵权以来，GEICO在个人汽车市场的份额已从2.5

10、%增至9.7%。与此同时保费总额从28亿美元增至167亿美元。以后它还会有更大成长。GEICO的优异表现应归功于莱斯利(Tony Nicely)和他的2.7万名同事。在这份名单中，我们还应该加上我们的吉科壁虎(Gecko)。(注：GEICO的宣传吉祥物，英文中壁虎Gecko的发音与GEICO类似)。不管风雨依旧昼夜都不能停止它工作，这小家伙始终坚持不懈，告诉美国人如何上GEICO.com能关心他们省专门多钞票。当我盘点我的好运气时，我会把GEICO算两次。* 我们新聘的投资经理人：库姆斯(Todd Combs)和惠斯勒(Ted Weschler)已证明自己富有智慧、品德高尚，在专门多方面而不是

11、在资产治理一域有助于伯克希尔，同时完美符合我们的企业文化。这两位让我们中了大奖。2012年他们每个人的业绩比标普500指数都高出10%以上。他们也让我望尘莫及。因此，我们已将两位所治理的资金每人增加约50亿美元(其中一些源自我们子公司的退休基金)。库姆斯和惠斯勒都年轻，在查理和我谢幕的专门久之后，他们还会治理伯克希尔的庞大资产组合。在他们接管公司后，你们能够高枕无忧。* 截至2012年底伯克希尔的雇员总数达到创纪录的28万8462人，较此前一年增加1万7604人。然而，我们的总部人数没有变化，依旧24个，为此抓狂实在是毫无意义。* 伯克希尔的“四大”投资 美国运通、可口可乐、IBM和富国银行

12、在过去多年都有良好表现。2012年我们在这四家公司的股权都有所增长。我们收购了富国和IBM的更多股份，前者已增至8.7%而2011年底为7.6%，后者现在为6.0%而2011年底为5.5%。与此同时，可口可乐和美国运通的股票回购推动我们的持股比例增加。我们在可口可乐的比例从8.8%增至8.9%，美国运通的从13.0%增至13.7%。 以后伯克希尔在所有这四家公司的股份可能接着增长。蕙丝(Mae West)讲得对：“好东西越多越好”。这四家公司都拥有非凡的业务，由既有才能又尊重股东的经理人经营。在伯克希尔，我们更倾向于拥有一家优秀企业非操纵性但专门大的股份，而不去拥有一家专门一般公司100%的所

13、有权。我们在资本配置方面的灵活性使我们能明显领先于那些只限于收购自己能运营企业的公司。依照我们年底的持股比例计算，2012年“四大”公司利润属于我们的股份总计39亿美元。然而，在我们提交你们的盈利报告中，我们仅计罢了我们收到的约11亿美元股息。但不要误会，这28亿我们没有报告的利润对我们来讲与已纪录的利润是同等宝贵。“四大”公司所保有的利润经常用于回购，这将提升我们在它们以后利润中的份额，它们还将用于为商业机会提供资金，而这通常将给企业带来优势。我们可能，随着时刻推移我们将从这四家公司获得显著增长的利润。假如我们是正确的，派给伯克希尔的股息将增加，更为重要的是，将增加我们的未实现资本收益(截至

14、2012年底，这四家公司的这一收益总计267亿美元)。* 去年CEO们面临专门多棘手的问题，当面临资本配置决策时，他们都呐喊“不确定性”(尽管其中许多CEO企业的利润和现金都达到了创纪录的水平)。在伯克希尔那个地点，我们不存在他们那样的恐惧，2012年我们在工厂和设备方面花了创纪录的98亿美元，其中约88%用在美国境内，这一金额较2011年高出19%，而2011年的数字依旧我们此前的历史新高。查理和我都喜爱向值得投入的项目大额投资，而不管专家们讲什么。相反，我们认同歌手艾伦(Gary Allan)新乡村民谣的歌词：“每场风雨后差不多上阳光”。我们将接着致力于此，几乎能够确信的是，2013年的资

15、本开支又将创纪录。美国境内的机会多得专门。有一点方法与我的CEO朋友们分享，因此以后近期内是不确定的，但美国自1776年以来一直面临未知。只是有时人们看重事实上一直存在的数不清不确定性，有时人们又忽略它们(通常这是因为此前一段时刻平安无事)。美国企业随着时刻推移会有良好表现。股市也会向好是确信的，因为市场的命运与企业业绩联系在一起。是的，周期性的挫折会发生，但投资者和经理人参加的这场博弈给他们积存了大额筹码。(20世纪道指从66点增至11497点，令人吃惊的17320%增长已成为现实，尽管期间伴随四次代价惨重的战争、大萧条和许多次经济衰退。不要不记得，在整个世纪中股东也收到了丰厚股息。)既然博

16、弈的差不多格局特不有利，查理和我认为，试图步入舞池却依照塔罗牌的翻转就退场是一个可怕的错误，依据所谓专家的预测、企业活动的潮涨潮落而退出差不多上如此。不参加这场游戏的风险要远大于参与其中的风险。我自己的经历提供了一个绝佳的例子：我在1942年春首次购买股票，当时美国正承受整个HYPERLINK /realstock/company/sh601099/nc.shtml太平洋战争的战区所带来的巨大损失。每天媒体头条差不多上更多的失败。即使如此，当时也没有关于不确定的议论，我认识的每个美国人都相信我们将赢得胜利。那个国家的成功源自那个令人困惑的危险时期，从1941至2012年，对通胀做出修正的人均G

17、DP增长了三倍以上。这一时期从始至终，每一个改日差不多上不确定的。然而，美国的运数始终是确定的：富足程度不断增长。假如你是一个拥有大型可盈利项目但因为短期内忧虑而搁置的CEO，请给伯克希尔打电话。让我们来给你减压。总的来讲，查理和我希望通过以下方式增加每股内在价值：(1)提升我们多家子公司的盈利能力；(2)通过补强收购进一步提高它们的利润；(3)参与我们所投资对象的成长；(4)在可猎取价格显著低于内在价值时回购伯克希尔的股票；(5)不定期进行大规模收购。我们还将通过一种专门罕见但并非不可能的方式来为股东实现业绩最大化，那确实是发行伯克希尔的股票。我们企业的砖石建立在磐石般稳固的基础之上。以后一

18、个世纪，伯灵顿北圣达菲和中美能源将接着在美国经济中扮演重要角色。此外，保险对企业和个人来讲仍将是差不多保障，没有那家公司能比伯克希尔更多地将资源引入这一领域。鉴于我们深知这些以及公司其他的优势，查理和我看好公司的前景。企业内在价值尽管查理和我谈企业内在价值谈得这么多，我们却不能精确告诉你伯克希尔每股内在价值是多少(对任何其他股票也是如此)。然而，在我们2010年报中，我们列出了三个差不多要素，其中一个是定性的，我们相信这些是明智可能伯克希尔内在价值的关键。这方面的讨论我们已复制在完整股东报告的104-105页。以下是对剩下的两个定量指标的更新：2012年我们的每股投资增加15.7%，至11万3

19、786美元，我们来自保险和投资之外业务的每股税前利润也增长15.7%，至8085美元。1970年以来，我们每股投资的复合年增长率为19.4%，我们每股利润的这一增长率为20.8%。在这42年里，伯克希尔股价的增长率与我们这两个价值指标的增速专门接近，这绝对不是一个巧合。查理和我乐于看到这两个指标的增长，但我们最为强调的始终是持续增加运营盈利。股息多位伯克希尔的股东，其中包括一些我的好朋友都希望伯克希尔支付现金股息。让他们感到不解的是，我们喜爱收取伯克希尔拥有的多数股票所产生的股息，但却不给自己股东任何股息。因此，让我们审视何时派息对股东有意义，何时又是无益的。一家盈利的公式可将利润通过多种方式

20、配置(这些方式并不相互排斥)。一家公司的治理层首先应探寻当前业务能提供的再投资可能性，诸如使公司变得更有效率的项目，扩大经营地域，增加和改善产品线或其他能加深公司与竞争对手之间经济护城河的措施等。总的来讲，股息政策应该是清晰、连贯和理性的。反复的政策将困惑股东，同时赶走可能的投资者。54年前，费雪(Phil Fisher)就惊人地将这一表述写在他所著一般股和不一般的利润的第7章。对严肃投资者来讲，这本书在历史最佳书单上仅排名于聪慧的投资者和1940年版的证券分析之后。费雪解释了你能够成功经营一家提供汉堡的餐馆，或者也能成功经营一家中国食品餐馆，但你不能在这两者之间变来变去又保住两方面的食客粉丝

21、。多数公司持续支付股息，通常它们试图每年增加股息，特不不愿削减股息。我们投资组合中的“四大”公司奉行这一明智和可理解的方式，在某些情况下还积极回购股票。我们赞同它们的行动，希望它们接着保持现在的路线。我们喜爱派息增加，我们深爱企业以合适价格回购股票。然而，在伯克希尔方面，我们一直奉行一种不同的而我们一直认为明智的方式。只要我们认为我们所设定的增加账面价值和市场价格溢价的前提是合理的，我们将坚持这一政策。假如这两个因素中任何一个前景恶化，我们将重新评估我们的行动。(立悟/编译)巴菲特致股东的信(2013年3月1日)英文原版Berkshires Corporate Performance vs.

22、the S&P 500Annual Percentage Changein Per-Share in S&P500BookValueof with Dividends RelativeBerkshire Inclued ResultsYear (1) (2) (1)-(2)1965 23.8 10.0 13.81966 20.3 (11.7) 32.01967 11.0 30.9 (19.9)1968 19.0 11.0 8.01969 16.2 (8.4) 24.61970 12.0 3.9 8.11971 16.4 14.6 1.81972 21.7 18.9 2.81973 4.7 (1

23、4.8) 19.51974 5.5 (26.4) 31.91975 21.9 37.2 (15.3)1976 59.3 23.6 35.71977 31.9 (7.4) 39.31978 24.0 6.4 17.61979 35.7 18.2 17.51980 19.3 32.3 (13.0)1981 31.4 (5.0) 36.41982 40.0 21.4 18.61983 32.3 22.4 9.91984 13.6 6.1 7.51985 48.2 31.6 16.61986 26.1 18.6 7.51987 19.5 5.1 14.41988 20.1 16.6 3.51989 4

24、4.4 31.7 12.71990 7.4 (3.1) 10.51991 39.6 30.5 9.11992 20.3 7.6 12.71993 14.3 10.1 4.21994 13.9 1.3 12.61995 43.1 37.6 5.51996 31.8 23.0 8.81997 34.1 33.4 0.71998 48.3 28.6 19.71999 0.5 21.0 (20.5)2000 6.5 (9.1) 15.62001 (6.2) (11.9) 5.72002 10.0 (22.1) 32.12003 21.0 28.7 (7.7)2004 10.5 10.9 (0.4)20

25、05 6.4 4.9 1.52006 18.4 15.8 2.62007 11.0 5.5 5.52008 (9.6) (37.0) 27.42009 19.8 26.5 (6.7)2010 13.0 15.1 (2.1)2011 4.6 2.1 2.52012 14.4 16.0 (1.6)Compounded Annual Gain1965-2012 19.7% 9.4% 10.3Overall Gain1964-2012 586,817% 7,433%Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 19

26、66, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshires results through 1978 have b

27、een restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pretax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the

28、appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY

29、 INC.To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of $24.1 billion. We used $1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of $22.8 billion for the year. The per-share book value of both our Cl

30、ass A and Class B stock increased by 14.4%. Over the last 48 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*(* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshires A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/

31、1500th of those shown for A.)A number of good things happened at Berkshire last year, but lets first get the bad news out of the way. When the partnership I ran took control of Berkshire in 1965, I could never have dreamed that a year in which we had a gain of $24.1 billion would be subpar, in terms

32、 of the comparison we present on the facing page.But subpar it was. For the ninth time in 48 years, Berkshires percentage increase in book value was less than the S&Ps percentage gain (a calculation that includes dividends as well as price appreciation). In eight of those nine years, it should be no

33、ted, the S&P had a gain of 15% or more. We do better when the wind is in our face.To date, weve never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43 times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch. (The record is on page 103.) But the S&P has now had gains in each of the last four years,

34、 outpacing us over that period. If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of five-year wins will end.One thing of which you can be certain: Whatever Berkshires results, my partner Charlie Munger, the companys Vice Chairman, and I will not change yardsticks. Its our job to increase intri

35、nsic business value for which we use book value as a significantly understated proxy at a faster rate than the market gains of the S&P. If we do so, Berkshires share price, though unpredictable from year to year, will itself outpace the S&P over time. If we fail, however, our management will bring n

36、o value to our investors, who themselves can earn S&P returns by buying a low-cost index fund.Charlie and I believe the gain in Berkshires intrinsic value will over time likely surpass the S&P returns by a small margin. Were confident of that because we have some outstanding businesses, a cadre of t

37、errific operating mangers and a shareholder-oriented culture. Our relative performance, however, is almost certain to be better when the market is down or flat. In years when the market is particularly strong, expect us to fall short. The second disappointment in 2012 was my inability to make a majo

38、r acquisition. I pursued a couple of elephants, but came up empty-handed.Our luck, however, changed early this year. In February, we agreed to buy 50% of a holding company that will own all of H. J. Heinz. The other half will be owned by a small group of investors led by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a renown

39、ed Brazilian businessman and philanthropist.We couldnt be in better company. Jorge Paulo is a long-time friend of mine and an extraordinary manager. His group and Berkshire will each contribute about $4 billion for common equity in the holding company. Berkshire will also invest $8 billion in prefer

40、red shares that pay a 9% dividend. The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding companys common stock for a nominal sum.Our t

41、otal investment of about $12 billion soaks up much of what Berkshire earned last year. But we still have plenty of cash and are generating more at a good clip. So its back to work; Charlie and I have again donned our safari outfits and resumed our search for elephants.Now to some good news from 2012

42、:. Last year I told you that BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy our five most profitable non-insurance companies were likely to earn more than $10 billion pre-tax in 2012. They delivered. Despite tepid U.S. growth and weakening economies throughout much of the world, our “pow

43、erhouse five” had aggregate earnings of $10.1 billion, about $600 million more than in 2011.Of this group, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire eight years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, B

44、NSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and for the remainder, issued shares that increased the amount outstanding by 6.1%. Consequently, the $9.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not

45、 simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.Unless the U.S. economy tanks which we dont expect our powerhouse five should again deliver higher earnings in 2013. The five outstanding CEOs who run them will see to that. Though I failed to land a major acquisition in 2012, the managers of

46、our subsidiaries did far better. We had a record year for “bolt-on” purchases, spending about $2.3 billion for 26 companies that were melded into our existing businesses. These transactions were completed without Berkshire issuing any shares.Charlie and I love these acquisitions: Usually they are lo

47、w-risk, burden headquarters not at all, and expand the scope of our proven managers. Our insurance operations shot the lights out last year. While giving Berkshire $73 billion of free money to invest, they also delivered a $1.6 billion underwriting gain, the tenth consecutive year of profitable unde

48、rwriting. This is truly having your cake and eating it too.GEICO led the way, continuing to gobble up market share without sacrificing underwriting discipline. Since 1995, when we obtained control, GEICOs share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.5% to 9.7%. Premium volume meanwhile increas

49、ed from $2.8 billion to $16.7 billion. Much more growth lies ahead.The credit for GEICOs extraordinary performance goes to Tony Nicely and his 27,000 associates. And to that cast, we should add our Gecko. Neither rain nor storm nor gloom of night can stop him; the little lizard just soldiers on, tel

50、ling Americans how they can save big money by going to GEICO.com.When I count my blessings, I count GEICO twice. Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our new investment managers, have proved to be HYPERLINK /brand/20020smart, models of integrity, helpful to Berkshire in many ways beyond portfolio management

51、, and a perfect cultural fit. We hit the jackpot with these two. In 2012 each outperformed the S&P 500 by double-digit margins. They left me in the dust as well.Consequently, we have increased the funds managed by each to almost $5 billion (some of this emanating from the pension funds of our subsid

52、iaries). Todd and Ted are young and will be around to manage Berkshires massive portfolio long after Charlie and I have left the scene. You can rest easy when they take over. Berkshires yearend employment totaled a record 288,462 (see page 106 for details), up 17,604 from last year. Our headquarters

53、 crew, however, remained unchanged at 24. No sense going crazy. Berkshires “Big Four” investments American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo all had good years. Our ownership interest in each of these companies increased during the year. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (our owner

54、ship now is 8.7% versus 7.6% at yearend 2011) and IBM (6.0% versus 5.5%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.8% to 8.9% and our interest at American Express from 13.0% to 13.7%.Berkshires ownership inter

55、est in all four companies is likely to increase in the future. Mae West had it right: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”The four companies possess marvelous businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire we much prefer owning a non-controlli

56、ng but substantial portion of a wonderful business to owning 100% of a so-so business. Our flexibility in capital allocation gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves only to acquisitions they can operate.Going by our yearend share count, our portion of the “Big Fours” 20

57、12 earnings amounted to $3.9 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive about $1.1 billion. But make no mistake: The $2.8 billion of earnings we do not report is every bit as valuable to us as what we record.The earnings that the four companies retai

58、n are often used for repurchases which enhance our share of future earnings and also for funding business opportunities that are usually advantageous. Over time we expect substantially greater earnings from these four investees. If we are correct, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more

59、important, so will our unrealized capital gains (which, for the four, totaled $26.7 billion at yearend). There was a lot of hand-wringing last year among CEOs who cried “uncertainty” when faced with capital-allocation decisions (despite many of their businesses having enjoyed record levels of both e

60、arnings and cash). At Berkshire, we didnt share their fears, instead spending a record $9.8 billion on plant and equipment in 2012, about 88% of it in the United States. Thats 19% more than we spent in 2011, our previous high. Charlie and I love investing large sums in worthwhile projects, whatever