美国贸易政策：关税评估

1、Taking stock of the tariffsUS trade policyEconomicsGlobalThe US trade policy targets rivals, friends, and WTO, seeking to remedy unfair practices and gain leverage intalksTaking stock of the tariffsUS trade policyEconomicsGlobalaDMofWeaofDoug LippoldtChief Trade Economist HSBC Bank plc HYPERLINK mai

2、lto:douglas.lippoldt douglas.lippoldt+44 20 7992 0375Shanella Rajanayagam Trade Economist HSBC Bank plc HYPERLINK mailto:shanella.l.rajanayagam shanella.l.rajanayagam+44 20 3268 41184 April 2019on gambit: saw many of In US of of on as US are by if are US to US US by the a the US may in in US to a to

3、 US in in US on is in for have at a to US US for at WTO, of WTO in like It of to USoninby is to on for be for US US new 1 M. Amiti, S. Redding, E. Weinstein, “Impact of the 2018 trade war”, CEPR, March 2019, DP 13564.Disclosures & DisclaimerThis report must be read with the disclosures and the analy

4、st certifications in the Disclosure appendix, and with the Disclaimer, which forms part of it.Issuer of report: HSBC BankplcView HSBC Global Researchat: HYPERLINK / US gets tough on tradeThe cost of the change in US trade policy is marginal butrisingUS toughness is being channelled through a range o

5、f unilateral measures, bilateral negotiations, and multilateralactionsor isIntroThis paper takes stock of highlights from the changes in US trade policy during the Trump Administration, considering the costs, risks and areas where gains for business might be found. The assessment builds on a long se

6、ries of trade reports prepared by HSBC Global Research economists over the past year.2 We start with a survey of the costs of recent US trade policy actions to the US economy (p. 2), then turn to consider actions intended to resolve the US challenge HYPERLINK l _bookmark0 s (p. 8), and finally move

7、to consider risks and opportunities HYPERLINK l _bookmark1 (p. 13). A short conclusion looks ahead considering the continued importance of the multilateral trading system and market openness of the US economy HYPERLINK l _bookmark2 (p. 15). The analysis is anchored by a series of 11 questions that r

8、un throughout the main paper. Annexes provide a review of the main trade measuresemployed by the US Administration during 2018 HYPERLINK l _bookmark3 (p. 16), a detailed state-level assessment of the aluminium and steel tariffs imposed by the US in 2018 HYPERLINK l _bookmark4 (p. 18), and a comparis

9、on of average tariffs among leading trading nations HYPERLINK l _bookmark5 (p. 22).Contemplating the costsWhat is the starting point for the US policy change?The longstanding US support for trade liberalisation and development of the multilateral trading system in the post-WWII period is in line wit

10、h mainstream economic thinking on the benefits of markets openness. In striving for gains from trade and market openness, the US has also been prone to usage of exceptions and trade remedies to assuage lingering trade concerns. From the constraints on textiles and apparel trade under the now-defunct

11、 Multi-Fiber Arrangement (in effect from 1974 to 1994) to the continued usage of anti-dumping measures, the US has often pushed back against domestic trade concerns by conceding some constraints on openness using sector or product specific measures. However, in the face of growing concerns about glo

12、balisation, the Trump Administration has scaled up these efforts and brought large scale trade liberalisation to a halt.Whiletherearelegitimatetradegrievancestobeaddressed(aswithforcedtechnologytransfer andabuseofintellectualpropertyrights),itappearsthatthereisanetcosttotheUSeconomy2 See HSBC report

13、s: HYPERLINK /R/10/R2gWhzVbhGKV?docid=1117094 Asian Economics Quarterly: With a boost from China, 28 March 2018; HYPERLINK /R/10/RBSGQcfbhGKV?docid=1110849 Global Economics Quarterly: Trading HYPERLINK /R/10/RBSGQcfbhGKV?docid=1110849 down, 3 January 2019; HYPERLINK /R/10/MsPBZwXbhGKV?docid=1109548

14、US-China trade truce, 2 December 2018; HYPERLINK /R/10/jjmrFcdbhGKV?docid=1109122 US-China trade perspectives, 26 November 2018, HYPERLINK /R/10/cxvfj96bhGKV?docid=1099592 US-China HYPERLINK /R/10/cxvfj96bhGKV?docid=1099592 trade, 13 July 2018, HYPERLINK /R/10/r7nZQwbbhGKV?docid=1098147 US fuels tra

15、de tensions, 22 June 2018; HYPERLINK /R/10/jgbs7HmbhGKV?docid=1089458 US-China trade relations V: The art of non-war, 23 March 2018. The discussioninthepresentpaperfocusesonUSpolicieswithrespecttotradedevelopmentanddoesnotcoversanctions matters.from the recent ramping up of US trade remedies. One we

16、ll-known consideration is that there is anasymmetryinthecostsandbenefitsoftradeliberalisationorprotectionism.Thefirmorsector benefittingfromprotectionismcanreapsignificantgainswhilethebenefitsfromliberalisationmay bemorediffuse.Asaresult,theprotectionistsmaybehighlymotivated.In addition, the pro-tra

17、de resolve of policy makers in a large country such as the US may be weakened due to the tendency for trade to play a smaller role in a market where there are more options to source products domestically (Chart 1). The US economy has the scale to accommodate a broad range of competitive domestic sup

18、pliers. And, in countries such as the US, Japan, and increasingly China, services account for a large share of the domestic economy. In the case of the US, for example, services accounted for some 77% of value added as of 2016 (World Bank, WDI data). Many services tend to be much less trade intensiv

19、e than goods. Thus, US policy makers may be less sensitive to the cost of protectionism or foregone liberalisation(eg,pullingoutoftheTrans-PacificPartnership)thanpolicymakersinsmaller,open economies. Interestingly, China as well has a relatively low trade intensity in its economy, which may also giv

20、e its policy makers a bit more latitude in dealing with the US reorientation in trade policy than would otherwise be thecase.Chart 1. Trade as a share of GDP, percent, 2017(Trade = sum of goods and services, imports andexports)6.0.85626.316.0.85626.31364.171.777.808118.9WorldCanada India China Japan

21、UnitedStates322.40.050.0100.0150.0200.0250.0300.0350.0Note: All data are for 2017 except for Japan and United States, which are for 2016. Source: World Bank, National AccountsThus, it may come as no surprise that the Trump Administration has been able to draw on existing US trade law and pursue a mu

22、ch more aggressive policy on trade over the past year. This has featured in particular the expanded use of tariffs as remedies for alleged trade abuses ortogainnegotiatingleverageinnegotiationsonothermatters.TheUSgrievancesmotivatingits tariff actions range from concerns about intellectual property

23、abuse to economic distortions due to the state-led interventions (eg, via subsidies), tariff rates applied by trade partners, the availability of trade preferences to developing countries on the basis of self-declaration, and limitations on access to agricultural markets, among otherissues.Chineseec

24、onomicpolicyhasbeenaparticularfocusfortheTrumpAdministration,ashaveto alesserextenttradepoliciesinCanada,theEuropeanUnion,Japan,andMexico.Overall,the USspecialtariffactions(newandexisting)ineffectduring2018affectednearly15%ofUSgoodsimports,accordingtoanestimatefromateamatthePetersonInstituteforInter

25、national Economics(PIIE).3As part of the reorientation of US trade policy during 2018, the US Administration drew on provisions available under domestic trade law (see Annex 1 for details). The actions have increasedtariffsandinsomecasesresultedinquantitativerestrictionsonimports.Themain measuresinc

26、luded:Increaseduseofanti-dumpingandcountervailingdutymeasures(AD/CVD);Recourse to safeguard measures against importsurges;Recoursetoprotectionagainstunfairtradepracticesbytradepartners(notablyChina);Nationalsecuritymeasuresagainstimportationofcertainstrategicallyimportantproducts.What are the impact

27、s of the tariffs on the US economy?This section of the paper reviews some of the recent empirical literature on the economic implicationsoftheUStariffactionsof2018.Thenextsectionconsidersemploymentvulnerability.Among the most comprehensive assessments of the US tariff actions one finds the recent pa

28、per byAmiti,ReddingandWeinstein(2019).TheseauthorsconsidertheeconomicburdenontheUS as a consequence of the US Administrations tariff strategy as implemented during 2018.4 Using regression analysis to assess the relationships among key variables while controlling for other factors, the authors find d

29、etrimental impacts on prices, varieties available, and welfare. Their assessment provides some unsettlinginsights:The additional monthly tariff costs amount to USD3bn and these costs are born almostexclusivelybytheUS-basedfirmsandconsumersdependentontheimports. In other words, the tariffs appear to

30、be fully passed through (ie, the exporters in China are not paying the tariffs decreased margins on their exports). The tariff revenue is a pure transfer from domestic stakeholders to the USgovernment.ThetariffhikeeffectivelyreducedimportsupplytotheUSeconomy.Aonepercentage point increase in tariffs

31、was associated with a six point fall in import quantities. Overall, the affected product categories saw a decline in imports of 54% from the original suppliers, thoughsomeofthiswasoffsetbyforeignsuppliersnotaffectedbythetariffs.The authors estimate that the overall volume of trade redirected as a re

32、sult of the importtariffsin2018amountedtoUSD136bn(nowaboutUSD11.4bnmonthly).Thisis a significant shock to supply chains as businesses scramble to find alternative domestic or foreign supplies. In addition, about USD2.4bn of monthly US exports are redirected as a consequence ofretaliation.With the im

33、position of tariffs, the number of varieties of the affected products generallydeclined,byupto10%onaveragedependingonwhichwaveoftariffsone considered.5 In the recent years leading up to the tariff hikes, the numbers of varieties (definedbytheHTS10digittarifflineandcountrycode)hadbeentendingtorise.3

34、These data are from Chad Bown and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang, “Measuring Trumps 2018 Trade Protection: Five Takeaways”, PIIE, 15 February 2019. They refer to trade covered by President Trumps tariff actions over 2018 as well as existing punitive antidumping and countervailing duties implemented by prior admi

35、nistrations. The estimate accounts for imports subject to both new and existing tariff measures to avoid double counting.4 Mary Amiti, Stephen Redding and David Weinstein, “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare”, CEPR Discussion Paper 13564, March 2019.5 The first wave of tarif

36、fs on solar cells and large washing machines, however, did not have this effect. This may have been because of the temporary nature of the tariff and the narrow targeting on a limited number of tariff lines.Theestimateofdeadweightlosses(ie,duetolostefficiency)reachedUSD1.4bnper month once the US Adm

37、inistration had implemented the various waves of additional US tariffs. These lossescontinue.Product prices typically rose by 10% to 30% once a tariff was implemented (prices estimatedbasedonunitvaluesofgoodsimported).Fortheproductsconcerned,prices rose even for supply from countries not targeted. O

38、verall, Amiti et al estimate that US domesticpriceswere1.1%higherinmanufacturingindustriesin2018duetothetariffs(the averageannualproducerpriceinflationoverthepast20yearswasabitover2%).PotentialgainsfromafutureUS-Chinatradedealareunlikelytoyieldaneteconomic benefit in the short to medium term, eg, po

39、tential improvements in intellectual property rights protection from a possible US-China deal may boost US royalties, but even a 25% increaseincurrentroyaltypayments(totalroyaltiesin2017amountedtoUSD8.3bn)would take three years to offset the losses so far from the US tariff war. If the US tariff war

40、 led to enough job creation to offset the loss of every steel and aluminium job lost over the last 10 years (35,400), then allocating the deadweight tariff loss across all the jobs created would yieldanapproximatecostofUSD195,000perjob(ie,fourtimestheannualwageofasteel worker(USD52,500).Fajgelbaum e

41、t al (2019) conducted a further study on the topic using an alternative methodology basedonestimateddemandandsupplyelasticitiesintegratedintoasupply-sidemodeloftheUS economy. The authors found similar types of impacts to those in Amiti et al (2019).6 Fajgenbaum et al (2019) estimate that the trade a

42、ffected by the US measures included about 12.6% of US imports (USD 303bn of 2017 exports) and that this trade experienced an average increase in tarifffrom2.6%to17%.Theyestimatethat6.2%ofUSexports(USD96bnof2017imports)were affectedbyretaliationandexperiencedanincreaseinaveragetarifffrom6.6%to23%.Imp

43、ortsof thetargetedproductsandcountriesdeclinedbyabout32%andtargetedUSexportsfellby11%. The authors found high pass-through of tariff costs to US and foreign consumers. Overall, when tariff revenue is factored in, they estimate that the trade war lowered aggregate US welfare by USD7.8bn on an annuali

44、sed basis, 0.04% of GDP. Fajgelbaum et al further note that US tariffs appear targeted to support sectors concentrated in politically competitive counties, whereas the retaliation weighed in particular on Republican-dominatedcounties.Broad structural challengesThese trade impediments come on top of

45、on-going challenges faced by traders due to larger structuralchangesintheglobaleconomy,apointnotedrecentlybySusanLund(McKinsey).7 For example,shenotesthatwagesarebecominglessimportantasashareofproductioncosts,even as knowledge intensity and skill intensity of work in increasing as automation, resear

46、ch, and innovationareplayingabiggerroleincompetitiveness.SomereshoringofproductioninDMshas followed from this. Intra-regional trade is increasing in importance in Asia, the EU and the US as speed-to-market is seen to convey competitive advantages. At the same time, EMs are claiming a bigger share of

47、 global economic activity, and producers there are also raising competitive challengestoincumbents.Thus,itisnotsurprisingthatinasurveyofglobalbusinessexecutives intheautumnof2018,McKinseyfoundthataboutthree-fourthsoffirmssurveyedwerechanging their globalisation strategies in light of such developmen

48、ts. In response to trade policy uncertainty,aboutahalfwereshiftingthegeographicfootprintoftheirsupplychainsandabouta quarterarebuildingouttheirdomesticproductiontoreduceexposuretotradepolicyuncertainty.6 Pablo Fajgelbaum, Pinelopi Goldberg, Patrick Kennedy, and Amit Khandelwal, “The Return to Protec

49、tionism”, working paper, UCLA, 10 March 20197 Susan Lund interviewed on Trade Talks, Episode 69, “Slowbalization”, by Soumaya Keynes and Chad Bown, PIIE, 25 January 2019.Lunds points tie in nicely with a recent PIIE compendium of studies edited by Ha Jiming and Adam Posen.8 In the editors introducti

50、on to the volume, they point out the economic value to China and the US of expanded international trade in the face of slowing growth. Trade helps to boost productivity (eg, by expanding the scale of addressable markets) and to promote a competitive environment for growth. They also note that a rule

51、s-based US-China accord for increased openness would benefit Chinese households as well as the sectors that would be pushed towards improved productivity. Strengthened bilateral trade and investment ties and marketaccesswouldbenefitboththeChineseandtheUSeconomies.Incontrast,USunilateral tradeactions

52、maybecounterproductiveinachievingtheUSeconomicanddiplomaticobjectives while potentially damaging the international norms and rules for the conduct of trade and the settlement ofdisputes.9All of us, empirical reality-based economists, whether working in China or the All of us, empirical reality-based

53、 economists, whether working in China or the United States, believe that outright trade war between the worlds two largest economies would be devastating to the working people of both countries, as well as destructive to the future of the entire world economy.Ha Jiming and Adam S. Posen, January 201

54、9, Part 2: US-China Economic Relations, PIIEHow exposed are US jobs to trade?According to OECD estimates of jobs reliant on trade, 8.8% of US jobs across all sectors were sustained by foreign final demand in 2015 (Chart 2). This share is relatively low by global standards as between 20% to 60% of to

55、tal jobs in most European countries were sustained by consumers in foreign markets in 2015. This likely reflects the large size of the US and its comparativelylowdependenceonforeigntrade.Thisdoesnotmeanthattradeisunimportantto the US labour market. In absolute terms, the US recorded the fourth highe

56、st number of jobs dependentonforeigndemand(nearly14million),behindChina(95million),India(59million)and Indonesia (19million).In terms of exposure to the US, 20% (3.7 million) of Canadian jobs and 19% (7.1 million) of Mexicanjobswerereliantontradein2015with12%(2.2million)and14%(5.2million)oftotal job

57、s, respectively, sustained by foreign final demand in North America (mainly the US) alone. This reflects deep regional integration between the US and its NAFTA partners whereby production typically takes place across regional supply chains. But the fragmentation of production across regional supply

58、chains and, hence, the relatively high dependence of CanadianandMexicanjobsonfinalUSdemand,suggeststhatemploymentinthesecountries couldbeadverselyaffectedbyongoingUStariffactions,particularlyifthesemeasuresleadto sustainedhighertradecosts(ie,viahighertariffsorincreasedcustomscompliancecosts)and redu

59、ced US demand for certain goods. About 3.0% of jobs (23.4 million) in China were also dependent on trade with the US in2015.On the other hand, employment in the US, Canada and Mexico is less exposed to trade with China than some other economies. For example, 0.7% of total jobs in Mexico, 1.1% in the

60、 US8 Ha Jiming and Adam S. Posen, January 2019, Part 2: US-China Economic Relations, PIIE. Note also the podcast, PIIE, Trade Talks podcast, Episode 77, “Happy Tariffversary, presented by Soumaya Keynes and Chad Bown, 25 March 2019.9 A further risk concerns on-going supply chain shifts in response t