公共债务和家庭通胀预期 Public debt and household inflation expectations 2023-bis

BISWorkingPapers

No1082

Publicdebtand

householdinflationexpectations

byFrancescoGrigoliandDamianoSandriMonetaryandEconomicDepartment

March2023

JELclassification:E31,E52,E58.

Keywords:Publicdebt,inflationexpectations,monetaryfinance,fiscaldominance.

ISSN1020-0959(print)

ISSN1682-7678(online)

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ThispublicationisavailableontheBISwebsite().

©BankforInternationalSettlements2023.Allrightsreserved.Briefexcerptsmaybe

reproducedortranslatedprovidedthesourceisstated.

1

PublicDebtandHouseholdInflationExpectations∗

FrancescoGrigoliCentralBankoftheUAE

DamianoSandri

BISandCEPR

March6,2023

Abstract

WeuserandomizedcontrolledtrialsintheUS,UK,andBraziltoexaminethecausaleffectofpublicdebtonhouseholdinflationexpectations.Wefindthatpeopleunderestimatepublicdebtlevelsandincreaseinflationexpectationswheninformedaboutthecorrectlevels.Theextentoftherevisionsisproportionaltothesizeoftheinformationsurprise.Confidenceinthecentralbankconsiderablyreducesthesensi-tivityofinflationexpectationstopublicdebt.Wealsoshowthatpeopleassociatehighpublicdebtwithstagflationaryeffectsandthatthesensitivityofinflationexpectationstopublicdebtisconsiderablyhigherforwomenandlow-incomeindividuals.

Keywords:Publicdebt,inflationexpectations,monetaryfinance,fiscaldominanceJELCodes:E31,E52,E58

∗FrancescoGrigoli,

francesco.grigoli@.ae

;DamianoSandri,

damiano.sandri@

.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresentthoseoftheBISortheCentralBankoftheUAE.WethankseminarparticipantsattheBISforusefulcommentsandYouGovandGavinEllisonforhelpingustodesignthequestionnairesandadministeringthesurveys.

2

1Introduction

TheeconomicrecoveryaftertheCOVID-19pandemichasbeencharacterizedbyasharpincreaseininflationagainstthebackgroundofrecord-highlevelsofpublicdebt.Thesurgeininflationhassparkedrenewedinterestinunderstandingthebehavioranddeter-minantsofinflationexpectations,leadingtoarapidlyexpandingbodyofnewacademicresearch(

Weberetal.

,

2022

).Thispapercomplementsongoingeffortstounderstandin-flationexpectationsbyanalyzingwhetherhighpublicdebtlevelscontributetoraisinghouseholdinflationexpectations.

Thisquestionismotivatedbytwoconsiderations.First,thelargefiscalpackagestocountertheglobalfinancialcrisisin2008andtheCOVID-19pandemicin2020havepushedpublicdebtlevelstohistorichighsinmanycountries,raisingpressingquestionsabouttheirmacroeconomiceffects.Forexample,akeyconcernisthathighpublicdebtlevelsmayweakencentralbanks’determinationtofightinflationgiventhepositiveef-fectsonfiscalburdens.Second,understandingtheeffectsofpublicdebtoninflationexpectationsisimportantwellbeyondthecurrenteconomicconjuncture.Theinfluenceofpublicdebtoninflationexpectationsisindeedcentraltothecontentiousdebateabouttheroleoffiscalpolicyinthedeterminationofthepricelevel,asforexamplediscussedin

LeeperandLeith

(

2016

)and

Cochrane

(

2023

).

Identifyingthecausaleffectofpublicdebtonhouseholdinflationexpectationsusingconventionalmacroandhouseholdsurveydataishighlyproblematic.Thisisbecauseinflationexpectationsareaffectedbyavastarrayoffactors—beyondpossiblypublicdebtlevels—thatcannotbejointlycontrolledfor.Toovercomethischallenge,theanalysisusessurveysspecificallydesignedforourresearchquestionthatincorporatearandom-izedcontrolledtrialbasedonaninformationprovisionexperiment.Thecorestructureofthesurveysinvolvesaskingpeopleabouttheirinflationexpectations,providingatreat-mentgroupwithinformationaboutthecorrectlevelofpublicdebt,andfinallyallowingallrespondentstorevisetheirinflationexpectations.Thekeyidentificationassumptionisthattheinformationtreatmentleadstoanexogenousupdateofpeople’sinformationsetaboutthelevelofpublicdebt.Theeconometricanalysisthenmeasureswhethertheinformationtreatmentaffectspeople’sexpectationsbycomparingtherevisionsofinfla-tionexpectationsamongthetreatmentgroupagainstthecontrolgroup.Thisinformationprovisionexperimentthusprovidesacleancausalidentificationoftheeffectsofpublicdebtoninflationexpectations.

Thesurveysalsocollectarichsetofadditionalinformationtoquantifytheeffectsofpublicdebtoninflationexpectationsmoreaccuratelyandenrichtheanalysisalongvari-

3

ousdimensions.First,weelicitpriorbeliefsaboutdebtlevels.Thisisessentialtomeasurethedirectionandsizeoftheinformationtreatmentshockandisolategenuinebeliefup-datesfromprimingeffects.Second,weinquireaboutpeople’sconfidenceinmonetaryandfiscalinstitutionstounderstandtheextenttowhichinstitutionalcredibilityanchorsinflationexpectationsandreducestheirsensitivitytodebtinformation.Third,weasksurveyparticipantsaboutthelikelihoodthatthecentralbankwillengageinmonetaryfinanceandabouttheirexpectationsregardingthefutureunemploymentrate.Weusethesequestionstoshedlightonthecognitivechannelslinkingpublicdebttoinflation.Finally,wegatherarichsetofdemographicandsocioeconomiccharacteristicstoexplorepotentialsourcesofheterogeneity.

Anotherkeystrengthoftheanalysisisthatthesurveyswereadministeredinthreecountriestoassesstherobustnessoftheresultsacrossdifferenteconomicandinstitu-tionalenvironments.Weconsidertwoadvancedeconomies(theUSandtheUK)andoneemergingmarket(Brazil).Thesecountriessharesomesimilaritiesthatmakethempartic-ularlysuitableforourstudy.Inparticular,theyhavehighpublicdebt—likelyincreasingpeople’sawarenessaboutthepotentialeffectsoninflation—butalsoinflation-targetingcentralbanksthatshouldanchorinflationexpectations.Yetthesecountriesalsodifferalongimportantdimensionsandthusconstituteagoodtestinggroundtoassessthero-bustnessoftheresultsacrossdifferentenvironments.Forexample,theUSarguablyfacesamplefiscalspacegivenitsreservecurrencystatus;theUKinsteadconfrontedseveremarketturbulenceinSeptember2022aftertheannouncementoflargeunfundedtaxcuts;andBrazilisatalowerlevelofeconomicdevelopment.

Wefindthatacrossallcountriespeopleonaveragelargelyunderestimatethelevelofpublicdebtandreviseinflationexpectationsupwardswheninformedaboutthecorrectlevels.Furthermore,theextentoftherevisionstoinflationexpectationsisproportionaltothesizeoftheinformationshock.Specifically,peoplewithlowerpriorbeliefsaboutpublicdebtincreaseinflationexpectationsmorestronglyoncetheyareinformedaboutthecorrectdebtlevel.Theseresultsproviderobustevidencethatpublicdebtlevelshaveacausaleffectonhouseholdinflationexpectations.Thequantitativeeffectsaresizeable:anincreaseinpublicdebtby10percentofGDPleadstoanincreaseinone-yearaheadinflationexpectationsbyabout0.6percent.

Theanalysisalsoshowsthatthecredibilityofthecentralbankplaysakeyroleinan-choringinflationexpectationsandreducingtheirsensitivitytodebtlevels.Peoplewhoaremoreconfidentaboutthecentralbank’sdeterminationtofightinflationoraremoreknowledgeableabouttheinflationtarget,reviseinflationexpectationsmuchmoremod-estly.Wealsofindsomeevidencethatconfidenceinfiscalrestraintbythegovernment

4

attenuatestheimpactofpublicdebtoninflationexpectations.Butoveralltheresultsshowthatpeopleattributeapredominantroletothecentralbankabovethefiscalau-thoritiesindeterminingtheinflationoutlook.

Regardingthecognitivemechanismsthatlinkpublicdebttohigherinflationexpec-tations,wedonotfindevidencethatpeoplethinkabouttherisksofmonetaryfinance.Surveyrespondentsthatincreaseinflationexpectationswheninformedaboutpublicdebtlevelsarenotmorelikelytoexpectthatthecentralbankwillengageinmonetaryfinancethanpeopleinthecontrolgroup.Peopleinsteadinterprethighpublicdebtlevelsasbadnewsfortheeconomicoutlook,leadingtobothhigherinflationandunemploymentexpectations.Throughthelensesofmacroeconomicmodels,highdebtlevelsarethusperceivedasnegativesupplyshocks,withstagflationaryeffectsontheeconomicoutlook.

Wealsoexaminewhetherthesensitivityofinflationexpectationsisheterogeneousacrosspeople.Aparticularlyrobustfindingisthatwomenincreaseinflationexpecta-tionsmuchmorestronglythanmenwheninformedaboutdebtlevels,onaveragetwiceasmuch.Thisistrueevenwhencontrollingforadditionalindividualcharacteristics.Lower-incomehouseholdsalsodisplayahighersensitivityofinflationexpectationstodebtlevels.Theseresultsarepartlyexplainedbythefactthatwomenandlower-incomehouseholdshaveweakerconfidenceinthecentralbankandlessknowledgeaboutitsin-flationtarget.

Relatedliterature.Thepaperbuildsonarecentyetrapidlygrowingliteraturethatusesinformationprovisionexperimentstounderstandthedeterminantsofhouseholdinfla-tionexpectations.

1

Earlierstudieshavefocusedonthesensitivityofinflationexpecta-tionstoinformationaboutpastandcurrentinflation.

Armantieretal.

(

2016

)findthatpeopletendtore-anchorinflationexpectationsaroundthelevelspredictedbyprofes-sionalforecasterswhenprovidedwithsuchinformation,consistentwithBayesianupdat-ing.

Cavallo,CrucesandPerez-Truglia

(

2017

)showthathouseholdinflationexpectationsareinfluencedbypersonalshoppingexperiencesevenwhenprovidedwithaccuratein-flationstatistics,thushighlightingtheroleofcognitivelimitations.

Recentcontributionshaveexaminedwhetherandhowcentralbankscaninfluence

householdexpectationsaboutinflationandothermacroeconomicvariables.

Haldaneand

McMahon

(

2018

)findthatusingmoreaccessiblelanguageininflationreportshelpsan-

1Informationprovisionsexperimentshavealsobeenusedtoexaminehouseholdexpectationsaboutothervariables,forexamplehouseprices(

Armona,FusterandZafar

,

2018

)andpersonaleconomicprospects(

RothandWohlfart

,

2020

).Furthermore,severalpapershaveemployedsimilartechniquestoexaminefirmexpectations(

Coibion,GorodnichenkoandKumar

,

2018

;

Coibion,GorodnichenkoandRo

-

pele

,

2020

;

Coibionetal.

,

2021

;

Savignacetal

.,

2022

).See

Haaland,RothandWohlfart

(

2023

)forabroaderliteraturereviewoninformationprovisionexperiments,includingoutsideofmacroeconomics.

5

chorpeople’sexpectationsaroundthecentralbank’sforecasts.

D’Acuntoetal.

(

2020

)showthathouseholdexpectationsaremoreresponsivetocentralbankcommunicationaboutpolicytargetsthanpolicyinstruments,suchasthepathofinterestrates.

Coibion,

GorodnichenkoandWeber

(

2022

)comparetheeffectsofdifferentformsofmonetarypol-icycommunicationonhouseholdinflationexpectations.

Coibionetal.

(

2023c

)showthatinformationaboutaverageinflationtargetingdoesnotchangehouseholdexpectationsrelativetoinformationabouttraditionalinflationtargeting.

Coibionetal.

(

2023b

)exam-inetheeffectsofforwardguidanceonhouseholdexpectationsaboutinflationandinterestrates.

Ourpapercomplementsthisliteratureonthedeterminantsofhouseholdinflationex-pectationsbyanalyzingwhetherandhowexpectationsareaffectedbyfiscalvariables,specificallybythelevelofpublicdebt.

Coibion,GorodnichenkoandWeber

(

2021

)alsoexaminetheinfluenceoffiscalvariablesoninflationexpectations.UsingsurveydatafromtheUS,theyfindthatnewsaboutfuturedebtlevelsincreasehouseholdexpecta-tionsaboutinflation,governmentspending,andinterestratesongovernmentdebt.Ouranalysisdiffersinseveraldimensions.First,weelicitpeople’sdebtbeliefsbeforetheinfor-mationtreatmentwhichiscrucialtotestifrevisionstoinflationexpectationsrespondtothesizeanddirectionoftheinformationshock.

2

Second,weextendtheanalysisbeyondtheUSbyalsorunningthesurveyintheUKandBrazil.Third,weenrichtheanalysisbyshowingthatthesensitivityofinflationexpectationstodebtlevelscruciallydependsonthecentralbank’scredibilityandbysheddinglightonthecognitivechannelslinkingdebttoinflation.

Ourpaperisalsorelatedtotheworkof

Roth,SetteleandWohlfart

(

2022

)thatexam-inestheimpactofpublicdebtonpeople’spreferencesforgovernmentspendingandtax-ationratherthanonpeople’sinflationexpectations.Consistentwithourresults,theyfindthatUShouseholdsconsiderablyunderestimatethelevelofpublicdebt.Finally,

Andre

etal.

(

2022

)providecomplementaryevidencetooursabouttheeffectsoffiscalvariablesonpeople’sexpectations.Theiranalysisuseshypotheticalvignettesaskingpeopleabouttheeffectsofseveralmacroeconomicshocks—amongwhichanincreaseingovernmentspendingandariseintaxation—oninflationandunemployment.Theydocumentcon-siderableheterogeneityinpeople’sresponseswithatendencytoexpecthigherinflationafteragovernmentspendingincrease.Ourpaperfocusesontheeffectsofdebtlevelsratherthanexpansionaryorcontractionaryfiscalshocks,usesinformationtreatments

2

Coibion,GorodnichenkoandWeber

(

2021

)alsotriedtomeasurepriordebtbeliefsbyaskingsurveyparticipantshowmanyyearsitwouldtaketorepaythestockofUSgovernmentdebtifallGDPwasusedforthispurpose.However,thequestionwaslikelytoocomplexforsurveyrespondents—leadingtoanaverageresponseof10years—andwasthusnotusedintheanalysis.

6

basedonrealdataratherthanhypotheticalscenarios,andexpandstheanalysisbeyond

theUS.

Weorganizethepaperasfollows.Section

2

describesthestructureandmodalitiesofthesurvey.Section

3

analyzestheeffectofthedebtinformationtreatmentoninfla-tionexpectationsandSection

4

examineswhetherthestrengthoftheeffectdependsonthecredibilityofmonetaryandfiscalinstitutions.Section

5

explorescognitivetrans-missionchannelsandheterogeneityacrosspeople’sindividualcharacteristics.Section

6

concludes.

2Surveydesign

TheanalysisusessurveydatacollectedbyYouGov,aninternationaldataanalyticscom-pany.YouGovconductspublicopinionsurveysonlineandhasaccesstoapanelofover22millionregisteredmembersacrossmorethan40countries.

3

Membersareatleast18yearsoldandreceivepointsforansweringsurveysthatcaneventuallybeconvertedtocash.

ThesurveyparticipantsfortheanalysiswereselectedbyYouGovtoensurethena-tionalrepresentativenessofthesamplebasedonahostofdifferentdemographicandsocioeconomiccharacteristics.Participantswereinvitedviaemail.Toensurethatonlythoseselectedforthesurveycouldparticipate,YouGovaskedpeopletoentertheiruser-namesandpasswordsbeforeansweringthequestionnaire.Furthermore,eachrespon-dentcouldtakethesurveyonlyonce.Tofine-tunetherepresentativenessofthesample,YouGovprovideduswithsampleweightsthatareusedthroughouttheanalysis.

Tolimitcognitivefatigue,thequestionnairewasadministeredindividuallyandonlyincludedquestionsrelatedtothestudy.Furthermore,thesurveywasbrief,involvingonly8questionsbesidescollectingdemographicandsocioeconomiccharacteristics.

4

Atnopointinthesurveywerepeopleinformedaboutthepurposeoftheanalysis.ScreenshotsfromthesurveyarepresentedinAppendix

A

.

Thesurveyinvolvedtheparticipationof2,000individualsineachcountry(US,UK,andBrazil)andwasadministeredbetweenNovember23rdandDecember2nd,2022.

3Onlinesurveysinvolvetwokeyadvantages.First,theyallowpeopletoprovidemoretruthfulanswers,freefromtheembarrassmentthatmayarisewhentalkingtoareal-personinterviewer.Thisisespeciallyimportantwhenelicitingpeople’sviewsaboutgeneralknowledgequestions,suchasinflationratesandpublicdebtlevels.Second,peoplecanparticipateinthequestionnaireatatimeoftheirconvenience,thusbeingabletodevotemoretimeandattentiontothequestions.

4Peoplewereaskedtoprovideinformationabouttheirage,gender,income,education,employmentstatus,numberofchildren,andgeographicallocation.

7

Participantswererandomlyallocatedtoacontrolandatreatmentgroupofequalsize.

5

Allsurveyquestionswerecommontobothgroups.Thisiscrucialtocontrolforpossibleprimingeffects.Peoplemayindeedreviseinflationexpectationsbetweenthebeginningandtheendofthesurveynotonlybecausetheyareprovidedwithcertaininformationbutmerelybecauseotherquestionsinthesurveymaynudgepeopletothinkaboutfac-torsthatarerelevanttoinflation.Bypresentingthetreatmentandcontrolgroupwiththesamequestions,theeconometricanalysiscanremovepossibleprimingeffectsbycompar-ingthetreatmentgroupagainstthecontrolgroup.

Thesurveyincludedfivepre-treatmentquestions.Peoplewereaskedabouttheex-pectedinflationrateoverthenext12months,thecentralbank’sinflationtarget,andthelevelofpublicdebtinpercentofGDP.Allquestionsprovidedsimpledefinitionsoftherelevanteconomicconcepts,forexampledefiningtheinflationrateas“thepercentageincreaseinthepricesofgoodsandservicesconsumedbypeople”.Peoplewerealwaysgiventheoptionnottorespondtoavoidcollectinguninformativeanswers.Peoplewerealsoaskedabouttheirdegreeofconfidencethat(i)thecentralbankwillpreventlargeincreasesininflationand(ii)thegovernmentwillpreventlargeincreasesingovernmentdebt.Answerstothesequestionswereprovidedonascalefrom1to5,withhighervaluesdenotingstrongerconfidence.

Thetreatmentgroupwastheninformedaboutthecorrectlevelofpublicdebtinper-centofGDP,equalto122,87,and88percentintheUS,UK,andBrazil,respectively.Noinformationwasinsteadprovidedtothecontrolgroup.Thisinformationtreatmentwillbeexploitedintheeconometricanalysistoestimatethecausaleffectofdebtlevelsoninflationexpectations.Thesurveycontinuedwiththreepost-treatmentquestions.Peoplewerefirstprovidedwiththeopportunitytorevisetheirinflationexpectations,afterbeingremindedabouttheirpreviousanswer.Participantswerethenaskedabouttheexpectedunemploymentratein12monthsandthelikelihoodthatthecentralbankwouldprintmoneytofinancegovernmentspendingorrepaygovernmentdebt.

3Publicdebtandinflationexpectations

Table

C.1

inAppendix

C

reportssummarystatisticsshowingtheaveragevaluesforeachsurveyresponsebycountry,aswellasdifferentiatingbetweenthecontrolandtreatmentgroups.Toensurethattheanalysisisnotbiasedbyimplausibleanswers,wedrop158respondentsoutof6,000thatreportinflationexpectationsinexcessof100percentordebtlevelsabove200percentofGDPorbelow0.Wealsotreatitasmissingadozenof

5Table

B.1

confirmsthatthegroupassignmentisnotpredictablebyindividualcharacteristics.

8

observationsthatreportbeliefsabouttheinflationtargetabove100percentandexpectedunemploymentratesabove100percentorbelowzero.

Thefirstfindingoftheanalysisisthatinallcountriespeoplestronglyunderestimatethelevelofpublicdebt.Onaverage,peoplereportpublicdebtlevelsintheUS,UK,andBrazilequalto54,63,and36percentofGDP,respectively.Thecorrectvaluesattheendof2022wereinstead122,87,and88percentofGDP.

6

Thisresultisconsistentwiththefindingsin

Roth,SetteleandWohlfart

(

2022

)fortheUS,showingthatpeopleconsiderablyunderestimatethelevelofpublicdebt.

7

Apreliminaryindicationthathighdebtlevelsmayraiseinflationexpectationscomesfromthecross-sectionalrelationbetweenpre-treatmentdebtbeliefsandinflationexpec-tations.AsillustratedinFigure

C.2

inAppendix

C

,inallcountriespeoplethatreporthigherlevelsofpublicdebttendalsotohavehigherinflationexpectations.Yetitwouldbeprematuretoattributeacausaleffectofpublicdebtoninflationexpectationsbasedonthiscross-sectionalevidencesinceomittedvariablesmaydrivethiscorrelation.Forex-ample,peoplewithlittleconfidenceindomesticeconomicfundamentalscouldbemoreinclinedtothinkthatthecountrysuffersfrombothhighdebtlevelsandhighinflation,eveniftheydonotperceiveacausallinkbetweenthesevariables.

Toidentifythecausaleffectofpublicdebtoninflationexpectations,itisthusneces-sarytogenerateanexogenousshiftinpeople’sperceptionsaboutdebtlevelsandthenexamineifpeoplereviseinflationexpectationsaccordingly.Weaccomplishthisstepbyexploitingtheinformationprovisiontreatmentinthesurvey.Theparticipantsassignedtothetreatmentgroupareinformedaboutthecorrectlevelofpublicdebtintheircoun-trywhilepeopleinthecontrolgroupreceivenoinformation.Thesurveyelicitspeople’sinflationexpectationsbeforeandaftertheinformationtreatment,andtheeconometricanalysisexaminesrevisionstoinflationexpectationsinthetreatmentgrouprelativetothecontrolgroup.

Aspreviouslydiscussed,peoplesubstantiallyunderestimatepublicdebtlevels.There-fore,peopleinthetreatmentgroupreceiveanupwardsurpriseaboutthesizeofpublicdebt.Ifhigherdebthasacausalpositiveimpactoninflationexpectations,weshouldthusobservethatpeopleinthetreatmentgrouprevisedinflationexpectationsupwardsrela-tivetothecontrolgroup.Totestforthishypothesis,weestimatethefollowingregression:

∆Eiπ=α+βTi+ξXi+ϵi.(1)

6Figure

C.1

inAppendix

C

illustratesthedistributionofthepublicdebtresponsesineachcountry.

7

Roth,SetteleandWohlfart

(

2022

)surveyedabout4,000respondentsintheUSbetween2017and2019andaskaboutthelevelofpublicdebtin2016asapercentofGDP.Themedianresponsewas60percentwhilethecorrectlevelofdebtwas105percent.

Thedependentvariablecapturesrevisionsininflationexpectationsbeforeandafterthe

treatment,with∆Eiπ=Eπ−Eπ.Thesubscriptidenotesindividualsurveypartic-ipantsandTiisadummythatidentifiespeopleinthetreatmentgroup.TheregressionequationcontrolsforavectorXiofdemographicandsocioeconomiccharacteristicsofthesurveyparticipants,includingage,gender,geographicalregion,employmentstatus,educationlevel,incomegroup,andwhethertheyhavekids.

Theregressioncoefficientαcapturespossiblerevisionsintheinflationexpectationsofpeopleinthecontrolgroup.Inprinciple,peopleinthecontrolgrouparenotexpectedtosystematicallyreviseinflationexpectationssincetheyarenotprovidedwithanyin-formationaboutpublicdebtlevelsorothervariables.Yettheymaystillreviseinflationexpectationsbecausetheyareinfluencedbyotherquestionsinthesurveyorjustbecausetheyaregiventheopportunitytoupdatetheirinflationexpectations.Ourprimaryinter-estliesintheregressioncoefficientβwhichmeasureswhetherpeopleinthetreatmentgroupreviseinflationexpectationsupwardsmorestronglythanpeopleinthecontrolgroup.Weestimateequation(

1

)foreachcountryaswellasbypoolingallobservationstogetherinwhichcasetheregressionalsoincludescountry-fixedeffects.

8

Columns(1)to(4)inTable

1

reporttheresults.Acrossallcountriesandinthepanelspecificationpeopleinthetreatmentgroupsubstantiallyincreaseinflationexpectationsonaveragerelativetothecontrolgroupafterbeinginformedaboutdebtlevels.Theseeffectsarehighlysta-tisticallysignif