新美国安全中心-胜负过半：美国新战争方式中的信息与指挥（英文）-2021.5正式版

MAY2021

MorethanHalftheBattle

InformationandCommandina

NewAmericanWayofWar

ChrisDougherty

AbouttheAuthor

ChrisDoughertyisaSeniorFellowintheDefenseProgramattheCenterforaNewAmericanSecurity(CNAS).Hisresearchareasincludedefensestrategy,strategicassessments,forceplanning,andwargaming.

PriortojoiningCNAS,Mr.DoughertyservedasSeniorAdvisortotheDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforStrategyandForceDevelopmentattheDepartmentofDefense(DoD).Duringthistime,heledahandfulofmajorinitiativesincludingthedevelopmentandwritingofmajorsectionsofthe2018NationalDefenseStrategy.

AbouttheDefenseProgram

Overthepast10years,CNAShasdefinedthefutureofU.S.defensestrategy.Buildingonthislegacy,theCNASDefenseteamcontinuestodevelophigh-levelconceptsandconcreterecommendationstoensureU.S.militarypreeminenceintothefutureandtoreversetheerosionofU.S.militaryadvantagesvis-a-visChina,andtoalesserextentRussia.Specificareasofstudyincludeconcentratingongreat-powercompetition,developingaforcestructureandinnovativeoperationalconceptsadaptedforthismorechallengingera,andmakinghardchoicestoeffectnecessarychange.

Acknowledgments

I’dliketothankWillMackenzie,EdMcGrady,andBeccaWasserforbeingmypartnersinwargaming,providingsupporttothisproject,andhelpingtoreviewthispaper.I’dliketothankMollyParrishforhertirelesssupportofthedefenseprogram.I’dliketothanktheCNASinternswhohavehelpedputonourwargamesandservedasnote-takers.Inparticular,I’dliketothankJessieDietzandRipleyHunterfortheirresearchassistance.I’dliketothankAlecBarker,PeterRevay,andGroupWfortheirmodelingandsimulationsupport.I’dliketothankLorenSchulman,MauraMcCarthy,andUshaSahayforprovidingmuch-neededfeedbackonthestructureofthepaper.I’dliketothankthefollowingfolksforreviewingthepaperandprovidingtheirthoughts,feedback,andedits:ElbridgeColby,JonSolomon,FrankHoffman,COLBuzzPhillips,ColBrian“Brutus”Stahl,MajKevin“Klinger”Mendel,JenniferMcArdle,TimWalton,AndrewMetrick,JacobCohn,WillSchlickenmaier,CAPTGregMalandrino,AdamComfort,ScottKendricks,IskanderRehman,CAPTMikeMartinez,MAJSarahP.White,TomShugart,andShawnSteene.I’dalsoliketothankmanyofourwargaming“regulars”withoutwhomthisprojectwouldnothavebeenpossible:EricCoulter,DerreckHolian,MarkGoolsbay,ColDanSkuce,COLSarahAlbrycht,ScottBoston,EricHeginbotham,CristinaGarafola,MarkSeip,GregGrant,ChrisRielage,NinaKollars,CaitlynLeong,ColStevenSutey,ColKaveriCrum,ColPaulCalhoun,ShaneBilsborough,MajJasonBuell,RyanBoone,MichaelKofman,etal.MysincerestapologiesifIleftanyoneoffofthislist—thenextpost-wargameroundisonme.Finally,I’dliketothankJennieMatuschakforhelpingmegetthisovertheline,andmostofallSusannaBlumeforherpatience,direction,andleadership.

Dedication

ToBernie,Susan,andMaryJo:Youalwaysbelievedinmeandyouwerealwaysthereforme.Imissyoualldearly.

TABLEOFCONTENTS

ExecutiveSummary

Introduction

SeeingRed:ChineseandRussianApproachestoInformationandCommand

OperationalVignette:EasternLatvia2030

AchievingDegradationDominanceintheTechno-CognitiveConfrontation

Domain-SpecificConceptsandCapabilities

RēzekneRevisited:EasternLatvia2030

Conclusion

DEFENSE|MAY2021

MorethanHalftheBattle:InformationandCommandinaNewAmericanWayofWar

ExecutiveSummary

China’sriseandRussia’sreemergenceasseriousmilitarycompetitorstotheUnitedStatesduringthelastdecadehavechangedthecharacterof

warfareasprofoundlyastheU.S.victoryintheGulfWar.Precision-guidedmunitionsandotheradvancedweaponssystemslikelywillplayanimportantroleinthisneweraofwarfare.However,toconferanadvantage,thesesystemswillrequiretheabilitytogather,transmit,process,understand,andactoninformationfasterandwithgreateraccuracythananopponent.Advantageinpeaceandvictoryinwarwilldemandamixtureoftech-nicalinformationsystemsandcognitivefunctionssuchascommanddecision-making.Everyeffortshouldbeexpendedtoattainanadvantagebydegradingadversarysystemsandprotectingfriendlysystemswhiledisruptingtheenemy’scognitivecommandprocessesandsustainingone’sown.Theseimperativescreatea“techno-cogni-tiveconfrontation”thatiscontinualandwidespread,crossingdelineationsbetweenpeaceandwar.Withinthiscontext,great-powerwarfarewouldbefarmorechaotic,lethal,andcontestedthantheconflictsofthepost–ColdWarperiod.

ChinaandRussiahavedevelopeddistinctbutsimilartheoriesofvictoryinthisnewtypeofwarfarefocusedonprevailinginthetechno-cognitiveconfrontation.Whiletheirmilitarystrategiesandconceptsarecomplexanddiverse,theysharefourcriticalattributes.First,theyaimtokeepconflictslocal,limited,andthere-forerelativelymanageable,whileobviatingU.S.globalmilitarypreponderance.Second,theyuse“peacetime”informationoperationsto(ideally)achievetheirobjec-tiveswithoutfightingortocreatefavorableconditionsifconflictoccurs.Third,theyattackcriticalsystemsinspace,cyberspace,andtheelectromagneticspectrum,aswellasphysicalnetworknodes,toachieveinforma-tiondegradationandcommanddisruption,orID/CD,againstadversarysystemsandthecognitiveprocessestheyenable.1Fourth,theyincreasinglyarecentralizing,automating,and“intelligentizing”theircommand

andcontroltoenablerapid,coordinatedactionsacrossmultipledomainsinthecriticalopeningdaysofapotentialconflict.

TheDepartmentofDefense's(DoD)belatedresponsetoemergingChineseandRussianconceptshasbeenoverlytechnologicalandfixatedonregainingthekindofinformationdominancethatU.S.armedforcesenjoyedfrom1990untilveryrecently.TheDoDcertainlyneedstodevelopnewsystemstoreplaceitscurrentinformationandcommandarchitecture,muchofwhichdatesback

tothe1970sand’80s.Still,amyopicfocusontechnologymissesthecriticalcognitiveandorganizationalaspectsoftheconfrontationwithChinaandRussia.Theobsessionwithregaininginformationdominanceisperhapsevenmoredeleterious.Barringsomewhollyunforeseenevent,theDoDisunlikelytoregainitspost–ColdWartechno-cognitivedominanceagainstChinaorRussia.Theyaretoocapableandtoocompetenttoallowthistohappen,andthechaoticcharacterofmodernwarfarevitiatesagainstthekindoflopsidedinformationadvantageU.S.forcesenjoyedagainstIraqintheGulfWar.

TheDoDneedstoembrace,ratherthanfightagainst,thechangesinthecharacterofwarfareandlearntothrivewithinitschaosinwaysthatChinaandRussiamaybeunabletomatchgiventheirhighlycentralizedanddirectivecommand-and-controlstructures.Insteadofstrivingforinformationdominance,theDoDshouldseek“degrada-tiondominance”asawayofachievinganadvantageinthetechno-cognitiveconfrontationwithChinaandRussia.Thisnotionattackstheirtheoryofvictorybydemonstratingtheabilitytooperateeffectivelyenoughwithdegradedsystemsincontestedenvironments,whileimposingproportionaldeg-radationonChineseandRussiansystems,therebycausingthemtoloseconfidenceintheirabilitytogainaninsuperableadvantageinthetechno-cognitiveconfrontation.

AchievingdegradationdominanceagainstChinaandRussiacomprisesfourmutuallyreinforcinglinesofeffort:

Forcethemintodilemmasaboutexpandingoresca-latingaconflictbyexploitingtensionsbetweentheirlimited-warstrategiesandtheiroperationalimperativetoattackinformationandcommandsystemsaggres-sivelyattheoutsetofaconflictby:

Focusingconceptandcapabilitydevelopmentonlimitingtheeffectivenessofreversibleandnon-kineticattacks,particularlyinspace;

Adoptingamoredispersedpostureforinformationandcommandsystems;

Workingwithalliesandpartnerstoincreasemulti-lateralcooperationinkeyinformationandcommandmissionareasthatwouldbehighprioritytargetsforChinaandRussia;and

ForcingChinaorRussiaintodilemmasaboutattackingtheU.S.homeland.

Leveltheplayingfieldinthe“peacetime”informationenvironmentby:

Gainingproperauthoritiesforinformationoperationsinkeytheatersanddeconflictingwithothergovern-mentagencies;

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Training,educating,andexercisingthejointforcetodealwithChineseandRussianinformationconfrontation;

Servingasa“systemsintegrator”toleveragealliedandpartnerexpertisewithChineseandRussianinformationoperations;

Aligninginformationoperationswithmilitaryoper-ationstoincreasetrustwithallies,partners,andkeyaudiencesabroad;and

AvoidingciviliancasualtiestostymieChineseandRussianinformationoperationsaimedatdegradingcoalitioncohesion.

Achievedegradationdominanceinthetechno-cog-nitiveconfrontationinspace,cyberspace,andtheelectromagneticspectrumby:

Enablingpeopleandbuildingtrustacrosscommandechelonsandorganizations,aswellaswithcriticalsystems;

AdoptingpoliciesanddemonstratingcapabilitiestoproportionallyattacksensitiveChineseandRussianinformationandcommandsystems;

Trainingtofightwithdegradedinformationanddisruptedcommand;

Developingtheabilitytooperatewith“loose”decentralizedpeer-to-peercommand,control,andcommunicationsstructuresindegraded,disrupted,orcontestedenvironments;

Developinganddeployinga“RosettaStone”com-municationsarchitecturethatenablesresilientmulti-pathnetworksthroughtranslation,ratherthaninteroperability;

Employingmissioncommandandotherformsofdecentralizedanddelegatedcommandphiloso-phies,particularlywhencommandsystemsaredisrupted;

Accepting“goodenough”targetingagainstlow-valuetargetsincontestedenvironments;

Adoptingrapidtargetingprocessesforhigh-tempo,degradedoperationsincontestedenvironments;

Leveragingartificialintelligence,sophisticatedautomation,andboundedautonomytoreducecog-nitiveloadsandacceleratedecision-making;and

Usingmilitarydeceptiontofoiladversaryplanningandtargeting,particularlyautomated,artificiallyintelligent,orotheralgorithmicallyenhancedsystems.

Organizeandtrainfordegradedanddisruptedmulti-domainoperations:

Putthe“combat”backintheGeographicCombatantCommandsbyrefocusingthemonwarfightingvicemilitarydiplomacy;

Createstanding,multi-domainunitsacrossmultipleechelonsofcommanddowntothetacticallevel;

Increaseregularjointandmulti-domaintrainingandCombatantCommandersExerciseEngagementandTrainingTransformation(CE2T2)funds;and

Uselive,virtual,andsynthetictrainingtotrainreal-isticallyinalldomains.

EnactingtheserecommendationswouldmarkamajorchangeintheDoD’smindsetaboutthefutureofwarfareandtheroleofinformationandcommandincompetitionandconflict.Lettinggoofnotionsofdomi-nancetostriveinsteadforoperatingeffectivelyenoughwhiledegradedisadifficult,butneeded,paradigmshiftgiventhechallengesposedbyChinaandRussiaandthechangingcharacterofmodernwarfare.Thealternativelikelywouldbearuinouslyexpensiveandfruitlesssearchforsymmetrical“overmatch.”

Thoughdaunting,theDoDhassuccessfullyembarkedonsimilarparadigm-shiftingreformeffortsinthepast.Themostrelevantwasthepost-VietnaminitiativetoaddressthepersistentweaknessofU.S.night-fightingcapabilities.Bybecoming,arguably,theworld’smosteffectivenight-fightingforce,theDoDpresentedadver-sarieswithavexingdilemma:fightduringthedayandfacethewrathofU.S.airpowerandfirepower,orfightatnightatperhapsanevenworsedisadvantage.

AchievingdegradationdominancethroughtheselinesofeffortwouldposeasimilardilemmatoChineseandRussianforcesintheeventofacrisisorconflict.TheywouldhavetoconsiderattackingU.S.informationandcommandcapabilities,albeitwithdiminishingconfidencethatsuchattackswouldrenderU.S.forcesincapableofresponding.Atthesametime,theiraggressionwouldriskescalatingorexpandingaconflictandopenuptheirowninformationandcommandsystemstoproportionalU.S.responses.Alternatively,theycouldoptnottoattack,orlimittheirattackstoreducetheriskofescalation,

buttheseapproacheswouldleaveU.S.informationandcommandsystemsrelativelyunscathed.Eitheroptionwouldleavethemwithalessthansatisfactoryoutcome,andmaintainingthatpessimisticassessmentiskeytodeterringaggression;defendingU.S.allies,partners,andvitalinterests;andupholdingafreeandopeninterna-tionalorderinEastAsiaandeasternEurope.

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MorethanHalftheBattle:InformationandCommandinaNewAmericanWayofWar

Introduction

Afterroughly40yearsofadvantage,ifnotoutrightdominance,intheabilitytouseinformationtogaingreatersituationalawarenessandcommand

forcesmoreeffectivelythanitsadversaries,theDoDisfacingcompetitorsthathavedevelopedthemeansandmethodstolevelthisplayingfieldorshiftittotheiradvantage.TheemergenceofChinaandreemergenceofRussiaasadvancedmilitarycompetitors—andpartic-ularlytheirdevelopmentofprecision-strikeweaponsandadvancedinformationsystems—havechangedthecharacterofwarfare.Some,suchasthelateAndrewMarshall,BarryWatts,andAndrewKrepinevich,havereferredtothisneweraofwarfareasa“maturepre-cision-strikeregime,”inwhichmultipleadvancedmilitariespossesstherequisitesensors,networks,andprecision-guidedmunitionstoconductpreciselong-rangeattacksatscale.2Thecharacterofmodernwarfareincorporatesthisregime,butalsoincludesotherrelatedaspectssuchastheincreasingsalienceofspaceandcyberspaceascombatdomainsandthegrowingimpor-tanceofsub-conflictcompetitionor“confrontation”intheinformationenvironment.

Theendresultofthesedevelopmentsisthatwarfarebetweenmoderngreatpowersislikelytobefast-paced,chaotic,highlylethal,andcontestedatlongrangesineveryenvironmentfromundertheseatothefarreachesofgeosynchronousearthorbit(GEO).3Large-scaleindus-trialplatformsandprocesseswillremainrelevant,butinter-statemilitarycompetitionandconflictincreasinglywillcenteraround“techno-cognitiveconfrontation”betweenopposinginformationsystemsandcognitivecommandprocesses.

Toprevailinthisnewkindofwarfare,ChinaandRussiahavedevelopedsimilar,albeitdistinct,theoriesofvictorythataligntheirconcepts,forcestructure,oper-ations,andcommandphilosophies.TheyarepursuingconceptsandcapabilitiestodegradetheabilityofU.S.,allied,andpartnerforcestomaintainsituationalaware-ness,trusttheirinformation,andcommunicate,andtodisrupttheirabilitytoexercisecommandandcontrol.Thisshared“informationdegradation/commanddisruption”orID/CDapproach,isdesignedtoturnlong-standingU.S.advantagesininformationandcommandintocriticalvulnerabilities.

Toexecutetheseconcepts,theyhavedevelopedtheirownwaysofusinginformationandcommandingtheirforces.Theyincreasinglyhavecentralized,auto-mated,androutinizedtheirinformationandcommandprocessestoexertgreaterdirectcontrolandbetter

synchronizetheiroperations.Thesemethodsaredesignedtooperateeffectivelyacross“peacetime”geopoliticalconfrontationandmilitaryconflicts.Moreworryingly,theyareinvestinginnewtechnologieslikeartificialintelligencetoleapfrogremainingU.S.technicalandcognitiveadvantages.

TheDoD’sresponsetothischallengehasbeenslowandhobbledbydifferentunderstandingsoftheproblemandthereforedivergentvisionsastothesolution.WhiletheDoDbelatedlyhasbeguntoshowprogressinareassuchastheJointAll-DomainCommandandControl(JADC2)concept,thesesolutionsaretechnical,whenmanyofthechallengesChinaandRussiaposearecogni-tive,psychological,andorganizational.4Moreover,thereisaperniciousthreadrunningthroughmanyDoDinitia-tivesregardinginformationandcommandandcontrol.Namelythatsmartinvestmentsintherightsystem,“system-of-systems,”or“architecture”canenabletheDoDtoreturntothelevelofinformationandcommanddominanceor“overmatch”thatU.S.armedforceshaveenjoyedoverthelastseveraldecades.5

Warfarebetweenmoderngreatpowersislikelytobefast-paced,chaotic,highlylethal,andcontestedatlongrangesineveryenvironmentfromundertheseatothefarreachesofgeosynchronousearthorbit.

Whileinvestmentsininformationandcom-mand-and-controlsystemsarecriticalandshouldremainoneoftheDoD’stopmodernizationpriorities,thedesirefordominanceunderestimatesthescaleofthechal-lengesposedbyChinaandRussia,andmisunderstandsthecharacterofmoderngreat-powerwarfare.Fortheforeseeablefuture,thereisnogoingbacktothelevelofinformationandcommandsuperioritytowhichtheU.S.jointforcehasbecomeaccustomed.ChinaandRussiaaresimplytoosophisticatedandtoocapableforthattobeafeasibleobjectiveinthescenariosthatmostworryU.S.defenseplanners.Furthermore,thecharacteroffutureconflictwithChinaorRussiawouldvitiatetherelativeadvantagesinsituationalawarenessandrapiddecision-makingthathavebeenthehallmarkoftheAmericanwayofwarsinceatleast1990.

Toexplorethechallengesofusinginformationandcommandingforcesinmoderngreat-powerconflict,theDefenseTeamatCNAS,duringthelast18months,

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conductedmorethan10wargamessetinthe2030timeframe.Specifically,thesegamesexploredfutureinter-actionsbetweenU.S.,Chinese,andRussianinformationandcommandconceptsincompetitionandconflict.Threeobservationsfromthesegamesweresalientacrossavarietyofscenariosandassumptions.

First,conflictbetweengreatpowersusingmodernweaponryisshockinglyfastanddisturbinglydestruc-tive.Forexample,inmorethaneightwargamessetintheIndo-Pacifictheater,coveringcampaignslastingfromseveraldaystoseveralweeks,typicalattritionexceededtheestimatedcombinedU.S.andJapaneseshipandaircraftlossesfromtheBattleoftheCoralSeaandtheBattleofMidway—twoofthecostliestairandnavalbattlesinWorldWarII.Thecombatisalsodisori-entinglychaotic,regardlessofwhetherinformationandcommandsystemsworked(inwhichcase,long-rangeprecisionfiresresultedincatastrophicattritionanddestruction)ornot(inwhichcase,bothsidesscrambledtounderstandwhatwashappening,makedecisions,andcommunicatethesedecisionsacrosstheirforces).

Second,thesidethatcouldrapidlyimposechaosonitsopponentwhilemaintainingsufficientunder-standingandordertocommanditsownforcesgainedanenormousadvantage.ThisadvantageaccruedtotheChineseandRussianteamsinnearlyeveryscenarioinwhichU.S.teamsusedcurrentconcepts.MostChineseandRussianredteamshadarelativelyconsistent“script”ofattacksthattheywouldusetosystematicallyconductID/CDagainstU.S.forces.Thisscriptrapidlygavethemanadvantageinkeyaspectsofthetechno-cognitivecon-frontation,suchastheabilitytotargetshipsatlongrangeandcoordinateattacksfrommultipledomains.

Third,oncegained(orlost),thisadvantagehadcas-cadingeffectsthatputtheweakerside—usuallytheU.S.team—intountenabledilemmasor,worse,seeminglyunrecoverablepositions.Thesegamessuggestedthat,withouturgentchangestohowtheDoDisconceptual-izingandengagingintechno-cognitiveconfrontation,U.S.forcesfacearealriskoflosingtheirsituationalawareness,capacitytomakedecisions,abilitytocom-municatereliably,andtheinitiativeinplausibleconflictscenarios.Oncethefightforinformationandcommandislost,U.S.forcesmaynotbeabletorecover,andmilitarydefeatbecomeslikely.

Despitethesedispiritingoutcomes,thelessonslearnedfromthesegamesandfromcomputermodelingandsim-ulationsuggestthattheDoDhasafeasiblepathtowardanadvantageinthetechno-cognitiveconfrontation,provideditletsgooftheideaofregaininginformationdominanceandpossessinganunassailableadvantage

intheabilitytocommandforces.Ratherthanbringingordertothechaosofmodernconflict,theDoDneedstoacceptthatchaosisendemicandlearntooperatewithinitwhileforcingChinaandRussiatodothesameinwaysthattheymaybestructurallyunableordisinclinedtodo.Insteadofstrivingforinformationdominanceor“over-match,”theDoDandthearmedservicesshouldfocusonoperatingwithdegradedinformationanddisruptedcommandsystemswhiledemonstratingtheabilitytoproportionallydegradeadversarysystems,toachievewhatthispapercalls“degradationdominance.”Thefundamentalideaistodemonstratetheabilitytooperateeffectivelyenoughwithdegradedsystemsincontestedenvironments—whileimposingsufficientdegradationonChineseandRussiansystems—thattheyloseconfidenceintheirabilitytogainadecisiveadvantageinthiscon-frontationthroughrapidorpreemptiveattacks.

Thefirstaspectofdegradationdominancethwartsrevisionist,antagonistic,andaggressiveChineseandRussianpoliciesbyunderminingandattackingChineseandRussianlimitedwarand“activedefense”strategieswhilemakingU.S.andcoalitionresponsesmorecredible.ChineseandRussianapproachestofightingU.S.-ledcoa-litionshaveinherenttensionsbetweentheirstrategicaimoflimitingandcontrollingconflictsandtheoperationalimperativetowardaggressivelyseizingtheinitiativeinherentinanyefforttodeterordefeataU.S.-ledcoali-tionresponselaunchedfromaglobalposture.Attackinginformationandcommandsystemsattheoutsetofaconflict—orevenpreemptively—isatthecoreofChineseandRussianmilitaryapproachtodeterring,delaying,

ordefeatingU.S.militaryoperations.Atthesametime,ChinaandRussiawouldprefertolimitandtailortheseattackstoavoidprovokingastrongcounter-coalitionorabroaderglobalwarwithallthepotentialrisksitwouldentail.U.S.informationandcommandsystemsthereforeshouldbedesigned,postured,andoperatedinsuchawaythatattackingthemrisksescalatingorexpandingaconflictwhilesimultaneouslymakingattacksonChineseandRussiansystemsmorecredible.ThisputsChinaandRussiaintoadilemma:actaggressivelyandriskesca-lation,expansion,andmoreaggressivecounterattacksontheirsystems,orrestraintheiractionsandincuroperationalrisksbyallowingkeyU.S.informationandcommandsystemstoremainfunctional.

Thesecondaspectistoleveloradvantageouslytilttheinformationplayingfieldinkeyregionsbyactingasanenablerand“systemsintegrator”foralliedandpartnereffortstopushbackonChineseandRussianinformationwarfare.GiventhebreadthofChineseandRussianinfor-mationoperations,theDoDshouldfocusitseffortson

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MorethanHalftheBattle:InformationandCommandinaNewAmericanWayofWar

maintainingallianceandcoalitioncohesion,improvinglocalsituationalawareness,andgainingapublicopinionadvantageversusChinaandRussiainkeylocations.Thispersistentcompetition—whichChinaandRussiacallconfrontationorstruggle—isfoundational.UnlesstheUnitedStatespushesbackonChineseandRussianoperations,itcouldlosethetechno-cognitiveconfron-tationwithoutafight,oritcouldbeginanyconflictinsuchadeficitthatvictorybecomesextremelyunlikely.

Thethirdaspectistoachievedegradationdominanceinthetechno-cognitiveconfrontationcenteredonspace,cyberspace,andtheelectromagneticspectrum.Gaininganadvantageinthesedomains,inlargepartbypreemptivelyorrapidlydeceiving,exploiting,degrading,ordestroyingadversarysystemsandthecognitiveprocessesthatrelyonthem,iscentraltoChineseandRussianapproachestoconfrontingorfightingtheUnitedStates.DemonstratingtheabilitytooperateeffectivelyenoughinthefaceoftheireffortstocontestthesedomainsanddegradeU.S.informationandcommandsystems,coupledwithacredibleabilitytodeceive,exploit,anddegradetheirinformationandcommandsystems,couldprofoundlyimpactChineseandRussiancalculationsofthecorrelationofforcesinkeytheaters.Thekeytothisisdevelopingmoreflexibleandresilient“loose”informationandcommandstruc-tures,incontrasttotherigid,stovepiped,hierarchicalstructuresthatpredominatetoday.

ThefourthaspectofthisconceptistochangehowtheDoDandthearmedservicesorganizeandtrainforcesforcombattooperatemoreflexiblyunderID/CDattacks.IftheDoDbelievesthatincreasingjointintegra-tionormulti-domainoperationsarecriticaltosuccess,itmustchangeorganizationalstructurestoenable,ratherthanimpedethisshiftbycreatingstandingforces—viceadhoctaskforces—inkeytheaters,builtaroundcriticalcapabilitiesandsizedonspansofcontrolthatarefeasibleusingdegradedsystemsincontestedenvironments.Unitandpersonnelrotationpoliciesshouldemphasizefamiliarityandthesharedunder-standingthatisvitalinchaoticandcontestedcombatoperationswhencommunicationssystemsbreakdown,ratherthanflexibilityforpersonnelmanagers.Trainingshouldcontinuallyemphasizejointormulti-domainoperationsincontestedenvironmentsusingdegradedsystems,leveraginglive,virtual,andconstructiveorsynthetictrainingwhereneeded.GiventherealitythatU.S.armedforceswillalmostalwaysfightaspartofamultinationalcoalition,thesereformscannotbelimitedtoU.S.forcesandoperations,butmustincorporatekeyalliesandpartnersfromtheoutset.

TheideaofeschewinginformationdominanceandacceptingdegradationrepresentsamassiveshiftfortheDoDandthearmedservices,butitisnotwithoutprecedent.FollowingVietnam,theDoDmadeaconsciousdecisionthat,afterdecadesofpoorperformanceinnighttimeoper-ations,itwouldinvestheavilyinnight-fightingcapabilities,suchasnightvision,alongwithintensivetraininginorderto“ownthenight.”ThisdecisionbroughtaboutaprofoundshiftinU.S.andadversarymilitaryoperations.AfterdecadesinwhichopponentssoughttonegateU.S.advantagesinfirepowerbyfightingatnight