【DOC】-上市公司信息披露外文翻译-一个自愿性信息披露与我国上市公司监管问题的研究体系-其他专业

【DOC】-上市公司信息披露外文翻译一一个自愿性信息披露与我国上市公司监管问题的研究体系-其他专业AStudyontheSupervisionSystemwithVoluntaryInformationDisclosureinChineseListedCompaniesAbstractThevoluntaryinformationoflistedcompaniesisbasedoncorporateimage,theinvestorrelates,whichistoavoidlawsuitriskbesidesthecompulsoryinformationdisclosure.Theinformation,whichthecompaniesdisclosedontheirowninitiative,istheimportantpartofdisclosureinformation.Itisaneffectivewaythatdemonstratestheircorecompetitiveability.Theauthoranalyzedtheproblemsonvoluntaryinformationdisclosed,whichexistedinChinesemainlandlistedcompany,proposedthesuggestionofconstructingsupervisionsystemwhichlistedcompaniesvoluntaryinformationtodisclose.*Keywords:Listedcompanies,Compulsoryinformationdisclosure,Voluntaryinformationdisclosure,SupervisionSystemAstheexpansionoftheincreaseofthenumberoflistedcompaniesandtheincreasinglydrasticmarketcompetition,thecompetitionhasbecomemoredifficultinmoreandmorelistedcompanies.Inordertocatchthescarceresource--thecapital,companiestendtochoosethewayofVoluntaryinformationDisclosure.Listedcompanies,withvoluntarytodisclosetheinformationreferstocorporateimage,theinvestorrelation,avoidlawsuitriskbesidesthecompulsoryinformationdisclosure.However,thesupervisionsystemisnotgoodenough;theinformationdisclosedvoluntarilyishardtobeproofthetruth.Therefore,itbecomesmoreandmoreimportanttobuildthesupervisionsystemwithvoluntaryinformationdisclosureforlistedcompanies.MotivationofCompulsoryinformationdisclosureInformation,theVoluntarydisclosure,istheexecutivesinlistedcompaniesonpersonnelbenefittodiscloseonowninitiative.Accordingtotheeconomictheoryof"theeconomicmanrationality",thesuperintendentsbalancethebehavioranddonottake,completelybasedonthebenefitandthisbehaviorwhichisthecosting.Thesuperintendent’sdecision-makingisalsobasedonthecostbenefitanalysis,ifthevoluntaryinformationdisclosurebringsthebenefitislargerthanthecost,thenthesuperintendentcancarryonvoluntarilydisclosed,otherwise,thesuperintendentratherdoesnotcarryonthevoluntaryinformationtodisclose,theirmannerswillchangewiththecostincomerelationschanging.(KaiXiang,2004)WiththeChinacapitalmarketgraduallydevelopment,thebusinessmanagementauthoritycanreducetheaveragecapitalcost,enhancethefinancialanalystandinvestor'sinterest,enhancecompanyconfidencelevel,improveinvestmentrelations,standoutcompanycompetitiveadvantages,enhancecompanystocksmarketfluidity,butalsomayreducethecompany’slawsuitrisk,becausethedisclosureisnotenoughandsoon,bydisclosingvoluntaryinformationbesidesthecompulsoryinformationdisclosure.TheChinacapitalmarketinformationdisclosurealsocangraduallymovetothestageofpayingequalattentiontovoluntaryandcompulsorydisclosure,notthesimplyregardingofthecompulsorydisclosure,thevoluntaryinformationdisclosurewillcertainlytobetheeffectiveway,bywhichlistedcompaniescandemonstratethecorecompetitiveability,communicatewiththestakeholders,anddescribethecompanyfuture.(XianzhongSong,2006)ContentofCompulsoryinformationdisclosureListedcompanies,withvoluntarytodisclosetheinformationisreferstocorporateimage,theinvestorrelates,avoidlawsuitriskexceptforthecompulsoryinformationdisclosure.Learningfromforeignlistedcompanies’experienceofdisclosinginformationvoluntarily,andaccordingtothesituationinChina,thelistedcompaniesvoluntarydisclosureofinformationinclude:Theforward-lookinginformation,basedonthecompany's“corecompetence”.Itcontainstheoperation,thebusinessplan,strategicplanning,businessenvironmentandsoon.Allofinformationcanhelpinvestorstomakerationalinvestmentjudgmentsanddecision-making;Informationcommunicatedwiththemarketintermediariesandinvestorsortheevaluationinformationfromthem;Informationofhumanresources.Undertheconditionsoftheknowledgeeconomysociety,humancapitalbecomesmoreandmoreimportant.Particularlyinthehightech,high-growthcompanies,employeesarethecompany'smostvaluableasset.Researchshowsthatthesecompaniesweresignificantlybetterthanothercompanies,intheabove-mentionedaspectsofthevoluntarydisclosureofinformation;Accordingtotheaccountingstandardsoftheconservativeprinciples,thereisalsolackofproperdisclosurerulesorlowinrequirementsdisclosure,whichisusefulfortheinvestmentdecision-making,suchasfairvalue;Corporategovernance,environmentalprotectionandsocialresponsibilitydonothavemandatorydisclosureinformation,becauseofcomplexityfromthemeasurementanddisclosure(DerongZhang,2004).MainproblemsexistinCompulsoryinformationdisclosureLowVoluntaryDisclosureRateandlowinitiativeAnumberoflistedcompaniesregardvoluntarydisclosureofinformationasanadditionalburden,ratherthanakindofobligationortheright,whichshouldbeventotheshareholders.Thustheywillbepassivetodisclosetheinformation,githat’stosay,theywilltakelessdisclosureaslessaspossible.Withtimegoingby,theconceptofthisunderstandingisacceptedbypeople,sothatthedeviationintheinformationdisclosuremakeslistedcompaniesinapassiveresponse.Themainreasonisthatthelistedcompanyistooworrytotellthepublicthesecretinitsmanagement,andthusthedisclosureofinformationcreatesapsychologicalfearandevasivetothem.LackofintegrityofVoluntaryinformationdisclosureToday,Chineselistedcompanies’practiceofdisclosinginformationvoluntarilyisnotsatisfactory.Manylistedcompaniesarereluctanttodisclose,andsomelistedcompaniesonlydisclosethecompany'sfinancialinformation;butthe"badnews"orinvolvedmatterswithacertainrisk,orotherseriouslymatters,thecompaniesarekeptsilent.Moreover,manylistedcompaniesdonotdisclosefullycredibility,hopingtheinvestorsrelyonthe“popular”,thentohelpthemsucceed.Chineseinvestorsarenotmaturity,particularlyintheprocessing,handlingandanalyzinginformation.Therefore,itisverydifficulttojudgethevalueofthecompanythroughthesignaltransferredbythecompany.ThevoluntarydisclosureoffalseinformationGenerallyspeaking,thevoluntaryinformationdisclosurehashighcredibility.Tothenon-mandatoryrequirementsinformation,managersoftendisclosethelesslikelytoleadtothedisclosureofriskinformationforreducingtheriskoflitigationandavoidinglegalsanctions.Inaddition,themainmotiveofhigh-qualityenterprisesdisclosingtheinformationtotheinvestorsistoconveythesignalqualityofenterprises,soastoreducemonitoringcosts.Voluntaryinformationdisclosuregenerallyhashigherquality.However,theabsenceofmandatorydisclosureisasstrictguidelinesasregulate,andauthoritieshavethetendencyofopportunism,pronetotheproblemofmoralhazard.What’smore,thepoorqualityoftheenterprisesarebasedonthetheoryofsignaltransduction,transmissionoffalseinformation,thevoluntarydisclosureofinformationisnotthesametothemandatoryinformation,astoundergoarigorousaudit.Andvoluntarydisclosureofinformationisdifficulttoguaranteethequality.ContentofvoluntaryinformationdisclosureisnotstandardAtpresent,mainlyChineselistedcompaniesarethecompulsorydisclosureofinformation,andvoluntarydisclosureofinformationinsomedocumentsarescattered,inreality,Chineselistedcompanies,disclosingvoluntarilyinformation,cannotmeetregulators,securitiesanalystsandinvestorsdemandregardlessofcontentorquality.Chineselistedcompaniesinthevoluntarydisclosureofinformationcontentnorms.TheChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommissionissuedthe"publicofferingsstock,thedisclosureofcorporateinformationcontentandformatstandards"oftherelevantprovisionsof1-6intheannotated"Open-here,"althoughvoluntarydisclosureofinformationtotheleftoftheroom,butthelackofspecificguidelinesandthecorrespondingpolicysupport,theoveralllevelofthelistedcompaniestodiscloseinformationvoluntarilyislow.Therefore,Chinesevoluntarydisclosureofinformationisworthyofpayingattentionandneedstobesolved.ImproveSupervisionSystemofVoluntaryinformationDisclosureinlistedompaniescAsgrowingcompetitionofcapitalinthemarketandthegraduallystandardizationoflegalsystem,therewillbeagrowingtrendofvoluntaryinformationdisclosureforadaptwiththecomplexandeverchangingandhighlyuncertaineconomicenvironment.FortheproblemsexistinginChineselistedcompaniesvoluntaryinformationdisclosure,andlearningfromthepracticalexperienceonforeignlistedcompanies,theauthormakesthefollowingrecommendations:ActivelyencourageandprotectlistedcompaniesvoluntarilydiscloseinformationWiththegraduallymaturationofChinesecapitalmarket,onthebasisofthemanagementcompanycompletingthemandatorydisclosureofinformationprovidedvoluntarydisclosureofinformation.Therefore,theregulatorydepartmentsshouldencouragelistedcompaniestovoluntarydisclosureofinformation,addclausesinthepoliciesandregulations,encouragelistedcompaniestodisclosethevoluntaryinformationbesidesexistinglaws,regulationsandrules,meettheinvestors’growingdemands.Atthesametime,inordertoavoidsomeofthecompany'smanagementshouldnotbefacedlitigationriskandotherproblems,regulatorsneedtostudyandformulaterelevantpoliciesforthecompany'svoluntarydisclosureofinformationacttoprotectthem."Deliberatemanipulation"and"accidentalfactors"belongtodifferentnatureofthesituationsandtreatthemdifferently.Itshouldinvestigatethelawliabilitytopartiesinthefirstcase.Otherwise,onlythelistedcompanieshaveadequateevidencesandcanexplainreasonably,don’tlookintotheirliability.StrengthensupervisingandmanagingpreventtodisclosethefalseinformationatwillandprotectthemarketorderOncethevoluntarydisclosureinformationpublished,itmustaccepttheessentialsurveillanceandtherestraintequallywiththecompulsorydisclosureinformation.Butvoluntaryinformationdisclosureisstilllackessentialsurveillancerulescurrently,shouldestablishasetofvoluntaryinformationdisclosuresupervisingandmanagingsystem,standardvoluntaryinformationquality.Forexample:toestablishvoluntaryinformationassuranceandcompensationsystem,toperformtheheavyfinetotheenterprisewhichmisleadstheinvestorandsoon.ThenegotiablesecuritiessupervisingandmanagingdepartmentandtheExchangesshouldstrengthensupervisingandmanagingtovoluntaryinformationdisclosuremarket,preventtodisclosethefalseinformationatwill,protectsthemarketorder.Thevoluntaryinformationdisclosuresupervisingandmanagingshouldcontainfollowingseveralaspects:First,integrity,listedcompaniesvoluntarilydiscloseoftheinformationareboth"positive"information,alsoincludesthe"negative"information;Second,systemic,whetherlistedcompaniesfromdifferentangles,throughvariousinformationdisclosuretorevealthesame,whetherformedadistinctivepatternofvoluntarydisclosureofinformation;Third,dynamic,long-termvoluntarylistedcompaniestodisclosecertaininformation,andconstantlyadjustedtoimprovethereliabilityofinformation;Fourth,widespread,aslongasallinvestorsequalaccesstoalllistedcompaniestovoluntarilydiscloseinformation;Fifth,thecomparative,whetherthecompulsoryinformationdisclosureismandatoryornot,itcanbethestandardsofjudgmentforthequalityofreferencestandards.GivingfullattentiontotheroleofmarketintermediariestoestablishtheauthorityofthedisclosureofcompanyinformationqualityevaluationsystemListedcompaniesshouldstrengthencommunicationwithinstitutionalinvestors,brokers,securitiesanalystsandothermarketintermediaries.Understandingthecompany'sexternalinformationneedstoreducethecompany'sasymmetricinformationthroughvoluntarydisclosureofinformation.Givingfullattentiontotheroleofmarketntermediaries,establishthelistedcompanydisclosureinformationqualityevaluationsystembymarketintermediaries.Actsaccordingtothespecializedknowledgeandafterthecompanyinteriorinformationfullunderstandingandtheanalysisbythemarketfacilitatingagencywhichithasmakestheomni-directionalappraisalopinion,regularlypromotesvoluntaryinformationdisclosurequalityratingresults,providescertainauthoritytoinformationdisclosurequalityappraisalopinionfortheinvestor,showstheriskbythepolicewhichtheordinaryinvestorpossiblycanface.(HongYin,2004).StrengthenCPAaudittovoluntarydisclosureofinformationCPAauditisanindependent,objectiveandimpartialsystem,itcanensurethecredibilityoftheaccountinginformation.VoluntaryInformationisprovidedbytheauthorities.Withspeculativerisks,theauthenticityandreliabilityofvoluntaryinformationshouldbetestedbycertifiedpublicaccountant.Althoughtheauditofvoluntaryinformationisnotasstrictasthemandatoryinformation,itshouldalsohaveforensiccapabilitiesbyregisteredaccountantscarryingoutthenecessaryscrutiny,toimproveandguaranteethecredibilityofitsinformation.Therefore,itisnecessarytoformulateandimproveauditrulesonvoluntarydisclosureofinformation,andtoincreaseviolationofprofessionalethicsorlegalresponsibilityfortheresponsibilityofacertifiedpublicaccountant.IntroductionofvoluntarydisclosureofinformationregulatorydocumentsOnaglobalscale,thevoluntarydisclosureofinformationisanirresistibletrendofdevelopment.Withtheincreasingspeedofthechangeoftheeconomicenvironment,therequirementfortheaccountinginformationrelevantarehigherandhigher,bytheextraneoususer,theexistingcompulsorydisclosureinformationwillbeinevitablydifficulttosatisfytheirinformationneed.Therefore,theextraneousinformationuserontheexistencetothebusinessmanagementauthoritydisclosedvoluntarilysomeinformationhelppolicy-makingthedemand.Webelievedthat,everytheonewhichdoesnotfallinthescopeofthecompulsoryinformationdisclosurecontentstipulation,andbehelpfultothebenefitcounterpartstothepolicy-makinginformation,allmaybedefinedasthevoluntaryinformationdisclosure.UnitedStatesFinancialAccountingStandardsBoard(FASB)in2001onthevoluntarydisclosureofthecontentsofinformationprovidesasfollows:"operationaldata,theanalysisofthedatamanagement,andforward-lookinginformation,relatingtothemanagementandshareholdersoftheinformation,notbeconfirmedinstatementsofintangibleassets".Therefore,Chinashouldandmustmakeacomprehensiveandin-depthinvestigationforstakeholderinformationneeds,andmodeltheframewhichtheSteringcommitteeproposedinFASB,namelyconfirmedsomeinformationiswhetheruseful,bythistodecidetoprovidetheinformationornot,andstandardizethecontentoftheinformationdisclosure.Whentheaccountingstandardsetterssectorandthesecuritiesregulatorydepartmentsareintheformulationofpoliciesandprogramsshouldtakeintoaccountthathowtoguideenterprisestocarryoutsomeofthedisclosureofprivateinformation,andthesecuritiesregulatorydepartmentsshouldbeintroducedlistedcompaniestodiscloseinformationvoluntarilycharterguidelinesassoonaspossible,toencourageandregulatelistedcompaniesvoluntarilyinformationdisclosure.References[1]KaiXiang.(2004).ListedcompaniestodiscloseinformationvoluntarilyCauseofEconomicAnalysisofthe.AccountingCommunications,(5).[2]XianzhongSong.(2006).Enterprisecorecompetenciesofthevoluntarydisclosureofinformation.AccountingResearch,(2)[3]DerongZhang.(2004).Enterprisevoluntarydisclosureofinformation.AccountingDigest,(1)[4]HongYin.(2004).OptimizationofChina'slistedcompaniesOpiniononvoluntarydisclosureofinformation.AccountingDigest,(6)一个自愿性信息披露与我国上市公司监管问题的研究体系摘要上市公司自愿性信息是企业形象的基础上，投资者有关，这是为了避免诉讼，除强制信息披露的风险。资料显示，该公司主动披露，是披露信息的重要组成部分。它是一种有效的方式，表明自己的核心竞争能力。笔者分析了自愿披露的信息，这在中国大陆上市公司存在，提出了建设监理制度，上市公司自愿性信息披露的建议的问题。*关键词:上市公司;强制信息披露;自愿性信息披露;监督引言作为上市公司的数量增加和日益激烈的市场竞争的扩大，市场竞争变得更为困难，越来越多的上市公司。为了赶上稀缺的资源-资本，企业倾向于选择自愿性信息披露方式。与上市公司自愿披露的信息，是指企业形象，投资者关系，避免诉讼，除强制信息披露的风险。然而，监管制度不够好，信息披露自愿很难被证明的真理。因此，它变得越来越重要，建立与上市公司自愿性信息披露监管制度。1.强制信息披露的动机信息，自愿披露，在对上市公司高管人员受益主动披露。据“经济人理性”的经济理论，警司平衡的行为，不采取完全的利益和行为，这是成本计算的基础。院长的决策也是基于成本效益分析，如果自愿性信息披露带来的好处是低于成本较大，则院长可进行自愿披露，否则，院长相当不进行志愿信息透露，他们的态度会改变的收入与成本的关系发生变化。（启翔，2004年）随着中国资本市场的逐步发展，企业管理当局可以降低平均资本成本，提高金融分析师和投资者的利益，提高公司的信心水平，改善投资关系，突出企业的竞争优势，提高公司股票的市场流动性，但也可能会降低公司的诉讼风险，因为披露是不够的，等等，除了强制披露信息披露义务的信息。中国资本市场的信息披露也可以逐步向并重自愿和强制披露的阶段，而不是单纯的强制披露有关的自愿性信息披露的必将是有效的方式，其中上市公司可以证明核心竞争能力，与有关各方沟通，并说明该公司的未来。（献忠宋，2006年）2。强制信息披露的内容与上市公司自愿披露的信息是指企业形象，关乎投资者，避免除强制信息披露的诉讼风险。学习国外上市公司自愿披露信息的经验，并根据情况在中国，上市公司自愿披露的信息包括:这些前瞻性信息的基础上，公司的“核心能力”。它包含的运作，业务计划，战略规划，商业环境等。所有的信息可以帮助投资者作出理性的投资判断和决策;信息沟通与市场中介机构和投资者或得到他们的评价资料;人力资源信息。根据知识经济社会条件下，人类CapitalbecOmes越来越重要。特别是在高科技，高成长型企业，员工是公司最宝贵的资产。研究表明，这些公司均显着高于其他企业更好地在自愿披露的信息上述问题;据保守原则的会计标准，也有在适当的披露规则的要求或低缺乏披露，这对投资决策，如公允价值的，有用的;公司治理，环境保护和社会责任，因为没有强制披露信息的复杂性，从计量和披露（德荣张，2004）。.义务教育阶段存在的主要问题存在信息披露低利率和低自愿性信息披露的倡议一个上市公司数量视为额外负担自愿披露的信息，而不是义务或权利，应赋予股东实物。因此，他们将被动披露的信息，这就是说，他们将采取以下披露尽可能少。光阴荏苒，这一概念的理解是被人们所接受，因此在信息披露的偏差，使上市公司处于被动的反应。最主要的原因是，上市公司过于担心，告诉公众在其管理的秘诀，从而对信息披露造成的心理恐惧和回避他们。缺乏对自愿性信息披露的完整性今天，中国上市公司自愿披露信息的做法并不令人满意。许多上市公司都不愿透露，一些上市公司只披露该公司的财务信息，但具有一定的风险，或者其他严重问题的“坏消息”或涉及的事项，这些公司保持沉默。此外，许多上市公司没有充分披露的可信性，希望投资者对“流行”，然后帮助他们取得成功的依据。中国投资者并不成熟，特别是在加工，处理和分析资料。因此，它是非常难以判断通过该公司转移的信号，公司的价值。自愿披露虚假信息一般而言，自愿性信息披露具有较高的可信度。对于非强制性要求的信息，管理者往往不披露可能导致减少诉讼风险，避免法律制裁的风险信息披露。此外，高品质的信息披露对投资者企业的主要动机是传达企业的信号质量，以减少监测费用。自愿性信息披露一般具有较高的质量。然而，强制性披露的情况下一样规范严格的准则，以及当局的机会主义倾向，容易出现道德风险问题。更重要的是，企业的质量差的信号转导，虚假信息传输理论的基础上，自愿披露的信息不是以强制性信息相同，以经过严格审核。与自愿披露的信息难以保证质量。自愿性信息披露的内容不规范目前，主要是我国上市公司信息披露义务，以及在一些文件中的信息披露义务分散在现实中，我国上市公司自愿披露信息，不能满足监管机构，证券分析师和投资者的需求，无论其内容或质量。在信息内容的规范我国上市公司自愿披露。在中国证券监督管理委员会发出的“公开发行股票，企业信息的内容和格式1-6中注明”开在这里的有关规定标准“披露，”虽然自愿披露信