荷兰国际关系研究所-欧盟安全防务战略指南针（英文）-2021.5-76正式版

TheEU’sStrategicCompassforsecurityanddefence

Squaringambitionwithreality

DickZandee

AdájaStoetman

BobDeen

ClingendaelReport

TheEU’sStrategicCompassforsecurityanddefence

Squaringambitionwithreality

DickZandee

AdájaStoetman

BobDeen

ClingendaelReport

May2021

Disclaimer:TheresearchforandproductionofthisreporthasbeenconductedwithinthePROGRESSresearchframeworkagreement.Responsibilityforthecontentsandfortheopinionsexpressed,restssolelywiththeauthorsanddoesnotconstitute,norshouldbeconstruedas,anendorsementbytheNetherlandsMinistriesofForeignAffairsandDefence.

May2021

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Abouttheauthors

DickZandeeisHeadoftheSecurityUnitattheClingendaelInstitute.HisresearchfocusesonEuropeansecurityanddefenceissues,EU-NATO,militaryforcesandcapabilitydevelopment,defenceindustryandothersecuritytopics.

AdájaStoetmanisJuniorResearcherattheSecurityUnitoftheClingendaelInstitute.Herworkrevolvesbotharoundsecurityanddefenceaswellasstrategicforesight.Herareaofexpertiseisinternationalsecurity,withaspecificinterestinLatinAmericaandtheDutchCaribbean.

BobDeeniscoordinatoroftheClingendaelRussiaandEasternEuropeCentre(CREEC)andSeniorResearchFellowintheSecurityUnitoftheClingendaelInstitute.Hisresearchcentresoninternationalsecurityissuesandmultilateralcooperation,withaparticularfocusonEasternEurope,Russia,theCaucasusandCentralAsia.

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Contents

ExecutiveSummary 

1

ListofAcronyms 

7

1

Introduction 

9

2

TheneedforaStrategicCompass 

11

3

WhattheEUshouldbeabletodo 

16

4

Whatisneededtogetthere 

29

5

HowtobettercooperatewithNATO 

45

6

Recommendations 

52

Annex1

WrittencontributionbyVice-Adm.(Ret.)BenBekkering 

54

Annex2

WrittencontributionbyMichaelSimm 

60

Annex3

WrittencontributionbyDr.(Hab)RenaudBellais 

66

ExecutiveSummary

TheEuropeanUnion(EU)isdevelopingaStrategicCompassforsecurityanddefence,tobereadybyMarch2022.Thefirstsemesterof2021isthephaseofthe‘strategicdialogue’withthememberstatesandinstitutionsoftheEU,includingtheinvolvementofthinktanksandotherstakeholders.CommissionedbytheMinistriesofDefenceandForeignAffairsoftheNetherlands,theClingendaelInstitutedeliversitscontributiontothestrategicdialogueontheStrategicCompassbyfocussingondefiningmorepreciselythemilitarylevelofambitionoftheEUandwhatitimpliesforcapabilitydevelopmentandtherelationshipwithNATO.

TheEUfacesawidersetofchallengesandthreatsthaneverbefore.IntheglobalpowerrivalrybetweenChina,RussiaandtheUnitedStates,itis‘Europe’thatrunsthedangerofbecomingirrelevantandtheobjectofgreatpoweractionsratherthanbeingaglobalactor.ThearcofinstabilityaroundEuropeisunlikelytoturnintoanarcofstability.Thechallengesposedbystateandnon-stateactors–thelatterinparticularinthesouthernneighbourhood–requiretheEUtorespondtoexternalconflictsandcrises,tosupportpartnerstoprovidesecurityfortheirownpopulationandtoprotecttheUnionanditscitizens–thethreestrategicprioritiesfortheEU’sCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP)asdefinedfiveyearsagointheImplementationPlanonSecurityandDefence.WhiletheEUhasmadeprogressinmanyareas–tradepolicies,partnerships,civiliancrisismanagement–itsmilitarytoolshaveremainedweakasaresultofalackofpoliticalwillandtheabsenceofadequatemilitarymeans.

TheStrategicCompassofferstheopportunitytoclosethegapbetween‘toomuchrhetoric’and‘toolittleaction’thathavecharacterisedtheEU’ssecurityanddefenceeffortssofar.Inrecentyears,newinstrumentshavebeencreatedtoimproveEuropeandefencecooperation–suchastheCoordinatedAnnualReviewonDefence(CARD),PermanentStructuredCooperation(PESCO)andtheEuropeanDefenceFund(EDF)–butthesearewhattheyare:withoutstrategicdirectioninstrumentstendtobecomebureaucratictoolsratherthantherailsonwhichthetraintravelstoitsdestination.

IntheStrategicCompasstheEUhastodefinemorepreciselyitsmilitarylevelofambitionandwhatitimpliesforcapabilitydevelopmentandpartnerships.Inshort,thereporttriestoanswertwoquestions:(1)whatshouldtheEUbeabletodo,and

whatisneededtogetthere?TherelationshipwithNATOhastobetakenintoaccountinansweringthesekeyquestions.

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WhatshouldtheEUbeabletodo?

ParalleltotheEU’sStrategicCompass,theAllianceisdevelopingitsnewStrategicConcept.Itoffersauniqueopportunitytoensurecomplementarityandtoendtheuselessdiscussionon‘eithertheEUorNATO’–mainlyfuelledbypoliticalagendasinsteadofpracticalarguments.Bothorganisationsaremuchneededand,thus,thequestionishowtheEU-NATOstrategicpartnershipshouldbefurtherdeveloped.

Asthememberstatesdeliverthemilitarycapabilities,thereisonlyoneconclusiontobemade:capabilitydevelopmentintheEUalsoservesNATOas21Europeancountriesaremembersofbothorganisations.TheUSwillcontinuetodemandthatEuropetakesmoreresponsibilityforitsownsecurityanddeliversalargerpartoftheNATOburden.Thus,theStrategicCompassshouldstatewhatEuropeisableandwillingtodo,whileatthesametimeindicatingthat,intermsofmilitarycapabilities,thiswillcontributetoafairerNATOburden-sharingwiththeUS.

FortheEU’smilitarylevelofambition,therealityofavailablecapabilitieshastobefactoredin.SeriousshortfallscontinuetoexistandlimitthescopeoftheEU’slevelofambitionwithregardtothespectrumofoperations–withshortcomingsatthehighend–aswellaswithregardtosustaineddeploymentandgeographicalreachduetopersonnelandequipmentshortages.Therefore,ambitionhastobesquaredwithrealism.Ascapabilitydevelopmenttakesconsiderabletime,theEUshouldmakeadistinctionbetweenthemilitarylevelofambitionintheshortterm,fromnowto2030,andthelongterm,thatisbeyondthatyear.

Shortterm

TheHelsinkiHeadlineGoalisoutdatedandisnotrelatedtothenew360-degreethreatenvironmentthattheEUisfacinginthe2020sandbeyond.ThebroadrangeofcrisismanagementoperationsasdefinedintheImplementationPlanforSecurityandDefenceof2016isstillvalidasthebasisfor‘whattheEUshouldbeabletodo’inthenearterm.Militaryoperationsforstrengtheningresiliencehavetobeincludedforensuringstableaccesstotheglobalcommons,includingtheprotectionofsealanesofcommunication(SLOC),airreconnaissanceandspace.TheEUshouldnotestablishanewquantitativeHeadlineGoalasmilitaryoperationswillrequiretailor-madeforcepackages.Instead,StrategicOperationalCases(SOCs)couldbedeveloped,describingthemostlikelygeographicalenvironment,thecharacteristicsoftheopponentanditswayofoperatingandwhatEUforcesoractionswouldbeneededinresponse.TheEUBattlegroups,butalsonewforcepackages,suchastheproposedEUinitialentrycapabilityofaround5,000militarywithallnecessaryenablers,havetobeincorporatedintheseSOCs.

ForexternaloperationsthegeographicalfocusshouldbeonthesouthernneighbourhoodandtheIndianOcean,withthepossibilityofdemonstratinga

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maritimepresenceinthePacific.Althoughtherecanbenoformaldivisionoflabour,thecomparativeadvantageoftheEU–theabilitytousethewholecivilianandmilitarytoolbox–arguesfortheUnionastheprimaryresponsibleorganisationincrisismanagement,inparticularinthesouthernneighbourhood,whileNATOremainsresponsibleforcollectivedefence.

Resiliencehasbothaninternalaswellasanexternaldimension.Hence,theEUmilitarylevelofambitioncannolongerbelimitedtoexternaloperationsthatcontributetotheresilienceofneighbouringandpartnercountries.Incontrast,theEUneeds

toactivelyengageinenhancingresilienceamongitsmemberstates.TheStrategicCompassshoulddefinewhattheEUanditsmemberstatesmeanbyresilienceanditsvariouselements.Article42.7(mutualdefenceclause)couldbeactivatedbyanEUmemberstateincaseofarmedattack,beitmostlikelyconsistingofcyberattacksorofotherhybridintrusioninmemberstates’domesticsituation.AnEUJointCyberUnitcouldbeestablishedprovidingthecoordinationhubfornationalcybercentres.Militarycybersecuritycommandsororganisationsshouldbeconnectedtothisnetwork.Intelligence-sharingisanotherareawherethemilitarycanprovideaddedvalue.TheSOCsshouldalsocoverEU-coordinatedmilitaryactivitiestocounterhybridthreatsunderArticle42.7(mutualdefenceclause)aswellasinthecontextofArticle222(solidarityclause)formilitarysupporttocivilianactors–thelatterpotentiallytobeusedforexampleinthecaseofdisasters.BasedontheCovid-19experience,EU-coordinatedmilitarymedicalsupportforfightingpandemicsshouldbeadded

asanewcategorytoArticle222.Thewiderangeofhybridthreatsrequireawiderangeofpotentialresponses.Asafirststep,allavailableresourcesshouldbelisted.Consequently,arrangementsforEU-coordinatedmilitaryassistancetomemberstatescouldbedeveloped.TheEUandNATOhavetodiscussthedelineationofresponsibilityandmilitarytaskswithregardtohybridthreats,inparticularcyberattacks.AnEUfocusoncivilianinfrastructurewhileNATOconcentratesonmilitaryinfrastructureseemstobealogicaldivisionoflabour.TheexistingCyberCentreofExcellenceinTallinn(Estonia)couldbetransformedintoajointCyberCentreofExcellencethatprovidestheforumforstrategicdiscussions,jointtrainingandexercises.

Longterm

By2030andbeyondtheEUmustbeabletoexecuteahighermilitarylevelofambitionwhichwillrequirecapabilitydevelopmentatanequallyambitiouslevel.WhileNATOremainsresponsibleforcollectivedefence,theEUneedstobeabletoconductallexternaloperationsmentionedfortheshortterm,butacrossthefullspectrumandinalldomains:allsortsofairassignments;landoperationswithallnecessarycombatcapabilities;large-scalenavaloperations;defensiveandoffensivecyberoperations;andthefulluseofspaceassetsforglobalpositioning(Galileo),observation(Copernicus)andsecureGovernmentalSatelliteCommunications.

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Forexternaloperationsthegeographicalscopeshouldbecomeworldwide,notrequiringapermanentEUmilitarypresenceacrosstheglobebuttheabilitytooperateinalldomainsinallareasoftheworldifneeded.

Resiliencemightdemandadditionalmilitaryaction,dependingonthefurtherdevelopmentofthesecurityenvironment.Increasedhybridchallengeswilldemandincreasedcounter-hybridresponses.ItmightbecomenecessarytomovefromEUcoordinationtoanincreaseddegreeofintegrationofEUcapabilities,inparticularinareaslikeintelligence-sharing.

Whatisneededtogetthere?

Inordertospeedupdecision-makingthefollowingpotentialshouldbeexplored:connectingtheuseofconstructiveabstentiontofinancialincentives(non-contributiontocommoncosts);betteruseofArticle44bydelegatingtheoperationalplanningandforcegenerationofmilitaryEUoperationstoasmallergroupofmemberstates;exploringthefurtheruseoftheCoordinatedMaritimePresencesconcept,alsoforoperationsintheairdomain,startingwithintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissancetasks.

ItisimportanttokeepinmindthattheremightbecircumstancesinwhichtheEUwillnotbeabletoactduetotheinabilitytodecidewhattodo.Insuchcases,aCoalitionoftheWilling,operatingoutsidetheEUcontext,hastoremainasthealternativeformatforaction.InothercasesNATOcouldstillbethepreferredoption,inparticulariftheparticipationoftheUnitedStatesisdeemedessential.

WiththegradualincreaseoftheEU’smilitarylevelofambitionitsmilitary-strategiccommand&controlstructurehastobeadapted:theMilitaryPlanningandConductCapability(MPCC)shouldbeenlargedtoplanandconductallEUmilitaryoperationswhichrequirespermanentmanninginsteadofworkingwithaugmentees.Inthelongterm,anEUCivil-MilitaryHeadquartersisneededinordertooptimisetheplanningandconductoftheintegratedapproach.SuchanEUCiv-MilHQwouldconsistofcollocatedmilitaryandciviliancommandandcontrolcomponents.

TheEU’scapacitytorespondmorerapidlyandmoreefficientlytosuddenconflictsorcriseswillalsobeenhancedbycontingencyplanning,advanceplanningandscenariodevelopment.TheStrategicOperationalCasescanbeusedforthispurpose.Thescenariosshouldencompassallsortsofoperations,basedontheshort-andlong-termmilitarylevelofambition.Contingencyplansshouldregularlybeadapted

tothechangingsecurityenvironment.TheEUshouldmakeuseofcontingencyplansalreadydevelopedbyNATOtotheextentpossibleandapplicable.Furthermore,EUliveexerciseshavetobeorganisedinordertobebetterpreparedforoperations.

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Withregardtocapabilitydevelopment,thereisnoneedfornewinstruments,butratherafullexploitationoftheexistingtools:CARDshouldbefurtherdevelopedandmemberstatesshouldbecome‘areafacilitators’inthecapabilityfocusareas;thecommitmentsdefinedinPESCOshouldberaisedandpeerpressurehastobeincreasedifmemberstatesdonotfulfilthem;andtheEDFneedsevenstrongercapability-basedinput,e.g.,bycreatinganEUGovernments-IndustriesForum.CombiningCARDandPESCOfortheirassessmentandreviewroleshastobeconsidered.

TheEUandNATOshouldfurtheraligntheNATODefencePlanningProcess(NDPP)andtheEUcapabilitydevelopmentprocesses.Althoughtheyremaindifferentintheirpurposeandnature,thereisadditionalscopeforalignment,inparticularintheareaofmonitoring,assessingandreviewingtheperformanceoftheircommonmemberstatesinfulfillingbothNATOforcegoalsandEUcapabilitypriorities.

NationalimplementationoftheEUinstrumentsiskeytoendthefragmentationoftheEuropeandefencelandscape.NexttoinitiativestoincreaseEUawarenessinthedefenceministriesandnationalarmedforces,itiscrucialtointegratetheEUcapabilityprioritiesandrelatedprogrammesandprojectswiththenationaldefence

andprocurementplanningprocesses–andnottoconsidertheseassomething‘additional’.

Space,cyberandemerging&disruptivetechnologies(EDTs)areallcharacterisedbydual-usepotential,withcivilianandcommercialcustomersoftendominatingdemandandsupply.ForthemilitaryitisoftheutmostimportancetomakemaximumuseofexistingEUdual-usecapabilities(Galileo,Copernicus,etc.)aswellastoconnecttocivilian-drivendual-useresearchandtechnology/development.TheTechnologyRoadmapoftheEuropeanCommission,tobereadybyOctober2021,isanimportanttoolforprioritisingtheselectionofinvestmentunderEUprogrammes.

Increasedcross-borderdefencetechnologicalandindustrialcooperationistheothersideofthecointoendintra-Europeandefencefragmentation.Multinationalprogrammeswithalargenumberofmemberstatesandtheirdefenceindustriesinvolvedshouldfocusonenablingcapabilitiessuchastransportandcommunicationassets.Smallergovernments-industriescombinationsarerequiredforcombatequipment,

buttheyshouldbebasedonacoreconsistingofFranceandGermany.TheEDFisthebestinstrumenttoconnectSmallandMedium-sizedEnterprisestolargerdefenceindustriesacrossnationalborders.

AnewareatolookatisthestructuringofEuropeanforces,whichcouldbuildonongoingnationalcapabilitypriorities,inparticularconcerningcountriesfocussingonheavylandforcesandthosewithanorientationtowardsmoremobile,lighterforcesand

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broadernavalcapabilities.NationalcapabilityprofilescouldbeusedasthebasisfordiscussingnewformsofspecialisationbygroupsofEuropeancountries.

TheultimatefactorforthesuccessoftheStrategicCompassissustainedhigh-levelpoliticalpressure.TheEuropeanCouncil’sinvolvementintheStrategicCompassisnotonlyrequiredforitsapproval,butregularlyduringitsimplementationwithreviewsoftheprogressmadeandnewdirectiontobegivenasrequired.

Thewayahead

ThisreportalsoliststenrecommendationsfortheDutchgovernmentforguidingitspolicyandactionsinsupportofthefurtherdevelopmentoftheStrategicCompass.TheyencompasspossibleinputinthenegotiationsontheCompasssuchasarguingforaphasedapproachfortheshort-andthelong-terminordertosquareambitionandrealism.TheNetherlandsshoulddeliveritsfairsharetoEuropeanmilitaryoperationsandtotheMilitaryPlanningandConductCapabilitywhenenlarged.Atthenationallevelfurthermeasureshavetobetaken,inparticularwithregardtointegratingEUcapabilityprioritiesandtargetsinthedefenceplanningprocesses.FurtherscopeforspecialisationshouldbeexploredwithGermanyforheavylandforcesandwithFranceforquicklydeployableinterventioncapabilities.High-levelpoliticalpressureremainsessential,alsoatthenationallevel–requiringthesustainedinvolvementofthewholegovernment,ParliamentandtheDutchsocietyintheEUsecurityanddefenceagendas.Furthermore,DutchdefencespendingwillhavetobeincreasedbythenewgovernmentiftheNetherlandswantstoturnwordsintodeedsonimprovingEuropeansecurityanddefence.

6

ListofAcronyms

ACO AlliedCommandOperations

A2/AD Anti-Access/AerialDenial

CAOC CombinedAirCommandCentre

CARD CoordinatedAnnualReviewonDefence

CDP CapabilityDevelopmentPlan

CERT ComputerEmergencyResponseTeam

CMP CoordinatedMaritimePresence

CoE CentreofExcellence

CoW CoalitionsoftheWilling

CPCC CivilianPlanningandConductCapability

CROC CrisisResponseOperationCore

CRTT CyberRapidResponseTeamsandMutualAssistanceinCyberSecurity

CSDP CommonSecurityandDefencePolicy

EADRCC Euro-AtlanticDisasterResponseCoordinationCentre

EDA EuropeanDefenceAgency

EDF EuropeanDefenceFund

EDT EmergingandDisruptiveTechnologies

EEAS EuropeanExternalActionService

EI2 EuropeanInterventionInitiative

EPF EuropeanPeaceFacility

ERCC EmergenceResponseCoordinationCentre

EU EuropeanUnion

EUCSS EuropeanUnionCyberSecurityStrategy

EUFOR EuropeanUnionForce

EUGS EuropeanUnionGlobalStrategy

EUMS EuropeanUnionMilitaryStaff

FCAS FutureAirCombatSystems

GNI GrossNationalIncome

GovSatCom GovernmentalSatelliteCommunications

GPS GlobalPositioningSystem

HQ Headquarters

IFOR ImplementationForce

IMC InternationalMilitaryCooperation

IPSD ImplementationPlanonSecurityandDefence

ISR Intelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance

JSCC JointSupportCoordinationCell

MED Mediterranean

MGCS MainGroundCombatSystems

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MilitaryMobility

MOC MilitaryOperationsCentre

MPCC MilitaryPlanningandConductCapability

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

NDPP NATODefencePlanningProcess

NPI NationalImplementationPlan

OHQ/FHQ OperationsHeadquarters/ForceHeadquarters

OSCE OrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope

PESCO PermanentStructuredCooperation

PRS PublicRegulatedSignal

QMV QualifiedMajorityVoting

R&T Research&Technology

SHAPE SupremeHeadquartersAlliedPowersEurope

SLOC SeaLanesofCommunication

SME SmallandMedium-sizedEnterprises

SOC StrategicOperationalCases

TEU TreatyontheEuropeanUnion

TFEU TreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion

UAS UnmannedAircraftSystem

UN UnitedNations

UPCM UnionCivilProtectionMechanism

US UnitedStates

8

1 Introduction

Ifonehasnocompass,whenonedoesn’tknowwhereonestandsandwhereonewantstogo,onecandeducethatonehasnoleadershiporinterestinshapingevents.(HelmutKohl,GermanChancellor1982-1998)

Today,wetraveltodestinationsbyusingGPSdevices,butinthedistantpastoneneededacompasstopointintherightdirection.TheEU’sStrategicCompasshasawiderpurpose:besidespointingintherightdirectionitalsohastostatewhattheaimis.According

totheCouncilConclusionsof10May2021“theStrategicCompasswilldefinepolicyorientations,concretegoalsandobjectivesforthenext5to10years,inareassuchascrisismanagement,resilience,capabilitydevelopmentandpartnerships”.TheCompasshastobe“ambitiousandactionable”.1Thefirstresult–thethreatanalysis–wascompletedlastyear.Inthefirstsemesterof2021thestrategicdialoguewithmemberstatesistakingplaceonthefourbasketsoftheStrategicCompass:crisismanagement,resilience,capabilitiesandpartnerships.Thissecondphaseistobefollowedbythedevelopment

oftheStrategicCompasstextinthesecondhalfoftheyear,ultimatelyleadingtoitsadoptioninMarch2022.AlmostinthesametimeframeNATOisundertakingitsownstrategicreflectionprocessandinitiatingthedevelopmentofanewStrategicConcept.AlthoughtheEUandNATOwilldeveloptheirnewdocumentsseparately,clearlythereisarelationshipbetweenthetwothathastobetakenintoaccount.

ThisreportisacontributiontotheEUStrategicCompass,focusinginparticularontheEU’smilitarylevelofambition,bothintermsofthe‘what’andthe‘how’.2WhatlevelofambitionincrisismanagementshouldtheEUaimfor,basedonthechangingsecurityenvironment?Whenitcomestoaddressinghybridthreats,whatrolecouldtheEUhave?Howshouldthisnewlevelofambitionberealised:whatdoesitmeanfortheshortandthelongterm?Furthermore,therelationshipwithNATOisessential.Inaddressingthesequestions,therealitycheckhastobetakenintoaccount.Tooofteninthepast,theEUhaspromisedtoscaleAlpinemountainsbuthasendeduphikingintheArdennes.Thisreportaimsatsquaringambitionwithrealism,withoutlosingsightoftheoverallaimoftheEUtakingmoreresponsibilityforitsownsecurity.Inchapter2theauthorsexplaintheoverallcontextandtheneedfordevelopingtheStrategicCompass.Chapter3addressestheissueof‘whattheEUshouldbeabletodo’anditsimplicationsforcrisismanagement,themilitarylevelofambition,thesortsofoperationstobeconducted,themilitarycontribution

CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,

CouncilConclusionsonSecurityandDefence

,8396/21,(Brussels:10May2021),paragraph2.

ThecivilianaspectsofEUcrisismanagementareexcludedinthisreport.

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toresilience–splitupfortheshortandthelongterm.Inchapter4thekeyissueis‘whatisneeded’inordertoimplementtheEU’smilitarylevelofambition,addressingvariouselementssuchasdecision-making,institutionaladjustmentandcapabilitydevelopment.ThetopicofhowtofurtherimproveEU-NATOcooperationisaddressedinchapter5.ThereportendswithrecommendationsthatarespecificallyfocusedontheNetherlands.

ThemethodologyappliedtothisreportisbasedonamixofliteraturedeskresearchandinterviewsconductedwithexpertsinEUmemberstatesandEUinstitutions.

On28April2021awebinarwasorganised,theresultsofwhichhavebeentakenintoaccountwhencompletingthereport.3Threeexternalauthorshavedeliveredwrittencontributionswhichareannexedtothereport.Vice-Admiral(Ret.)BenBekkeringprovidesamilitarypointofview,MichaelSimmaddressesthetopicofcapabilitydevelopmentandRenaudBellaisdeliversinputfromadefence-industrialperspective.Theauthorswouldliketothankthethreeexternalcontributorsfortheirvaluableessays,thecontentofwhichremainstheirresponsibility.4

TheClingendaelInstituteandtheEuropeanUnionInstituteforStrategicStudies(EUISS),“

Marchingto

where?TheoperationaldimensionoftheStrategicCompass

”(EventReport),webinarsupportedb