劳动需求弹性估计课件

Chapter5

NonwagelaborcostsQuasi-fixedcostsandtheireffectsondemandDefinitionofQuasi-fixedcostNotstrictlyproportionaltohoursofworkNonwageEffectsThechoicefirmshavebetweenhiringmoreworkersandemployingthosealreadyonthepayrollforlongerhours.NonwagelaborcostsNonwagelaborcostsinclude:hiringcosts,NonwagelaborcostsNonwagelaborcostsinclude:hiringcosts,trainingcosts,NonwagelaborcostsNonwagelaborcostsinclude:hiringcosts,trainingcosts,employeebenefits.HiringcostsHiringcostsincludethecostsassociatedwith:placingadvertisements,HiringcostsHiringcostsincludethecostsassociatedwith:placingadvertisements,selectingcandidatesforinterviews,HiringcostsHiringcostsincludethecostsassociatedwith:placingadvertisements,selectingcandidatesforinterviews,interviewingcandidates,HiringcostsHiringcostsincludethecostsassociatedwith:placingadvertisements,selectingcandidatesforinterviews,interviewingcandidates,selectingcandidatesforjoboffers,HiringcostsHiringcostsincludethecostsassociatedwith:placingadvertisements,selectingcandidatesforinterviews,interviewingcandidates,selectingcandidatesforjoboffers,negotiatingjoboffers,HiringcostsHiringcostsincludethecostsassociatedwith:placingadvertisements,selectingcandidatesforinterviews,interviewingcandidates,selectingcandidatesforjoboffers,negotiatingjoboffers,andprocessingtheworker'semployment(fillingoutW4forms,I9forms,andaddingtheworkertothecompany'sinsuranceandpensionplans)inthehumanresourcesdepartmentofthefirm.HiringcostsdifferencesacrossfirmsInthesecondarylabormarket,hiringcostsaregenerallyrelativelylow.HiringcostsdifferencesacrossfirmsInthesecondarylabormarket,hiringcostsaregenerallyrelativelylow.Hiringcostsintheprimarylabormarket,however,canbeverysubstantial,particularlywhenafirmisoperatinginanationallabormarket.TrainingcostsTrainingcostsinclude:theexplicitcostofhiringtrainersandusingmaterials(suchasmanuals,videotapes,andcapitalequipment)fortrainingpurposes,TrainingcostsTrainingcostsinclude:theexplicitcostofhiringtrainersandusingmaterials(suchasmanuals,videotapes,andcapitalequipment)fortrainingpurposes,theimplicitcostofusingotherworkers,rawmaterials,andcapitalduringinformalon-the-jobtraining,TrainingcostsTrainingcostsinclude:theexplicitcostofhiringtrainersandusingmaterials(suchasmanuals,videotapes,andcapitalequipment)fortrainingpurposes,theimplicitcostofusingotherworkers,rawmaterials,andcapitalduringinformalon-the-jobtraining,andtheopportunitycostofthetrainee'stimeduringtraining.Trainingcostsandwageofferslowwages-higherturnoverratesandlowerqualityapplicants,leadingtohighertrainingcosts.Trainingcostsandwageofferslowwages-higherturnoverratesandlowerqualityapplicants,leadingtohighertrainingcosts.highwages-lowerturnoverratesandhigherqualityapplicants,leadingtolowertrainingcostsEmployeebenefitslegallymandatedsocialinsuranceprograms(suchassocialsecurityandunemploymentcompensation),Employeebenefitslegallymandatedsocialinsuranceprograms(suchassocialsecurityandunemploymentcompensation),andprivatelyprovidedbenefitssuchashealthinsurance,vacationpay,andpensionplans.Quasi-fixedcostsQuasi-fixedcostsarecoststhatvarywiththenumberofworkershiredbythefirm,butnotwithhoursworkedperemployee.OptimalmixofemploymentandhoursFirmsmayincreasetheiruseoflaborby:addingadditionalworkers,OptimalmixofemploymentandhoursFirmsmayincreasetheiruseoflaborby:addingadditionalworkers,increasingthelengthoftheworkweek,OptimalmixofemploymentandhoursFirmsmayincreasetheiruseoflaborby:addingadditionalworkers,increasingthelengthoftheworkweek,orsomecombinationofincreasesinhoursandincreasesinthenumberofworkers.ProductionfunctionQ=f(M,H)where:Q=quantityofoutputM=numberofworkersH=lengthofaverageworkweekProductionfunctionQ=f(M,H)where:Q=quantityofoutputM=numberofworkersH=lengthofaverageworkweekMPofMdeclinesasMincreasesProductionfunctionQ=f(M,H)where:Q=quantityofoutputM=numberofworkersH=lengthofaverageworkweekMPofMdeclinesasMincreasesMPofHdeclinesasHincreasesOptimalmixofMandH=MPHMEHMPMMEMWhere:MPM=marginalproductofMMEM=marginalexpenseofMMPH=marginalproductofHMEH=marginalexpenseofHEffectofanincreaseinmandatedovertimepremiumequivalenttoanincreaseinMEHEffectofanincreaseinmandatedovertimepremiumequivalenttoanincreaseinMEHsubstitutioneffect:MincreasesandHdecreasesEffectofanincreaseinmandatedovertimepremiumequivalenttoanincreaseinMEHsubstitutioneffect:MincreasesandHdecreasesscaleeffect:MandHbothdecreaseEffectofanincreaseinmandatedovertimepremiumInamorecompletemodel,othereffectswouldoccur:asubstitutionofcapitalandotherinputsforlabor,EffectofanincreaseinmandatedovertimepremiumInamorecompletemodel,othereffectswouldoccur:asubstitutionofcapitalandotherinputsforlabor,increasednoncompliance,EffectofanincreaseinmandatedovertimepremiumInamorecompletemodel,othereffectswouldoccur:asubstitutionofcapitalandotherinputsforlabor,increasednoncompliance,onlylimitedsubstitutionoflessskilledunemployedworkersfortheskilledworkerswhotendtoworkovertimehours,EffectofanincreaseinmandatedovertimepremiumInamorecompletemodel,othereffectswouldoccur:asubstitutionofcapitalandotherinputsforlabor,increasednoncompliance,onlylimitedsubstitutionoflessskilledunemployedworkersfortheskilledworkerswhotendtoworkovertimehours,increasedmoonlighting,EffectofanincreaseinmandatedovertimepremiumInamorecompletemodel,othereffectswouldoccur:asubstitutionofcapitalandotherinputsforlabor,increasednoncompliance,onlylimatedsubstitutionoflessskilledunemployedworkersfortheskilledworkerswhotendtoworkovertimehours,increasedmoonlighting,andadeclineinthebaserateofcompensationinthoseindustriesthatusesignificantamountsofovertime.

Part-timeemploymentandmandatedbenefitsThequasi-fixedcostsassociatedwithfull-timeemployeesisusuallyhigherthanthequasi-fixedcostsassociatedwithpart-timeemployees.Part-timeemploymentandmandatedbenefitsThequasi-fixedcostsassociatedwithfull-timeemployeesisusuallyhigherthanthequasi-fixedcostsassociatedwithpart-timeemployees.Mandatoryhealthinsurancewouldreducetheuseofpart-timeemployment.Multi-perioddemandforlaborfirmsmaylosemoneyduringatrainingperiodiftheycanreceiveasufficientreturnonthetraininginvestmentinsubsequentperiods.PresentvaluePresentvalueThepresentvalueofafuturepaymentislowerwhen:thepaymentisreceivedinthemore-distantfuture,PresentvalueThepresentvalueofafuturepaymentislowerwhen:thepaymentisreceivedinthemore-distantfuture,and/ortheinterestrateisrelativelyhigh.Twoperiodmodel:definitionsWo=wageduringtrainingW1=post-trainingwageW*=wageifnotrainingisreceived(thesameineachperiod)Z=hiringandtrainingcost(paidduringthetrainingperiod)MPo=marginalproductduringtrainingMP1=marginalproductaftertrainingMP*=marginalproductifnotrainingisreceived(assumedtobethesameineachperiod)ShiftsinMPduetotrainingOptimalemploymentwhentrainingcostsarepresentPV(MRP)=PV(MFC)OptimalemploymentwhentrainingcostsarepresentPV(MRP)=PV(MFC)Definitions:PVP=MPo+MP1/(1+r),OptimalemploymentwhentrainingcostsarepresentPV(MRP)=PV(MFC)Definitions:PVP=MPo+MP1/(1+r),andPVE=Wo+Z+W1/(1+r).OptimalemploymentwhentrainingcostsarepresentPV(MRP)=PV(MFC)Definitions:PVP=MPo+MP1/(1+r),andPVE=Wo+Z+W1/(1+r).Optimalemployment:PVP=PVEOptimalemploymentwhentrainingcostsarepresentPV(MRP)=PV(MFC)Definitions:PVP=MPo+MP1/(1+r),andPVE=Wo+Z+W1/(1+r).Optimalemployment:PVP=PVEMPo+MP1/(1+r)=Wo+Z+W1/(1+r)OptimalemploymentwhentrainingcostsarepresentOptimalemploymentwhentrainingcostsarepresentWo+Z-MPo=(MP1-W1)/(1+r),OptimalemploymentwhentrainingcostsarepresentWo+Z-MPo=(MP1-W1)/(1+r),orNEo=GGeneralandfirm-specifictrainingGeneraltrainingistrainingthatraisesaworker'sproductivityinmorethanonefirm.Generalandfirm-specifictrainingGeneraltrainingistrainingthatraisesaworker'sproductivityinmorethanonefirm.Firm-specifictrainingincreasestheworker'sproductivityonlyinthecurrentfirm.CostsofgeneraltrainingSincegeneraltrainingraisestheproductivityoftheworkerinmorethanonefirm,thecosts(andbenefits)ofgeneraltrainingareexpectedtobebornebytheworker.CostsofgeneraltrainingSincegeneraltrainingraisestheproductivityoftheworkerinmorethanonefirm,thecosts(andbenefits)ofgeneraltrainingareexpectedtobebornebytheworker.Wo=MPo-Z,andCostsofgeneraltrainingSincegeneraltrainingraisestheproductivityoftheworkerinmorethanonefirm,thecosts(andbenefits)ofgeneraltrainingareexpectedtobebornebytheworker.Wo=MPo-Z,andW1=MP1Costsoffirm-specifictrainingIfworkersbearthecosts,thereisnoreasonforthefirmtokeeptheworker.Costsoffirm-specifictrainingIfworkersbearthecosts,thereisnoreasonforthefirmtokeeptheworker.Iffirmsbearthecosts,thereisnoreasonforworkerstostay.Costsoffirm-specifictrainingIfworkersbearthecosts,thereisnoreasonforthefirmtokeeptheworker.Iffirmsbearthecosts,thereisnoreasonforworkerstostay.Itisexpectedthatthecostsof(andbenefitsfrom)firm-specifictrainingwillbeshared.Costsoffirm-specifictrainingIfworkersbearthecosts,thereisnoreasonforthefirmtokeeptheworker.Iffirmsbearthecosts,thereisnoreasonforworkerstostay.Itisexpectedthatthecostsof(andbenefitsfrom)firm-specifictrainingwillbeshared.MPo-Z<Wo<MP*Costsoffirm-specifictrainingIfworkersbearthecosts,thereisnoreasonforthefirmtokeeptheworker.Iffirmsbearthecosts,thereisnoreasonforworkerstostay.Itisexpectedthatthecostsof(andbenefitsfrom)firm-specifictrainingwillbeshared.MPo-Z<Wo<MP*MP*<W1<MP1Layoffs,productivity,andtrainingafirmwillbemorereluctanttolayoffworkerswhohavereceivedtraininginvestmentspaidforbythefirm,Layoffs,productivity,andtrainingafirmwillbemorereluctanttolayoffworkerswhohavereceivedtraininginvestmentspaidforbythefirm,firmsaremorelikelytorelyonovertimeratherthanusingadditionalemployeesinthosemarketsinwhichfirmspayasubstantialshareoftrainingcosts,Layoffs,productivity,andtrainingafirmwillbemorereluctanttolayoffworkerswhohavereceivedtraininginvestmentspaidforbythefirm,firmsaremorelikelytorelyonovertimeratherthanusingadditionalemployeesinthosemarketsinwhichfirmspayasubstantialshareoftrainingcosts,productivityfallsduringarecession,Layoffs,productivity,andtrainingafirmwillbemorereluctanttolayoffworkerswhohavereceivedtraininginvestmentspaidforbythefirm,firmsaremorelikelytorelyonovertimeratherthanusingadditionalemployeesinthosemarketsinwhichfirmspayasubstantialshareoftrainingcosts,productivityfallsduringarecession,andrisesduringanexpansion.MinimumwageandtrainingcostsForworkerstobearpartorallofthecostoftheirtraining,theymustbepaidlessduringthetrainingperiod.Mi