海外发展研究所-数字身份、生物特征和 纳入人道主义反应 难民危机（英）-2021.10-45正式版

HPGworkingpaperKerrieHolloway,ReemAlMasriandAfnanAbuYahiaOctober2021Readersareencouragedtoreproducematerialfortheirownpublications,aslongastheyarenotbeingsoldcommercially.ODIrequestsdueacknowledgementandacopyofthepublication.Forꢀonlineuse,weaskreaderstolinktotheoriginalresourceontheODIwebsite.Theviewspresentedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsofODIorourpartners.ThisworkislicensedunderCCBY-NC-ND4.0.Howtocite:Holloway,K.,AlMasri,R.andAbuYahia,A.(2021)Digitalidentity,biometricsandinclusioninhumanitarianresponsesꢀtorefugeecrises.HPGworkingpaper.London:ODI(/en/publications/digital-identity-biometrics-and-inclusion-in-humanitarian-responses-to-refugee-crises).ThisPDFhasbeenpreparedinaccordancewithgoodpracticeonaccessibility.Covergraphic:Fingerprint.MuhammadRidho/NounProjectAcknowledgementsTheauthorswouldliketothanktherefugeesandcontactsinJordanandkeyinformantswhogavetheirvaluabletimetoparticipateinthisstudy,includingthemanyinformantswhoalsopeerreviewedthispublicationandgaveinvaluablecomments.ThankstoBarnabyWillitts-KingforhisguidanceduringthestudyandtoSorchaO’Callaghan,OliverLoughandJohnBryantwhoalsoprovidedcommentsonanearlydraft.ThestudycouldnothavebeencompletedwithoutthesupportofCatLangdon(ProjectManager),LauraMertsching(ProjectManager),KatieForsythe(Editor)andHannahBass(SeniorPublicationsOfficer).AbouttheauthorsKerrieHollowayisaSeniorResearchOfficeratODI’sHumanitarianPolicyGroup(HPG).ReemAlMasriisaSeniorResearcherat7iberMagazineinJordan.AfnanAbuYahiaisanindependentconsultant.ContentsAcknowledgements/3Listofboxesandtables/5Acronyms/61Introduction/71.1Methodology/91.2Limitations/112Digitalidentityandbiometricsinthehumanitariansector/122.1Howwegothere:thehistoryofbiometrics/142.2Wherearewenow:biometrics,cashandrefugeesinJordan/182.3Wherewearegoing:thefutureofbiometrics/203Digitalidentityandinclusion/223.1Reasonsforandimplicationsofexclusionfromdigitalidentitysystems/233.2ExperiencesofexclusionfromrefugeesinJordan/254Threeareasofconcernforemployingbiometricsfordigitalidentity/294.1Choiceandinformedconsent/294.2Privacyanddataprotection/314.3Ethicsanddataresponsibility/345Conclusionandrecommendations/365.1Recommendations/37References/39ListofboxesandtablesBoxesBox1Box2Box3Box4Box5Box6Terminology/8WhyJordanwaschosenforthisstudy/11Whyusebiometricsforcashandvoucherassistance?/14Biometrics,digitalidentityandCovid-19/16Biometricsandfinancialinclusion/23Jordan-specificproceduralrecommendations,basedoninterviews/38TablesTable1Table2Stakeholderinterviewsconducted/9Numberofrefugeesinterviewed,bygeographicregion/10AcronymsAIartificialintelligenceAMLATFanti-moneylaunderinganti-terroristfinancingATMCaLPCCFCOautomatedtellermachineCashLearningPartnershipCommonCashFacilitycountryofficeCVADIGIDDRCFSPcashandvoucherassistanceDignifiedIDDemocraticRepublicofCongofinancialserviceproviderGDPRIASCICRCIDGeneralDataProtectionRegulationInter-AgencyStandingCommitteeInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossidentitydocumentINGOIOMJDinternationalnon-governmentalorganisationInternationalOrganizationforMigrationJordanianDinarKYCOCHAOIOSPINknow-your-customerOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairsOfficeofInternalOversightServicespersonalidentificationnumberSustainableDevelopmentGoalUnitedNationsSDGUNUNHCRUNRefugeeAgencyUNRWAUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestineRefugeesintheNearEastWFPWorldFoodProgramme7HPGworkingpaper1IntroductionDigitalidentityandbiometricshavelongbeendivisivetopicsinthehumanitariansector.Ontheonehand,theyhavethepotentialtobemoreinclusiveandreachpeopleinneedatscaleduetoperceivedefficiencygains.AlegalidentityforeveryoneaspartoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)hasspurredthedrivetoinnovationandregistration,particularlyintheaidanddevelopmentsectors.Ontheotherhand,seriousquestionshavebeenraisedaroundtheirpotentialforharm,particularlyrelatedtodataprivacy.Astheuseofdigitalidentityandbiometricscontinuestogrow,thehumanitariansectormustfindwaystoimprovethesystemsthatareinplaceandmitigatepotentialrisks.Theserisksgobeyondtechnicalfailureandrelatetobroaderissues.Theadditionoftechnologyhasoftendeepened,ratherthansolved,long-standingstructuralissues,suchastheunequalpowerdynamicsbetweenaidgiverandaidreceiver,andquestionsofinclusionandexclusion,suchaswhogetstodecidewhoisincludedandhowthesedecisionsaremade.Duetotheirimmutablenature,theuseofbiometricshasthrownupseveralhumanrightsissuesaroundchoice,informedconsent,privacyanddataprotectionforthosewhoneedhumanitarianassistance,aswellashighlightingwiderissuesaroundethicsanddataresponsibilityinthesector.Biometricshavebeenusedtocreatedigitalidentitiesinthehumanitarianspacesincetheearly2000s,thoughlittleresearchhasbeenconductedonhowendusers–inthiscase,thosewhoregisterforhumanitarianassistance–understandandexperienceusingthistechnologytoreceiveaid.This1reportseekstoworktowardsfillingthisgapbysharingtheperspectivesof(mostlySyrian)refugeesinJordanontheirexperienceswithbiometricsalongsideinformationandanalysisonthelargerissuesofdigitalidentity(forterminology,seeBox1).1SomenotableexceptionsincludeCasswell(2019);BakerandRahman(2020);Schoemakeretal.(2020)andIazzolino(2021).8HPGworkingpaperBox1TerminologyForthepurposesofthispaper,digitalidentityrefersto‘asetofelectronicallycapturedandstoredattributesandcredentialsthatcanuniquelyidentifyaperson’(Casswell,2019:64).Itcanbeusedaseitherafoundationalidentity(alegalorpersonalidentity,suchasabirthcertificateorpassport)orafunctionalidentity(anidentityusedtoaccessservices,suchasalibrarycardoranautomatedtellermachine(ATM)card).Anidentitydocument(ID)providesproofofone’siidentity.Occasionally,theuseofbiometricsnegatestheneedforaphysicalID,whenthecaptureofbiometricslinksdirectlytorecordsstoredincentraldatabases,ratherthanonpaper(Ucciferrietal.,2017).Often,however,biometricsareusedinconjunctionwithaphysicalID.Biometricsarethebiologicalorphysiologicalcharacteristics(fingerprints,facialstructures,irisorretinalpatterns,voicerecognition,gait,etc.)measuredandassessedforeitheridentification–whoareyou?–orverification–areyouwhoyousayyouare?–ofanindividualthroughcomparisonwithadatabaseofpreviouslycollectedsamples.Biometricsaresometimesusedtofacilitatedigitalidentityforservicedelivery,butthisuserisessignificantlywithcashandvoucherassistance(CVA),whichhasbecomeakeycomponentofhumanitarianresponses,duetothehigherlevelofassurancerequiredbydonorswhengivingcash.Identificationbybiometricsistypicallyviewedasmoreinvasivethanothermeansofidentification,suchaspersonaldetailslikenamesandaddresses,becauseoftheirimmutability.Bycontrast,biometricshavealsobeenpromotedasawaytopreventidentitytheftbecauseitistiedtoauniqueidentifier.iSeeGelbandClark(2013),KunerandMarelli(2020)andManby(2021)formoreonthisdistinction.9HPGworkingpaper1.1MethodologyThisstudyusedaqualitativeapproachbasedonin-depthinterviewswithglobalstakeholdersandrefugeesinSyria.Thirty-threeinterviewswithkeystakeholdersgloballywereconductedinEnglishbyaresearcherintheUKbetweenDecember2019andMarch2021.TwointerviewswithkeystakeholdersinJordanwereconductedbyresearchersinJordan(seeTable1).Thelocationoftheseinterviewswillnotbeusedthroughoutthereporttoensureallrespondents’anonymity.Interviewswith45refugeeslivingoutsidecampsinJordantookplaceremotely–duetoCovid-19restrictions–betweenFebruaryandApril2021.TheseinterviewswereconductedinArabicbyresearcherslocatedinJordan.Alloftheintervieweeshadhadtheirbiometricdata,includingirisscans,collectedduringtheregistrationprocess,andalloftheintervieweeswerereceivingorhadpreviouslyreceivedassistanceviatheirisauthenticationmodality.Somewerealsoreceivingorhadpreviouslyreceivedassistanceviaapre-paidATMcard.Asof30April2021,88.3%ofrefugeesunderthemandateoftheUnitedNationsRefugeeAgency(UNHCR)inJordanwereSyrian.Likewise,40of245interviewees(88.9%)werefromSyria.Theageandgenderofrespondentsvaried,asdidplaceofresidence(seeTable2).Table1StakeholderinterviewsconductedTypeoforganisationNumberAdvocacyorganisationꢀꢄInternationalnonꢁgovernmentalorganisationꢂINGOꢃRedCross/RedCrescentmovementPrivatesectorꢀ6ResearchinstitutionUNagency7ꢄTotal352ThisfiguredoesnotincludePalestinianrefugees,ofwhichtherearemorethan2.2millionregisteredinJordan,underthemandateoftheUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestineRefugeesintheNearEast(UNRWA)(/where-we-work/jordan).10HPGworkingpaperTable2Numberofrefugeesinterviewed,bygeographicregionGovernorateRefugeepopulation%oftotalrefugeepopulationiNumberinterviewedAmmanIrbid272,236137,72887,54436.118.311.66.8244MafraqZarqaOtherTotal11551,419205,523754,45027.2100145iSeefootnoteꢀꢁSource:UNHCRꢂꢀꢃꢀꢄbRefugeesinJordanwereself-selectedbyrespondingtoapostonaFacebookgroupforrefugeesreceivingaidthroughirisscansꢂwhichdescribedtheresearchꢂtheresearchteamandtheaimsoftheresearchꢁWithinthispostꢂtherewasalinktoaformwheretheyaddedtheirinformationꢂandtheresearchteaminJordancalledthemforfurtherverificationꢂsuchasthedatefromwhichtheystartedtoreceiveassistanceandthemethodthroughwhichtheycollectitꢁOncethishadbeencompletedꢂatimewassetfortheinterviewsꢂwhichwerecarriedoutremotelyꢁSomeoftheintervieweeswerefoundthroughsnowballingꢂwhereintervieweesfromtheFacebookgroupsuggestedfurthercontactsꢁToaccompanythepublicationofthisreportꢂalinktotheArabicversionwillbepostedinthesameFacebookgroupandsentdirectlytoallintervieweesviaWhatsAppꢁConductingremoteinterviewsallowedforabroadergeographicalrangeꢂalthoughpeople’sanswersremainedremarkablyconsistentacrosslocationsꢁForthisreasonꢂageꢂgenderandlocationarenotusedthroughoutthereporttoensurerespondents’anonymityꢁFormoreonwhyJordanwaschosenꢂseeBoxꢀꢁ11HPGworkingpaperBox2WhyJordanwaschosenforthisstudyJordanwasselectedforthisworkingpaperbecauseithasarelativelystablerefugeepopulation,whichhasbeenusingbiometricsforregistrationandtoaccessCVAforseveralyearswithoutanymajordocumentedissues.Asof30April2021,85.4%oftherefugeepopulationunderUNHCR’smandatehadbeenregisteredusingbiometrics,with14.6%awaitingbiometricprocessing(UNHCR,2021b).UrbanrefugeeswerechosenasintervieweesbecausetheymakeupthemajorityofrefugeesinJordanunderUNHCR’smandate–83%asof30April2021(UNHCR,2021b).TheJordaniangovernmenthasshownawillingnesstoactonprogressivepoliciesforrefugees,suchasaccesstothelabourmarketthroughtheJordanCompact,andJordanisalreadyequippedtouseirisscanequipmentforrefugeesandcitizensalikeattheborderandinthebankingindustry(seesection2.2).Workingwithotherrefugeepopulationswhoareundergoingbiometricregistrationatalargescale,suchastheRohingyainBangladesh,wouldhaveposedamuchbiggerpossibilityforharm(particularlyemotionalandsocial),andinterviewsorquestionsaroundtheuseofbiometricswouldhavebeenmorelikelytoreignitepre-existingconcernsarounddataprotectionandidentity(seeIslam,2018;BakerandRahman,2020).Bydoingtheinterviewswithamoresettledpopulation,theexperiencesandrecommendationscaninformotherprogrammes,withoutsparkingrumoursorincreasingfearinasystemthatrefugeesoftenmustagreetousetosurvive.1.2LimitationsTheresearchunderpinningthispapertookplaceoverthecourseof18months–fromDecember2019toMay2021–duetothechallengesofCovid-19.InterviewsinJordanweresettotakeplace,inpersoninMarch2020,butwerelimitedtophoneinterviews,conductedinearly2021.ThepopulationsampledwasnotrepresentativeoftherefugeepopulationinJordan.Itwaslimitedbytherecruitmentmethod,whichsawrespondentsself-selectedbyvolunteeringtoparticipateandthroughthoserespondents’contacts.Thisexcludedpeoplewhodonothavesocialmediafromparticipatingintheinterviews,though82%ofurbanrefugeesinJordanhaveusedmobileinternetand73%ownasmartphone(Casswell,2019).Therewasalsoanunevengendersplitamongrefugeesinterviewed,withmorewomenagreeingtobeinterviewedthanmen,thoughresponsesacrosstheentiresampleremainedconsistentanddidnotvarybasedongender.Thispaperlargelyfocusesontheuseofbiometricsanddigitalidentityinrefugeecontexts,ratherthanprovidingacomprehensiveandglobalassessment,inordertogivemoredetailofasituationwhereitisusedoften,ratherthantoprovideashalloweroverview.Moreover,thefocusonirisscansasthebiometricmodalityintherefugeecontextinJordanalsolimitsthestudy’spotentialapplicabilitytootherbiometricmodalities,eachofwhichhasitsownriskandprotectionprofiles.Deploymentstyles–whetherthebiometricisstoredinadatabaseornot,whetherthereisasinglemodeofaccessormultiple–alsovaryandimpacttheamountofriskinvolved.Itistheauthors’hopethatthisdeepdivespursfurtherconversationarounddifferenttypesofbiometricmodalitiesandhowtheyareexperiencedbythosewhousethemonadailybasis.12

HPGworkingpaper2DigitalidentityandbiometricsinthehumanitariansectorOverthepastdecade,governmentsaroundtheworldhaveturnedtofoundationaldigitalidentities,oftenwithbiometricverification,toregistercitizensandnon-citizensalike.Foundationalidentitiesarelegalorpersonalidentities,suchascivilregistriesornationalIDcards(GelbandClark,2013).Inpart,thedigitisationoffoundationalIDsissupportedbySDG16.9,whichcallsforlegalidentitiesforeveryoneinapushtosafeguardrightssuchasaccesstoeducation,healthcareandfinancialinclusion,amongothers.However,thisSDGdoesnotstipulatethattheseidentitiesbedigitalorincludebiometrics,anditsonlyindicatorisfocusedonbirthregistration.Nevertheless,governmentsandbiometriccompanieshaveusedSDG16.9asjustificationtoimplementbiometricidentitysystems,duetoaperceivedreliabilityofthesesystemstodetermineuniqueidentityaswellastheincreasingavailabilityofthistechnology(PrivacyInternational,2018;Manby,2021).Accordingtooneinterviewee,however,peopleincrisiscontextsrarelymakeadistinctionbetweenaphysicalfoundationalID,suchasabirthcertificate,andabiometricID,suchasanationalidentitycardthatistiedtoafingerprint;andmostare‘willingtogiveuptheirfingerprintiftheythinkitwillmakelifeeasierforthem’.Withlittledistinction–and3littlesayinwhichsystemsareused(seesection4.1)–itisimportantthatthoseimplementingidentitysystemsmitigatepotentialrisksasmuchaspossible.FoundationaldigitalIDswithbiometricshavebeenusedinnumerouscasesthroughouttheworld,mostnotablyIndia’sAadhaarnationalregistrationsystem.Inthehumanitariansector,UNHCRistheonlyorganisationmandatedtogivestatelessanddisplacedpeoplefoundationalIDs(UNHCR,2013).The2018Strategyondigitalidentityandinclusionnotes:Integratednationalidentitysystemsprovidingafoundationalidentitytoeverybody,includingrefugeesandasylumseekers,statelesspersons,andotherforciblydisplaced,willreceiveUNHCR’sfullsupport.Hence,theUNRefugeeAgencywillfocusonrefugeeregistrationasafunctionalsubsetofamulti-sectorandmulti-purposeIDinfrastructureandassistStatestoregisteranddocumentallindividualslivingontheState’sterritory,incl.thoseundertheorganization’smandate(UNHCR,2018:2).Digitisation,then,hasextendedthelong-standingprocessbywhichstateshavedelegatedsomepowerstoUNHCR,leadingUNHCR’sregistrationprocesstobecome‘somethingcomparabletocitizenship’betweenUNHCRand‘quasistate-citizens’(HilhorstandJansen,2010:1124;citedinLemberg-PedersenandHaioty,2020:609).Thisresponsibilitymeansthey‘needtohaveassurancesthattheyknowwhotheyaredealingwith,andthatthatpersonstaysthesamethroughouttheserviceprovisioningprocess.Theyarethereforemorelikelytoemployadvancedbiometrics’(Schoemakeretal.,2018:33).3Thesamecouldlikelybesaidofpeopleinhigh-incomecountries,althoughtheynormallyhavemorechoiceinwhattypesofsystemtheyconsenttothanthoseincrises.13

HPGworkingpaperTheuseofbiometricsbyUNHCR,then,canbeforbothfoundationalandfunctionalIDs(i.e.IDsthatareusedforaspecificserviceprovision,aretypicallyproprietarytoasingleagency/consortiumandarenotuniversallyissued),leadingtoconfusionamongthosewhoregisterwithUNHCRastowhytheydonotautomaticallyreceiveaid.AccordingtoSchoemakeretal.(2020:8),‘refugeesregisterwithUNHCRandotherorganizationsfortwoprimaryreasons’:first,theyregister‘toobtainlegalstatusasarefugee’,orforafoundationalID;andsecond,‘tobeabletoaccesscriticalservices’,orforafunctionalID.FunctionalIDsarelesslikelytoincorporatebiometricsunlesstheyareprovidingCVA(seeBox3).4SeveralorganisationsincludingUNHCRandtheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM),aswellasgovernmentsaroundtheworld,areexploringtheuseofself-sovereignIDs–digitalIDsthatarecontrolledbytheenduseranddecentralisedfromaspecificorganisation.Theuseofself-sovereignID,however,remainsrare,anddespitethegrowingdiscoursearounditsdisruptiveeffectsonasymmetricalpowerstructures,itisunlikelytocircumventorchallengetheroleofgovernmentsinprovidingfoundationalIDsduetostatesovereignty(Cheesman,2020).Self-sovereignIDscanbeusedforeitherfoundationalorfunctionalidentities.Althoughthisstudyrecognisesthatthefieldofdigitalidentityislargeandtherearemanyexamplesofdigitalidentitysystemsthatdonotincludebiometrics–suchasthedigitisationofpaperrecords(Manby,2021)–theuseofthesenon-biometricprogrammesislesscontested,inpartbecausetheyaresoubiquitous.Bycontrast,biometricsgoesbeyondinformationtypicallycapturedinrecords–suchasname,age,address,etc.–toincludeadatapointthatis‘singularlyuniquetotheindividualinvolvedandcannotbechanged’andthatisincreasinglyusedforsurveillanceandmonitoringinawaythatnamesandagescannotbe(Rahman,2018:5).Forbeneficiariesinvulnerablesituations,forexamplebecausetheyhavebeenforciblydisplacedorareinconflictsituations,thistypeofinformationpresentspotentialrisksthatcanoutweighthepotentialbenefits(seesection4).Thus,thebulkofthispaperfocusesontheuseandexperienceofbiometricsindigitalidentitysystems,howtomitigatetheirrisksandhowtomakethesesystemssaferandmoreefficientforthosereceivingaid.4OtherINGOsprovidingCVAthatdonotusebiometricsrequiredigitalregistrationduetocountryrestrictionsandknow-your-customer(KYC)requirements.14HPGworkingpaperBox3Whyusebiometricsforcashandvoucherassistance?Biometricsareoftenusedincashandvoucherassistance(CVA)becauseofaperceivedneedforiahigherlevelofassuranceofthebeneficiary’sidentitythaniftheassistancewasin-kind.Theymayberequiredbythedonor,thefinancialserviceprovider(FSP)orboth.Theuseofcash–particularlywhendelivereddigitally–exposesorganisations,FSPsandprivatesectorpartnerstointernationalregulationssuchasknow-your-customer(KYC),anti-moneylaundering(AML)andanti-terroristfinancing(ATF)regulations.BecausemostrefugeesdonothavesufficientidentificationtomeetKYCrequirements,manyhumanitarianorganisations–includingUNHCR–establishabankaccount,withrecipientsholdingsub-accounts(Schoemakeretal.,2018).iOnekeyinformantdisclosedthatstudieshadbeendoneshowinghowtheimplementationofbiometricshadcuttheamountoffraudby20%ofthedistributedvalue,butthesestudiesarenotpubliclyavailable.Theauthorswerethereforeunabletoassessorcitethem.2.1Howwegothere:thehistoryofbiometricsDigitisedbiometricsmadetheirentranceinthehumanitariansectorintheearly2000swhenUNHCRintroducedirisscansintherepatriationprocessofAfghanrefugeesinPakistan,mainlytoeliminateaidfraudcausedby‘recyclers’,i.e.peoplewhoregisteredasarefugee,returnedhomeandthencamebacktoregisteragaininordertoreceivemoreaid(Jacobsen,2015).Althoughbiometricregistrationtoreduceaidduplicationmayhavebeeninitiallyconceivedasaone-offeventamongahighlymobilerefugeepopulation,asanINGOworkerremarked,‘decisionsabouttechnologyandsystemsaremadehastily,butthentheyenduplastingandendupbeingthechannelsandinfrastructureforalongtime’.Indeed,inthe2003Handbookforregistration,UNHCRnotesthatitis‘likelytousebiometricssparinglybecauseoftheirtechnicalcomplexityandtheircosts,bothinitialandlong-term.Theuseofbiometricsmayberecommendedinonlyafewsituationsandonlyafterarigorousanalysisofthecomplexitiesinvolvedin,andthepotentialalternativesto,usingbiometrics’(UNHCR,2003:141).Lessthanadecadelater,however,biometricswasanofficialpolicyinUNHCRrefugeeregistration(UNHCR,2010).Thiswaslargelyduetotheabilityofbiometricstouniquelyidentifyindividualsandsatisfythehighlevelsofassuranceofverificationmentionedpreviously.Bytheendof2019,UNHCRaimedtohaveallrefugeebiometricdatainasinglepopulationdatabase(Madianou,2019b)–confirmingwhatoneacademicreferredtoas‘theuseofbiometricsmoregenerallyhasbecomeagoalinitself’.Sinceitsfirstuseintheearly2000s,themainroleofbiometricsforUNHCRhascomeaspartoftheregistrationprocessforpeoplenewlyarrivedinhostcountries,ratherthanforservicedelivery.However,oncebiometricsareregistered,theyareoftenusedforCVAandin-kinddistributionswherefeasibleandnecessary.Accordingtooneinformant,‘Biometricsareverymuchapartofour15

HPGworkingpaperregistrationandidentitymanagementprocessandthatiswhywecapturebiometrics;ithelpsustoanchoridentities.[Distributingcash]issecondary…Wedon’tcollectbiometricsforassistanceorotherprogramming,wecapturebiometricsaspartofourregistrationprocedures’.OtherUNagenciesandhumanitarianorganisationshaveusedbiometricsmoresporadically.The‘underpinningprinciple’oftheWorldFoodProgramme(WFP),forexample,‘istodobiometrics[forfunctionalIDs]asalastresortwhenthere’snofoundationalIDinplace,orwhenit’sveryweak’,accordingtooneinformant,andtheyoftenrelyonotherUNagencies,suchasUNHCR,toprovideverifiedIDandtheassociatedchecks.Yet,theincreaseinbiometric-specificpoliciesfromNGOsandtheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)maysuggestthattheuseofbiometricsoutsideoftheUNsystemisontherise.In2015,Oxfamself-imposedamoratoriumonusingbiometrics(Rahman,2018).In2021,however,itpublishedaBiometricandfoundationalidentitypolicy,whichcommittedtoresponsiblebiometricpracticebasedonspecificprinciplesfordatausethatminimisesharm,sincebiometricsare‘moretightlyboundtoindividualsinwayswhichremoveindividuals’abilitiestoavertharmtothemselvesoravoidharmfulconsequencesinthefuture’(Oxfam,2021:8).TheICRClikewisehasapolicyspecifictobiometrics,whichsetsoutthelimited-usecasesandconditionsrequiredforprocessingthistypeofdataduetothespecificrisksposedbyitssensitivity(ICRC,2019a).Althoughfingerprintsandirisscansforregistrationandassistancearethemostwell-knownusesofbiometricsinthehumanitariansector,theyarenottheonlyones.Othermodesincludefacialandvoicerecognitiontechnology,andbiometricshavealsobeenusedtotrackhealthrecords.TheICRCisdevelopingnewcapabilities,leveragingartificialintelligence(AI)andfacialrecognitioninitsRestoringFamilyLinksProgramme(includingthe‘TracetheFace’website).Inthisprogramme,familymemberslookingfortheirlovedonesasktheICRCforhelp.Familiesprovidephotosofthepersontheyarelookingfor,andthesephotosarerunthroughadatabaseofphotosofpeoplelookingforlostrelatives.Thefacialrecognitionalgorithmiscompletedwithfuzzysearches(thatsearchforacloseratherthanexactmatch)onbiographicaldata(ICRC,2019b).VoicerecognitiontoconfirmidentitypriortothedisbursementofmobilemoneypaymentshasalsobeenusedbyINGOsseekingtoincreasetheiraccountabilityandreducethelogisticalprocesses,particularlywithhard-to-reachcommunities.Inoneexample,anINGOusesvoicerecognitiontodisbursepaymentstopastoralcommunitiesinSomaliland(Mebur,2021).Accordingtoakeyinformant,thisorganisationpreviouslytravelledtocommunitiesandcollectedsignaturesorthumbprintsbeforepaymentscouldbereleased.Now,theSIMcardisinsertedintoamobilephone,therecipientsaysaphraseand,ifthevoicematches,themoneyisreleasedwithoutteamshavingtotraveltocollectsignatures.Ifavoicedoesnotmatch,thatpersonreceivesaphonecall,andtheyhaveanotherchancetosaythephrasecorrectly.Inhisopinion,thevoiceidentityproje