股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献

股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)外文:TakingStockSeriously:Equity-MarketPerformance,GovernmentPolicy,andFinancialGlobalizationMosley,LaynaSinger,DavidAndrewAreequitymarketsjustanotherfacetofglobalfinance,oraretheyuniqueintheirresponsesto—andinfluenceson—governmentpoliciesandinstitutions?Recentworkhasexploredtheimpactofpoliticalfactorsonbondmarketbehaviorandforeigndirectinvestment,butlittleattentionhasbeenpaidtostockmarkets.Onthebasisoftheparticularconcernsofequityinvestors,wehypothesizeapositiveassociationbetweenstock-marketvaluationsandlevelsofdemocracy,shareholderrights,legaltraditions,andcapital-accountliberalization,anegativeassociationwithrealinterestrates,andnoassociationwithfiscaldeficitsorsurpluses.Weassessourexpectationsbyanalyzingthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofaggregateprice-to-earningsratiosforasampleofupto37countriesfrom1985to2004,usingbothcross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectionalanalyses.Wefindsupportformost,butnotall,ofourhypotheses.Ourfindingssuggestthatwemustdisaggregatetheeffectsofdifferentassetmarketstounderstandtheimpactofeconomicglobalizationongovernmentpolicies.Howdogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsaffectequity-marketperformanceacrosscountries?Asstockmarketsgrowbroaderanddeeperinboththedevelopedanddevelopingworlds,thisquestionbecomesmorecritical.In2004,globalstock-marketcapitalizationstoodat$37.2trillion,comparedtoglobalGDPof$41.3trillion.Whilethisfigurewasslightlylessthanglobalcommercialbankassets,itmarkedlyexceededthetotalsizeofoutstandingpublicdebtsecurities,whichwere$23.1trillion.1Thebulkofglobalstock-marketcapitalizationrepresentsdeveloped-countryequitymarkets,butlessdevelopedcountrymarkets—whichaccountedfor14percentoftotalcapitalizationin2004—arequicklygainingground.Someemergingmarketcountries,suchasMalaysia,Singapore,andSouthAfrica,havetotalstock-marketcapitalizationsthatexceedtheirrespectivegrossdomesticproducts.Equitymarketsenhancecorporateefficiency,spurinnovation,andprovideavaluablesourceofcapitalforlong-termeconomicdevelopment.Theyalsoprovideausefulmechanismforgovernmentstoraisecapitalthroughthesaleofstate-ownedenterprises.Moreover,equity-marketinvestmentsconstituteanimportantelementofindividuals’assets,particularlyasgovernmentsshifttheirpensionsystemstowardtheprivatesector.Inshort,itisclearthatequitiesconstituteanincreasinglyimportantcapitalmarketintheworldeconomy.However,wecurrentlyknowverylittleabouthowgovernmentpolicychoicesandpoliticalinstitutionsinfluenceequityinvestors’decisions.Thefewextantanalysesofstockmarketsandpoliticstendtofocusononeortwodevelopedcountries,oronsectoralvariationwithinaparticularmarket,ratherthanonthedeterminantsofnational-levelmarketoutcomesinabroadercross-countrycontext.Forinstance,DavidLeblangandBumbaMukherjeeconsidertheimpactofgovernmentpartisanshipandelectionsonstockmarketoutcomesintheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain.Inawiderstudy,FionaMcGillivray(2003)considerstheimpactofpartisanchangesandelectoralinstitutionsonstock-marketoutcomesinfourteenadvanceddemocracies.Heranalyses,however,focuslargelyonindustry-levelvariation,arguingthatshiftsinpoliticalconstellationschangeinvestors’expectationsregardingwhichsectorswillbenefitfrompublicpolicies.Indeed,McGillivrayisinterestedlessinequity-marketoutcomespersethaninusingsuchoutcomesasaproxymeasureoftheexpectationsofeconomicactorsregardingpoliticaldecisions.Similarly,WilliamBernhardandDavidLeblangconsidertheimpactofpoliticsandpoliticaluncertaintyondailymarketbehaviorinseveraladvanceddemocracies.Unlikemostanalyses,theirsconsidersoutcomesinmultipleassetmarkets,includingcurrencies,equities,andgovernmentbonds.BernhardandLeblang’saim,however,istoexploretheconsequencesofdiscretepoliticalevents—suchaselectionsandcabinetformations—oncapitalmarkets,ratherthantoassessthebroaderimpactofpublicpolicyandinstitutionsoncapitalmarketoutcomes.Thisarticleseekstoroundouttheliteratureonfinancialglobalizationbyexploringthelinkagesbetweenequity-marketoutcomesandnationalgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions.Itscontributionisboththeoreticalandempirical.Theoretically,weelaborateonthepoliticsofequity-marketperformance,focusinginparticularontheeffectsofgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsonstockmarketvaluations.Werelyontherelativelydevelopedliteratureonforeigndirectinvestmentandsovereignbondmarketstounderscorethedistinctivenessofequity-marketreactionstogovernmentpolicies.Empirically,weconductanovelevaluationofthecorrelatesoftotal-market,price-to-earningsratios(P⁄E)forasampleofupto37developedandemergingmarketcountriesduringthe1985–2004period.Cross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectional(TSCS)analysesrevealthatlevelsofdemocracy,marketliquidity,shareholderrights,andcapital-accountliberalizationarepositivelyassociatedwithequity-marketvaluations,whilerealinterestratesarenegativelyassociated.Wealsofindthatinvestorsarepositivelydisposedtowardequitymarketsinemerging-marketcountries,andnegativelydisposedtowardmarketswithhighdividendpayoutratios.Interestingly,manyofthepoliticalandeconomicfactors—includinginflation,andfiscalpolicy—deemedhighlysalienttoinvestorsinotherfinancialmarketsarenotstatisticallyassociatedwithstock-marketvaluations.Theseresultsarerobusttotheinclusionofanumberofcontrolvariables,includingcapital-assetpricingmodel(CAPM)factorsandalternativepricingmodelconsiderations.Notethattheresponsesofinvestorstopoliciesandinstitutionsalsohaveimplicationsforfuturegovernmentpolicychoices.Forinstance,ifanation’seconomyreliesmoreheavilyonFDIthanonsovereignlendingorbankfinancing,itsgovernmentmayfacefewpressurestoreducepublicspending.Ontheotherhand,ifagovernmentreliesheavilyonthebondmarkettofinanceitsexpenditures,buthasarelativelylowlevelofstock-marketcapitalization,itmayfacegreaterpressuresforfiscalandmonetarytightening.Andifacountryreliesonavariedmenuoffinancialinflows,asmostdo,assetholderswillexpressdiversepreferencesoverpublicpolicy.Untanglingthevariousfinancial-marketinfluencesongovernmentpolicymakingisclearlyalongtermresearchproject.Thisarticle,whichfocusesonthepoliticaldeterminantsofequityinvestors’behavior,complementssimilaranalysesofsovereignbondmarketsandforeigndirectinvestment.Onceweunderstandhowinvestorsineachmarketreacttogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions,wecanthenadvancetoabroaderanalysisoftheimpactoffinancialmarkets—alongwithdomesticinstitutions,interestgroups,andotherfactors—ongovernmentpolicymakingandinstitutionaldesign.Stock-marketperformanceisincreasinglyatargetofanalysisbypoliticalscientists,becauseequityinvestorsmaybehighlysensitivetotheeffectsofcertaingovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsontheirinvestments.Equityinvestmentsaregenerallyveryliquid,andthetimehorizonsofequityinvestorsareoftenrelativelyshort.Asaresult,changesingovernmentpoliciescantriggeraswiftresponsebyinvestors.Governmentpoliciesthatenhanceinvestorconfidence—eitherdirectly,byprovidingshareholderprotectionsandeaseofexit,orindirectly,byexpandingtheeconomyandimprovingcorporateearnings—willberewardedbyhigherstockpricesandmarketvaluations.Ontheotherhand,investorscanquicklywithdrawtheirfundsifgovernmentschoosemarket-unfriendlypolicies,therebygeneratingdownwardpressureonstockpricesandvaluations.Stockmarkets,inshort,areavaluableindicatoroffinancialactors’preferencesovergovernmentinstitutionsandpolicyoutcomes.Afittingalternativemeasureofperformanceistheratioofthestockpricetocompanyearnings—or,inotherwords,thepricethatequityinvestorsarewillingtopayforanexpectedstreamofprofits.Aswithstockprices,theseratiosreflectinvestors’expectationsaboutfutureearnings,buttheyalsosignalinvestors’preferencesovertime-varyinggovernmentpolicyandlargelyinvariantpoliticalinstitutions.Becauseofthelatter,cross-nationalvariationinP⁄Eratiospersistsevenwhennationalstockmarketsarehitsimultaneouslybyglobalpriceshocks.Theextantliteratureonthelinkagesbetweenglobalizationanddomesticpoliticshaspaidscantattentiontothediversewaysinwhichcountriesareintegratedintotheworldeconomy.Byassumingthatfinancialmarketsimposeaunifiedinfluenceongovernmentpolicies,priorstudieshaveoverlookedthestarkvariationinthepreferencesofinvestorsacrossdifferenttypesoffinancialassets.Inthisarticle,wearguethatequityinvestorsarebecominganincreasinglyinfluentialforceintheglobaleconomy,andthattheirpreferencesdivergefromthoseofotherfinancialactorsinimportantways.Toillustratethisdivergence,wepresentempiricalanalysesofthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofequitymarketperformanceacrossasampleofdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Amongthemostinterestingfindingsarethatmarketvaluationsaresignificantlyassociatedwithcapital-accountopenness,shareholderprotections,levelsofdevelopment,andalternativedomesticinvestments.Inaddition,equityinvestorsappearindifferenttowardgovernmentfiscalbalancesandthepartisanorientationsofgovernmentleaders.Giventhatcountriesareintegratedintotheglobalfinancialsystemindifferentways,thesefindingsleadtothequestionofhowgovernmentpolicymakersmightreconcilethecompetinginterestsofdifferenttypesoffinancialinvestors.译文：股市严重性讨论：股权市场现象，政府政策与金融全球化在政府的政策和体制影响中，股市是另一个全球金融市场，还是有其独特的反应？最近的工作探讨了政治因素对债券市场的行为和外国直接投资的影响，但很少注意到股票市场。在股票投资者特别关注问题的基础上，我们假设股市估值与它的平均水平之间呈正相关，股东权利，传统法律，以及资本账户自由化，与实际利率之间呈负相关，无财政赤字和盈余。通过我们评估的政治和体制因素的期望值分析，从1985年到2004年，以37个国家的总价格为样本，横轴为时间序列，纵轴为市盈率。我们发现这支持大多数人的说法，但不是所有的。我们的研究结果表明，我们必须集合不同资产市场的影响来了解经济全球化对政府政策的影响。通过各国股票市场的政策和机制表现，它是如何影响政府的？随着市场更广泛的发展，股票在发达国家和发展中国家的逐渐深入，这个问题变得更加重要。2004年全球股票市值为38.4亿万美元，全球国内生产总值为41.3亿万美元。虽然这一数字略低于全球商业银行资产，但他明显超过了其他公共债券的总规模23.1亿万美元。全球股票市值占大部分发达国家的股票市场，但欠发达的国家市场也取得很大的进展，其中在2004年占总市值得14%。股票市场提升企业的效率，鼓励创新，是提供资金的长期经济发展的重要来源。他们还使各国政府通过提高国有企业销售资金的有效机制。此外，股票市场的投资构成是个人资产的重要组成部分，特别是各国政府转向私营部门的养老金制度。总之，很显然的，股票构成在世界经济中是一个日益重要的资本市场。不过，我们目前所知甚少，对于政府如何选择政策和政治体制是由股票投资者决定的。对股市和一些现实政治的分析往往集中在一个或两个发达国家，那是某一特定市场部门内部的变化，而不是在更广泛的范围内国家一级市场因素决定的结果。例如，在美国和英国DavidLeblang和BumbaMukherjee考虑到政府的党派和选举对股市影响的结果。在更广泛的研究中，菲奥娜麦克基利夫雷（2003）认为，先进的民主国家选举机构党派变化对股市的影响。然而，她的分析在很大程度上基于行业水平的变化，她认为政治群体的变化，改变了投资者对哪些行业受益于公共政策的预期。事实上，麦克基利夫雷很感兴趣，作为对决定政治经济行为者的期望的结果没有比股票本身的市场效果大。同样的，在一些先进的民主国家的正常政治上，威廉和大卫考虑到政治的影响和市场的行为是不稳定的。不同于大多数分析的结果，他们认为是在多个资产市场的，包括货币，股票和政府债券市场。然而，Bernhard和Leblang旨在探讨的是政治事件，如选举和内阁离散的后果，，而不是更广泛的评估资本市场公共政策和机构影响的结果。在国家政府的政策和机构中，本文旨在探讨金融全球化的文献与完善股票的市场的成果之间的联系。它的贡献是理论和实证两个方面。从理论上讲，我们详细说明股票的市场对政治的表现，特别是侧重于股市估值对政府政策和体制的影响。我们依靠丰富的文献对外国直接投资和主权债券市场的比较，强调了股票的市场