全球发展中心-国际货币基金组织的韧性和可持续性信托：条件如何帮助各国建立韧性

TheIMF’sResilienceandSustainabilityTrust:HowConditionalityCanHelp

CountriesBuildResilience

JOHNHICKLIN

Abstract

TheIMF’sResilienceandSustainabilityTrust(RST)hasbeenoperationalforoverayear,

withthefirstseventeencountriesreceivingcommitmentsoffinancialsupport.Butif

lendingfromtheRSTistoachieveitsobjectives,theIMFshouldmakeitfitterforpurpose

bytakingaradicallydifferentapproachinapplyingconditionstotheloans.Thispaper

firstgivesthebackgroundandsummarizestheargument;setsouttheuniquechallenges

involvedindesigningbestpracticeconditionalitytodealwithclimatechange–thefocus

oftheRSTsofar;andmakesthreespecificsuggestionstoaddressshortcomingsinthe

emergingconditionalitytomakethemostoftheIMF’snewinitiativetohelpmember

countriesbuildresilienceandsustainability.TheIMFhasadapteditsapproachbasedon

initialexperience.AforthcomingExecutiveBoardreviewwillallowforfurthercourse

correctionandmuch-neededgreatertractionfortheRST.

POLICYPAPER324•MARCH2024

TheIMF’sResilienceandSustainabilityTrust:HowConditionalityCanHelp

CountriesBuildResilience

JohnHicklin

CenterforGlobalDevelopment

TheauthorisgratefulforhelpfulconversationswithDavidAndrews,SanjeevGupta,KathrynMcPhail,Mark

Plant,andEtienneRomsom,andforcommentsfromtwoanonymousreviewers;andisresponsibleforany

remainingerrors.

JohnHicklin.2024.“TheIMF’sResilienceandSustainabilityTrust:HowConditionalityCanHelpCountriesBuildResilience.”CGDPolicyPaper324.Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment.

/

publication/imfs-rst-how-conditionality-can-help-countries-build-resilience

CENTERFORGLOBALDEVELOPMENT

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Washington,DC20036

researchthatdrivesbetterpolicyandpracticebytheworld’s

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CenterforGlobalDevelopment.2024.

fundersoftheCenterforGlobalDevelopment,ortheauthors’respectiveorganizations.

Contents

A.Backgroundandsummaryofargument 1

B.Theexceptionalpolicychallengesposedbyclimatechange 7

Theurgencytoaddresstheexceptionalrisksofclimatechange 8

Theexceptionalsizeofthefinancingrequirements 10

Thecomplexityofthedomesticpolicychallenge 11

Theweaknessofdomesticaccountabilityforclimate

changepolicies 12

Thefailuresintheglobalsystemofaccountability 13

C.AmoreambitiousapproachtoRSFconditionality 14

Bestpracticeconditionality 15

MainfeaturesofRSFconditionalitysofar 16

AddressingtheshortcomingsofRSFconditionality 17

Issue1.MaximizingRSFeffectivenessthroughgreater

transparencyandaccountability 17

Proposal1.Establishanewmechanismfortransparency

andaccountability 18

Issue2.IncreasingRSFeffectivenessbyfocusonafew

“IMF-focused”criticalactions 21

Proposal2.Focusmoreclearlyonafewcriticalactions 22

Issue3.IncreasingtheurgencyofRSFengagementwithasmany

countriesaspossible 24

Proposal3.Introducealow-accesscredittranchetotheRSF 25

TheparallelneedforamajorinitiativetostrengthenArticleIV

surveillanceforallmembers 26

References 27

ListofBoxes

1.Theescalatingrisksandcostsofclimatechange 8

2.Accountabilitygapsintheframeworkofinternationalcooperation 13

A.Backgroundandsummaryofargument

TheIMFformallyestablisheditsnewResilienceandSustainabilityTrust(RST)inApril2022withitsdeclaredpurpose“tohelpcountriesbuildresiliencetoexternalshocksandensuresustainablegrowth,contributingtotheirlong-termbalanceofpaymentsstability.”1Thefocushassofar

beenexclusivelytoaddressthechallengeofclimatechangethoughpandemicpreparednesswasidentifiedasanotherareatobecovered,withthepossibilityofaddingothertopicsatalaterstage.

Inall,143countriesweredeemedeligibleinprinciple.TheimmediateimpetusfortheIMF’sinitiativecameinthemidstoftheglobalpandemic.TheunprecedentedallocationinAugust2021ofsome

$650billionworthofSpecialDrawingRights(SDRs)toIMFmembercountrieswasaccompanied

byapledgefromthelargesteconomies–whohadnoneedofthelion’ssharetheyreceivedofthe

additionalSDRs–to“recycle”or“re-channel”$100billionworthofSDRstocountriesingreaterneedofthem.2PartwasenvisagedtobolstertheIMF’sPovertyReductionandGrowthFacility(PRGT)withsomescopealsotochannelthroughothermultilateralinstitutions.Some$44billionwastargeted

forthenewRST,ofwhichsome$36billioncouldbelentoutwiththeremaindersetasidetoprovideagainstliquidityandcreditrisk.3Sofar,almost$30billionisavailabletolend.TheResilienceandSustainabilityFacility(RSF)wascreatedasthelendinginstrumentfundedbytheRST.

Lendingoperationsbeganinlate2022.ByOctober2022theIMFhadfirmedupsufficient

financialcontributionsfromcreditorsanddeclaredthenewTrustoperational.4Subsequentlyit

negotiatedpolicyprogramswiththefirstrecipients,settingtheconditionsthatcountriesmust

meettosecureloanswithunusuallylong-term(20-year)maturity.Byend-February2024,the

IMFExecutiveBoardhadapprovedcommitmentstotaling$7.0billiontoCostaRica,Barbados,

Rwanda,Bangladesh,Jamaica,Kosovo,Seychelles,Senegal,Niger,Kenya,Morocco,Moldova,CaboVerde,Benin,Mauritania,Paraguay,andCameroon.ThefirstdisbursementswerenotscheduledtobemadeforseveralmonthsafterinitialapprovalanddependedonsubsequentIMFExecutive

Boardreview.Byend-February2024,only$1.4billionhadbeendisbursedtoninecountries,withafurther$3.4billiontotheseventeencountriessofarscheduledfor2024.5Nonetheless,getting

eventhisfarisanaccomplishmentandreflectstheIMF’sabilitytoadaptitsfinancinginstrumentstomeetnewneedsofitsmembercountries.TheIMFhashadtoovercomemajortechnical,legal,

1SeeIMFstatementandpolicypaper(IMF,April18,2022)andAndrews,PlantandHicklin,“TheIMF’sRSTHasMet

Contributors’Wishes–NowItMustMeetBorrowers’Needs!”(CGDblog,May10,2022).AnOperationalGuidanceNotewasissuedinNovember2023(IMF,November28,2023).

2SeeG20RomeLeaders’Declaration(G20,2021).

3Bytheend-December2023,theRSThadsecuredtotalpledgesofSDR31.9billion($42.8billion),ofwhichSDR26.3

billion($35.3billion)countstowardtheSDR33billionRSTfundraisingtarget($44billionattheprevailingexchangerate).See

https://ww/en/Topics/Resilience-and-Sustainability-Trust

;andalso

/

data-dives/sdr/#tracking-sdr-channeling-through-the-rst

.Withamountssetasidefordepositandreserveaccounts,thefundraisingtargetwouldallowsomeSDR27billion($36billion)tobeavailableforloans.

4SeestatementbytheManagingDirector(IMF,October12,2022).

5Firstdisbursementsscheduledfor2023wereapprovedforRwandainMay;BarbadosandCostaRicainJune;

JamaicainAugust;KosovoinOctober;Seychelles,Bangladesh,andSenegalinDecember;andforKenyainJanuary2024.Niger’s2023disbursementawaitsapproval.Forupdatedtracking,see

/data-dives/

sdr/#tracking-sdr-channeling-through-the-rst

.

THEIMF’SRESILIENCEANDSUSTAINABILITYTRUST:HOWCONDITIONALITYCAN1

HELPCOUNTRIESBUILDRESILIENCE

andfinancialhurdlesaswellasfindpolicyconsensusamongstshareholders.However,what

comesnext–includingtheapproachtoconditionality–willbecrucialtodeterminingwhetherthisinitiativeisultimatelyasuccess.

Acentralissueisthatthemetricsforsuccessarenotwellspecified,makingitdifficultfortheRSTtobefullyeffectiveuntiltheyaremadeclearandconditionsappropriatelygearedtowhattheIMFcanhelpdeliver.TheIMF’sapproachsofarseemstobetohopeforthebestbyprovidingadditionalliquiditysupportandbyspecifyingasconditionsvarioususefulcountry-ledpolicyreforms–somealreadyunderconsideration–thatplausiblycontributetotacklinglong-termstructuralproblemsandprospectivebalance-of-paymentsproblems.Thisapproachblursthreecompetingthoughnotexplicitobjectives.Themostimportantistosupportsubstantivepolicyreformincountriesfacingclimatechange.Twoothersareimplicit:todisbursequicklytoalleviateliquidityconcerns;andto

contribute–defacto–todebtreprofilingfordevelopingcountriesintheyearstocome,objectivesthatareeasiertopursueatthemarginthroughtheRSFthanrelyingsolelyonregularIMFfacilities.However,specifyingmoreclearlytheIMF’sroleinthedifficulttaskofmeetingthefirstobjectiveisthekeytotheultimatesuccessoftheRST,andthefocusofthispaper.

Forsome,aquickdisbursementofRSFfundswouldmarkonemeasureofsuccess.Bycontrast,

noothermultilateralinstitutionhasyetmanagedtodeviseandimplementaschemewithsufficientshareholdersupporttorecycleSDRsatall,thoughtheAfricanDevelopmentBank(AfDB)isfurthestadvanced.6AmetricofrapiddisbursementwouldbeunsurprisinggiventhecircumstancesunderwhichtheRSTwascreated.Manydevelopingcountriesfacedliquidityconstraintsandlackof

fiscalspaceduringtheCOVID-19pandemic,inadditiontothedauntingfinancingrequirements

amountingtoseveraltrillionsofdollarseachyeartorestructuretheireconomiestoinvestin

energytransitionwhiletacklingclimatechangeandpreparingforfuturepandemics.Eachofthesechallengesentailspresentorprospectivebalanceofpaymentsproblems,andtheRSFfundscan

beveryusefuladditionalresourcesforindividualcountries.Nonetheless,theamountspledgedto

theRSFareextremelymodestcomparedtothescaleofthefinancingneeds,muchofwhichwillcomefromtheprivatesectoraswellasotherofficialsources,bothexternalanddomestic.Akeyrolefor

rapiddisbursementofRSFfunds,givingfinancialsupporttonationalpolicyintent,isthereforethesignalitsendsthatcancatalyzemuchlargerresourcesfromothersources.

Besidesadesiretodisbursequickly,thedesignofRSFconditionalitysuggestsanadditionalif

unstatedpurposetohelpreprofileacountry’sdebtserviceobligations.RSFdisbursementsfinancesomenewupfrontbudgetexpenditurebutalsoprovideareservebuffer,sothattheRSFtopsup

accesstotheresourcesthatareprovidedbytherequiredregularIMFprogram.TheIMF’sapproachthereforehastheeffectofmakingiteasierforcountriestoservicedebtthatwillbeduetotheIMF

andothersinthenextfewyearswhenmanyRSF-eligiblecountriesfacetheprospectofdebtdistress

6SeePlant,“FundingHybridCapitalattheAfDBIstheBestDealforSDRDonors.”(CGDblog,March9,2023).FurtherimpetuswasgivenduringtheIMF’sAnnualMeetingsinOctober2023.

THEIMF’SRESILIENCEANDSUSTAINABILITYTRUST:HOWCONDITIONALITYCAN2

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thatisheightenedbywar,pandemic,andclimatechange,inadditiontoanypolicyshortcomings.Sincethe20-yearmaturityofRSFloansexceedsthatforregularIMFandPRGTloans,theRSF

wouldinessenceallowapartialreschedulingofdebtservicefallingduetotheIMFandothers.

Thetemptationtopursuethisunstatedbenefitshouldnot,however,distractfromtryingtomaximizetheRSF’simpactonincreasinglong-termresiliencetoclimatechange(andtootherchallenges

includingpandemics).

Fundamentally,thesuccessoftheRSFwilldependonthestrengthofthepoliciesthatcountries

undertaketobolstertheirresilience,andtheRSFcontributioncomesfromthelinkbetweentheavailabilityofIMFfinancingandthenatureandspeedofpolicyactionthattheRSFloanswillhelptosupport.ThedesignofRSFprogramconditionswillthereforebekeytowhetherthenewTrust

succeedsinitspurpose.ArgumentsovertheappropriatedesignofRSFconditionalityarejustthelatestepisodeinalongsagaofcontroversiesoverIMFconditionalitypolicy,andoffrequentreviewsofitbytheIMFitself.7InthecaseoftheRSF,thedebateoverwhetherconditions–includingthe

195ReformMeasures(RMs)inthefirstseventeenprograms–arenecessaryorsufficient,ortoo

lenientortooburdensome,isheightenedbytheoriginalframingofthedesiretorecycleSDRs

tothosemostvulnerableasawaytomakethe2021SDRallocationmoreequitable.Thepressure

todisbursemoneyquicklymightsuggestverylightconditionality,andthereiscertainlynoshortageofpolicyactionsrelatedtobuildingacountry’sresiliencethatcouldplausiblybeusedtojustifyquickdisbursementsifdesired.Moreover,someofthe143eligibleborrowingcountrieswillbeputoffif

theyperceivetherequirementsimposedbycreditorstobetoostringent,includingtohaveaparallel“regular”IMFprogramorcreditline,giventhestigmathatanyagreementwiththeIMFevokes.Othercountrieswillstruggletogarnerthepoliticalwilltotakesubstantivepolicymeasuresonclimate

mitigationoradaptationthatrequirethetime,skill,andsupporttobuildconsensusfordifficult

decisions.CreditorsareconcernedlesttooeasyRSFconditionalitywouldencouragecountriesto

bypassconditionalityusuallyrequiredunderregularIMFprograms,andbydoingsowouldweakentheprospectsofrepayingRSFloans.Applyingparallelandthereforetougherconditionalityhasbeenonewaythatcreditorsarguewillpreservethe“reserveassetstatus”oftheon-lentSDRs.

BasedontheagreedRSFmodalitiesandtheevidencefromearlycases,theaimsofrelativelyrapidfinancingandfacilitatingsubstantivechangewillbefurthered,butmodestly:therateofactual

disbursementsisslow,andtheimpactonresiliencedifficulttoquantify.ThemodalitiesoftheRSF,includingthephasednatureofdisbursementsandloanconditions,especiallytherequirement

tohaveaconcurrentIMFprogramorcreditline,metthecreditors’requirementsandasaresult

eventhecommittedSDRswillnotbedisbursedveryquickly.ForthefirstRSF-supportedreform

programs,thefirsttranchewasnotmadeavailableforsomefourmonths(CostaRica)toninemonths(Bangladesh)afterExecutiveBoardapproval,withfulldisbursementspreadoutoverthreeyears,

7Themostrecentwascompletedin2019,see“2018ReviewofProgramDesignandConditionality”(IMFMay2019).

AparticularlyeventfulandcontentiousperiodisdescribedinJamesBoughton,“SilentRevolution:TheInternationalMonetaryFund1979–1989”(IMF,2001),pp557–636.

THEIMF’SRESILIENCEANDSUSTAINABILITYTRUST:HOWCONDITIONALITYCAN3

HELPCOUNTRIESBUILDRESILIENCE

andcontingentonperformancenotonlyofagreedreformmeasuresundertheRSFbutalsoofthe

accompanyingmacroeconomicprogram.Withthepresentlimitsonacountry’saccesstoRSFfunds,theapproximately$30billionnowavailablewouldbedisbursedby2030onlyiftheearlypaceof

approvalsismaintainedandifallprogramsarefullyimplemented.8

Thedegreeofsubstantivechangeisinquestion,andthedangerwiththecurrentapproachisthat

theIMFwilloverpromiseandunderachieveinitsbidtobolstercountries’long-termresilienceand

sustainablegrowth.Theinitialcountryprogramsreflectanenormousamountoftechnicalwork

andcommitmentatthenationallevel,andsignificantcooperationbetweentheIMFstaffandpartnerinstitutions,includingtheWorldBank.However,therearethreeconcernsabouttheeffectivenessofRSFconditionality.First,sinceagreementnowonReformMeasuresisonlypartofthegeneration-

longprocessofbuildingconsensusandadaptingpoliciessufficienttomeetanever-changingconceptofnationalresilience,existingRSFconditionalitydoesnotgoasfarasitcantomandategreater

transparencythatcouldfosterbroaderdomesticpolicybuy-inandexternalfinancialsupport,while

increasingaccountabilityofdomesticandforeignactors.Second,assessmentsofearlyprogramsarethatmanyoftheRMs,whileworthwhileandintherightdirection,arerelativelylightor“low-depth”

andthequestioniswhethertheywillcontributeenoughtohelpmeettheenormouschallengefacingtherecipientcountries.9SomeoftheRMs–anaverageoftwelvesofar–wouldstruggletomeetvery

rigoroustestsofmaterialityandparsimony,withmanypolicymeasuresofaprocessnature,not

bythemselvesaffectingeconomicbehaviortotheextentrequiredtotackleprospectivebalanceof

paymentsproblems.Relatedly,thereareinsufficientmetricstomonitorandevaluatetheextentofa

reform’simpact.Moreover,therationaleforcoverageofRMsisunclear,especiallywhysomereformsareincludedinsomecountriesbutexcludedinothers.Third,theearlyenthusiasmfromthefirst

recipientsstillleavesoverahundredeligiblecountriesthatarenotyettakingadvantageofthepolicydiscussionsandpotentialfinancialsupport.Thesedelaysaredamagingatboththenationalandgloballevel,asthecostsofslowadaptationandmitigationrisesharply,justifyingmakingtheRSFmore

attractivetomorecountries,includingthoseforwhomIMFengagementisstigmatized.Whereas

traditionalIMFprogramengagementforimmediatebalanceofpaymentsproblemswillonlyinvolveaminorityofmembercountriesatonetime,addressingresilienceandsustainabilitytoalleviate

prospectivebalanceofpaymentsproblemsisauniversalaswellasurgentchallenge.

8LimitsonindividualcountryaccessweresetinitiallyatthelesserofSDR1billionor150percentofIMFquota,witha“norm”of75percent.Theaverageaccessforthefirstseventeenprogramswas$0.4billion(onaverage,112percentofquota),withtwoeconomies(BangladeshandMorocco)cappedatSDR1billion($1.3billion)andsevenothersat

themaximum150percentofquota.Asimilaraverageprofilewouldrequiremorethan50additionalprogramstobeapprovedby2027todisburse$30billionby2030.

9Forcritiques,seeGuptaandBrown,“HowCantheIMF’sNewLendingFacilityforClimateandPandemicPreparednessBeMadeMoreEffective?”(CGDblog,March29,2023);GuptaandBrown,“IMFLendingUndertheResilienceand

SustainabilityTrust:AnInitialAssessment.”(CGDpolicypaper289,March28,2023;andGuptaandBrown,“The

ResilienceandSustainabilityFacility’sRecentProgramsStillFallShortofItsAmbitiousGoals.”(CGDblog,August22,2023),whofocusonthe“low-depth”ofreformmeasuressofar.SeealsoCitrinandSembene,“IMFSupportfor

ClimateResilienceinAfricaIsHelpful,ButMoreCanBeDone.”(CGDblog,September22,2023)whoargueforgreateraccesstofinancing.Moreover,theearlycaseshavefocusedonlyonclimatechangeresilience,notyetonpandemic

preparednessthatwastheotherissuehighlightedintheExecutiveBoarddecisionestablishingtheRSTinApril2022.

THEIMF’SRESILIENCEANDSUSTAINABILITYTRUST:HOWCONDITIONALITYCAN4

HELPCOUNTRIESBUILDRESILIENCE

Inparttheseconcernsreflecttheurgentandimmenselycomplexchallengethatclimatechangeposesfornationalpoliciesandthesystemofinternationalcooperation.Thefundamentalissue

isthatinteractionsbetweentheIMFandacountry’sauthorities,evenmoresothanintraditional

IMFprogramcontexts,areonlyonesmallpartofthecomplexsystemthatcanhelpacountrytackleprospectiveandlong-termstructuralproblemsrelatedtoclimatechange.Theproblemsrequire

urgentactionyetwillnotyieldfullbenefitsforageneration.Policyformulation,implementation,andfinancingdependonactorsbeyondtheIMF’straditionalcounterparts,andmanynecessarynationalpoliciesareoutsidetheIMFareasofexpertise,requiringcooperationbetweenother

internationalorganizations,complicatingthequestionofwhoisresponsibleforprovidingadvice,andtowhom.

Are-evaluationofthenatureofRSFconditionalityisthereforewarrantedtoexaminewhatmore

canbedonetoincreasethelikelihoodthattheRSF’sobjectivesareachieved.Itwouldbeamistake

todeterminethe“Goldilocks”degreeofconditionality–neithertoolittlenortoomuchbutjust

right–simplybypragmaticjudgmentsofwhatmightbeacceptabletobothcreditorsandborrowers.Theappropriatemeasure,againstwhichsuchanevaluationcouldbebased,canbeexpressedas

themaximumadaptationofIMFpoliciesandproceduresconsistentwithboththethreattoglobal

prosperityandthefundamentalpurposeandobligationsoftheIMF’smandate.10Indecidinghowto

adaptconditionality,theIMFshouldreassessitsapproachtorisk,recognizingthatnottakingabolderapproachnowtoRSFconditionalitywouldbydefaultentailmoresignificantrisks–forcountriesandfortheIMF.Bycontrast,actionnowwouldlowertheprobabilityofprospectivebalanceofpayments

problemsthattheRSTissupposedtohelpalleviate.

ApplyingthisbestpracticemetricinthecaseoftheRSFarguesforaradicallydifferenttypeof

conditionalitytomeettheRST’sgoal,withmuchgreateremphasisonclarifyingtheaccountabilityofthevariouspartiesresponsibleforachievingdesirableoutcomesoveranextendedperiod.

Nocountryonitsown,andneithertheIMFnoranyotherinstitution,cansolvethesesystemic

problems.TheIMFshould,however,domuchmoreinordertofulfillitsownmandatewhileplaying,throughitsownpoliciesoftransparencyandsurveillance,avitalrolebyencouraginggreater

accountabilityfortheperformanceofothers,bothwithinmembercountriesandbyotherpartner

internationalinstitutions.TheIMFhasauniqueopportunity,byleveragingitsadviceandresources,tohelpcountriesstrengthendomesticprocessesthatfosterreform.Atthesametime,itcanhelp

improvetheflawedsystemofinternationalcooperationthatisfartooslowtoaddresstherisksposedbyclimatechangeandpandemics.Abetter-definedrolefortheIMFwouldcomplementamuch

moreactiverolefortheWorldBankthatisoverdueandreflectedintherecentproposaltoexpanditsmissionstatement.11

10TheconceptofbestpracticeconditionalityisfurtherexplainedinSectionC.

11See“EndingPovertyonaLivablePlanet,”ReporttotheGovernorsoftheIMF-WorldBankDevelopmentCommittee,September28,2023.

THEIMF’SRESILIENCEANDSUSTAINABILITYTRUST:HOWCONDITIONALITYCAN5

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Thispaperproposesamoreambitiousapproach,buildingonwhathassofarbeenachievedto

increasethechancesofachievingthesubstantiveaimsoftheRST.12Insum,theIMFshouldadaptitsRSFconditionalityinthreeways:

First,aspartofitsformalRSFconditionality,itwouldestablishanewmechanismfortransparency

thatwouldmakecentral–andgivegreatertractionto–theauthorities’statementofpolicy

objectivesandactionstoachievethem.AnewResilienceandSustainabilityPolicyStatement(RSPS)

wouldbedesignedtoincreasetheaccountabilityofdomesticandinternationalinstitutionsintheir

ownareasofresponsibility;betterexplainpolicydirectionandhelpbuildinternalconsensusfortheactions;andfacilitatetheIMF’scatalyticroleinattractingdomesticpoliticalsupportandmuchlargerresourceflowsfromofficialandprivatesectorsources.

Second,theIMFshouldfocusmoreclearlyonafewcriticalactionswithinitsareaofexpertisethatitwillhelpcountriesdesign,monitor,andevaluateasRSFloanconditions,separatingouttheseactionsfrom

themuchbroaderrangeofpolicyactionsthatcountriesaretakingorneedtotake.Thesepolicieswouldcenteronfiveareas,thefirsttwoyieldingquantitativelysignificantlocalaswellasglobalbenefits:

a.carbonpricing(orequivalentregulation),includingeliminatingfossilfuelsubsidies;b.orgas-andoil-producingcountries,levyingdefaultpenaltiesonmethaneemissions;c.incorporationintoacountry’smedium-termbudgetthemanyspecificrevenueand

expendituremeasuresrequiredtomeetclimatechangemitigation,adaptation,and

transitiongoals,includingfinancialsupportforthoseonlowerincomesaffectedbypolicychange(aswellasmeasuresforpandemicpreparedness);

d.upgradingfinancialsectorregulationandsupervisiontoincorporateclimate-relatedrisks;e.targetinganadditionalforeignreservebuild-uptobolsterresiliencetoshocks.

Third,itshouldallowallRSF-eligiblecountriestodrawalow-accessor“firstcredittranche”

equivalentto25percentofIMFquota,withoutrequiringaconcomitantIMFprogram.Theaimwouldbetoengageasamatterofurgencywithasmanycountriesaspossibletosupporteconomicpolicy

actiontoaddressclimatechange.DisbursementswouldbeconditionedonpublicationofanRSPSandonundertakingtoconsultwiththeIMFonthecountry’sbalanceofpaymentspoliciesandprospects.

Andequallyimportantly,theIMFshouldintegrateitsRSFworkintoitsbroaderresponsibilitiesbyamajorinitiativetosubstantiallyexpanditssurveillancerole.MeetingthegoaloftheRSTdependsgreatlyonthepolicyactionsofallIMFmembers,especiallythelargesteconomies,andnotjusttherecipientsofRSFloans.ThosecountrieseligiblefortheRSFandmostvulnerabletoclimatechangewouldbenefitmostfromwhateverinfluencetheIMFcanbringtobearonthelargesteconomiestourgemuchmorerapidadherencetomitigationandadaptationpledges.Twoaspectsoftheinitiative

12AnearlieroutlineofthisapproachhasbeendevelopedinlightofexperienceandthepublicationoftheIMF’sRSFOperationalGuidanceNote.SeeHicklin,“LaunchingtheRST:CountryPoliciesMustAdapt–andSoTooMust

IMFConditionality.”(CGD