美联储-代际进步停滞了吗？五代美国人的收入增长（英）-2024.1

Finance

and

Economics

Discussion

SeriesFederal

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Board,

Washington,

D.C.ISSN

1936-2854

(Print)ISSN

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(Online)Has

Intergenerational

Progress

Stalled?

Income

Growth

OverFive

Generations

of

AmericansKevin

Corinth

and

Jeff

Larrimore2024-007Please

cite

this

paper

as:Corinth,

Kevin,

and

Jeff

Larrimore

(2024).

“Has

Intergenerational

Progress

Stalled?Income

Growth

Over

Five

Generations

of

Americans,”

Finance

and

Economics

Discus-sion

Series

2024-007.

Washington:

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of

Governors

of

the

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papers.HasIntergenerationalProgressStalled?IncomeGrowthOverFiveGenerationsof

AmericansKevinCorinthJeffLarrimoreAmericanEnterpriseInstitute,IZAFederalReserveBoardJanuary2024AbstractWefindthateachofthepastfourgenerationsofAmericanswasbetteroffthanthepreviousone,usingapost-tax,post-transferincomemeasureconstructedannuallyfrom1963-2022basedontheCurrentPopulationSurveyAnnualSocialand

EconomicSupplement.Atage36–40,Millennialshadarealmedianhouseholdincomethatwas18percenthigherthanthatofthepreviousgenerationatthesameage.Thisrateof

intergenerationalprogress

wasslowerthanthatexperiencedbytheSilent

Generation(34percent)andBabyBoomers(27percent),butsimilartothatexperiencedbyGenerationX(16percent).Slowerprogressfor

GenerationXandMillennialsisduetotheirstalledgrowthinwork

hours—holdingworkhoursconstant,theyexperiencedagreaterintergenerationalincreasein

realmarketincomethanBabyBoomers.IntergenerationalprogressforMillennialsunderage30hasremainedrobustaswell,althoughtheirincomegrowthlargelyresultsfromhigherrelianceontheirparents.

Wealsofindthatthehighereducationalcostsincurredbyyoungergenerationsisfaroutweighed

bytheirlifetimeincomegains.JELcodes:D31,E24,H24,J3,J62Keywords:Fullincome;Growth;Generations;Mobility;MillennialsTheresultsandopinionsexpressedinthispaperreflectthe

viewsoftheauthorsand

donotindicateconcurrence

byothermembersoftheresearchstaffortheBoardof

Governors.Forhelpfulcommentsanddiscussion,we

thankRichardBurkhauser,JonathanFisher,MaggieJones,Bruce

Meyer,ScottWinship,andparticipantsatthe2023NationalTaxAssociationconference.1.

IntroductionAdefiningaspectoftheAmericanDreamisthattheeconomicwellbeingof

eachgenerationshouldsurpassthatofthepreviousone.Whetherthisconditionholdsforyoungergenerationshasrecentlybeen

calledintoquestion.A2022Galluppollfoundthatjust42

percentofAmericans

expectthattoday’syouthwillhaveabetterlifethantheirparents—downfrom71percentwho

feltthatway

in1999(Brenan2022).

Similarly,headlinesinrecentyearshave

calledMillennials(bornfrom1981–1996)the“unluckiestgenerationinU.S.history”(VanDam2020)andclaimedthat“many

Millennialsareworseoffthantheirparents—afirstinAmericanhistory”(Luhby2020).1

Yet,whenaskedabouttheirownfinancialsituationcomparedtotheirparentsatasimilaragein

theFederalReserve’sSurveyofHouseholdEconomicsandDecisionmaking(SHED),MillennialandGenerationZadultswerenearly

aslikelyasBabyBoomerstoreportdoingbetterthantheirparentsatthesameage.2

Hence,youngadultsappeartobemorepositiveabouttheirownfinancialprogressthanpopularcommentarysuggests.Additionally,recentworkbyTwenge(2023)claimedthatcountertorecentnarratives,intergenerationalincomegrowthformillennialsinyoungadulthoodfarsurpassedtheintergenerationalincomegrowthforeitherGenerationXorBabyBoomers.

Gaininganaccurateunderstandingofchanges

ineconomicwellbeingacrossgenerations,inlightofthesenarratives,isimportantforassessingthestateoftheAmericanDream.Previousresearchhasprovidedimportantinsights

onintergenerationalcomparisonsofwellbeing.Muchofthisresearchcomparestheeconomicwellbeingofadult

childrentotheirparents.3

Studiesofabsolutemobilityestimatetheshareofadultswhoseincomesexceedthatoftheirparentsat

aconstant

age,often

comparingcontemporaryadultstotheirparentswithoutexamininglongerperiods

todocumenttrendsinabsolutemobility(e.g.,Urahnetal.2012).Onerecent

exceptionisChettyetal.(2017).They

combinecross-sectionalsurveydatawithindividualtaxrecords,allowingthemtocalculatetrendsinabsolutemobilityoverlongertime1

ThatMillennialsarethefirst

generationto

underperformtheirparent’sgenerationisalsothethesisofFilipovic(2020).2

Inthe

2022survey,50

percentofMillennialadultsand51

percentofGenerationZadults

felttheywerebetterofffinanciallythantheirparentsatthesameage.AmongGenerationXadults,53

percentfelt

theywerebetteroffandamongBabyBoomers,56

percentdid.In

eachofthesegenerationsanadditional21

to26percentsaidtheyweredoingaboutthesameastheirparentsfinancially

(authors'

calculations;FederalReserveBoard2023).3

Otherresearchcomparesmobilityintermsofotheroutcomessuchasoccupations(Longand

Ferrie2013;Songetal.2020).1periods.Whendoingso,

theyfindthattheshareof

childrenwho

earnmorethantheirparentsfellfrom92percentamongthosebornin1940to50percent

amongthoseborn

in1984.Otherstudiesfocusonrelativemobility,thatis,

thecorrelationbetweenthe

positionofanadultintheincomedistributiontothepositionoftheirparents

intheincomedistributionataconstantage(Mayer

andLopoo2005;

LeeandSolon2009;Chettyetal.2014;Ward2023).4Althoughmuchofthepreviousliteratureislimitedtocomparingarelativelysmallnumberofgenerations(typicallytwo)inacomparisonofcontemporaryadultstotheirparents,whetherthepaceofintergenerational

improvementhasslowed

couldbeasimportantas

whethergrowthispositive.Additionally,adirectcomparisonoftheeconomicwellbeingofadultstotheirownparentsisnottheonlyinformativequestionabout

whetherprogresshasslowedorreversedovergenerations.Currentgenerationsofadultsmightalsocomparethemselvesto

thewiderdistributionofmembersofpreviousgenerations,

notsolelytheirownparents.5

Finally,previousresearchhasnot

evaluatedchangesinwellbeingusingacomprehensivemeasureofincomethatadjustsfortaxes,andincludesbothcashandin-kindtransfers

fortheentiresampleperiodtoevaluatetrendsinafullarrayofresources.6Weaddressthesequestionsbyevaluatingwhethereachgenerationasawholehassurpassedthepreviousone,comparingindividualsfromacrosssevengenerations—fromthe

LostGeneration(born1883–1900)toGenerationZ(born1997–2012)—usingtheCurrentPopulationSurveyAnnualSocialEconomicSupplement(CPSASEC)fromFlood

etal.(2022).7

Weconstructconsistentcomparisonsbyestimatingforeachgenerationateachagethedistributionofabroadmeasureofincomethataccountsfortaxliabilitiesandcashandin-kindtransfers.Theimportanceofassessingeconomicwellbeingusingabroadmeasureof

incomehasbeen4

Survey-basedstudieshavefoundmixedresults.Chettyetal.

(2014)

uselinkedtaxrecordstocomparetheincomeofadultsof

approximately30

yearsofage

in2011and2012totheirfamilyincomeaschildren,findingthatachildwhoseparentsare10

percentilepointshigherup

intheincomedistributionhaveon

averagea

3.4percentilepointshigherincomewhentheybecomeadults.5

Comparisonstoone’sownparentsalsodifferfromcomparisonsacrossgenerationsinthat

one’sparentsarenotalwaysinthepreviousgeneration.Astheageatwhichparentshavetheirfirstchildhasincreased(MathewsandHamilton2002),itproducesmoretimeforimprovementsfromparenttochildrelativetotheroughlyconstantlengthofsocietalgenerations.6

We

emphasize,however,that

thecostofearningtheincomecanchangeaswell,asmore

youngadultsareinvestingincollegeand

thecostofhighereducationhasrisenovertime.We

discussimplicationsofchangestohumancapitalaccumulationon

resultsinsection5

of

thispaper.7

Whileourdatacontainsome

membersofthesesevengenerations,weprimarilyfocuson

thefivegenerationsfromtheGreatestGeneration(born1901–1927)throughMillennials(born

1981–1996)sincewecanobservetheminmid-adulthood.2demonstratedbypreviousresearchthatshowsconclusionsabouttrendsineconomicwellbeingovertimearechangedwhenusingafullmeasureofincomerelativetoanarrowerone(see,forexample,Piketty,Saez,andZucman2018;Larrimoreetal.2021;Burkhauseretal.

Forthcoming;AutenandSplinterForthcoming).Thus,usingabroadmeasureofincomecouldchangeconclusionsaboutwhetheryoungergenerationshaveoutperformedoldergenerationsat

asimilarage.

In

addition,our60-yearsampleperiod(1963–2022)allowsforalongerperiodthanmostpreviousstudiestoputrecentchangesinhistorical

context.Ouranalysisofincomesacrossgenerationscanserveas

acomplementtorecentresearchbyFisherandJohnson(2022)whousedthePanelStudyofIncomeDynamicstoconsiderincome,consumption,andwealthacrossgenerationsthroughadultsbornbefore1985.

It

alsocomplementsHorpedahl(2021)whousedtheFederalReserve’s

DistributionalFinancialAccountstolookatintergenerationalwealthtrends.Wefindthatatage36–40(ourfocalage

rangebecauseitallowsfor

comparisonsacrossfivegenerations)broadincomehasrisenforeverygenerationrelativetothepreviousone,thoughataslowerrateforGenerationXandMillennials.Themedian36–40yearold

fromtheSilentgenerationhad

ahouseholdincomethatwas34percenthigherthantheGreatestGeneration’smedianpersonforthesameagerange.BabyBoomersinthisagerangehadamedianincomethatwas27percentabovethatoftheSilentgeneration.

Theintergenerationalincomegrowthratewasalower16percentforGenerationXand18percentforMillennials.Therateofbroadincomegrowthwasalsopositiveatthe25th

and75th

percentilesforeachgeneration

comparedtothepreviousone,withasimilarslowdownforthemore

recentgenerations.Thepatternsofincomegrowthovertimehavebeenaffectedbythegrowthingovernmenttransfers.

Inparticular,the

slowdowninintergenerationalprogresswasmorepronounced

whenlookingatmarketincomesthanwhenlookingat

broaderincomemeasures

accountingfortaxesandtransfers.Nevertheless,Millennialsintheirlate30sstillhadmarketincomesthatwere14percent

abovethatofGenerationX.Thecontinuedintergenerationalprogresswe

observeforthoseintheirlate30sisalsonotduetochangingratesof

householdformation.Changesinhouseholdformationboostedrecentintergenerationalprogressinhouseholdincomesforthoseintheir20s,as

morepeoplenowlivewithandrelyontheirparentsinearlyadulthoods.

Thiscouldreflectsomefinancialdistress3amongyoungadultsiftheydesiremovingawayfromtheirparentsbutlack

thefinancialresourcestodoso.8

Yet,byage31lessthan10percentofMillennialslivedwithinahouseholdwheretheirparentsreceivedoverhalftheincome.

Consistentwiththesehouseholdformationtrends,theimprovements

acrossgenerationsforthoseintheirlate-30sarealsoapparentwhenlookingattheincomesofindividualsandcouples,ratherthanhouseholds.AmajorcontributortotheslowdowninintergenerationalprogressforGenerationXandMillennialsisaslowdowninthegrowthofworkhours.

In

theirlate30s,themedianmembersoftheSilentGenerationand

BabyBoomersworked27

to32percentmorehoursthanthepreviousgeneration,whileGenerationXandMillennialsworkedonaverage1to4percentmorethanthepreviousgeneration.Theworkhoursslowdowncoincideswiththestallingoffemalelaborsupplygrowthattheturnofthemillennium,after

whichpointGenerationXandMillennialsbegantoreachtheirlate30s.Holdingworkhours

constant,wefindthatGenerationXandMillennialsexperienced

alargerintergenerational

increaseinmarketincomethanBabyBoomersandasomewhatsmallerintergenerationalincreasethantheSilentGeneration.Giventheheightened

concernsaboutstudentloan

debtandthecostofcollegeerodingthisprogress,we

alsoconsiderthemagnitudeofintergenerationalimprovementsrelativetoincreasesinthecostofhighereducation.Onceaccountingforgrowingfinancialaid,

wefindthattheincreaseinthecostofhighereducationforMillennialsrelativetoGenerationXrepresentsonlythreeyearsoftheincreaseintheirhouseholdincomes.Theburdenof

repayingthisdebtisfrontloadedonearlyworkingyearswhen

earnings(forallgenerations)arelower,whichdooffsetintergenerationalgainsforthosewhoattend

collegeasthey

enteradulthood.Nevertheless,whenconsideredovertheentirelifespan,theincreasedcostofcollegerepresentsasmallshareoftheincreaseinlifetimeincomeforMillennialsrelativetopreviousgenerations.Ourresultsareconsistent

withpreviousresearchshowingageneraldeclineinabsoluteupwardmobilityovertime(Chettyetal.2017;Fisher

and

Johnson2022).ButincontrasttothatworkwefindthatforMillennialsthisdeclinestoppedandincomegrowthslightlyincreased.However,

wealsofindthatanyaccelerationinincomegrowthisfarsmallerthanthatsuggestedbyTwenge8

Non-financialfactorsmayalsoplaya

role,however,suchastherisingageof

firstmarriage

(Julian2021).4(2023),whoobservedthatMillennialshadabout9timestheintergenerationalincomegrowthatages25–34thaneitherBabyBoomersorGenerationX.Thegreaterintergenerationalprogressthatwe

observerelativetoFisherandJohnson(2022)inpartreflectsourbroaderincomemeasure;additionalyearsofdata;and

adjustingforinflationusingthePersonalConsumptionExpenditures(PCE)priceindex,

whichliketheChainedConsumerPriceIndex

(ChainedCPI)betterreflectspricechangesthanthetraditionalConsumerPriceIndex(CPI-U).9

ThegreaterconsistencyinintergenerationalincomegrowththatweobserverelativetoTwenge(2023)islikelyduetoourobservingindividualsacrossallyearsofthedata.10GiventhatweonlyobservetheoldestMillennialsatourcomparisonageinourdataset,ourresultsarelikelytosomewhatunderstatethe

intergenerationalprogressofMillennials.ThisresultcounterssomepopularnarrativesthatMillennialsareworseoffthanpreviousgenerations,butitalsoprovidesoptimismthattheAmericanDreammaynolongerbe

fading.Thisisespeciallythecaseifratherthancomparingthemselvesonlytotheirparents,AmericansdefineprogressonthebasisofhowtheycomparetothefulldistributionofAmericansinthepriorgeneration,as

wedointhispaper.Thepaperproceedsas

follows:Section2describesourdata,theconstructionofourbroadincomemeasure,andhowwedefineandcomparegenerations.Section3presentsourmainresultsonintergenerationalprogress.Section4documentstheroleofchangesinworkhours.Section5reportsintergenerationalprogressbyeducationalattainment.Section6considersracialdifferencesinintergenerationalprogress.Section7

reportstheresultsofalternativespecificationsthataccountforincompleteobservationofsomegenerationsandtheinclusionofthevalueofhealthinsuranceasincome.Section8discussestheresults.Section9concludes.9

Themethodologyof

theCPI-Uhaschangedovertime.The

ConsumerPriceIndexretroactiveseries(CPI-U-RS)appliescurrentmethodstothehistoricalCPI-U.Therefore,whencomparingresultsinthispapertotheCPI

weusetheCPI-U-RSratherthanthe

CPI-U.FordetailsontheCPI-U-RS,seeStewartandReed(1999).10

Although

Twenge(2023)selectsexpansionyearsforthe

comparison,the

notablydifferentresultsforGenerationX’sintergenerationalincomegrowththatshefindsinfigure

5.15comparingGenXin2004

toBabyBoomersin1987

(atages25–34)and

infigure4.19comparingGenXin2019

toBabyBoomersin2004

(atages45–54)suggeststheimportance

ofthe

observationyearsforthetrends.52.

DataandmethodologyWeusetheCPSASECtoconstructourvariousincomemeasuresfor

each

yearfrom1963to2022.TheCPSASECis

anationallyrepresentativehouseholdsurveyused

bytheCensusBureautoestimatehistoricalhouseholdincomeandpovertytrends.

It

hastheadvantagesofaskingalargesetofquestionsaboutincomethatelicitrelativelymoreaccurateresponsesthansomeotherhouseholdsurveysandbeingavailableannuallyforapproximatelysixdecades.Weuse

theCPSASECtocalculatefor

eachindividualorhouseholdtwoprimarydefinitionsofincome—(i)marketincomeand

(ii)post-tax,post-transferincome,whichstartswithmarketincomeandsubsequentlyadjustsfortaxesandincludesthe

valueofcash

andnonmedicalin-kindtransfers.11AlthoughtheCPSASECisamongthebestsourcesofhistoricalhouseholdincomedata,itlackssomeofthenecessaryinformationtocalculatetheseincomemeasuresbecauseitlackstaxinformationpriorto2005andthevalueofin-kindtransferbenefitspriorto1979.Thus,weimputethesemissingincomesourcesfollowingthe

approachinBurkhauseretal.(Forthcoming).Weimputefederalincometaxes,stateincometaxes,andpayrolltaxesforallyearsusingNBERTAXSIM

(Feenbergand

Coutts1993).12

Weusetheimputedvaluesofmajornonmedicalin-kindtransfers—theSupplementalNutritionalAssistanceProgram(SNAP),rentalhousingassistance,andschoollunch—from

Burkhauseret

al.(Forthcoming).Theseimputationsrelyonadministrativedataonaggregatecaseloadandspendingdataforeachyear,

aswellaspredictionsofrecipientsandbenefitvaluesonthebasisofsurveyresponseswhensuch

datawererecordedintheCPSASEC.WealsocorrectforunemploymentinsuranceunderreportingintheCPSASECduringtheCOVID-19pandemicusingtax-record

basedimputationsfromLarrimore,Mortenson,andSplinter(2023a).WesimilarlycorrectfordifferentialnonresponseduringtheCOVID-19pandemicusingthecorrectedweightsfromRothbaumandBee(2021).

In

Section8,wediscusshowotherformsofincome

misreportingforwhichwedonotcorrectmay

biasourresults.11

Forincome

years1963-1966,weexcludefrommarketincomeallunearnedincome—bothgovernmentincomeandinterest,dividends,rent,and

alimony—becausealloftheseincomesourcesare

reportedtogetherasasingleaggregatesource.Thiswillleadustounderstatemarketincomein1963-1966,and

because

thesenon-governmentincomesourcesare

countedasmarketincomeinalllateryearsstartingin1967,willleadustooverstategrowthinmarketincome

for

ourearliestgenerations.Giventhatourfocusisonrelativelyyoungworkingage

adults(age

36-40),

however,

theseunearnedsourcesofincomearelikelysmallandthusthe

upwardbias

inmarketincomegrowthislikelysmall.In1967,theseunearnedgovernmentincomesourcesrepresentedjust2percentofthetotalmarketincomeof

36to

40

yearoldadults.12

Becausestatetaxlawspriorto1978are

notincorporatedinTAXSIM,weapplystatetaxlawasof1978toimputestateincometaxesforallyearsfrom1963-1977,followingtheapproachtakenby

Burkhauseretal.(Forthcoming).6Finally,whiletop-coding

ofincomeintheCPSASECleadstounderstatementofincomeatthetopofthedistribution,ourfocusonthemedian—andoccasionallythe25th

and75th

percentilesoftheincomedistribution—insteadofmeansallowsustoavoidthissourceofbias.Weconvertallnominalincomevaluesinto2019

dollarsusingthePCEpriceindex.We

usethePCEpriceindexbecauseunliketheCPI-U-RSitaccountsfortheabilityofconsumerstosubstituteacrossbroadcategoriesofitems,andbecauseunlikethe

ChainedCPI-U,thePCEpriceindexisavailableforourentiresampleperiod.13

In

asensitivityanalysis,wealsoshowmajorresultsusingtheCPI-U-RSinstead.Notably,othershavearguedthateven

thePCEpriceindexoverstatesinflationlargelybecauseitdoesnot

adequatelyaccountfornewproductsandqualitychanges(MeyerandSullivan2012;Moulton2018);thiswouldsuggestthatourbaselineestimatesthatadjustforinflationusingthePCEpriceindexcouldunderstateintergenerationalprogress.Weanalyzetwodifferentsharingunits.Ourprimaryanalysistakesthehouseholdasthesharingunit,reflectingalloftheresourcesavailabletohouseholdmembersregardlessofwhobringstheresourcesintothehousehold.Whenusingthehouseholdsharingunit,weequivalizeresourcesusingasquareroot

equivalencescale.Thisreflectseconomiesofscaleinconsumption,suchthatthecostofmaintainingaconstantstandardoflivingwhenmovingfromonetotwohouseholdmembersisequaltothecostwhenmovingfromtwotofourhouseholdmembers.

In

separateanalyseswe

alsoconsidertheincomeofindividualsandcouplestodistinguishbetweenresourcesreceivedbythemembersofaparticulargenerationandthe

resourcesbroughtinbyotherssuchasparentsandtoseparateincometrendsfromshiftsinresourcesthatresultfromchangingchild-bearingdecisions.Totheextentthatadultchildrenincreasinglylivewithandrelyontheirparentstomeettheirmaterialends

(socalled“boomerang

children”),thisdistinctioncouldaffecttrendsinhouseholdincomegrowth.Fortheincomeofindividualsandcouples,wefollowPiketty,Saez,and

Zucman(2018),Larrimore,Mortenson,andSplinter(2022),

andAutenandSplinter(Forthcoming),andallocatehalfofthe

couple’sresourcestoeachindividualwithout13

In2023,theCensusBureaubeganusingtheChainedCPI-Utoadjustincomesforinflation,ratherthana

versionoftheCPI-Uthatappliescurrentmethodshistorically(CPI-U-RS),recognizingthatitisabettermeasureof

actualconsumerinflationexperiences(GuzmanandKollar2023).TheChainedCPI-Uisonlyavailablesince2000,

socannotbe

usedinearlieryears.BecausethePCEpriceindexandChainedCPI-Ufindsimilarratesofinflation,andthePCEpriceindexisavailablefromthe

beginningofourseries,weusethePCEprice

indexforallyears.7furtheradjustmentsfor

economiesofscale.14

Weallocateallmarketincomesuchasearningstotheindividualwhoearns

it,andweallocatetaxes

equallywithincoupleswhoareexpectedtojointlyfileataxreturn.ForcashtransferincomecapturedintheCPSASEC,weallocatethetransferincomebasedon

therecipientrecordedinthesurvey.Forimputedin-kindtransferincome,weallocatetransferstothehouseholderidentifiedintheCPSASEC.Wegroupindividualsintogenerationsbasedontheyearinwhichtheywereborn:theLostGeneration(1883–1900),

theGreatestGeneration

(1901–1927),theSilentGeneration(1928–1945),BabyBoomers(1946–1964),Generation

X(1965–1980),Millennials(1981–1996),andGenerationZ(1997–2012).Theseclassifications,

takenfromthosecreated

byPewResearch(Dimock2019),havetheadvantageof

beingused

inpreviousresearch,

reports,andpubliccommentary.15

EachofthegenerationclassificationssincetheSilentGenerationalsospansarelativelysimilaramountoftime,from15to18years,allowingforconsistentcomparisonsofincomegrowthacrossgenerations.We

comparegenerationsbyexaminingthedistributionofincomeacross

allindividualsinagivengenerationofagivenage(or

agerange).Becausemembersinagivengenerationwerebornovera15-

to18-year

period,agivengenerationwillbeofagivenageindifferentcalendaryears.For

example,membersofGenerationXwere

35yearsoldbetween2000(thosebornin1965)and2015(thosebornin1980).Ourdatasampleincludes

calendaryears1963through2022,andsowecan

onlymakecomparisonsofgenerationswhichreached

agiven

ageinsomeyearduring

thatrange.16

Figure1indicatesthecalendaryearsinwhichageneration’smemberswereofagivenage.The

dashedredlinesat1963and2022indicatetheearliestand

latestyearsofour

sample.Thus,weonlyobserveageneration’smembersatagivenageifit

isatleastpartiallycontainedbythedashedredlines.Forexample,

atage20,weobservethreeyearsoftheSilentGeneration(thosebornin1943–1945),aswellas

allBabyBoomers,GenerationXandMillennials.WedonotobservetheGreatestGenerationatage20becausetheywerebornpriorto1943.Similarly,wedonot14

Subsequentreferencesinthis

papertocoupleincomesalwaysrefertotheincome

ofthe

individualaloneifsingle,andtheequal-splitincome

oftheindividualandtheirspouseifmarried.15

Dimock(2019)does

notprovideabeginningyearfortheGreatestGenerationorthespanoftheLostGeneration.We

definetheLostGenerationasthosebornbetween1883and1900basedon

StraussandHowe(1991),whoalsodefinetheGreatestGenerationasstartingwiththosebornin1901.16

Toensurethatresultsarenot

drivenbythe

pandemicexperiences,wealsoconductedouranalysesendingin2019andproducedsimilarresults.8observethosemembersof

GenerationZwhowerebornafter2002atage20

orlaterinadulthood.Forour