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HOWFARCANINCLUSIONGO?THELONG-TERMIMPACTSOFPREFERENTIALCOLLEGEADMISSIONS

MichelaCarlana

EnricoMiglino

MichelaM.Tincani

WorkingPaper32525

/papers/w32525

NATIONALBUREAUOFECONOMICRESEARCH

1050MassachusettsAvenue

Cambridge,MA02138May2024

WethankseminarparticipantsatPUC,Tufts,LUISS,IFS,QueenMary,UCL,StockholmUniversity,theVATTInstituteandatvariousworkshopsforhelpfulcomments.SaraChiuriandSofiaBetaniaSierraVasquezprovidedexcellentresearchassistance.AERRCTRegistryID:AEARCTR-0002288.TheprojecthasobtainedIRBapprovalfromHarvardUniversity(IRB23-0805)andUCL(10515/002).WeacknowledgesupportfromHKSMalcolmWienerCenterforSocialPolicy.TheviewsexpressedhereinarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheNationalBureauofEconomicResearch.

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©2024byMichelaCarlana,EnricoMiglino,andMichelaM.Tincani.Allrightsreserved.Shortsectionsoftext,nottoexceedtwoparagraphs,maybequotedwithoutexplicitpermissionprovidedthatfullcredit,including©notice,isgiventothesource.

HowFarCanInclusionGo?TheLong-termImpactsofPreferentialCollegeAdmissionsMichelaCarlana,EnricoMiglino,andMichelaM.Tincani

NBERWorkingPaperNo.32525

May2024

JELNo.I24

ABSTRACT

Affirmativeactionandpreferentialadmissionpoliciesplayacrucialroleinfosteringsocialmobilitybybolsteringtheprospectsofdisadvantagedgroups.Inthispaper,weanalyzethelong-termeffectsofaChileanpolicy(PACE)thattargetsstudentsinunderprivilegedschools,offeringguaranteedadmissiontoselectivecollegestothosegraduatinginthetop15percentoftheirhighschoolclass.LeveragingboththerandomizedexpansionofPACEandtheadmissiondiscontinuity,ouranalysisrevealsthatPACEyieldspositivelabormarketeffectsfortheaveragetargetedstudent,especiallywomen,drivenbytheselectivityoftheattendedcolleges.However,formarginallyeligiblestudents,higherdropoutratesandnegativelabormarketoutcomesemerge,suggestingPACEmayinduceamismatchbetweentheirskillsandtheacademicrigorofselectiveprograms.Finally,wefindthatstudentsinthebottom85percentoftheirschoolsexperiencepositiveeffectsonlabormarketoutcomes.Weidentifyequilibriumeffectsonlocallabormarketsasapotentialmechanism.Theresultssuggestthatthereisalimittohowfarpreferentialadmissionscangowhiledeliveringontheirpromises.

MichelaCarlana

HarvardKennedySchool

79JFKStreetTaubmanBldg

Cambridge,MA02138andIZA

andalsoNBER

michela_carlana@

MichelaM.Tincani

UniversityCollegeLondonGowerStreet

London-WC1E6BTUK

m.tincani@ucl.ac.uk

EnricoMiglinoBankofItaly

miglinoenrico@yahoo.it

ArandomizedcontrolledtrialsregistryentryisavailableatAEARCTR-0002288

1

HowFarCanInclusionGo?TheLong-termImpactsofPreferentialCollegeAdmissions*

MichelaCarlanat,EnricoMiglino‡,andMichelaM.Tincani§May2024

Abstract

Affirmativeactionandpreferentialadmissionpoliciesplayacrucialroleinfos-teringsocialmobilitybybolsteringtheprospectsofdisadvantagedgroups.Inthispaper,weanalyzethelong-termeffectsofaChileanpolicy(PACE)thattargetsstu-dentsinunderprivilegedschools,offeringguaranteedadmissiontoselectivecollegestothosegraduatinginthetop15percentoftheirhighschoolclass.LeveragingboththerandomizedexpansionofPACEandtheadmissiondiscontinuity,ouranalysisrevealsthatPACEyieldspositivelabormarketeffectsfortheaveragetargetedstu-dent,especiallywomen,drivenbytheselectivityoftheattendedcolleges.However,formarginallyeligiblestudents,higherdropoutratesandnegativelabormarketout-comesemerge,suggestingPACEmayinduceamismatchbetweentheirskillsandtheacademicrigorofselectiveprograms.Finally,wefindthatstudentsinthebottom85percentoftheirschoolsexperiencepositiveeffectsonlabormarketoutcomes.Weidentifyequilibriumeffectsonlocallabormarketsasapotentialmechanism.Theresultssuggestthatthereisalimittohowfarpreferentialadmissionscangowhiledeliveringontheirpromises.

1Introduction

Despiteeffortstopromoteequalaccesstohighereducation,collegedegreesremaindis-

proportionatelyattainedbystudentsfromadvantagedbackgrounds(Chettyetal.,

2020)

.Affirmativeactionandpreferentialadmissionpoliciestacklesuchinequalitybyenhancing

admissionchancesfordisadvantagedgroups.Mostresearchrevealssubstantialbenefitsto

*WethankseminarparticipantsatPUC,Tufts,LUISS,IFS,QueenMary,UCL,StockholmUniversity,theVATTInstituteandatvariousworkshopsforhelpfulcomments.SaraChiuriandSofiaBetaniaSierraVasquezprovidedexcellentresearchassistance.AERRCTRegistryID:AEARCTR-0002288.TheprojecthasobtainedIRBapprovalfromHarvardUniversity(IRB23-0805)andUCL(10515/002).We

ackyflK,a,oie,d-:al.carlana@).

‡BankofItaly(e-mail:Enrico.Miglino@esterni.bancaditalia.it).

§UniversityCollegeLondon,IFS,CEPR,CESifo,andLEAP(e-mail:m.tincani@ucl.ac.uk).

2

well-prepared,underrepresentedstudentsadmittedtoselectivecolleges(Bleemer,

2022;

Black,Denning,andRothstein,

2023;

Otero,Barahona,andDobbin,

2023)

.However,thebenefitsfordisadvantagedstudentswithloweracademicpreparationremainanopenquestion,asmuchofthepriorworkhascenteredonrelativelyhigh-achievingunderrep-resentedapplicants.ThisquestionhasgarneredsignificantrelevancefollowingtherecentU.S.SupremeCourt’sbanonrace-basedadmissions.Institutionsarepivotingtowardsadmissionpreferencestargetedatstudentsfromlow-incomefamilies.Thesestudentshavefeweropportunitiestoenhancetheirhumancapitalduringchildhoodandadoles-

cence(CunhaandHeckman,

2007),withnegativeconsequencesfortheirachievementby

theendofcompulsoryschooling(BelleyandLochner,

2007;

BaileyandDynarski,

2011;

Chettyetal.,

2020;

Hanusheketal.,

2022)

.Thispaperinvestigatestheimpactsinthela-bormarketofextendingpreferentialadmissionstodisadvantagedstudents,substantiallyunderpreparedcomparedtotheirpeers.

WeanalyzetheeffectsofaChileanaffirmativeactionpolicycalledPACE(ProgramadeAcompa˜namientoyAccesoEfectivoalaEducaci´onSuperior),whichtargetsstudentsindisadvantagedschoolsandoffersthosegraduatinginthetop15%oftheirhighschoolguaranteedadmissionstoselectivecolleges.Althoughtopgraduateswithintheirschools,thehighschoolstandardizedtestscoresoftargetedstudentsare0.9standarddeviationsbelowthoseofregularcollegeentrants.Forthosejustaroundthetop15%admissioncutoff,thisdifferencereaches1.1standarddeviations.

Weevaluatetheimpactsofthepolicyonstudentslabormarketoutcomesanded-ucationalattainment.Weusetworesearchdesigns.First,weexploittherandomizedexpansionoftheprogramthatoccurredin2016toidentifytheeffectofbeinginaschoolthatparticipatesinPACE.Ourrandomizedcontroltrialanalysis(RCT)considerssepa-ratelytheimpactsonthetop-15percentofstudents,whomthepolicyaimedtoattracttocollege,andonthebottom-85percentofstudents.Second,weexploitthediscontinu-ityintheadmissionruletoisolatetheeffectofreceivingapreferentialadmissionoffer.Theregressiondiscontinuityapproach(RDD)focusesonstudentsinschoolsparticipatinginthePACEprogramsince2014,whosegradesareclosetothepreferentialadmissioncutoff.Thetwoapproachesprovidecomplementaryevidence.TheRCTallowsustoestimatetheeffectofintroducingaffirmativeactioninschoolsforbothtop-performingstudentsandtheirschoolmates,combiningtheeffectofpreferentialadmissionswithany

otherchanges,suchastotheincentivestostudywhileinschool(Tincani,Kosse,and

Miglino

,

2024)ortheorientationclassesprovidedbyPACEtoallstudentsinparticipat

-ingschools.TheRDDnarrowsdowntheimpactexclusivelyofpreferentialadmissionbycomparingstudentsjustaboveandjustbelowthepreferentialadmissioncutoff.Intermsofpopulationsofinterest,theRCTprovidesthetreatmenteffectthroughoutthebaselineabilitydistribution,whiletheRDDprovideslocaleffectsattheeligibilitymargin.

3

Weconstructauniquepaneldatasetmergingtogetheradministrativedataoneduca-tionandlabormarketoutcomesuptosixyearsafterleavinghighschool.Forthecohortgraduatingin2016,weadditionallylinksurveydataonexpectationsaboutfuturecollegeperformancethatwecollectedattheendofhighschool.Furthermore,wecreateasepa-ratedatasetlinkingadministrativedataoneducationandlabormarketoutcomesforoldercohortsofstudentswhograduatedfromthesameschoolsasourstudysubjectsbetween2006and2010.

Thisdatasetallowsustoimplementthesurrogateindexmethod(Athey,

Chetty,Imbens,andKang,

2019)topredictprogramimpactsonlabormarketoutcomes

uptofifteenyearsafterhighschool,allowingustoprovidesomeofthelongest-termestimatesofpreferentialadmissionimpacts.

First,weprovideevidenceontheeffectsofPACEontargetedstudents,thetop15%oftheirschool,includingthosearoundthepreferentialadmissioncutoffthattheprogramaimedtobringtocollege.

Along-standingtheory,the‘mismatchhypothesis’(Sander,

2004),positsthatpreferentialadmissionstargetedatlow-achievingstudentscouldmake

themworseoffbyinducingthemtoenrollinselectivecollegesonlytolaterdropout,loweringtheirlifelongearnings.Whileexistingevidencehassofarmostlydisputedthis

hypothesis(Black,Denning,andRothstein,

2023;

Bleemer,

2022,

2021;

Otero,Barahona,

andDobbin

,

2023),PACEtargetsapopulationofstudentswithsubstantiallylowerpre

-collegeachievementthanthoseregularlyadmittedtocollege,andthanthosetargetedbysimilarprogramsinothercountries.Whethermismatchcanoccurinsuchapopulationremainsanopenempiricalquestion.

IntheRCTanalysis,wedonotdetectsignificantimpactsonlaborforceparticipationorearningsfortop15%studentsinthefirstfiveyearsafterhighschool.Usingthesurrogateindexmethod,wepredictpositiveeffectsonyearlyearningsinthelongterm,withanincreaseby3.9%intheyearlyearningsbetween11and15yearsafterhigh-schoolgraduation.Consistentwiththenullimpactsonlaborforceparticipation,PACEdidnotincreasehighereducationattendanceonaverageinthisgroup.Whileenrollmentinhighereducationincreasedsubstantiallythefirstyearafterhighschool(+6.2percentagepoints(p.p.),a10%increasecomparedtothemeanofthecontrolgroup),PACEdidnotalterthelikelihoodofenrollingwithinsixyearsofhighschool.Thepositivepredictionsonlong-termyearlyearningsaredrivenbyanincreaseingraduationfromselectivecolleges(+6.2p.p.,a22%increase),withasimilardecreaseingraduationfromvocationalandnon-selectiveinstitutions.Thelong-termpositiveeffectonthelabormarketisfullydrivenbywomen,withanyearlyearningincreaseof9%inthelongterm,likelydrivenbytheirhighergraduationfromselectivecolleges(+10.6p.p.,or36%increase).TheeffectofPACEforhigh-achievingmenisnegligible,bothinthelabormarketandhighereducation.Inlinewithpreviousstudies,therefore,wedonotfindevidenceofglobalmismatchamong

thepooloftargetedstudentsonaverage(ArcidiaconoandLovenheim,

2016)andmore

4

positiveimpactsonwomen(Black,Denning,andRothstein,

2023)

.Incontrasttopreviousstudies,wefindthatthebenefitsarefullyconcentratedamongwomen.Whenseverelydisadvantagedtop-performingmenareofferedtheopportunitytoattendselectivecolleges,theydonotincreasetheirprobabilityofgraduatingfromthem,limitingtheirpotentialforlong-termsocialmobility.

Theresultsforstudentsjusteligibleforapreferentialadmission,however,arestrik-inglydifferentcomparedtotheaverageeffectforalltargetedstudents.MarginalstudentsaresystematicallylesslikelytoworkwheneligibleforaPACEslotinthefiveyearsafterhighschool,witha10%decreaseinthenumberofmonthsworked.Thiseffectisaccom-paniedbya10%yearlyearninglossduringthisperiod.Inthelongterm(years11-15afterhighschoolgraduation),thesurrogateindexmethodpredictsapositivebutinsignificanteffectonearnings.Consistentwiththenegativeimpactonlaborforceparticipationintheshortterm,PACEadmissionsincreasedthelikelihoodofenrollingintoanytertiaryinsti-tutionwithinsixyearsofhighschool(4.1p.p.,ora5%increase),suggestingthatsomestudentswereinducedtoattendhighereducationinsteadofenteringthelabormarket,anextensivemargineffect.Preferentialadmissionsboostedselectivecollegedegreeattain-mentforsomemarginalstudents(+5.5p.p.),butalsoincreasedthelikelihoodtoenrollintertiaryeducationonlytolaterdropout(+6.5p.p.).Whilesomeofthisdropoutlikelyoccurredamongthenewentrants,somemayhaveoccurredamongthosewhowouldhaveobtainedahighereducationdegree(potentiallyfromalessselectiveinstitution)withoutthepreferentialadmission.

Theheterogeneitybygenderoffersvaluableinsightsontheseresultstounderstandwhobenefitsfromaffirmativeactionpoliciestargetingverydisadvantagedstudents.Pref-erentialadmissionsboostedselectivecollegedegreeattainmentforsomemarginalstudentsofbothgenders(5.5p.p.),buttheyalsoincreasedthelikelihoodtoenrollintertiaryin-stitutionsonlytolaterdropoutforsomemen(12.7p.p),withnegativeimplicationsforearnings,consistentwithpreferentialadmissionsinducingmismatchamongsomemarginalmalestudents.PACEyieldedpositivelong-termlabormarketoutcomesforsomemarginalstudents,ofbothgenders,andnegativeforothers,especiallymen.TofurtherinvestigatewhatisdrivingthenegativeRDDresults,weassesswhetherinformationfrictionsprecludesomestudentsfromcorrectlyforeseeingtheconsequencesofenrollinginademandingcol-legeprogram.

Thisisacentraltenetofthe‘mismatchhypothesis’(Arcidiaconoetal.,

2011),thathassofarbeendifficulttodirectlytestabsentexpectationdata

.

Usingsurveydatawecollectedfromstudentsinasampleofhighschoolsin2016duringtheirfinalyearandlinkedtotheiradministrativerecords,weshowthatstudents,espe-ciallymen,areoveroptimisticabouttheirchancesofgraduatingfromaselectivecollege.Forexample,nearly40%ofcollegeentrantswhowerecertaintheywouldgraduatefromaselectivecollegehadinsteaddroppedoutduringthefollowingsixyears.Weshowsupport-

5

ingevidencethatthenegativeimpactsonthehighereducationperformanceofmarginalstudentsareconcentratedamongstudentswho,inhighschool,hadabove-medianlev-elsofoverconfidenceintheirbeliefthatacceptingadmissiontoaselectivecollegewouldleadtograduation.Incontrast,andinlinewiththerevealedpreferencetheory,studentswhoheldmorerealisticexpectationsfacednonegativeeffectswhenofferedadditionalopportunitiestoattendcollege.Thisevidenceisentirelyconsistentwiththetheorythataffirmativeactionandpreferentialadmissionscanleadtomismatcheffectsinthepresence

ofinformationfrictionsforlow-achievingandoveroptimisticstudents(Arcidiaconoetal.,

2011)

.

Next,wediscussthePACEeffectsonuntargetedstudents,thosebelongingtothebottom85%oftheirschoolintermsofGPAattheexperiment’sbaseline.Preferentialadmissionpoliciescaninfluenceschoolmatesoftargetedstudentsthroughatleastthreechannels.Exposuretopeersheadedforcollegecouldleadthemtopursuehighereducation

athigherratesthroughadesiretoconform(Golightly,

2019;

Fern´andez,

2021;

Anelliand

Peri

,

2019)

.Notbeingawardedapreferentialadmissioncouldactasanegativesignalonownacademicabilityandconstraineducationalaspirations,leadingstudentstoinvestin

theirlabormarketprospectsinstead(GenicotandRay,

2017;

LaFerrara,

2019)

.Finally,admissionpoliciescouldgenerateequilibriumeffectsinlocallabormarketsbyincreasing

thesupplyofcollegeattendants(Moretti,

2004)

.

IntheRCTanalysisforbottom85%students,wefindsizeablepositiveimpactsonlaborforceparticipation(+7%moremonthsworked)andearnings(+8%)inthefirstfiveyearsafterhighschool,withtheinitialearningboostpredictedtopersistovertime,althoughdecreasinginmagnitudeandnotpreciselyestimated.Wedonotfindanyeffectsoneducationalattainmentinthisgroup,rulingoutthepeerspilloverschannel.Examiningpatternsofentranceexamre-takingoversubsequentrounds,wefindnoevidencethattheincreasedlaborforceparticipationcameatthecostofadisengagementwiththehighereducationsector,aswouldbeexpectedifstudentsinterpretedtheabsenceofpreferentialadmissionasanegativesignalconstrainingtheireducationalaspirations.Instead,wefindsupportforequilibriumeffectsinlocallabormarkets.WhenwecomparestudentsinPACEandnon-PACEschoolsthatarelocatedinthesamelabormarketthroughtheinclusionoflabormarketfixedeffects,thepositiveeffectsofbeinginaPACEschoolonlabormarketoutcomesintheshorttermvanish.Thepositiveeffectswedetected,therefore,couldbeduetochangesoccurringinthelabormarketshostingtreatedschools.Sincetargetedstudentsfromtreatedschoolsattendhighereducationforlongerthantheircounterpartsincontrolschoolsduringthefirstfiveyearsafterhighschool,aplausiblemechanismisthattherearemorejobvacanciesandlesscompetitionforjobsinthelocal

6

labormarketshostingtreatedschools.1Whilesuchimbalancesinvacanciesacrosslabormarketsfluctuateoverthefirstfiveyears,infrictionallabormarketstheycangenerateconstantemploymentdifferenceslikethosewedocumented.

Thepapercontributesseveralnovelfindingstotheliteratureoncollegeadmissions.First,itextendstheliteratureonpreferentialadmissionsbasedonsocioeconomicdisad-vantage,providinglabormarketimpactestimatesforapopulationofstudentswithlowerpre-collegeachievementthanthepopulationstargetedbysimilarprogramsinothercoun-

tries(Black,Denning,andRothstein,

2023;

Bleemer,

2021)

.Thisallowsustoprovide

newempiricalinsightstothedebateovermismatchinaffirmativeaction(Sander,

2004;

ArcidiaconoandLovenheim,

2016)

.Unlikepreviousstudies,wefindevidenceconsistentwiththemismatchhypothesisforsomemarginallyeligiblemen,butnotfortheaveragestudentstargetedbythepolicy.Substantiallyrelaxingadmissionrequirementsmayat-tractintoselectivecollegesmenwhowouldhaveotherwiseenteredthelabormarket.Asseveralpreferentiallyadmittedmarginalmendropoutofhighereducation,theshort-termearninglossesarenotnecessarilyoffsetbyhigherfuturewages.2,3Suchshort-termearn-inglosseshavenotbeendocumentedinpreferentialadmissioncontextsthatreachmoreacademically-ablestudents,forwhomamorecommoncounterfactualchoicewouldbetoenteralessselectivecollege.4

Ourevidencecontributesinseveralwaystotheaffirmativeactionliterature.First,itdemonstratesthatmismatchisalocalphenomenonevenincontextsinwhichadmissionpreferencesaresubstantiallyextended.Theresultsalsospeaktotheexternalvalidityofanalysesbasedonlocalestimatesaroundadmissioncutoffs.Inthecontextofaffirmativeactionforhighereducation,localeffectsmaynotgeneralizeawayfromadmissioncutoffs

aswellasinothereducationcontexts(AngristandRokkanen,

2015)

.

Second,weprovidenewevidenceontheequilibriumimpactsthataffirmativeactionpoliciescanhaveonuntargeteddisadvantagedstudents.Priorstudieshavemostlyfocusedonexaminingtheimpactsonuntargetedadvantagedstudents,eitherthosedisplaced

1Whilethetreatmentdidnotincreasethelikelihoodofenteringhighereducationfortop-performingstudents,targetedstudentsintreatedschoolsenterhighereducationearlier,andattendlongerprograms.Asaresult,inthefirstyearafterhighschool,andthenagaintwoyearslater,highereducationattendanceislargeramongtargetedstudentsfromtreatedschoolsthanamongtheircounterpartsincontrolschools.

2UsingageneralizedRoyframeworkappliedtoNLSY79datafromtheUnitedStates,

Heckman,

Humphries,andVeramendi

(2018)estimateinsignificanteffectsofcollegegraduationonthewagesof

studentswithbelow-medianacademicabilityintheU.S.Theyconjecturethattheshort-termearninglossesfromenteringcollegeinsteadofthelabormarketforsuchstudentsarenotoffsetbyhigherfuturewages,buttheirestimatesarenoisybecausefewstudentsinthisgroupentercollegeabsentpreferentialadmissionprograms.

3Somemarginallyadmittedmenmayhaveobtainedvocationaldegreesabsentpreferentialadmissions.Byforegoingtertiarydegrees,thesemenmayexperiencelong-termwagelosses.

4AnalyzingtheCaliforniantoppercentplan,

Bleemer

(2021)findsonlyintensive-margineffectson

collegequality.AnalyzingtheTexastoppercentplan,

Black,Denning,andRothstein

(2023)findextensive

margineffectsonthelikelihoodofattendinghighereducationatall,butdonotstudyshort-termearningimpacts.

7

fromcollegeopportunities(Black,Denning,andRothstein,

2023;

Bleemer,

2021;

Otero,

Barahona,andDobbin,

2023),orcollegeincumbents(Machado,Reyes,andRiehl,

2023)

.5Ourevidenceofpositiveequilibriumeffectsonthelabormarketoutcomesofuntargeteddisadvantagedstudentsdemonstratethatacomprehensivecost-benefitanalysisoftheimpactsofthesepoliciesshouldconsidertheirpotentialtoaffectthisgroupofuntargetedstudents.6

2Institutionalbackground

2.1HighereducationinChile

Chile’shighereducationsystemencompassesthreedistincttypesofinstitutions:selectivecolleges,non-selectivecolleges,andvocationalinstitutions.Thesecategoriescontributetohighereducationenrollmentinvaryingproportions,withselectivecollegesaccountingfor41%,non-selectivecollegesrepresenting8%,andvocationalinstitutionsconstitutingthemajorityat51%in2018.

Selectivecollegesincludethethirty-ninethatparticipateinthecentralizedadmission

system(SUA,SistemanicodeAdmisi´on).Renownedfortheiracademicfocus,these

institutionsprovidecomprehensivefourtosix-yearprograms.Toenroll,studentsmusttakeastandardizedcollegeentranceexam,whichwascalledPSU(PruebadeSelecci´onUniversitaria)upto2020.Studentssubmitanapplicationonthecentralizedplatform,andanallocationmechanismmatchesapplicantstoprograms.Likeinmostindustrializedcountries,enrollmentinselectivecollegesishighlyunequalacrosssocioeconomiclines(Figure

A1)

.

2.2ThePACEprogram

PACE(ProgramadeAcompa˜namientoyAccesoEfectivoalaEducaci´onSuperior)isapreferentialadmissionpolicyintroducedtoincreaseadmissionstoselectivecollegesamongdisadvantagedstudents.Theprogramisunderpinnedbyanagreementbetweenthegov-

5Anexceptionis

Golightly

(2019),whoexaminesimpactsontheeducationoutcomesofstudentsin

schoolstargetedbytheTexasTopTenpolicybutwhoarenottop-decilestudents.

6Thispaperextends

Tincani,Kosse,andMiglino

(2024),whofocusontheimpactsofPACEon

pre-collegeoutcomesandeducationoutcomesinthefirstfiveyearsafterhighschool.

Tincani,Kosse,

andMiglino

(2024)combinetheRCTwithastructuralmodelofeducationchoicestorationalizePACE

impactsonpre-collegeeffort,anddonotexploitthediscontinuitytoexamineadmissionimpactsamongmarginallyeligiblestudents.Therefore,thetwocentralcontributionsofthispaper—identifyinghowmuchadmissionrequirementscanbeextendedwhilestillbenefitingthelong-termoutcomesoftargetedstudents,andprovidingevidenceofspillovereffectsonthelabormarketoutcomesofuntargeteddisad-vantagedstudents—areentirelynovel.

8

ernmentandtheselectivecolleges,whichcommittoofferingalistofreservedseatstoPACEstudents.

ThePACEprogramtargetshighschoolsselectedbythegovernmentbasedonaschool-levelvulnerabilityindex(I´ndicedeVulnerabilidadEscolar).Itwasfirstintroducedindis-advantagedChileanhighschoolsin2014,andlaterexpanded,ascanbeseenfromthemapinFigure

1

andthedynamicgraphicavailable

here

.ThefirsthighschoolstoparticipateinPACEin2014werelocatedinthepoorestregionsofsouth-centralChilewheremostindigenouscommunitieslive(e.g.Auracan´ıa)andinthepoorestneighborhoodsofthesouthwesternSantiagometropolitanarea.Theprogramexpandedgraduallyovertime,incorporatingschoolsselectedfromthepoorestareasofthecountry.WhenaschoolfirstentersthePACEprogram,thepreferentialadmissioncriteriaapplyonlytothecohortin11thgrade;insubsequentyears,theyapplyalsotothenewcohortsentering11thgrade.

Afterthefirsttwoyearsofprogramimplementation,thegovernmentidentified218highschoolsthatwerenotyetPACEschools,butthatmettheeligibilitycriteriaforenteringPACEin2016givenstudents’socioeconomicstatus.7FollowingadvicefromourresearchteamandusingarandomizationcodewrittenbyPNUDChile(UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram),itrandomlyselected64ofthe218eligibleschoolstoreceivethePACEtreatment.Figure

A2

showsthegeographicdistributionoftheexperimentalschools.Therandomizedexpansionconcernedasinglecohortofstudents:thosestar