【IMF】新兴市场和发展中经济体的债务脆弱性和融资挑战-关键数据概述-2025.2

©20[xx]InternationalMonetaryFund

January2025

DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCING

CHALLENGESINEMERGINGMARKETSAND

DEVELOPINGECONOMIES—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

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ElectroniccopiesofIMFPolicyPapersareavailabletothepublicfrom

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InternationalMonetaryFund

Washington,D.C.

February6,2025

DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMERGINGMARKETSANDDEVELOPINGECONOMIES—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

ApprovedBy

GuillaumeChabert(SPR)

PreparedbyKarimFodaundertheoverallguidanceof

KarinaGarcia.DataanalyticsandvisualizationsupportwasprovidedbyJoyceSaitoandChenChen.Administrative

assistancewasprovidedbyClaudiaIsernandEimanAfshar(allSPR).

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 3

EVOLUTIONOFDEBTVULNERABILITIES 3

CHALLENGESAHEAD 7

THEROADAHEAD 21

FIGURES

1.PublicDebttoGDPandPrimaryBalancestoGDP 4

2.IMF-WorldBankLIC-DSFandIMFSRDSFRiskRatings 5

3.ChangesinCreditorCompositionofExternalPPGDebt 6

4.CompositionofPublicandPubliclyGuaranteedDebt 7

5.OverallInteresttoRevenueandExternalDebtServicetoRevenue 8

6a.EMDEBondSpreadsandUnderlyingYields 9

6b.AverageInterestRatesonNewExternalCommitments 9

7.ExternalPublicandPubliclyGuaranteedPrincipalPayments,ByCreditorType 10

8.ExternalFinancingSupplyandNeeds 10

9.NetExternalPublicandPubliclyGuaranteedDebtFlows,ByCreditorType 11

10.CountrieswiththeHighestRelativeFinancingChallenges,2024-27 12

11.RegionalDistributionofCountrieswithHighRelativeFinancingNeeds 13

12.AverageandEffectiveInterestRatesonPublicDebtvs.TaxRevenuetoGDPfor

CountrieswithHighOverallInteresttoRevenueRatios 14

DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

2

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

13.AverageInterestratesonPublicDebtvs.PublicDebt-to-GDPCountrieswithHighOverall

InteresttoRevenueRatios 15

14.DomesticDebtServicetoRevenueRatios 16

15.ExternalPrincipaltoRevenueRatios 17

16.SharesofExternalPrincipalandInterestPaymentsonPPGDebt,byCreditorType,

2024-27 18

17.NetExternalPPGDebtFlows,byCreditorType,2018-23 19

18.PrimaryBalancetoGDPRatiosinCountrieswithHighExternalPrincipaltoRevenue

(excl.grants)Ratios 20

19.CountrieswithHighExternalPrincipalandHighOverallInteresttoRevenue(excl.grants)

Ratios:TaxRevenuesandExternalPPGDebt 21

20.DSARiskRatingsofCountrieswithHighExternalPrincipalorHighOverallInterestto

RevenueRatios 21

21.TaxRevenuetoGDPRatio 22

22.ExportsandInternationalReservesCoverageinEMDEs 23

DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

3

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INTRODUCTION

Manyemergingmarketsanddevelopingeconomiesfaceelevateddebtvulnerabilitiesandfinancingneeds.Followingthe2020-21surgeindebtlevelsassociatedwiththeCOVID-19shock,andthe

subsequenttighteninginglobalfinancialconditions,manyemergingmarketsanddeveloping

economies(EMDEs)1aregrapplingwithrisingdebtserviceburdensthatsqueezethespaceavailablefordevelopmentspending.Pandemic-induceddeficitshavedeclined,anddebtlevelshavestabilizedandareprojectedtoremainstableorslightlydeclineunderstaff’sbaselineassumptions.However,

manyEMDEsareconfrontinghighcostsoffinancing,largeexternalrefinancingneeds,andadeclineinnetexternalflowsamidimportantinvestmentandsocialspendingneeds.Tohelpaddressthesechallenges,countrieswouldbenefitfromactions,bothatdomesticandinternationallevel,to

proactivelyexpandtheircapacitytofinancedevelopmentspending.Therearealsoimportantriskstothebaselinethatwillrequirecarefulmonitoring.Thispaperaimstohelpinformtheinternational

debateontheseissuesbyprovidingfactualdataandinsightonthedebtvulnerabilitiesandfinancingpressuresfacingEMDEs.

EVOLUTIONOFDEBTVULNERABILITIES

DebtVulnerabilitiesandFinancingNeedsRemainElevatedinEMDEs

1.PublicdebtlevelsinEMDEsremainelevated,thoughtheyhavestabilizedpost-

pandemicandareexpectedtoremainstableordeclineslightlyoverthemedium-term.PublicdebtinEMDEswasalreadyhighandonanincreasingtrendbeforetheCOVID-19pandemic,

followingasteadyincreasethroughthe2010s.TheCOVID-19shockin2020ledtosteeperincreasesindebt-to-GDPlevelsaspublicspendingrampeduptosupportthepolicyresponseandrecovery,

andGDPdeclined.Inthepost-pandemicperiod,countrieshavesoughttorestorefiscalsustainabilityandprimaryfiscaldeficitshavemostlynarrowed.Forthemedianlow-incomecountry(LIC),the

primaryfiscaldeficithasnarrowedtoabout1percentofGDP,arounditspre-pandemiclevels.Forthemedianemergingmarketeconomy(EM),primarydeficitshavenarrowedsignificantlyandareclosetobalance.Therefore,post-pandemicpublicdebtlevelshavenowstabilized(Figure1).

2.Whileelevated,publicdebtlevelsinEMDEsremainwellbelowhistoricalhighs.ThisisparticularlytrueforLICswithdebtburdensmuchlowertodaythanintheperiodleadinguptotheHIPCDebtreliefInitiative,2withthedebt-to-GDPofthemedianLICatabout55percenttoday

comparedtothepeakofabout70percentin1994.Furthermore,evenforcountriescurrently

assessedathighriskorindebtdistress,theircurrentmediandebttoGDPratioof57percentisstillmarkedlylowerthantheirpeakattheeveoftheHIPCInitiative(67percent)andmuchlowerthanthemedianofthe39HIPCcountriesatthattime(thatpeakedatjustbelow90percentofGDP).

(Figure1).

1Encompassesallcountrieswhicharenotclassifiedashigh-incomecountriesbytheWorldBank,excludingChina

andIndiaduetotheireconomicsizeandspecificsituations,plusallcountriesclassifiedasSmallDevelopingStatesbytheIMF.Withinthisgroup,LICsrefertoPRGT-eligiblecountries.

2TheHIPCinitiativewaslaunchedin1996.

DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

PercentofGDP

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

2024

2026

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Highrisk/Indebtdistress(#35)HIPCs(#39)

EvolutionofLICTotalPublicDebt

(Median,inpercentofGDP)

mnIQR(LICs)LICs(#69)

PercentofGDP

EMs:PublicDebttoGDP

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

EMIQREMMedian

Figure1.PublicDebttoGDPandPrimaryBalancestoGDP

PercentofGDP

LICs:PrimaryBalancetoGDP

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

-7

mnaLICIQRLICMedian

PercentofGDP

EMs:PrimaryBalancetoGDP

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

-7

mnEMIQREMMedian

Source:IMFGlobalDebtDatabase2023andWorldEconomicOutlookJanuary2025.

Note:2024valuesareestimates.IQRreferstointerquartilerange.

3.Underbaselineassumptions,theriskofasystemicdebtcrisisappearsbroadly

contained.Thenumberofcountrieswithunsustainablepublicdebt,indebtdistressbasedonDSAassessments,and/orareengagedindebtrestructuringsremainscontained;outof136

EMDEcountriesinthisnote’sperimeter,only12LICsareindebtdistressorhaveunsustainablepublicdebt,3and2EMsareundergoingdebtrestructurings.AmongLICs,whiletheshareof

countriesassessedathighriskofexternaldebtdistressbrieflyincreasedattheonsetofthe

pandemic,thesituationhasimprovedsince2021,withthesharenowsevenpercentagepointslower(Figure2).Itisalsoimportanttonotethatahigh-riskratingdoesnotnecessarilysignalariskofdebtdistressinthenearterm.BasedonthelatestLIC-DSAsthrough2023,nearly30

percentofhigh-riskratingsweredrivenpredominantlybylong-termbreachesinsolvency

indicators(forwhichcorrectiveadjustmentscouldbemadeoverasufficientperiodoftime

beforerisksmaterialize)ortheapplicationofjudgmenttoreflectlonger-termconsiderations,ratherthannear-termbreaches.Furthermore,theshareofcountriesatlowandmoderaterisk

3BasedonLIC-DSFriskratingsavailableasofDecember2024.

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DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

(whosedebtisdeemedsustainablewithahighprobabilityforIMFpolicies)hasreturnedtopre-pandemiclevels,anothersignalthatrisksofasystemicdebtcrisisisdeclining.AmongEMs,

medium-termdebtdistressrisksremainstable,butsomeremainvulnerablewithrisksatthetail-endofthedistribution(Figure2).

4.However,thereareimportantuncertaintiesaroundthebaseline.Whiletheriskofabroad-baseddebtcrisishasdiminishedcomparedtotheassessmentatthetimeofCOVID-19,therearesignificantriskstothebaseline,includingonglobalgrowth,internationalfinancial

conditions,exchangeratemovements,weakerthananticipatedmacro-structuralpolicies,ortheriskofacombinationof-orsuccessive-shocks.Iftheserisksweretomaterialize,current

financingchallengescouldevolveintoabroaddebtcrisis.Anadditionalcaveatisthatstaff’sassessmentisbasedonavailabledatasuchthatdebtdatalimitationscouldresultinsome

underestimationofthescaleofthesechallenges.

Figure2.IMF-WorldBankLIC-DSFandIMFSRDSFRiskRatings

LICs:ShareofCountriesusingLIC-DSFEMs:DistributionofRisksofDebtDistress

100

80

60

40

20

0

6

6

12

13

14

13

15

15

15

14

24

29

35

38

41

38

44

43

39

39

49

44

37

32

29

31

36

36

31

32

22

21

19

16

16

15

10

10

10

11

2015

2016

2017

口Low

2018

2019

2020

ModerateHigh

2021

2022

2023

2024

Indebtdistress

LIC-DSAswithHighExternalDebtRiskRating:PatternofFirst-TimeBreachesofDebtIndicatorsThresholds

overTimeandbyTimeofRisk,2018-23

(Share,inpercentoftotal)

Sources:IMF-WorldBankLIC-DSFdatabaseandIMFSRDSFdatabase.

Note:ForLICs(leftchart),basedonfinalexternalriskratings.ForEMs(rightchart),risksbasedonSRDSFmedium-termfanchartz-scores:Greenarea=Lowrisk(Crisisprobability<9%,Missedcrisisprobability=10%);Yellowarea=Moderaterisks(Crisis

probability>9%,<20%);LightPink=Highrisk(Crisisprobability>20%,=10%);DarkPinkarea=Crisisprobability>40%.

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

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DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

TheNatureofDebtVulnerabilitiesHasEvolvedSignificantlyOvertheLastDecade

5.Thecompositionofpublicexternaldebthaschangedsignificantlyoverthelasttwo

decades(Figure3).Bothprivateandnon-ParisClubcreditorsincreasedtheirexposure,particularlyinLICs.Thesharesofexternalpublicdebtheldbycommercialcreditors–includingbondholdersandotherprivatecreditors—andnon-ParisClubofficialcreditorsalmostdoubledsince2010,from

22percentto38percentatend-2023,withtheshareofParisClubcreditorsdecliningsignificantlyduringthesameperiodandamarginaldeclineintheshareofmultilateralcreditors(Figure3).ForEMs,therehasbeenasimilarincreaseinprivateandnon-ParisClubbilateralfinancingalthough

fromahigherstartingpoint,withthesharegoingfrom52to64percentoverthesameperiod.

Whilethebroadershiftofthefinancingmixtowardsprivatecreditorsandnon-ParisClubcreditorshasledtogreateraccesstofinance,ithasalsobeenaccompaniedbygreater-andcostlier-debtserviceburdens.Furthermore,theincreasedexposuretoprivatecreditorshasbeenparticularly

pronouncedforfrontiermarkets,whosedebtprofilehasevolvedclosertothatofEMs.

Figure3.ChangesinCreditorCompositionofExternalPPGDebt

(PercentofexternalPPGDebtStock)

LICsEMs

Bondholders1%

Non-

Bondholders

6%

Private

6%

WB-IDA28%

End-2010

Non-ParisClub16%

Bilaterals36%

ParisClub20%

Multilaterals

58%

AsianDev.

Bank

Other17%

IMF8%

4%

End-2023

Bondholders

10%

Non-

Non-ParisClub19%

Bondholders10%

PrivateBilaterals

19%

ParisClub11%

30%

WB-IDA23%

Multilaterals51%

Other15%

AsianDev.

Bank6%

6%

AsianDev.

Bank4%

End-2010

Non-ParisClub

3%

ParisClub16%

Bilaterals20%

Multilaterals

31%

IMF4%

WorldBank-

Non-

IBRD

Bondholders

10%

9%

Bondholders39%

Private49%

Other15%

10%

End-2023

Non-Paris

6%

6%

Bilaterals

12%

Multilaterals

30%

WorldBank-

IBRD

AsianDev.Bank

3%

Bondholders48%

Non-

Bondholders

Private58%

Other14%

ParisClub

8%

Source:WorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2024andFundstaffcalculations.

Note:ForLICs,debtoutstandingunderWorldBank’sIBRDisaccountedforinthe“Other”category.ForEMs,debtoutstandingunderWorldBank’sIDAisaccountedforinthe“Other”category.

6.Relianceondomesticdebthasalsoincreased(Figure4).Since2010,themedianLIChasincreaseditsshareofdomesticpublicdebt(proxiedastotalpublicdebtlessexternalpublicdebt)bynearly9percentagepoints.Aftertheonsetofthepandemic,thistrendacceleratedgiventhe

unanticipatedneedforfundingandlimitedaccesstointernationalmarkets,withtheshareof

domesticdebtincreasingbyanother9percentagepoints(or6.5percentagepointsofGDP)forthemedianLIC.ForthemedianEM,accesstodeeperdomesticfinancialsystemsprovedanimportantsourceoffinancingattheonsetofthepandemicin2020,whendomesticpublicdebtincreasedby

8percentagepointsofGDP,comparedtoa3.6percentagepointsofGDPincreaseinexternalpublicdebt.

6

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

PercentofGDP

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

External

Total

LICs

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Domestic*

Figure4.CompositionofPublicandPubliclyGuaranteedDebt

PercentofGDP

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

EMs

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

External

Total

Domestic*

Source:IMFWorldEconomicOutlookOctober2024andJanuary2025,WorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2024,andFundstaffcalculations.

Notes:Domestic*debtproxiedasthedifferencebetweentotalandexternalpublicdebt.SampleincludesEMDEcountriesforwhichdataisavailableforbothtotalandexternalpublicdebt.

7.NewdebtinstrumentshavealsobeenincreasinglyusedbyLICs,whichtendtobe

riskierandhardertorestructure.4Guaranteed,securitized,andcollateralizeddebtcontractslinkedtopublic-privatepartnerships(PPPs),state-ownedenterprises(SOEs),andpensionfunds/social

securityfunds,amongothers,havegainedbroaderusageamongLICsinrecentyears.Total

investmentsinPPPsinLICsroseabout17-foldfromUS$0.3billionin1994toUS$5.9billionin2021,whilethenumberofPPPprojectswithinthesameperiodmorethandoubledfrom11to26,mostofwhichinvolvesovereignguarantees.Theseinstrumentsdonotreflectimmediatelyinthedebt

burdenindicators;however,theycouldgiverisetoasuddenincreaseindebtvulnerabilitiesatatimewhenpublicguaranteesorcollateralsarecalled.

CHALLENGESAHEAD

DebtChallengesLooktoRemainDifficultAmidElevatedDebtServiceObligations,GrowingFinancingNeedsandDecliningNetFlows

8.Fiscalspacehastightenedamidsthighinterestcostsandgrowingexternaldebtserviceburdens(Figure5).Countries’effortstorebuildfiscalsustainabilityhaveledtoacrowdingoutof

criticalgrowth-enhancingdevelopmentspendingandsocialprioritiesasanincreasingshareof

revenueshashadtobeallocatedtointerestexpenditures.Interestpaymentsontotalpublicdebt

(externalanddomestic)haveincreasedsignificantly,particularlyforLICs,whereinterestbillshave

increasedbyovertwoandahalftimescomparedtoadecadeago,fromaround$13billionin2014toUS$35billion.Thepaceofincreasehasbeenmorerapidsince2021,averagingaboutUS$3billionmoreperyear,comparedtoUS$1billionmoreperyearover2014-16,andoverUS$2billionperyear

4See

IMFWP/23/79.

7

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

over2017-20.Atthesametime,LICs’externaldebtservice(interestandprincipal)pressureshavealsointensified,risingbyabouttwoandahalftimesasmuchasashareofrevenues(excluding

grants)thanadecadeagoforthemedianLIC,from6to16percentbetween2014and2024.WhileexternaldebtserviceforEMshasgenerallyeasedinrecentyears(Figure5),themedianEMstill

spendsover12percentofrevenues(excludinggrants)onservicingexternaldebt(almosttwiceashighasadecadeago).

Figure5.OverallInteresttoRevenueandExternalDebtServicetoRevenue

Ratio

18

Ratio

30

25

EMs:OverallInteresttoRevenue

(excl.grants)

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

EMIQREMMedian

EMs:ExternalDebtServicetoRevenue

(excl.grants)

20

15

10

5

0

EMIQREMMedian

Ratio

LICs:OverallInteresttoRevenue

18

(excl.grants)

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

mnLICIQRLICMedian

Ratio

25

20

15

10

5

30

LICs:ExternalDebtServicetoRevenue

(excl.grants)

0

LICsIQR(25thto75thpercentile)LICs(#69)

Sources:IMFWorldEconomicOutlookOctober2024,January2025;andWorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2024.

Note:Revenuesexcludinggrants.2024valuesareestimates.IQRreferstointerquartilerange.

9.Despitesomeeasinginfinancingconditions,fundingcostsremainhigh.Globalfinancialconditionsbegantotightenin2022asadvancedeconomycentralbankstightenedmonetarypolicyandEMDEbondspreadsrose(Figure6a).Thisimpliedasharpriseininterestratesonnewofficial

andprivateexternalcommitmentsformostEMDEs(Figure6b).By2024,spreadshadgenerally

declinedtopre-pandemiclevelsformostcountries,5which,coupledwithsomeeasingofmonetarypolicyinadvancedeconomies,facilitatedareturnbysomeLICstointernationalcapitalmarkets.

5Inparallel,theshareofcountriestradingatdistressedlevels(>1000bps)declinedsignificantlywithseveral

countriesmakingprogressresolvingtheirdebtrestructuring(e.g.,Ghana,SriLanka,Ukraine,Zambia),thoughsomepocketsofvulnerabilityremain,andanumberofcountriesstilltradeatstressedlevels(>700bps).

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

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DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

Nevertheless,fundingcostsremainwellabovepre-pandemiclevels(Figure6a),sointerestburdensratesarelikelytocontinuerisingasdebtcontractedpre-pandemicneedstoberefinanced.

Figure6a.EMDEBondSpreadsandUnderlyingYields

Basispoints

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

JPMorganEMBIGSpreads

(basispoints)

mnInterquartilerange

Median

90thpercentile

2018201920202021202220232024

6,000

5,000

4,000

Basispoints

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

Percent

5.04.54.03.53.02.52.01.51.00.50.0

BenchmarkYieldsandEMBIGSovereignSpreads

700

650

600

550

500

450

400

350

300

250

Index

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

US10YEMBIGsovereignspread(rhs)

Sources:Bloomberg,JPMorgan,andFundstaffcalculations.

Note:AsofDecember31,2024.

Percentage

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

LICs

LICmedian,officialLICmedian,private

Figure6b.AverageInterestRatesonNewExternalCommitments

Percentage

EMs

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

EMmedian,officialEMmedian,private

Sources:WorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2024andFundstaffcalculations.

10.Meetingrefinancingneedsinthecomingyearswillbechallenging,withexternal

principalpaymentssettoincreasesignificantly(Figure6).ExternalprincipalpaymentsexceededUS$20bninLICsin2023,morethanthreetimeshigherthanadecadeago.Morethanthree-quartersofthesepaymentswereduetoofficialcreditors,withmostoftheremainderduetocommercial

lenders,reflectingtheshiftincreditorcompositionoverthelastdecade.Lookingahead,LICs’

externalrefinancingneedsaresettoexceedUS$30billionperyearover2025-27basedonexistingstocks.6AmongEMs,thepaceofincreaseinexternalprincipalpaymentshasbeenlessrapid,

6Duetodataconstraints,thisisbasedondebtcontractedasofend-2023;itdoesnotcapturetheimpactofnewfinancingraisedin2024.Externalrefinancingneedsestimateexcludecountriescurrentlyundergoingadebt

restructuringtoavoidoverestimatingfuturepayments.

9

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DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

10

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

reachingUSD$185bnin2023.Inthenextfewyears,averageannualgrossflowsofaboutUS$350billionperyeartoEMDEswillbeneededjusttomaintainexposuretothesecountries(Figure8).WhilethisamountisbroadlyinlinewithflowsobservedduringtheCOVID-19crisis,theseare

notablyabovegrossflowsobservedinthepast,especiallyforLICs.Andthisdoesnottakeintoaccountthenetnewfinancingthatisneededtofinanceprimarydeficits.

Figure7.ExternalPublicandPubliclyGuaranteedPrincipalPayments,ByCreditorType

(USDbns)

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

LICs

Bilateral

Multilateral

BondHoldersOtherPrivate

250

200

150

100

50

0

EMs

.ml

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Multilateral

2015

2016

2017

Bilateral

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

BondHoldersOtherPrivate

2027

Source:WorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2024.

Note:2024onwardsareIDSprojectionsbasedon2023externaldebtstocks.Countriescurrentlyundergoingadebtrestructuringareexcludedtoavoidoverestimatingfuturepayments.

Figure8.ExternalFinancingSupplyandNeeds

(USDbillions)

LICSEMS

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

grossflowstomantainexposure

Avg.2008/09

Avg.2010/15

Avg.2020/22

2023202420252026

officialprivateAmortizationInterestpaymentsNetflows

400

300

200

100

0

-100

-200

-300

-400

Avg.2008/09Avg.2010/15Avg.2020/222023202420252026

mofficialprivatemAmortizationInterestpaymentsNetflows

Sources:FundstaffcalculationsandWorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2024.

Note:Countriescurrentlyundergoingadebtrestructuringareexcluded.

11.Financingchallengesarefurtheraggravatedbythesharpdeclineinnetflows,limitingscopetomeetthesubstantialinvestmentsneedstoadvancetowardstheSustainable

DevelopmentGoals(SDGs)andadapttoclimatechange(Figure9).NetexternalPPGdebtflowstoLICshavestagnatedinrecentyears(andevendeclinedin2021-22),aslargercontributionsfrom

multilateralcreditorsfailedtofullyoffsetdeclinesfromprivateandbilateralcreditors.Netexternal

flowstoEMshavealsofallenasprivateflowsscaledbackandthesmallervolumesofbilateralofficialsupportdiminished.Competingdemandsforfinancing,includingfromadvancedeconomiesthat

DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

havealsoimportantfinancingneeds,increasestheriskofEMDEsfailingtoraisesufficientfinancingatanaffordablecost,asituationthatisfurthercomplicatedbytheimportantuncertaintyandrisksaroundtheevolutionofinternationalfinancialconditionsandexchangeratemovementsin2025

andbeyond.

Figure9.NetExternalPublicandPubliclyGuaranteedDebtFlows,ByCreditorType

(USDbns)

LICs

USDbns

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

-50

-100

EMs

USDBns

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

Multilateral

Bilateral

BondHolders

OtherPrivate

Totalnetflows

Multilateral

Bilateral

BondHolders

OtherPrivate

Totalnetflows

Source:WorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2024.

EMDEsFaceImportantFinancingChallengesbuttheTypeandSourceVaryAcrossCountries

12.Focusingoncountrieswiththelargestinterestburdens,principalrepayments,andprimarydeficitshelpsidentifykeysourcesoffinancingchallenges.Thisprovidesinsightintodriversofdebtvulnerabilities,includingcostoffinancing,highrolloverrisks,andhighfinancing

needs.Figure10presentsthecountriesinthetopquartileofeachofthesekeycomponentsover2024-27—overallinterestcosts,externalprincipalrepayments,andprimarydeficits—relativetocountries’revenuesandGDP.7Tosharpenthisinsightwithaviewtowheretofocusinordertopreempthigherrisksofdebtdistress,countriesthatarealreadyindistress(countriescurrently

undergoingornegotiatingdebtrestructuringsorcountrieswithunsustainabledebtasidentifiedundertheLIC-DSFortheSRDSF)areexcludedfromthisanalysis.

7ProjectionsbasedonIMFWorldEconomicOutlookOctober2024,andWorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2024.Toavoidskewingthedistribution,countrieswithparticularlyhighvulnerabilitiesarecontrolledforwhen

establishingquartilecut-offs.

11

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

DEBTVULNERABILITIESANDFINANCINGCHALLENGESINEMDEs—ANOVERVIEWOFKEYDATA

12

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

Figure10.CountrieswiththeHighestRelativeFinancingChallenges,2024-27

EMs:1

LICs:1

LICs:7

EMs:8