【ESRB】审查银行业的欧盟宏观审慎框架

ReviewoftheEUMacroprudential

FrameworkfortheBankingSector

March2022

AConceptNote

ESRB

EuropeansystemicRiskBoard

EuropeansystemofFinancialsupervision

ReviewoftheEUMacroprudentialFrameworkfortheBankingSector/March2022

Contents

1

Contents

Foreword2

Keyconcepts3

1Introduction6

2SystemicrisksintheEUbankingsystemoverthenextdecade11

3EnhancingtheEUmacroprudentialbankingframework15

3.1Macroprudentialcapitalbuffers15

3.2Riskweightmeasures27

4Broadeningtheregulatoryperimeter31

4.1Borrower-basedmeasures31

4.2Systemicliquidity39

4.3Bank-likeactivitiesofnon-banks42

5Macroprudentialtoolstoaddresshybridrisksinthenextdecade46

5.1Systemiccyberrisks46

5.2Climate-relatedfinancialrisks48

6Cooperationinabroaderregulatoryandinstitutionalcontext52

References55

Annex61

BoxA1Elementsofaharmonisedmacroprudentialriskweightarticlefor

realestateexposures61

BoxA2ProposalforincludingBBMsinEUlegislation63

Imprintandacknowledgements69

ReviewoftheEUMacroprudentialFrameworkfortheBankingSector/March2022Foreword

2

Foreword

Large-scaleandswiftpolicyinterventionintheEuropeanUnionandabroadhelpedstabilisetheeconomy.Thisincludedfiscal

policy,labourmarketpolicyandmonetarypolicymeasures.They

werecomplementedbymeasurestargetedatthefinancialsystemtoensureasustainedflowoffinancingtohouseholdsandbusinesses.

Thereformstotheregulatoryframeworkforbanks

implementedaftertheglobalfinancialcrisisandeuroarea

sovereigndebtcrisishelpedavoidafinancialcrisis.Entering

ChristineLagarde,Chairofthe

EuropeanSystemicRiskBoard

theCOVID-19pandemic,bankswerefundedwithmoreandbetter-qualityequitytoabsorbunexpectedlosses.Theyalsoretainedmoreliquidassetstomeetfundingliquidityshocks.Andresolution

frameworkswereinplaceofferingmoreoptionsthaninthepastto

dealwithfailingbankshadthisturnedouttobenecessary.

Workisongoingtofullyimplementinternationallyagreedreformsandtocompletethebroaderregulatoryreformagenda.Thisnotablyincludesthefullandfaithfulimplementationofthe

finalisationoftheBaselIIIagreementaswellasthecompletionofCapitalMarketsUnionandBankingUnion.Thereformagendastrivestomakethefinancialsystemmorestable,moreefficient,andmorereliable.Thisoftencomesintheformofrestrictions,andhenceatacosttofinancialinstitutions.Butthisisacostwellworthpayingasitensuresthatourfinancialsystemremainsresilientwhenfaced

withunexpectedshocksanddoesnotamplifyeconomiccriseswhentheseshocksoccur.

FinancialstabilityremainsoneofthefoundationsonwhichtobuildtheEuropeanUnionofthefuture.ItallowsthefinancialsystemtoserveEuropeanhouseholdsandbusinessesandthustocontributetosustainableeconomicgrowthacrosstheEU.Weshouldnotbecomplacent,

particularlyatthepresenttimes.Increasedindebtednessacrosstheeconomy,elevatedasset

pricesremainkeyvulnerabilitiesandcyber-attacksthatareincreasinginfrequencyand

sophisticationposearisk.Theseandothervulnerabilitiesandrisksneedtobeaddressedsuchthatthefinancialsystemcansupporttheeconomicrecoveryfromthepandemicandthetwingreenanddigitaltransitionsofoureconomies.

Thisishencetherighttimetoreviewwhetherourmacroprudentialtoolkitforbanks

functionsaswewantitto,inlightoftherecentexperienceandofwhatmighthappeninthefuture.ThebankingsectorremainsatthecoreofthefinancialsystemintheEuropeanUnion.ThepresentESRBConceptNotediscussesthemainchallengestobeaddressedandsetsoutwhatintheESRB’sviewneedstobedonetoensurethatourmacroprudentialrulesforbanksremainfitforpurposeandfutureproof.ItisdesignedtoinformandfeedintotheCommission’sreviewofthe

macroprudentialframework.

ChristineLagarde

ChairoftheESRB

ReviewoftheEUMacroprudentialFrameworkfortheBankingSector/March2022Keyconcepts

3

Keyconcepts

1.Theeconomicandsocialcostsoffinancialcrisesarelarge.Theaimofmacroprudentialpolicyistoreducetheprobabilityandimpactofsuchcrises.Thebenefitsofthisonlyaccrueover

time,canseemabstractandarespreadoutacrossallstakeholders,whileimplementation

costsarefeltimmediatelyandsometimesbornbyonlyafewstakeholders.Thiscanleadtoaninactionbias,whereasaneffectivemacroprudentialpolicyframeworkmustfosterpromptanddecisivepolicyaction.

2.Theenhancedregulatoryframeworkforbanks,includingmacroprudentialtools,servedtheEUwellduringtheCOVID-19crisis.However,itremainstobetestedthroughawholefinancial

cycleandintheabsenceofsignificantinterventionbypublicauthorities.Full,timelyand

consistentimplementationoftheoutstandingBaselIIIreformsiscrucialtofurther

strengtheningtheframework.Resilientbanks–bothintermsofqualityandquantityofcapital–arebetterlenders,astheycancontinuetoprovidecreditintimesofcrisistobusinessesand

householdsthataresolvent,butliquidity-constrained.

3.Themacroprudentialtoolkitcontributedtoresilience,eventhoughitwasusedunevenlyacrosstheEU.ThoseMemberStateswhichhadbuiltupreleasablebuffersusedthem–atleast

partially–formacroprudentiallooseningduringtheCOVID-19crisis.Inmost,though,creditinstitutionsmadelimiteduseofthecapitalfreedupbymicro-andmacroprudentialloosening.Reasonsincludealimitedneedtoabsorblossesduetomonetaryandfiscalsupportfortheeconomy,fearofmarketstigma,uncertaintyaboutfuturelosses,muteddemandfrom

creditworthyborrowers,overlappingcapitalrequirementsandotherfactors,amongthemexpectedsupervisoryactiontorestorecapital.Nevertheless,empiricalevidencesuggestscapitalreliefmeasureswereeffectiveinsupportingcreditsupplyduringthepandemic.

4.Theexperiencegainedbyapplyingmacroprudentialprovisionsinthelasttenyearshighlightstheneedformoreconsistent,forward-lookingandactivelycountercyclicaluseof

macroprudentialinstruments.Afurtheroverarchingaimofreformistoreducethecomplexityoftheprovisions,bothprocedurallyandconceptually:thiswouldfacilitatetheirusebyauthoritieswithoutweakeningexistingsafeguardsfortheintegrityoftheinternalmarket.

5.Lookingintothenextdecade,theprioritiesforthemacroprudentialtoolkitforbanksare:

(i)ensuringthatbanksfundthemselveswithenoughcapitaltomatchcyclicalandstructural

systemicrisks;(ii)enhancingtheusabilityandeffectiveuseofcapitalbuffers;(iii)closinggapsinthetoolkit,notablybyincludingborrower-basedmeasures;(iv)ensuringconsistentuseofpolicyinstrumentsacrosstheEU.

6.Morereleasablecapitalcanbeobtainedbybuildingupthecountercyclicalcapitalbuffer

(CCyB)earlierandinamoreforward-lookingmanner.Thiscouldbecombinedwithapositiveneutralrate,i.e.onethatispositiveinastandardriskenvironment.Thiscouldapplytothe

CCyBand/orthesystemicriskbuffer(SyRB)andbeimplementedusingguideddiscretionbyMemberStates.

7.ESRBanalysishasshownthatseveralbanks,inparticularsystemicallyimportantones,arenotabletofullyusetheircapitalbuffers,duetooverlappingcapitalrequirements.Thisisthecasewhendippingintothebufferswouldresultinabreachoftheparallelminimumrequirementsfortheleverageratioorminimumrequirementsforownfundsandeligibleliabilities(MREL).

Regulatorycapitalbuffersmightthereforebe(partially)ineffective.Theadvantagesanddisadvantagesofpotentialmitigatingoptionsarediscussed.

8.Riskweightsplayacrucialroleindeterminingtheamountofcapitalthatmustbeheldbybankstofostertheirresilienceagainstdifferentsourcesofrisk.Thereforeriskweightsshouldnotonlyincorporateidiosyncraticrisksbutalsoincludeasystemicriskcomponent.Asitisparticularly

importanttoensuretheappropriatenessofriskweightsforexposuressecuredbyimmovableproperty,severalnationalauthoritieshaveincreasedriskweightspursuanttoArticle124oftheCRRoradoptedstricternationalmeasuresunderArticle458.Thelatterintroducedriskweightmeasuresthattakedifferentforms,arebasedondifferentmethodologiesandtakedifferent

typesofconsiderationsintoaccount.Forriskweightsonresidentialandcommercialreal

estate,anewsingleharmonisedmacroprudentialarticleonriskweightsreplacingthespecificprovisionsinArticles124,164and458oftheCRRshouldbecreated.Thisnewarticleshouldrelyonguideddiscretion,withtheaimofstrikingtherightbalancebetweenconsistent

applicationandflexibility.TheexperiencegainedwiththeuseofArticle458alsosuggestsafewsimplificationscouldbeintroduced,whilekeepingitsstatusasaninstrumentoflastresort.

9.TheEUlegalframeworkshouldbeenrichedbyincludingborrower-basedmeasures(BBMs)forresidentialrealestate(RRE)loansinatargetedmanner.ThiswouldensurethatabasicsetofinstrumentsisavailableinallcountriestoeffectivelymitigaterisksrelatedtoRREmarketsat

bothnationalandinturnalsoEUlevel.ItisimportantthatBBMsshouldbeincludedinEU

legislationinawaythatallowssufficientflexibilitytoaddressnationalspecificitiesandensuretheyremaineffective,ratherthanthroughfullyharmoniseddefinitionsanduniformapplicationthroughouttheEU.Similarly,decisionsonactivatingandreleasingBBMs,aswellas

calibratingandapplyingthemeasuresoverall,shouldbeleftinthehandsofnational

authorities.TheEUlegalframeworkshouldthereforeonlyprovideaminimumlevelof

harmonisationinlinewiththeprinciplesofsubsidiarityandproportionality.TheCommission

shouldalsoconsiderwhatsafeguardswouldbenecessarytoensurethenewsetof

macroprudentialpowersisusedsolelyatnationallevel,astheproposaltoincludeBBMsinEU

legislationissubjecttotheconditionthattheECB’stopping-uppowerdoesnotapply.

Nonetheless,commonstandardsforthegovernanceoftheminimumsetofBBMsshouldbe

setout,toreducepotentialforinactionbias.MinimumharmonisationofBBMsatEUlevel

wouldfurtheralignnationallegalsystems,reducethecomplexityresultingfromthemultitudeofdifferentnationallegalframeworksandfacilitatethecompletionoftheSingleMarket.ItwouldalsofacilitatereciprocationofBBMsandmitigatesystemicriskattheEUlevel.IncludingBBMsinEUlawcouldgohandinhandwithharmonisingthedefinitionsrelatedtoRREandCRE

loansincurrentEUreporting;thiswouldreducethecostsofreportingforlendersandfacilitatemonitoringofRREriskstofinancialstabilityacrosscountries.

10.Congruentregulationwhichappliessimilarrequirementstoallentitiescarryingoutthesametypeoffinancialactivities,takingaccountoftheirspecificriskprofiles,shouldhelpprevent

regulatoryarbitrageandthetransferofriskstootherpartsofthesystemsuchasFinTechsand

ReviewoftheEUMacroprudentialFrameworkfortheBankingSector/March2022Keyconcepts

4

BigTechs,whichappearlessregulatedthanbanksbutincreasinglyperformsimilaractivities.Entity-specifictoolscouldthereforebecomplementedwithactivity-basedtools.Borrower-

basedmeasures,forinstance,couldinprincipleaddressalltypesoflending,regardlessoftheinstitutionalformofthelender.

11.Asinvestmentfunds,moneymarketfundsandotherfinancialinstitutionsrepresentan

importantsourceofwholesalefundingforthebankingsector,itisimportanttomonitorliquidityflowsatthescaleofthewholeEUfinancialsystemandensurecoherentsystem-wideanalysisofliquidityrisks.

12.Toaddresstheriskofcyberincidentshavingfinancialconsequencesinadditiontooperationalones,andevenaffectingconfidenceinthefinancialsystem’sabilitytoprovidecriticaleconomicservices,themacroprudentialmandateneedstobeextendedtocyberresilience.Thecurrent

toolkithaslimitedcapacitytodevelopspecificcyberriskmitigantsandaddresstheriskarisingfromtheincreasingimportanceofthird-partyinformationandcommunicationtechnologies

(ICT)providersinthefinancialsystem.Additionalcyberresiliencerequirementsfor

systemicallyimportantinstitutionsshouldbeintroducedtoaddressthesystemicriskstemmingfromthese.Toensureproportionality,smallerandlower-capacityinstitutionsmightfocusonstrengtheningcyberhygiene.Themacroprudentialmandatealsoneedstoencompassthird-

partyproviders,asalreadyforeseenformicroprudentialsupervisionintheproposedDigitalOperationalResilienceAct(DORA).

13.TheEUshouldreflectonhowmacroprudentialpolicycouldcontributetoincreasingthe

resilienceofcreditinstitutionstoclimate-relatedfinancialrisks–bothtransitionalandphysical.TheESRB,togetherwiththeECB,isassessingthepossibleuseofmacroprudentialpolicy

instrumentstoaddresssystemicrisksrelatedtoclimatechangeinthefinancialsystem.

Preliminaryfindingsindicatethat,withsomeamendments,thesystemicriskbufferandlargeexposurelimitscouldpotentiallyberelevanttools.Asagrowingbodyofanalysisonclimate-relatedrisksbecomesavailable,furtheradjustmentstothemacroprudentialtoolkitandnewtoolsmaybeneeded.

14.Inactionbiasinmacroprudentialpolicycouldbefurtherreducedbyclearallocationof

responsibilities,greatertransparency,bettercommunicationandclearernarratives,aswellasmoreflexibleinstrumentsandsimplerimplementationandreciprocationprocedures.Commonmethodologies,includingtaxonomiesforidentifyingriskandcalibrationguidanceforfloorsandbenchmarks,canplayanimportantroleinaddressingpossibleinactionbiasandmeritfurtherassessmentandelaboration.Ensuringcooperation,coordinationanddataexchangebetweenmicro-andmacroprudentialauthorities,resolutionauthoritiesandcentralbanksisalsokey.

Keywords:bufferusability;simplification,riskweightmeasures,borrower-basedmeasures;activity-basedtools;hybridrisks;bettercooperation.

ReviewoftheEUMacroprudentialFrameworkfortheBankingSector/March2022Keyconcepts

5

ReviewoftheEUMacroprudentialFrameworkfortheBankingSector/March2022Introduction

6

1Introduction

TheCapitalRequirementsDirectiveandRegulation(CRD/CRR)aimtostrengthenthe

resilienceofthebankingsectorsoitcanbetterabsorbeconomicshocks,whileensuring

bankscontinuetofinanceeconomicactivityandgrowth.1Bankshaveacrucialrolein

allocatingcapitalefficientlyintheeconomybyprovidingcredittothosehouseholdsandfirmsthatcanbestuseit,aswellassupportingtheirliquidityandriskmanagement,andarealsoessential

intermediariesinpaymentsystems.Banksthereforeneedtobeabletowithstandeconomicshockstoavoidharmfuldisruptionstotheirservices.

Since2014theCRD/CRRalsoprovideamacroprudentialtoolkit,enablingauthoritiesto

reacttobothcyclicalsystemicrisks(e.g.thoserelatedtothefinancialcycle)andstructuralones(e.g.thoserelatedtointerconnectedness,financialmarketstructureorthebusinessmodelsoffinancialintermediariesatagivenpointintime).SinceCRDIV/CRR2cameinto

forcein2014andCRDV/CRRII3in2020,theresilienceoftheEUbankingsectorhasfurther

increased,mainlyduetohighercapitalrequirements,betterqualityofcapitalandhigherliquiditybuffers.AdditionalprogressisexpectedwiththeupcomingCRDVI/CRRIII,whichwillincorporatethelatestglobalregulatoryreform,i.e.BaselIII,4intoEUlaw.AfurtherreviewofEUregulationisexpectedin2022,withafocusonthemacroprudentialpolicytoolkit.AllproposalsincludedinthisConceptNotearethereforeintendedtobecompatiblewithfull,timelyandconsistent

implementationofBaselIIIintheEuropeanUnion.

ThroughthisConceptNotetheESRBGeneralBoardtakesacomprehensiveviewand

proposesenhancementstotheexistingEUmacroprudentialframeworkforthebanking

sector–andbeyond–forthenextdecade.Table1providesanoverviewoftheESRB’spolicyproposalsandreferstotherespectivemainsourcesofsystemicriskintheEUthatneedtobe

addressed.Section2outlinesthemainsystemicrisksintheEUbankingsectoroverthenext

decade,showingwhythereisaneedtoenhanceandadjustthemacroprudentialframework.

Section3focusesontwoinstrumentswhichhavebeenusedfrequentlyacrosstheEU:capital

buffersandriskweights.Basedontheexperiencewiththeseinstrumentsoverthelastdecade,

specificareasareidentifiedwherethemacroprudentialframeworkneedstobeenhanced.

Section4providesproposalstobroadenthemacroprudentialframeworkintheEUtobetter

mitigatesystemicriskswhichhaveariseninthelastdecade.First,theemergenceofvulnerabilities

1SeeEuropeanCommission,Statementonprudentialrequirements.

2Directive(EU)2013/36/EUoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof26June2013onaccesstotheactivityof

creditinstitutionsandtheprudentialsupervisionofcreditinstitutionsandinvestmentfirms,amendingDirective2002/87/ECandrepealingDirectives2006/48/ECand2006/49/EC(OJL176,27.6.2013,p.338);Regulation(EU)No575/2013oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof26June2013onprudentialrequirementsforcreditinstitutionsandinvestmentfirmsandamendingRegulation(EU)No648/2012(OJL176,27.6.2013,p.1).

3Directive(EU)2019/878oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof20May2019amendingDirective2013/36/EUasregardsexemptedentities,financialholdingcompanies,mixedfinancialholdingcompanies,remuneration,supervisory

measuresandpowersandcapitalconservationmeasures(OJL150,7.6.2019,p.253);Regulation(EU)2019/876oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof20May2019amendingRegulation(EU)No575/2013asregardstheleverageratio,thenetstablefundingratio,requirementsforownfundsandeligibleliabilities,counterpartycreditrisk,marketrisk,exposurestocentralcounterparties,exposurestocollectiveinvestmentundertakings,largeexposures,reportingand

disclosurerequirements,andRegulation(EU)No648/2012(OJL150,7.6.2019,p.1).

4SeeBCBS,Reforms–BaselIII.

intherealestatesectoracrosstheEuropeanUnionmakesitindispensabletoenshrinethe

availabilityofborrower-basedmeasuresinEUlaw.Second,liquidityrisksneedtobemonitoredandaddressedtakingamoresystem-wideperspective.Third,otherinstitutionsinthefinancialsector

areprovidingbank-likeservices,implyingthattheyarebothbenefitingfromregulatorycomparativeadvantagesandalsoexposingthemselvestobank-likerisks.Toaddresstheserisks,aholistic

approachtoreviewingthemacroprudentialframeworkisrequired.Section5providesproposalstoaddressnewhybridriskswhicharealreadythreateningthestabilityofthebankingsectorandareexpectedtoincreasefurther,suchassystemiccyberrisksandclimate-relatedfinancialrisks.

Section6includesproposalstofacilitatecooperationandcoordinationamongauthoritiesatalllevelsinabroaderregulatorycontext.

Overall,theESRBisaimingforamacroprudentialpolicyinbankingthat:

•…actsinaforward-lookingmanner.Itfostersresiliencebeforesystemicrisksmaterialise,includingthroughactivecountercyclicaluseofbuffersandbycompletingthetoolkitwith

borrower-basedmeasures.

•…showsflexibilityinrespondingtostructuralchanges.Itisabletoaddresscurrentandfuturesystemicrisksfromstructuralchangestothefinancialsystemaswellascyberand

climatechange-relatedfinancialrisks.

•…formspartofaholisticframework.Itpromotescongruentregulationacrossallactivitiesinthefinancialsystemandfacilitatescooperationbetweenauthoritiesatalllevels.

Table1

ProposalstoenhancetheEUmacroprudentialbankingframework(Section3)

ProposalsforpolicytoolstoaddressthemainsourcesofsystemicriskintheEU

Measure

ProposalsforamendmentsintheCRD/CRRtoolkit

(andbeyond)*

*ProposalsinitalicsrefertoareasbeyondCRD/CRR.

Macroprudentialobjective

Sourceof

systemicrisk

Capital

buffers

CCyB

•Determineamoreexplicitroleforcyclicalindicatorsbesidethecredit-to-GDPgap(e.g.thequalitativedimensionofcredit)andbetteracknowledge

measurementuncertainty.

•Makeearly,forward-lookingbuild-upmoreexplicit(refertotheprospectofincreasingsystemicrisks).

•Allowtheoptiontoreducethe12-month

implementationperiodtosixmonthswithoutanyneedtoexplainexceptionalcircumstances.

•Removethe2.5%capformandatoryreciprocityoftheCCyB.

•Encourage/allowthepossibilityfornational

authoritiestosetapositiveneutralrateforcyclicalrisks.

•MaintainthepossibilitytosetCCyBratesforexposurestothirdcountries.

SyRB

•Encourage/allowthepossibilityfornational

CCyB

•Increasemacroprudential

buffersthatcanbeusedduringacrisistoabsorblosses,whileavoidingexcessive

deleveragingthatwouldbeharmfulfortheeconomy.

•Promoteforward-lookingbuild-upofresilienceviatheCCyB,usingabroaderindicatorbasethatcapturescyclicalrisksfrombuoyantcredittotheprivate

non-financialsector.

•Fosterandfacilitatereciprocation.

•Reduceinactionbiasonthepartofmacroprudential

authorities.

SyRB

•Allowbuild-upofSyRBto

•Insufficient

resilience

and/orflexibilitytothe

materialisationofcyclicalandstructural

systemicrisks

triggeredby

developments

inthemacro-

economicandfinancial

environment.

ReviewoftheEUMacroprudentialFrameworkfortheBankingSector/March2022Introduction

7

Measure

ProposalsforamendmentsintheCRD/CRRtoolkit

(andbeyond)*

*ProposalsinitalicsrefertoareasbeyondCRD/CRR.

Macroprudentialobjective

Sourceof

systemicrisk

authoritiestosetapositiveneutralrateforstructuralandunknownrisks.

•RevisethecumulationruleforbroadandsectoralSyRBrates.

•RequiremandatoryreciprocityoftheSyRB(aboveamaterialitythreshold).

•ClarifythatrecognisedforeignSyRBratesdonotcounttowardsthethresholdsthattrigger

CommissionapprovaloranEUgovernanceprocedure.

O-SIIbuffer

•PromoteanEU-widefloormethodologywithguidanceforcalibratingO-SIIbuffers.

•Promotemeasurestoaddressthewindowdressingproblem(e.g.useaveragesovertheyearinsteadofyear-endvalues).

CCoB

•Emphasisethatthecapitalconservationbufferisageneralbackstopforlossabsorptionandshouldnotbereleasedbyauthorities.

Protectionofreleasedcapital

•Duringaseveresystemiccrisis,promotetheuseofsoftpowertoindicatethatcapitalfreedupby

regulatorymeasuresshouldnotbeusedforpayouts.

Bufferusability

•Considerwaystomitigateimpedimentstobanks’abilitytousetheirbuffers.

•Considerincreasingbufferusabilitybyreviewingoverlapsofrequirementsinthemulti-restrictive

framework.Thisrequiresamendmentstothe

CRD/CRR,alsototheBRRD/SRMR5withrespecttoMREL.Thecurrentreviewofthecrisis

managementanddepositinsuranceframeworkintheEUshouldbeusedforthis,toensure

consistencywiththemacroprudentialreview.

absorbunexpectedand

unknownexternalshocks.

•Fosterandfacilitatereciprocation.

•Reduceinactionbiasonthepartofmacroprudential

authorities.

O-SIIbuffer

•Ensuremorehomogeneous

applicationofO-SIIbufferratesacrosstheEU.

CCoB

•Maintaincurrentlevelofresilience.

Protectionofreleasedcapital

•Supportbanks’abilitytoabsorblossesduringacrisis.

Bufferusability

•Enhancebufferusabilityandtheeffectivenessofbufferreleases.

Risk

weight

measures

•Createasinglearticleforriskweightmeasuresforexposuressecuredbyimmovableproperty,builtonguideddiscretion.Mandatoryreciprocitysubjecttomaterialitythresholds.

•Deletetheprovisionsonriskweightadjustments

fromArticles124andArticle164oftheCRRandthestricterriskweightmeasuresfromArticle458.

•Avoidunderestimating

macroprudentialorsystemicriskintherisk-weighted

prudentialframework.

•Actassubstituteforthe

sectoralsystemicriskbufferwhenthelattercannotco