公司理财（第6版）（上下册）课件 第29章　公司治理

CorporateFinanceSixthEditionChapter29CorporateGovernanceCopyright©2024,2021,2018PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReservedChapterOutline29.1

CorporateGovernanceandAgencyCosts29.2

MonitoringbytheBoardofDirectorsandOthers29.3

CompensationPolicies29.4

ManagingAgencyConflict29.5

Regulation29.6

CorporateGovernanceAroundtheWorld29.7

TheTradeoffofCorporateGovernanceLearningObjectives(1of4)Definecorporategovernanceanddescribeitsroleinthesuccessfulreductionofagencyproblems.Describetherolesofthefollowingincorporategovernance:a.Theboardofdirectorsb.Themarketforcorporatecontrolc.RegulationLearningObjectives(2of4)Definetheterm“capturedboard”anddescribesituationsinwhichaboardismostlikelytobecaptured.Discussthecostsandbenefitsofhavingmanagersasshareholders,intermsofpropercorporategovernance.Discussthecostsandbenefitsofhavingmanagerialcompensationtiedtofirmperformance,intermsofpropercorporategovernance.LearningObjectives(3of4)Identifyalternativesavailabletoshareholdersiftheboardfailstoactintheirinterests.Identifythemethodsthatboardscanusetoentrenchthemselves.DescribetheprovisionsoftheExchangeActsof1933and1934,theSarbanes-OxleyActof2002,andtheDodd-FrankActof2010,whichattempttoimproveshareholderprotections.LearningObjectives(4of4)Comparecorporategovernancepracticesacrosscountries.Specificallyaddressthefollowing:a.Common-lawversuscivil-lawcountriesb.Pyramidalownershipstructuresc.Dualclasssharesd.Theroleofemployeesingovernancee.Cross-holdings29.1CorporateGovernanceandAgencyCostsCorporateGovernanceThesystemofcontrols,regulations,andincentivesdesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweenmanagersandinvestorsandpreventcorporatefraudTheroleofthecorporategovernancesystemistomitigatetheconflictofinterestthatresultsfromtheseparationofownershipandcontrolwithoutundulyburdeningmanagerswiththeriskofthefirm29.2MonitoringbytheBoardofDirectorsandOthersIntheUnitedStates,theboardofdirectorshasaclearfiduciarydutytoprotecttheinterestsoftheshareholdersMostothercountriesgivesomeweighttotheinterestsofotherstakeholdersinthefirm,suchastheemployeesTypesofDirectors(1of2)InsideDirectorsMembersofaboardofdirectorswhoareemployees,formeremployees,orfamilymembersofemployeesGrayDirectorsMembersofaboardofdirectorswhoarenotasdirectlyconnectedtothefirmasinsidersare,butwhohaveexistingorpotentialbusinessrelationshipswiththefirmTypesofDirectors(2of2)Outside(Independent)DirectorsAnymemberofaboardofdirectorsotherthananinsideorgraydirectorBoardIndependence(1of2)Onaboardcomposedofinsider,gray,andindependentdirectors,theroleoftheindependentdirectorisreallythatofawatchdogHowever,becauseindependentdirectors’personalwealthislikelytobelesssensitivetoperformancethanthatofinsiderandgraydirectors,theyhavelessincentivetocloselymonitorthefirmBoardIndependence(2of2)CapturedDescribesaboardofdirectorswhosemonitoringdutieshavebeencompromisedbyconnectionsorperceivedloyaltiestomanagementBoardSizeandPerformanceResearchershavefoundthatsmallerboardsproducesurprisinglyrobustresultthatareassociatedwithgreaterfirmvalueandperformanceThelikelyexplanationforthisphenomenoncomesfromthepsychologyandsociologyresearch,whichfindsthatsmallergroupsmakebetterdecisionsthanlargergroupsOtherMonitorsIncludessecurityanalysts,lenders,theSEC,andemployeesSecuritiesanalystsproduceindependentvaluationsofthefirmstheycoversothattheycanmakebuyandsellrecommendationstoclientsLenderscarefullymonitorfirmstowhichtheyareexposedascreditorsEmployeesofthefirmaremostlikelytodetectoutrightfraudbecauseoftheirinsideknowledgeTheSECprotectstheinvestingpublicagainstfraudandstockpricemanipulation29.3CompensationPoliciesStockandOptionsManagers’paycanbelinkedtotheperformanceofafirminmanywaysManycompanieshaveadoptedcompensationpoliciesthatincludegrantsofstockorstockoptionstoexecutivesThesegrantsgivemanagersadirectincentivetoincreasethestockprice,whichtiesmanagerialwealthtothewealthofshareholdersPayandPerformanceSensitivity

(1of4)Theuseofstockandoptiongrantsinthe1990shasleadtoasubstantialincreaseinmanagementcompensationHowever,thishashadsomenegativeconsequencesPayandPerformanceSensitivity

(2of4)Forexample,oftenoptionsaregranted“atthemoney,”meaningthattheexercisepriceisequaltothecurrentstockpriceManagersthereforehaveanincentivetomanipulatethereleaseoffinancialforecastssothatbadnewscomesoutbeforeoptionsaregranted(todrivetheexercisepricedown)andgoodnewscomesoutafteroptionsaregrantedFigure29.1CEOCompensationPayandPerformanceSensitivity

(3of4)RecentresearchhasfoundevidencesuggestingthatmanyexecutiveshaveengagedinbackdatingtheiroptiongrantsPayandPerformanceSensitivity

(4of4)BackdatingThepracticeofchoosingthegrantdateofastockoptionretroactively,sothatthedateofthegrantwouldcoincidewithadatewhenthestockpricewaslowerthanitspriceatthetimethegrantwasactuallyawardedBybackdatingtheoptioninthisway,theexecutivereceivesastockoptionthatisalreadyin-the-money29.4ManagingAgencyConflictAcademicstudieshavesupportedthenotionthatgreatermanagerialownershipisassociatedwithfewervalue-reducingactionsbymanagersButwhileincreasingmanagerialownershipmayreduceperquisiteconsumption,italsomakesmanagershardertofireDirectActionbyShareholders(1of3)ShareholderVoiceAnyshareholdercansubmitaresolutionthatisputtoavoteattheannualmeetingRecently,unhappyshareholdershavestartedtorefusetovotetoapprovetheslateofnomineesfortheboardDirectActionbyShareholders(2of3)ShareholderApprovalShareholdersmustapprovemanymajoractionstakenbytheboardForexample,targetshareholdersmustapprovemergeragreementsDirectActionbyShareholders(3of3)ProxyContestsDisgruntledshareholderscanholdaproxycontestandintroducearivalslateofdirectorsforelectiontotheboardThisgivesshareholdersanactualchoicebetweenthenomineesputforthbymanagementandthecurrentboardandacompletelydifferentslateofnomineesputforthbydissidentshareholdersFigure29.2ProxyContestOutcomesManagementEntrenchmentLargeinvestorshavebecomeincreasinglyinterestedinmeasuringthebalanceofpowerbetweenshareholdersandmanagersinafirmTheInvestorResponsibilityResearchCenter(IRRC)hascollectedinformationon24differentcharacteristicsthatcanentrenchmanagersTheThreatofTakeoverManyoftheprovisionslistedintheIRRCindexconcernprotectionfromtakeoversOnemotivationforatakeovercanbetoreplacepoorlyperformingmanagementAnactivetakeovermarketispartofthesystemthroughwhichthethreatofdismissalismaintained29.5RegulationTheSarbanes-OxleyAct(SOX)TheoverallintentofSOXwastoimprovetheaccuracyofinformationgiventobothboardsandtoshareholdersSOXattemptedtoachievethisgoalinthreeways:ByoverhaulingincentivesandindependenceintheauditingprocessBystiffeningpenaltiesforprovidingfalseinformationByforcingcompaniestovalidatetheirinternalfinancialcontrolprocessesTheCadburyCommissionFollowingthecollapseofsomelargepubliccompanies,theU.K.governmentcommissionedSirAdrianCadburytoformacommitteetodevelopacodeofbestpracticesincorporategovernanceDodd-FrankActDodd-Frankaddedanumberofnewregulationsdesignedtostrengthencorporategovernance,includingIndependentCompensationCommitteesNominatingDirectorsVoteonExecutivePayandGoldenParachutesClawbackProvisionsPayDisclosureInsiderTradingInsiderTradingOccurswhenapersonmakesatradebasedonprivilegedinformationSomeexamplesofinsiderinformationincludeknowledgeofanupcomingmergerannouncement,earningsrelease,orchangeinpayoutpolicyThepenaltiesforviolatinginsidertradinglawsincludejailtime,fines,andcivilpenalties29.6CorporateGovernanceAroundtheWorldProtectionofShareholderRightsThedegreetowhichinvestorsareprotectedagainstexpropriationofcompanyfundsbymanagersandeventhedegreetowhichtheirrightsareenforcedvarywidelyacrosscountriesandlegalregimesControllingOwnersandPyramids

(1of8)MuchofthefocusintheUnitedStatesisontheagencyconflictbetweenshareholdersandmanagersInmanyothercountries,thecentralconflictisbetweenwhatarecalled“controllingshareholders”and“minorityshareholders”ControllingOwnersandPyramids

(2of8)Inthesefirms,thereisusuallylittleconflictbetweenthecontrollingfamilyandthemanagement(itisoftenmadeupoffamilymembers)Instead,theconflictarisesbetweentheminorityshareholders(thosewithoutthecontrollingblock)andthecontrollingshareholdersControllingOwnersandPyramids

(3of8)DualClassSharesandtheValueofControlDualClassSharesWhenoneclassofafirm’sshareshassuperiorvotingrightsovertheotherclassOnewayforfamiliestogaincontroloverfirmsevenwhentheydonotownmorethanhalfthesharesistoissuedualclasssharesForexample,aclassBsharemighthave10votesforeveryonevoteofaclassAshareControllingshareholderswillholdallormostoftheshareswithsuperiorvotingrightsandissuetheinferiorvotingclasstothepublicControllingOwnersandPyramids

(4of8)PyramidStructuresPyramidStructureAwayforaninvestortocontrolacorporationwithoutowning50%oftheequitywherebytheinvestorfirstcreatesacompanyinwhichhehasacontrollinginterestThiscompanythenownsacontrollinginterestinanothercompanyTheinvestorcontrolsbothcompaniesbutmayownaslittleas25%ofthesecondcompanyControllingOwnersandPyramids

(5of8)PyramidStructuresThefollowingslidedetailsanactualpyramidcontrolledbythePesentifamilyinItalyasof1995ThePesentifamilyeffectivelycontrolsfivecompanieseventhoughitdoesnothavemorethan50%ownershipofanyoneofthemFigure29.3PesentiFamilyPyramid,1995ControllingOwnersandPyramids

(6of8)PyramidStructuresTunnelingAconflictofinterestthatariseswhenashareholderwhohasacontrollinginterestinmultiplefirmsmovesprofits(andhencedividends)awayfromcompaniesinwhichhehasrelativelylesscashflowtowardfirmsinwhichhehasrelativelymorecashflowrights(“upthepyramid”)ControllingOwnersandPyramids

(7of8)TheStakeholderModelStakeholderModelTheexplicitconsiderationmostcountries(otherthantheUnitedStates)givetootherstakeholdersbesidesequityholders,inparticular,rank-and-fileemployeesTable29.1EmployeeParticipationinCorporateGovernanceinOECDCountriesMandatedWorksCouncilsEmployeeAppointedBoardMembersConstitutionalEmployeeProtectionsNoExplicitRequirementsAustriaAustriaFranceAustraliaBelgiumCzechRepublicIcelandCanadaDenmarkDenmarkItalyChileFinlandEstoniaNorwayIrelandFranceFranceIsraelGermanyGermanyJapanGreeceHungaryMexicoHungaryLuxembourgNewZealandKoreaNetherlandsPolandNetherlandsNorwaySwitzerlandPortugalSlovakRepublicTurkeySloveniaSloveniaUnitedKingdomSpainSwedenUnitedStatesSource:BasedonOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment,SurveyofCorporateGovernanceDevelopmentsinOECDCountries(2004)andOECDCorporateGovernanceFactbook2021.ControllingOwnersandPyramids

(8of8)Cross-HoldingsWhileintheUnitedStatesitisrareforonecompany’slargestshareholdertobeanothercompany,itisthenorminmanycountriesInJapan,groupsoffirmsconnectedthroughcross-holdingsandacommonrelationtoabankareknownaskeiretsuInKorea,hugeconglomerategroupscomp