2025年自愿碳市场在全球气候行动中的作用报告（英文版）-联合国贸易发展委员会

UNITEDNATIONSCONFERENCEONTRADEANDDEVELOPMENT

Technicalandstatisticalreport

TheRoleofVoluntary

CarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

Geneva,2025

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ii

TheRoleofVoluntaryCarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

Acknowledgements

ThisreportwaspreparedundertheoverallguidanceofNanLiCollins,DirectorofInvestmentandEnterpriseofUNCTAD.ThereportteamcomprisedYongfuOuyang,MaJun(UNCTADconsultant),JosephClements,JasonMunyan,SaraRosicandIrianaTarte,withYongfuOuyangandMaJuncoordinating.AshrafAbdelaal,MathildeClosset,ChantalDupasquier,YiLiu,StephaniaMageste,MassimoMeloniandAmeliaSantosPaulinocontributedinsightsandcomments.

UNCTADfurthergratefullyacknowledgesthecommentsofCarolynFischer(WorldBank)andtheSustainableFinanceWorkingGroupfor2025undertheGroupof20,inparticularthePresidencyofSouthAfrica.

ThepresentreportisbasedonaninputpapersubmittedtotheSustainableFinanceWorkingGroupfor2025undertheGroupof20.TheinputpaperbenefitedfromsubstantiveinputsprovidedbyKrystenSong(GreenDevelopmentInstitute,HongKong,China),TracyWong(HongKongGreenFinanceAssociation,China)andGabrielWongandBoBai(MVGX,Singapore).

iii

TheRoleofVoluntaryCarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

Abbreviations

A6.4ER

Article6.4EmissionReduction

AIIB

AsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank

AMC

AdvancedMarketCommitment

ASEAN

AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations

ACCU

Australia’sAustralianCarbonCreditUnit

CA

CorrespondingAdjustment

CASI

Capacity-buildingAllianceofSustainableInvestment

CBAM

CarbonBorderAdjustmentMechanism

CCER

ChinaCertifiedEmissionReductions

CCPs

CoreCarbonPrinciples

CDM

CleanDevelopmentMechanism

CDR

CarbonDioxideRemoval

COP

ConferenceoftheParties

CORSIA

CarbonOffsettingandReductionSchemeforInternationalAviation

DLT

DistributedLedgerTechnology

ETS

EmissionsTradingSystem

G20

GroupofTwenty

GHG

GreenhouseGas

HKGFA

HongKongGreenFinanceAssociation

ICAO

InternationalCivilAviationOrganization

ICAP

InternationalCarbonActionPartnership

ICE

IntercontinentalExchange

ICVCM

IntegrityCouncilfortheVoluntaryCarbonMarket

IETA

InternationalEmissionsTradingAssociation

IMO

InternationalMaritimeOrganization

IOSCO

InternationalOrganizationofSecuritiesCommissions

IPCC

IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)

ISSB

InternationalSustainabilityStandardsBoard

ITMO

InternationallyTransferredMitigationOutcome

LDC

LeastDevelopedCountry

MDB

MultilateralDevelopmentBank

MOU

MemorandumofUnderstanding

MRV

Measurement,Reporting,andVerification

NDC

NationallyDeterminedContribution

NGFS

NetworkforGreeningtheFinancialSystem

OTC

OvertheCounter

PACM

ParisAgreementCreditingMechanism

RCEP

RegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnership

REDD+

ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandForestDegradation

SBTi

ScienceBasedTargetsinitiative

SME

SmallandMedium-sizedEnterprise

tCO2e

Tonsofcarbondioxideequivalent

UNFCCC

UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange

VCM

VoluntaryCarbonMarket

VCMI

VoluntaryCarbonMarketsIntegrityInitiative

iv

Tableofcontents

Acknowledgement iii

Abbreviations iv

Executivesummary vi

Introduction 1

1Thecurrentlandscapeforvoluntarycarbonmarkets 3

2Challengesfacingvoluntarycarbonmarkets 9

2.1Lackofclearpolicysignalsandregulatoryalignment 9

2.2Integrityconcernsandconfidenceinthemarket 10

2.3Lackofpricingtransparencyanddataavailability 11

2.4Fragmentedmarketstructuresincludinglimitedintegration

betweenvoluntaryandcompliancemechanisms 11

2.5Uncertaintyaroundcross-bordertransactionsandArticle6implementation 12

2.6Barrierstoparticipationandfinancialintegrityofthemarket 13

3RecenteffortstoimprovetheintegrityandinterconnectivityofVCMs 14

3.1EnhancingandharmonizingstandardsforVCMintegrity 14

3.2Improvingpricestability,marketfunctionalityandfinancialcredibility 16

3.3Establishingmechanismsforcross-bordertransactions 18

4Thewayforward 19

4.1ClarifyVCMs’roleindecarbonizationefforts 19

4.2Boostdemandforcarboncreditsbyleveragingoffsetmechanisms

thatlinkVCMswithcompliancemechanisms 20

4.3Enhancethequalityandintegrityofcarboncreditsbypromoting

theadoptionofinternationalstandards 20

4.4PromoteinteroperabilityamongVCMsthroughcooperationmechanisms 21

4.5Adopttechnologysolutionstoimprovethedistributionofbenefits

towardscommunitiesindevelopingeconomies 22

4.6Developoperationalrulesforcross-bordertransactions 24

4.7Scaleupcapacitybuilding 25

v

Executivesummary

Thisstudyreviewsthecurrentstateofvoluntarycarbonmarkets(VCMs)globally,withparticularreferencetothoseindevelopingcountries.Basedonastock-takinganalysis,itidentifieskeybarrierstoVCMdevelopmentandexplorespathwaysforenhancingqualityandinteroperabilityacrossmarkets.

1

ThestudyidentifiesthefollowingkeychallengesfacingVCMdevelopment:

Alackofclearpolicysignalsfromgovernmentsandlimitedguidancefrominternationalorganizationsregardingtheroleofcarboncreditsasatoolforfacilitatingsustainablefinanceandachievingglobalclimategoals;

2

Heightenedintegrityconcerns,reflectingissuesrelatedtostandardsetting,verificationpractices,doublecounting,andtransparency,whichreinforceperceptionsofgreenwashing;

3

Insufficientconsiderationgiventotheinteroperabilityofstandardsandmarketconnectivity,dueinpart,totherapiddevelopmentandfragmentationofcreditingschemes;

4

ThedisjuncturebetweenmostVCMsandcomplianceemissioncontrolregimes,whichholdsbackthegrowthofbothVCMsandcompliancemarkets;

5

Policyambiguityregardingcross-bordertransactionsofcarboncredits;and

6

Thehighcostsassociatedwiththedevelopment,measurement,reporting,verification(MRV),andregistrationofcarboncreditsthatlimitthebenefitstocommunitieshostingcarbonprojectsindevelopingcountries.

Thisstudyproposesseveraloptionstoaddressthesechallengesandenhancethequality,scale,interoperability,andinterconnectivityofVCMs.Theseinclude:

1)providingpolicyclarityontheroleofVCMswithinnationalandinternationalcarbonpricingmechanisms,withinternationalorganizationsplayingasupportingrolethroughtechnicalassistanceandglobalcoordination;2)creatingdemandforcarboncreditsbyleveragingoffsetmechanismsthatlinkVCMswithcompliancemarketsorcarbontaxes,consistentwithArticle6.2and6.4oftheParisAgreement;

3)enhancingthequalityandintegrityofcarboncreditsbypromotingtheadoptionofCore-Carbon-PrinciplesbytheIntegrityCouncilfortheVoluntaryCarbonMarket

(ICVCM);4)promotinginteroperabilityamongVCMsthroughtheestablishmentofcooperationmechanisms;5)adoptingtechnologicalsolutionstoimprovethedistributionofbenefitstocommunitiesindevelopingeconomiesandmovingtoanimpactbasedapproachbeyondCO2offsetting;6)developingoperationalrulesforcross-bordertransactions;and7)enhancingcapacitybuildingforVCMregulatorsandkeyparticipantsindevelopingcountries.

vi

Introduction

RecentestimatesindicatethatapproximatelyUS$7.4trillioninclimate-relatedinvestmentisrequiredannuallytomeetnet-zero

targetsby2030.YetonlyaboutUS$1.5

trillionisbeingmobilizedeachyear.1G20

memberscollectivelycontributearound75percentofcurrentglobalclimatefinance

andemitapproximately80percentof

globalgreenhousegases(GHG),which

invitesthemtoleadeffortsinscalingand

standardizingtheuseofcarbonmarketsastoolstomobilizefinanceforclimateactions.

Voluntarycarbonmarkets(VCMs)provideamechanismforincentivizingandchannellingcapitalintoprojectsaimedatemissions

reduction,avoidanceorcompensation.

Fordevelopingcountries,VCMscanserve

asanessentialmechanismformobilizingprivatefinancealignedwithnationalclimateanddevelopmentgoals–particularly

whereconcessionalorpublicclimate

financeisinsufficient.2Incontrasttomostcompliancecarbonmarkets,theychannelinvestmentcapitalacrossborders,as

mostVCMcreditsareissuedforprojectsindevelopingcountriesandsoldtobuyersindevelopedcountries(primarilyEuropeancountriesandtheUnitedStates).

Despiteincreasinginterestincarboncreditmarkets,thelackofgloballycoordinatedstandardsandpracticesforVCMshas

ledtodiscrepanciesincreditquality,

pricing,andmarkettrust.Inturn,thishasunderminedthepotentialforVCMgrowth.

Voluntary

carbonmarketschannelprivatecapitalto

projectsthat

cut,avoid,or

offsetemissions

1ClimatePolicyInitiative.GlobalLandscapeofClimateFinance2024:InsightsforCOP29:

https://www.

/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2024.pdf

2UNCTAD(2023).WorldinvestmentReport:InvestinginSustainableEnergyforAll.UnitedNations:NewYorkandGeneva.

1

TheRoleofVoluntaryCarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

However,recentdevelopmentspresentopportunitiesforallpartiestobenefit

fromgreatercollaborationaroundcarbon

markets.Notably,theagreementatCOP29oncooperativeapproachesunderArticle6oftheParisAgreementandrevisedcountryassessmentsoftheirNationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs).Manyinitiatives,suchastheCOP,havehighlightedthenecessitytoensureharmonizationandcollaborationonVCMs,andthiscanbefurthersupportedbytheG20andthestrengtheningof

globalcoordinationmechanisms.

Basedonastock-takingofthecurrent

landscapeofVCMsglobally,withparticularattentiongiventothoseindeveloping

countries,thisstudyidentifiesbarriers

toscalingupthemarket.Theseinclude,

amongothers:(i)thelackofclearpolicy

signalsandregulatoryalignmentat

theinternationalandnationallevels;(ii)

heightenedgreenwashingrisksresultinginalackofinvestorconfidenceanddemandforcredits;(iii)lackofpricingtransparencyanddataavailability;(iv)limitedintegration

betweenvoluntaryandcompliancemarkets;(v)policyuncertaintyaroundcross-border

transactionsandArticle6implementation;and(vi)excessivelyhighcostsof

developing,verifying,andregisteringcarboncredits,andfinancialintegrity.

MostofthesechallengesarecommontoallVCMsratherthancountryspecific.Toavoidduplicationandminimizecoordinationcosts,theG20andotherrelevantinternational

coordinationbodiescantaketheleadin

developingsolutions.Thesecouldinclude,butarenotlimitedto:clarifyingtheroleofVCMsindecarbonizationefforts;advisingcountriesoncreatingoffsetlinkages

betweencompliancemarkets/carbontaxesandVCMs;creatingoraligningwitha

globalVCMstandard,usingclearlabellingandbenchmarking,includingfortheco-benefitsofcredits;clarifyingthescenariosfortheuseofcorrespondingadjustments3forcross-bordertransactions;developinginternationaldatasharingmechanisms;

supportingmarketinteroperabilitythroughthedevelopmentofframeworksand

registriesusingastandardizedcommondatamodel;andprovidingcapacity-

buildingtodevelopingcountriesonVCMdevelopment.Thesesevensuggestionsarefurtherelaboratedinthefinalsectionofthisstudyforconsiderationbythe

G20andotherinternationalbodies.

3Correspondingadjustmentsaimtopreventthedoublecountingofcarbonemissions:whenamitigationoutcomeistransferredinternationally,thismitigationoutcomecannotbecountedbythePartythatagreedtotransferittowardstheirclimatecommitments.

2

TheRoleofVoluntaryCarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

1

Thecurrentlandscapeforvoluntarycarbonmarkets

Carbonpricingisvitalforachievinganet

zeroglobaleconomyandtrulyreflecting

theenvironmentalandsocialcostsof

emissions.Complementarytocompliance

marketsandtaxesinthecarbonpricing

toolbox,VCMsserveasmechanisms

throughwhichprojectswithclimatebenefitscangeneratecarboncreditsandattract

privatecapitalparticipation.Whilecarbon

marketscanprovideclimatefinancein

additiontotraditionalfinancingsources,

VCMscanhelpdeliverbroadersustainabledevelopmentaims,suchasstrengthening

climateresilienceandotherco-benefitssuchasjobcreationandpovertyalleviation.

Tomeaningfullycontributetothegreen

transitionandnetzerotargetsandbecomeasignificantsourceofclimatefinance,VCMsneedtobescaledup,withashifttoward

high-qualityremovalsalongsidecontinuedsupportforemissionsreduction.For

example,thenetzeroscenariodevelopedbytheNetworkforGreeningtheFinancialSystem(NGFS),whichisconsistentwith

anemissionspathwaythatlimitsglobal

warmingto1.5°Celsius,indicatesthat

globaldemandforcarboncreditswould

needtoincreasebyafactorof15by2030.Thiscorrespondstoamarketvalueof

US$50billionunderahighercarbonpriceregime.4ResearchbyMorganStanley

estimatedthatthemarketsizeforVCMscouldreachUS$250billionby2050.5

VCMssupportsustainable

developmentbyboostingclimate

resilienceandcreatingjobsandother

co-benefits

4McKinsey(2021).Ablueprintforscalingvoluntarycarbonmarketstomeettheclimatechallenge.

https://

/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/a-blueprint-for-scaling-voluntary-carbon-markets-

to-meet-the-climate-challenge

5MorganStanley(2023).WheretheCarbonOffsetMarketisPoisedtoSurge.

https://www.morganstanley.

com/ideas/carbon-offset-market-growth

3

TheRoleofVoluntaryCarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

Figure1.1.

VCMmarketsizebyvalueoftradedcarboncredits,2014to2024

(Millionsofdollars)

2100

1900

755

535

534

298278199

285

320

136

20142015201620172018201920202021202220232024

Source:EcoSystemMarketplace,MSCI,2024.

Alarge surplusof unretired credits,like2024’s71Mt, depresses pricesandundermines

integrity

However,despiteasurgeinVCMsin2021and2022,theirvaluehasfacedvolatility,withasignificantdeclinein2023and

2024,reflectingshiftingconcernsaboutcreditintegrityandquality(figure1.1).

VCMcreditsarenotfungible,anddespitebeingdenominatedinunitsoftonsofCO2equivalent(tCO2e)theyaredifferentiated

bytype,derivingfromunderlying‘assets’

whosequalitydeterminesthevalue,and

henceprice,ofthecredit.Corporatebuyersremaincautious,particularlyinREDD+6

andrenewableenergyprojects,dueto

concernsoverwhetherprojectsprovideadditionality,whethertheyarepermanent,

andanyconsequentreputationalrisks.

Meanwhile,apersistentsurplusofissued

butunretiredcredits,suchasthe71milliontonsofcarbondioxideequivalent(tCO2e)

surplusin2024,continuestoweaken

pricesandchallengemarketintegrity(figure1.2).Thesefeatureshighlighttheneed

forrobustverificationstandards,creditingharmonization,andtoexploreenhanced

linkagesbetweenvoluntaryandcompliancemarkets.Suchmeasuresareessentialforboostingconfidenceanddemand,andforpositioningVCMsasakeytoolforclimatefinanceanddecarbonizationefforts.

6ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandforestDegradation

4

TheRoleofVoluntaryCarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

Figure1.2.

Issuancesandretirementsofcarboncreditsbyprojectcategoryinindependentcreditingmechanisms2018–2024

Creditsissuedandretired(r/haxis),andcumulativenon-retiredcredits(l/haxis)(VolumeinmilliontCO2e)

RenewableEnergyWasteEnergyefficiency/fuelswitchingHouseholdAgricultureChemicalprocesses/IndustrialmanufacturingForestryOther

350

300

250

200

150

77

100

288

361

143

192

72

165

99

245

157

241

163

o-Cumulativenon-retiredcredits

800

600

400

170

200

5054

0

Issued

IssuedRetired2020

IssuedRetired2021

IssuedRetired2022

Issued

IssuedRetired2018

Retired

Retired

2019

2023

IssuedRetired2024

Source:UNCTADbasedonClimateFocusandthefollowingcreditingmechanisms:AmericanCarbonRegistry,ClimateActionReserve,GoldStandard,andVerifiedCarbonStandard.

DevelopingeconomiesplayapivotalroleinVCMsasthesourceofmostcarbonreductionprojectsandcreditissuance.

CountriesinAsialeadglobalcredit

issuance,withothercountriessuchas

Brazil,Peru,andRwandarankingamongthetoptenissuers,in2024(figure1.3).Asmoredevelopingeconomiesimplement

policymeasurestostrengthencarbon

creditingframeworks,theirmarketshare

issettoexpand,furtherpositioningthemasdriversofglobalclimatefinanceand

emissionsreduction.7Atthesametime,itisimportantthatpolicyframeworksaroundcarboncreditingarealsoalignedwith

broadersustainabledevelopmentgoals.

Asialeads

globalcredit

issuance,withBrazil,PeruandRwandaalso

among2024’stopissuers

7UNCTADWorldInvestmentReport2025

/publication/world-investment-report-2025

5

TheRoleofVoluntaryCarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

Figure1.3.

Developingregionsaccountfor75percentofVCMcreditvolume

VolumeofcredittradedinVCMs,2004-2024

(millionsofcredits)

515

NorthAmerica

356

323

LatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanAfrica

24

16

DevelopedAsiaandOceaniaEurope

0.2

International

Source:BerkeleyCarbonTradingProject’sVoluntaryRegistryOffsetsDatabasebasedon:AmericanCarbonRegistry(ACR),ClimateActionReserve(CAR),GoldStandard,andVerra(VCS).

VCMsoperateina fragmentedlandscapeofoverlapping, inconsistent privateandgovernment frameworks

TherecentexpansionofsomeVCMshas

beendrivenbyarangeofusecasesfor

carboncredits,includingcorporatevoluntarypurchases,linkageswithcompliance

markets,linkageswithinternational

offsettinginitiatives,andgovernments

seekingtomeettheirNDCs.Thesediversechannelsofdemandareshapingthe

evolutionofVCMsandinfluencingboththevolumeandqualityofcredittransactions.

Currently,VCMsindifferentjurisdictions

operateunderafragmentedlandscape

involvingmanyoverlappingbutinconsistentframeworkscomprisingbothprivateand

government-drivenmechanisms.Three

parallelcarbonmarketstructuresnowexist:

1.Independentmechanismsmanagedbyspecializednon-governmental

organizations,suchasVerra,the

GoldStandard,AmericanCarbon

Registry,andClimateActionReserve;

2.Nationalmechanismsledby

governmentssuchasAustralia’s

AustralianCarbonCreditUnit(ACCU)

market,China’sCCER,Japan’sJ-Credit,andvariousREDD+initiatives;and

3.Internationalmechanisms,such

astheCleanDevelopment

MechanismandtheParisAgreementCreditingMechanism(PACM)

Asbusinessesseektooffsettheirresidualemissionsandmeetclimate-related

commitments,corporatevoluntary

purchasesremainthedominantsource

ofdemand.8However,offsettingcanbe

biasedtowardsover-creditingwithwide

rangingcredittypesofvaryingquality

andcredibility.9Thisissuecannotbe

resolvedbystandardisationalonebut

alsorequiresfundamentalreformsto

marketincentives,theadoptionofhigh-

transparencytechnologiesforverification,

andashifttowardlarger-scale(jurisdictional)crediting.Whilecorporatesshouldprioritiseemissionsreductionsbasedonscience-

basedGHGreductiontargets,10manycorporations,especiallythoseinhard-to-abatesectorssuchasaviation,shipping,andheavyindustry,includevoluntary

carboncreditsthattargetemissionreductions,removalorsequestrationintheirgreentransitionstrategies.

8WorldBank.StateandTrendsofCarbonPricing2024.

/server/api/

core/bitstreams/253e6cdd-9631-4db2-8cc5-1d013956de15/content

9Hayaetal.,(2023).QualityAssessmentofREDD+CarbonCreditProjects

/assets/

uploads/page/Quality-Assessment-of-REDD+-Carbon-Crediting.pdf

10TheScienceBasedTargetsInitiative(SBTi)reportsthat,asofJanuary2025,over10,000businesseshavecommittedtosettingscience-basedGHGreductiontargets.ScienceBasedTargets(2025):TargetDashboard.

/target-dashboard

6

TheRoleofVoluntaryCarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

Integratingcarboncreditsintocompliance

markets,wherealimitedpercentageof

high-qualityoffsetsareallowedforregulatorycompliance,canplayaroleindrivingthe

expansionofVCMs.Thislinkageprovides

anadditionalchannelofdemand,increasingliquidityandpricestabilitywhilereinforcingthecredibilityofvoluntarycreditsby

adheringtocompliance-graderequirements.SeveralnationalEmissionsTradingSystems(ETSs)allowlimitedcredituseasa

complianceoption(table1.1).Forexample,theRepublicofKorea’sETSpermitseligibleinternationaloffsets,whileChina’snationalETSispilotingthereintroductionofChinaCertifiedEmissionReductions(CCERs)forcompliance.InSingapore,thecarbontax

Allowing

limitedhigh-

qualityoffsetsincompliancemarketscan

helpexpand

voluntary

carbonmarkets

regimeislinkedtointernationalhigh-qualitycarboncredits.InLatinAmerica,Colombiaalsoallowscompaniestousevoluntary

creditstooffsetcarbontaxobligations.11

Moreover,thelinkagesbetweenlegally

governedcomplianceschemesand

VCMs,drivenbyprivatestandards,can

actasastepping-stoneforbroadermarketintegration,wherevoluntarycreditsthat

meethighintegritystandardscouldgain

recognitioninemergingcompliancemarketsorfutureinternationaltradingunderArticle

6oftheParisAgreement.Atthesametime,severaljurisdictions,suchastheEUETS,donotcurrentlyallowvoluntarycarboncreditstobeusedforregulatorycompliance.12

Table1.1.

Examplesofuseofoffsetsincompliancecarbonmarkets13

Internationaloffsetallowed

Nooffsetallowed

Domesticoffsetallowed

EUETS

GermanNationalETSNewZealandETS

SwitzerlandETS

UKETS

AustraliaNationalETS

ChinaNationalETS

BritishColumbiaOutput-BasedSystemKazakhstanETS

MexicanETS

RegionalGreenhouseGasInitiative

QuébecCap-and-TradeSystem

ColombiaCarbonTax(indevelopment)

KoreaETS

CaliforniaCap-and-tradeSystemKyotoCap-and-tradeSystem

SingaporeCarbonTaxRegime

Source:UNCTADbasedonICAP.

Note:Domesticoffsetsinclude,forexample,nationalreforestationormethanereductionprojects.InternationaloffsetsincludethroughtheCDMorArticle6oftheParisAgreement.

11ClearBlueMarkets(2025).

/knowledge-base/colombian-government-

proposes-changes-to-carbon-tax-mechanism

12Seeregulation.-2021/1119(‘EuropeanClimateLaw’)

13InternationalCarbonActionPartnership(2023).OffsetUseAcrossEmissionsTradingSystems.

https://

/system/files/document/ICAP%20offsets%20paper_vfin.pdf

7

TheRoleofVoluntaryCarbonMarketsinGlobalClimateAction

in%202030

8

AsofFebruary2025,more than59 countrieshavesigned97bilateralagreementsunder

Article6.2

Attheinternationallevel,severalsector-

specificmechanismsfurtherdrivedemandforvoluntarycarboncredits.TheCarbon

OffsettingandReductionScheme

forInternationalAviation(CORSIA),

implementedbytheInternationalCivil

AviationOrganization(ICAO),requires

airlinestooffsetemissionsexceeding

2019levelsbypurchasingeligiblecarboncredits.14Thisinitiativehasgenerated

substantialdemandforhigh-integrity

credits,particularlyfromnature-based

solutionsandcarbonremovalprojects.TheInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO)

isexploringmarket-basedmechanismsinthemaritimesector,includingapotentialcarbonpricingsystemforshipping

emissions.15Ifimplemented,sucha

frameworkcouldestablishastructureddemandforcarboncreditslikeCORSIA.

Thereisfurtherconvergencebetween

voluntaryandcompliancemarketsas

voluntarystandardsframeworksadopt

safeguards(correspondingadjustments,hostcountryauthorization)aligningcreditswithArticle6oftheParisAgreement.

UndertheParisAgreement,Article6.2

enablescountriestotradeInternationally

TransferredMitigationOutcomes(ITMOs)

throughbilateralormultilateralagreements,inpursuitoftheirNDCtargetsaslongas

acorrespondingadjustmentismadeto

ensureitisnotcountedtwice.Underthismechanism,thereisariskthatcountriesmightwaterdowntheambitionoftheir

NDCsinfavouroftradingcredits,requiringfurtherinternationalcoordinationtoavoidthisscenario.AsofFebruary2025,morethan59countrieshavesigned97bilateralagreementsunderArticle6.2,although

theseagreementsvaryinstructure,scope,andenvironmentalintegrityrequirements.16

Meanwhile,Article6.4establishes

acentralizedcreditingmechanism

toreplacetheCleanDevelopment

Mechanism(CDM),whichmayfurther

enhancedemandforvoluntarycreditsbycreatingastandardizedframeworkfor

internationalcarbontrading.17Although

thegeneralruleshavebeenadopted,

theoperationalizationofArticle6.4isstillunderdevelopment,meaningitseventualintegrationwithexistinggovernment-led

andvoluntaryprogramsremainsuncertain.Infuture,integrationbetweenArticle6

mechanismsandVCMswilllikelyhinge

onclarifyingtherulesregardingtheuse

ofcorrespondingadjustments,especiallyontherelationshipbetweencross-bordertransactionsforvoluntaryclaimsand

thoseaffectinghostcountries’NDCs