2025生育率悖论教育是关键研究报告（英文）-

Thefertilityrateparadox:

Educationiskey

10September2025

AllianzResearch

AllianzResearch

2

Content

4

ExecutiveSummary

10

Moneycan’tbuymorechildren

21

Lowfertilityratesareheretostay

27

Theworldpopulationmightpeakearlierandageevenfasterthanexpected

30

Capital-fundedpensionprovisionandflexibleretirementsolutionsgainin

importance

33

Educationiskeyforincreasingproductivity

38

Appendix

3

10September2025

Executive

Summary

MichaelaGrimm

SeniorEconomist,

Demography&SocialProtection

michaela.grimm@

ArneHolzhausen

HeadofInsurance,Wealth&ESGResearch

arne.holzhausen@

Moneycan’tbuymorechildren.AmongOECDcountries,taxbreaks,cash

benefitsandservicesgrantedforfamiliesandchildrencorrespondedto1.8%

ofGDP.IntheEU-27,theaverageshareofgovernmentexpendituresspendon

familyandchildrenhasincreasedfrom1.6%in2001to1.9%ofGDPin2023,

rangingfrom0.8%inMaltato4.0%inDenmark.However,inmanyindustrializedcountriestodayfamilyandchildrenpolicyisnotonlyconsideredanimportant

elementinpreventingchildhoodpovertyandsmoothingconsumption,butalsoasmoreorlesssubtleincentivetoincreasethefertilityrate.Theunprecedenteddeclineinfertilityratesinmanycountries,callsthetargetsoftoday’sfamily

policyintoquestion,suggestingthatjustspendingmoremoneydoesnot

necessarilyleadtohigherfertilityrates.Thisinturnraisesthequestionof

whetheritwouldnotbemoreimportanttofocusfamilypoliciesonguaranteeingthateverychildhasthesamechancesirrespectiveoftheparents’incomeandtopushaheadwiththenecessarymeasurestoadaptlabormarketsandpension

systemstotherealityofagingsocieties.Evenmoreso,iftoday’scriticsoftheUNpopulationprojectionsturnouttoberightandtheworldpopulationagesmuchstrongerthanexpectedinthelongterm.

Fertilityrateskeepdeclining,anditishardtotellwhy.Theunprecedenteddeclineinfertilityratesisaglobalphenomenon.InGermany,forexample

ithasfallentoanaverage1.35childrenperwoman,inJapanitdroppedto

1.15childrenandtheUSreportedarecordlow1.6childrenperwomanin

2024.However,noonecanpinpointtheonesinglereason,thatcouldexplain

thisdevelopment,sincefertilitybehaviordependsonamultitudeoffactors,

includingwomen’seducationattainmentlevels,theavailabilityandaffordabilityofhousingandchildcarefacilities,thelabormarketsituation,work-lifebalanceandsocietalnorms.Inthiscontext,effortstoraisethelaborforceparticipationrateofwomentodampentheimpactofdemographicchangeonthelabor

market,theincreasingcostofliving,still-limitedchildcarefacilitiesand

unaffordablehousing,especiallyinbigcities,andanincreasingshareofyoungpeoplewhointendtoremainchildless,arelikelytokeepglobalfertilityrateslowfortheforeseeablefuture.

Withoutareversalofcurrentfertilitytrends,theglobalpopulationissettopeakearlierthanexpectedandagemuchmorethanexpected,whichmakescapital-fundedpensionprovisionallthemoreurgent.IntheUN’slow-fertilityscenario,theold-agedependencyratioinhigh-incomecountrieswouldincreasetoalmost80%inthelongrun.Thiswouldmeanahugestrainontax-orpay-as-you-gofinancedpensionsystems,whichwillnotbesustainableorprovidean

adequatestandardoflivinginoldageinthelongrun.Hence,pensionsystemswillneedtoadapttotheneedsofanagingpopulation,andcapital-funded

pensionprovisionwillbecritical.

4

AllianzResearch

Labormarketsandcompaniesalsoneedtobeadaptedtotheneedsofan

agingworkforcepopulation.Thedeclineofthepopulationinworkingage

couldbecushionedbyanincreaseofthelaborforceparticipationinhigher

ages.IfEU-27membercountriessucceededingraduallyincreasingthelabor

forceparticipationratesinhigheragestolevelsalreadyseeninJapantoday,thenumberofpeopleavailableonthelabormarketwouldincreasefrom221.7mn

todayto228.2mnin2041–eveninthelowfertilityscenario–beforedecliningto192.1mnin2060,with43%ofthembeing50andolderbythen.Therefore,labormarketsandcompaniesneedtobeadaptedtotheneedsofanagingworkforcepopulation,notleastinordertoincentivizeolderworkerstopostponeretirement.

Educationisalsokey.Whilehighereducationalattainmentdoescontribute

toalowerfertilityrate,itisalsoanimportantmeanstocushiontheimpact

ofdemographicchangeonlabormarketsandeconomicgrowth,sincethe

educationalattainmentleveloftheworkforcepopulationispositivelycorrelatedwithproductivity.Therefore,thedeclineinthenumberofchildreninthefuture

shouldnottriggeracutinpublicspendingoneducation.Instead,itshouldbeatleastkeptstableinordertoincreasepercapitainvestmentsinhumancapital.

10September2025

5

Moneycan’tbuymorechildren

Today,mosthigh-incomeandmanymiddle-income

countrieshaveimplementedfamilyandchildren

policies,includinginstrumentssuchascashbenefits

andtaxcredits.Furthermore,manyofthemnotonly

grantpre-andpost-birthmaternityleavetoprotectthehealthofmothers–ranginginOECDcountriesfromintotaltwoweeksinAustraliato56weeksinGreece–

butalsoextendedpaidleavetobothparents.AmongOECDcountries,Slovakiaisthemostgenerousin

termsofduration(upto164weeksofmaternityleave)

whileRomaniatopsthelistintermsofbenefits,grantingpaymentscorrespondingto89weeksofafull-rate

equivalent(i.e.thenumberofweeksitwouldhavetakenthemothertoearnthesameamountifshehadearned

100%ofherpreviousearnings¹).Theleastgenerous

countryintheserespectsistheUS,where12weeksof

job-protectedunpaidleaveareonlygrantedtopublic

employeesandemployeesofprivatecompaniesthathaveatleast50employees,undertheFamilyandMedical

LeaveAct(FMLA)(seeFigure1).

¹InRomania,forexample,ayoungmotherisonaverageentitledto85%ofherpreviousincomeforaperiodof104.3weeks.Shewouldhaveneeded89weekstoearnthesameamountifshehadearned100%ofherpreviousincome.SeeableOECD(2025).TablePF2.1.A.,Summaryofpaidleave

entitlementsavailabletomothers.

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Figure1:Totalpaidweeksofmaternityleaveavailabletomothersandfull-rateequivalent(inweeks)

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Romania

Estonia

Hungary

Bulgaria

Slovakia

Greece

Czechia

Lithuania

Slovenia

Austria

Croatia

Latvia

Germany

Poland

Norway

Finland

Luxembourg

SouthKorea

Japan

Sweden

Chile

Italy

Portugal

Netherlands

Iceland

Denmark

Canada

France

Malta

Colombia

CostaRica

Spain

Cyprus

Belgium

Israel

Türkiye

NewZealand

UK

Mexico

Australia

Switzerland

Ireland

USA

weeks(lhs)full-rateequivalent(weeks,rhs)

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Source:OECD.

Financialsupportforfamilies,likecashtransfers,childtaxcreditsorreducedsocialsecuritycontributions,is

inmostOECDcountriesgrantedatleastuntilthechildturns18.Insomecountries,itlastsevenbeyondthat

age,lastingaslongasthechildisineducation.Hence,therearemarkeddifferencesinthetaxtreatmentof

singleswithnochildrenandfamilieswithchildren.In

Belgium,forexample,incometaxandemployees’socialsecuritycontributionsminuscashbenefitsforamarriedcouplewithone-earnerandtwochildrenaddupto

19.9%ofthegrosswage,whileforasinglepersonwithnochild,incometaxplussocialsecuritycontributionsamountto39.7%oftheaveragegrosswage.²However,

thedifferencesinthetaxtreatmentofsingleswith

nochildrenandfamiliesvarymarkedly.Thehighest

differencewithrespecttothetaxandsocialcontributionburdenbetweensingleswithoutchildrenandmarried

coupleswithone-earnerandtwochildrenwasreportedinSlovakia,wheretheincomeoffamilieswiththese

characteristicswasonaverage107%ofthegrosswage,whilethetaxesandsocialsecuritycontributionsaddedupto24.1%forasingleperson.InGreece,thisdifferencewasmerely2.4%,whileinTürkiye,MexicoandCosta

Ricatherewasnodifferencebetweenasinglewithnochildandfamiliesinthisrespect(seeFigure2).

²TheOECDtaxwedgeisnetofcashbenefitswhichincludethoseuniversallypaidtoworkerswithdependentchildrenagedfromsixtoelevenandin-workbenefitspaidtoworkersingeneral,seeOECD(2025):Taxingwages2025,p.32.

10September2025

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Figure2:Incometaxplusemployeecontributionslesscashbenefits(in%ofgrosswageearnings),2024

(in%ofgrosswageearnings)

40

30

20

10

0

-10

Belgium

Lithuania

Germany

Denmark

Slovenia

Hungary

Austria

Luxembourg

Italy

Finland

Türkiye

Norway

France

Ireland

Latvia

Iceland

Netherlands

Greece

Canada

Australia

Portugal

USA

Poland

Slovakia

Sweden

Spain

Japan

UK

Czechia

NewZealand

Estonia

Israel

Switzerland

SouthKorea

Mexico

CostaRica

Chile

singlenochildmarriedone-earnercouple,twochildren

Source:OECD.

Furthermore,inmostOECDcountries,benefitsfor

familiesincreasewiththenumberofchildren.AccordingtoOECDstatistics,benefitsforatwo-parentfamily,in

whichoneparentworkedfull-timeandonepart-time,withbothonwagesatthemedianofthefull-time

earningsdistribution,withfourchildren,rangedfrom

4.5%ofanaveragewage³inSouthKoreato47%ofan

averagewageinEstoniain2023.Forarespectivecouplewithonlyonechild,theyrangedbetween0.9%inIcelandto8.1%ofanaveragewageinItaly.ExceptionswereTürkiyeandtheUS,whichofferednocomparablefamilybenefits(seeFigure3).

Figure3:Amountoffamilybenefits,bynumberofchildren(inpercentofaveragewage)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Estonia

Italy

Poland

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Latvia

Cyprus

France

Belgium

Slovenia

Austria

Germany

Czechia

Slovakia

Netherlands

OECDaverage

Croatia

Sweden

Romania

Canada

NewZealand

Hungary

Portugal

Ireland

Finland

Switzerland

Denmark

Japan

Spain

Bulgaria

Australia

Malta

Greece

UK

Iceland

Norway

Chile

Israel

SouthKorea

Türkiye

USA

.1child。2children▲3childreno4children

Source:OECD.

³Theaveragefull-timewagereferstotheaveragegrosswageearningspaidtofull-time,full-yearworkers,beforedeductionsofanykind,seeOECD(2025),tablePF1.3.C.Valueoffamilybenefitsbynumberofchildren.

AllianzResearch

8

IntheEU27,theaverageshareofgovernment

expendituresspentonfamilyandchildrenamounted

to1.9%ofGDPin2023.Governmentsofalmostevery

EUmembercountryspendahighershareofGDPon

familiesandchildrentodaythanin2001,withthesharesrangingfrom0.8%inMaltaand4.0%inDenmarkin

2023.Bothcountrieswerebeingamongthosewheretheincreaseofgovernmentspendingonfamilieswas

lowerthanGDPgrowth.BesidesDenmark,Finland,

FranceandSwedenwerealsoamongthecountriesthatspentthemostforfamilyandchildren,whileItaly,Spain,GreeceandIrelandwereatthelowerendofthisscale(seeFigure4).

Figure4:Generalgovernmentexpendituresonfamilyandchildren(in%ofGDP)

generalgovermentexpenditures,familyand

5.5

5.0

4.5

children(in%ofGDP)

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Denmark

Luxembourg

Finland

Slovakia

Norway

Estonia

Poland

France

Sweden

Belgium

Cyprus

Netherlands

Austria

Bulgaria

Croatia

Germany

Lithuania

Portugal

Slovenia

Romania

Hungary

Latvia

Czechia

Italy

Spain

Greece

Ireland

Malta

Switzerland

200120132023

Source:Eurostat.

OnOECDaverage,taxbreaks,cashbenefitsand

servicesgrantedforfamiliesandchildrencorrespondedto1.8%ofGDP⁴,withmarkeddifferencesinthetotal

shareandcompositionoffamilybenefits.Totalpublic

spendingforfamilysupportinOECDcountriesrangedfrom0.5%ofGDPinTürkiyeto3.8%inIceland,withcashbenefitsbeingthemajorinstrumentinmostcountries,

accountingformorethan70%ofthebenefitsinCanada

andGreece.However,thelevelsofgovernmentspending

forfamiliesandchildrenarenotreflectedinfertilityrates.Infact,despiterelativelylowlevelsofsupportforfamiliesandchildren,IrelandandtheUScontinuetohavesomeofthe

highestbirthratesamongOECDcountries(seeFigure5).

⁴Datarefersto2021.

10September2025

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Figure5:Publicspendingforfamilysupport(in%ofGDP)andfertilityrates

Iceland

Poland

Germany

France

Sweden

Belgium

Luxembourg

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

Austria

Hungary

Latvia

Norway

Lithuania

NewZealand

Slovakia

Japan

Israel

Colombia

Czechia

Switzerland

UK

Australia

Netherlands

Slovenia

Spain

Italy

Portugal

Korea

Greece

Canada

Chile

Ireland

USA

CostaRica

Mexico

Türkiye

4.03.53.02.52.01.51.00.50.0

Cash(in%GDP)

Services(in%GDP)

Taxbreaksforfamilies(in%GDP)

Fertilityrate2023

Sources:OECD,UNPopulationDivision(2024).

Thispicturedoesnotchangewhenalsotakingparentalleaveandrelatedbenefitsintoaccount:Measuringthefamilypolicygenerositybysimplyrankingcountries

bythelengthofandbenefitlevelsgrantedinparentalleaveandthecorrespondingshareofpublicspending

ofGDP,andweighingtheresultsinthethreesub-

categoriesequally,putsEstoniaatthetopoftheranking,whilepublicpolicyintheUSistheleastgenerous(see

Figure6).

Figure6:Familypolicygenerosityandfertilityrates

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

40

Estonia

Hungary

Slovakia

Finland

Germany

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Austria

Norway

Czechia

Sweden

Luxembourg

Greece

Japan

Iceland

Slovenia

France

Denmark

Korea

Belgium

Italy

Canada

Portugal

Netherlands

Colombia

NewZealand

Chile

UK

Israel

Spain

Australia

Ireland

Switzerland

CostaRica

Türkiye

Mexico

USA

FPG(lhs)fertilityrate(rhs)

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Sources:OECD,UNPopulationDivision(2024),AllianzResearch.

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10

Onthecontrary,accordingtothelatestavailablefigures,thedeclineinfertilityratesinmajorEU27member

countries–includingtheformerNordicmodelcountriesDenmark,FinlandandSweden–continuedin2024.

InGermany,wherethefertilityratedeclinedto1.35

childrenperwoman,theslowdownofthedeclinein

thenumberofbirthswasalreadyconsideredapositivedevelopment.IntheUS,aslightincreaseinthenumberofbirthscouldnotpreventthefertilityratefromfallingbelow1.6childrenperwoman.InJapan,thefertilityratedeclinedfurtherto1.15,withthenumberofbirthsfallingbelow700,000forthefirsttime.However,therewere

alsosomemajorAsianeconomieswherefertilityratesdevelopedcontrarytothegeneraltrend:Chinareported

Figure7:Fertilityrates,selectedcountries

anincreaseofthenumberofbirthsforthefirsttimeaftersevenyearsfollowingtheintroductionofawholerangeofbirth-friendlypolicies.SouthKoreaalsoregisteredanincreaseinthenumberofbirthsandthefirstincreaseofthefertilityratesince2015,from0.72to0.75.ThelatestdataforTaiwanshowaslightincreaseofthebirthratefrom0.87to0.89,andpreliminaryfiguresforHongKongalsoindicateaslightincreaseofthenumberofbirths.

However,itistooearlytojudgewhetherthisisonlya

temporaryupwardbliporareversalofthetrend.In

Singapore,thefertilityratedidnotdeclinefurtherbut

remainedstableatanaverage0.97childrenperwoman(seeFigure7).

3.0

totalfertilityrate

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

1979198419891994199920042009201420192024

Austria

Canada

China

Denmark

England&Wales

Finland

France

Germany

Italy

Japan

Portugal

Singapore

SouthKorea

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Taiwan

USA

Sources:HumanFertilityDatabase;BundesamtfürStatistikDeutschland;BFSSwitzerland;DepartmentofStatisticsSingapore;DepartmentofHouseholdRegistrationM.O.ITaiwan;INSEE;ISTAT;Martin,JoyceA.,BradyE.Hamilton,andMichelleJ.K.Osterman(2025);OfficeforNationalStatisticsUK;StatistikAustria;StatisticsFinland;StatisticsKorea;StatisticsSweden;UNPopulationDivision(2024).

10September2025

11

Lowfertilityratesareheretostay

Theselatestdevelopmentsreflectthefactthatthere

isnot“the”onesinglefactorthatexplainsthefertilitybehaviorinasociety.Thedecisionwhethertohave

children,andhowmanyandwhen,isratherinfluencedbyacombinationoffactors,suchastheeducational

levelofwomen,theaffordabilityofhousing,theoverallleveloflivingexpenses,expectedexpendituresfora

child’seducation,costsandavailabilityofchildcare

facilities,thelabormarketsituationorthechanceof

balancingworklifeandfamily.Therelativeimportanceofasinglefactormayshiftovertimeandinlinewith

thedevelopmentstageofaneconomyorchanging

attitudesandsocietalnorms.Whichexplainswhyinthepastpro-natalpolicieshaveledonlytoalimitedand

oftentemporaryincreaseinfertilityrates.AccordingtotheGBD2021FertilityandForecastingCollaborators,empiricalevidencesuggeststhatthesepoliciesledtoanincreaseofthetotalfertilityrateofnomorethan0.2birthsperwoman.⁵

Moreeducatedwomenhavefewerchildren

Probablythemostimportantfactorsaretheeducationalattainmentlevelandthebargainingpowerofwomen.Thehigherthelevelofeducationandtheshareofa

woman’scontributiontohouseholdincome,i.e.the

bettercareeropportunitiesforwomenareandthe

highertheirownincome,thelowerthefertilityratein

general.Inlow-incomecountries,evenjustfinishing

primaryschoolmakesadifference,reducingthefertilityrate(seeFigure8).

⁵SeeGBD2021FertilityandForecastingCollaborators(2024),p.2088.

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Figure8:Educationalattainmentlevel*andtotalfertilityrates

7

6

totalfertilityrate

5

4

3

2

1

0

atleastcompletedprimarylevel,female25+(in%)

020406080100

*atleastcompletedprimary,femalepopulation25+years(%),(cumulative)Sources:WorldBank,UNPopulationDivision(2024).

Inmiddle-andespeciallyhigh-incomecountries,the

increasingshareofwomenwithatertiaryeducationalattainmentlevelhascontributedtothefurtherdeclineoffertilityratesastheageofentryintothelabormarketandstartingone’sownhouseholdisdelayedbyalongertimespentineducation.Intoday’sEU-27member

countries,forexample,theaverageshareofyoungwomenagedbetween25and34whoholdatertiary

degreehasalmostdoubledfrom25.3%in2002to49.8%in2024,withthesharesrangingbetween26.3%inRomaniaand69.6%inIreland.Thismarkedincreasewasobservedinallcountries,withtheexceptionofFinland,wherethis

sharewashighestin2000(seeFigure9).Inthegenerationofthe45-to54-year-olds,only36.6%ofthewomenintheEU-27heldatertiarydegree,andofthoseagedbetween55and64merely25.4%in2024.

Figure9:Femalepopulationwithtertiaryeducationalattainmentlevel,agegroup25-34(in%)

females,25-34,tertiaryeducationlevel(in%)

75

60

45

30

15

0

Ireland

Luxembourg

Lithuania

Sweden

Netherlands

Denmark

Spain

Belgium

Latvia

Malta

France

Slovenia

Poland

Estonia

Greece

Portugal

Austria

Bulgaria

Finland

Slovakia

Germany

Czechia

Italy

Romania

200020102024

Source:Eurostat.

10September2025

13

Theoverallshareoffemaleswithtertiaryeducation

agedbetween25and64intheEU-27hasmorethan

doubledfrom18.3%in2002to39.0%in2024,withthe

sharesrangingfrom21.4%inRomaniato60.8%inIreland.However,theaverageshareisstillmarkedlybelowthe

levelintheUS,whereaccordingtothelatestavailableWorldBankfigures51%ofallwomenaged25and

olderhadatleastcompletedshort-term-cycletertiary

education⁶.InSouthKorea,⁷oneofthecountrieswith

thelowestfertilityratesworld-wide,theshareofwomenaged15andolderwhograduatedeitherfromcollegeoruniversityhasincreasedfrom14.6%to39.5%since2000.

Asaconsequenceoflongerperiodsofeducation,in

OECDcountries,theaverageageofmothersatfirstbirthincreasedfrom26.4yearsin2000to29.5yearsin2022.

Withanaverageageof32.9,SouthKoreahadtheoldestfirst-timemothersofallOECDcountries,followedbyItaly,wheremothersareonaverageaged31.8atfirstbirth.

Bulgariahadtheyoungestfirst-timemotherswithintheEU27,withanaverageageof26.9years.IntheUS,thisagewas27.5⁸,withtheageincreasealsoreflectingthesuccessinreducingthenumberofteenagepregnancies(seeFigure10).

Thedelayinchildbearingisreflectedintheincreasein

fertilityratesintheagegroups30andolder.However,

theolderwomenareatthetimeofbecomingafirst-timemother,thelowerthechancetheygivebirthtoasecondorthirdchild,sincethelikelihoodofafurther(natural)

pregnancydecreaseswithage,whiletheassociated

healthrisksforthemotherandtheunbornchildincrease.Hence,manywomenandcoupleswhopostponedtheirwishforeitherfoundingafamilyorhavingafurther

childduetotheCovid-19pandemicin2021aremore

likelytonotbeabletohavethenumberofchildrentheyintended.

Thefertilityrateofwomenwithalowereducational

attainmentlevelisingeneralhighersincetheyoften

havetheirfirstchildearlier.InGermany,forexample,theshareofwomenwiththreeandmorethanfourchildrenismorethantwiceashighamongwomenwithalow

educationalattainmentlevelcomparedtothosewithahighormediumeducationalattainmentlevel(seeFigure11)acrossallagecohorts.

Figure10:Averageageofmothersatfirstbirth(inyears)

meanageatfirstbirth(inyears)

33

32

31

30

29

28

27

26

25

Korea

Italy

Ireland

Liechtenstein

Spain

Luxembourg

Switzerland

Taiwan

Greece

Japan

Netherlands

Canada

Portugal

Denmark

Norway

Sweden

Finland

Austria

Cyprus

Germany

Malta

Belgium

Croatia

France

Slovenia

Czechia

Hungary

Estonia

Lithuania

Poland

Serbia

Latvia

USA

Slovakia

Romania

Bulgaria

Source:OECD,Brown,AndreaD.(2025),table1.

6WorldBankDevelopment(2025)WorldDevelopmentindicators.InallcountriesbesidesGermanyandSouthKorea,theshareofwomenwithterti-aryeducationwashigherthanthatofmenintheagegroup25to64.

⁷SeeStatisticsKorea(2025).

⁸SeeBrown,AndreaD.etal(2025),table1.

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14

Figure11:Fertilityrates,byeducationalattainmentlevelandagegroup,Germany

2.5

totalfertilityrate

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

1998-20071988-19971978-19871968-19771958-19671947-1957

highmediumlow

Source:BundesamtfürStatistik,Germany.

Atthesametime,theshareofwomenwhoremainchildlesshasbeenmarkedlyhigheramongthose

withatertiarydegreethaningroupswithalower

educationaldegree.InGermany,thissharewasin

generalaround10ppshigherthanamongwomenwithaloweducationalattainmentleveland5ppshigherthanthatamongwomenwithamediumone.Ofthehighly

educatedwomenbornbetween1978and1987,29%were

childlesscomparedto16%ofthosewithaloweducationallevel(seeFigure12).However,thetotalshareofwomenwhoremainchildlesshasincreased:Ofthewomenbornin1941merely11%remainedchildlesscomparedto21%ofthose

bornin1977.

Figure12:Shareofwomenremainingchildless,byagecohort,Germany

100

childlessness(in%ofagecohort)

80

60

40

20

0

1998-20071988-19971978-19871968-19771958-19671947-1957lowmediumhigh

Source:BundesamtfürStatistik,Germany.

10September2025

15

Theincreaseintheshareofwomenwhoremain

childlessisaglobalphenomenonandexplainsapartofthedeclineinfertilityrates:Thehighestshareofwomenwhoremainedchildlessintheagecohortbornin1955wasreportedintheNetherlandsat17.1%;amongthosebornin1965itwas22.1%inJapan⁹andinthecohort

bornin1975thissharehasincreasedto28.3%,again

registeredinJapan,whichalsosawthehighestincreaseofallincludedOECDcountries(seeFigure13).

However,thischildlessnessisnotineverycaseintended.Onthecontrarytheshareofwomenwhoremained

childlessunintendedlyismuchhigherthantheshareofwomenwhointendedtoremainchildless,withthehighestgapbetweenwished-forandrealizednumberofchildrenfoundamonghighly-educatedwomen.10

Theopportunitycostsofhavingchildrenarestillbornbywomen

Thefactthatfertilityratesandtheshareofchildless

womencorrespondtotheeducationalattainmentlevelofwomenreflectsthatopportunitycostsplayamajorroleinthedecisionsofifandwhentohavechildrenasthelaborforceparticipationrateofwomen,andwith

ittheireconomicindependenceandtheirbargaining

power,increasewiththeireducationalattainment

level.OnEUaverage,forexample,ofthewomenagedbetween15and64withalowersecondaryeducationalattainmentlevel,merely43.0%wereactiveonthelabormarket,comparedto71.4%ofthosewithanupper

secondaryorpost-secondarydegreeand87.9%ofthewomenwithtertiarydegree(Figure14).AndtheEUisnotanexception.Thesamestructurecanalsobefoundinotherindustrializedcountries,likeinSouthKorea,

wherethecorrespondinglaborforceparticipationratesintheagegroup15andolderwere32.7%,50.9%and

71.2%.11

Figure13:Proportionofdefinitivechildlesswomenpercohort(in%)

30

childlesswomenpercohort(in%)

25

20

15

10

5

0

Germany

Netherlands

USA

Engl.&Wales

Canada

Denmark

Austria

Ireland

Sweden

Poland

Finland

Estonia

Japan

Spain

Hungary

Czechia

Bulgaria

Lithuania

Norway

Portugal

SouthKorea

1955196519701975

Sources:OECD,BundesamtfürStatistik.

9However,despitehavingthehighestshareofwomenwhoremainedchildless,thetotalfertilityrateinJapanisstillhigherthaninSouthKorea,due

EQ\*jc3\*hps16\o\al(\s\up4(t),1)

EQ\*jc3\*hps16\o\al(\s\up4(o),0)

Ih

EQ\*jc3\*hps16\o\al(\s\up4(